

P A P E R S

RELATING TO THE

OCCUPATION OF KANDAHAR.



Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.



L O N D O N :

PRINTED BY GEORGE EDWARD EYRE AND WILLIAM SPOTTISWOODE,
PRINTERS TO THE QUEEN'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY.
FOR HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE.

1881.

the amount which India must send home to meet her current wants is still very large. Obviously under such conditions one essential element of State finance—stability—must be wanting. We can never feel any certainty of the sum to which the item “Loss by Exchange” may not amount.

10. No less than $8\frac{1}{4}$ millions of our net revenue is derived from opium. It is true that whilst the revenue from opium has of late years been steadily increasing, it has been decided to rely on opium only to the extent of $6\frac{1}{2}$ millions net in framing the estimates. But I cannot, on this account, consider that the force of the arguments based upon the precarious nature of this revenue are

	£
Opium receipts, 1879–80	- 10,319,000
„ expenditure, 1879–80	- 2,067,000
Net revenue	- 8,252,000

diminished. Six and a half millions is a very large sum of money, and there will always be a tendency to discount the anticipated receipts above that amount. It may reasonably be argued that the degree of embarrassment which would be caused by the whole or partial loss of the opium revenue increases in the direct proportion of the sums which the Indian Treasury derives from this source. The anomalies and inconsistencies attendant upon the present system are year by year being brought into more prominent notice. Only a short time ago, the Government of India, alarmed at the increasing export of opium from Persia to China, placed a duty upon all Persian opium transhipped at Bombay, and subsequently moved the Government of ~~the~~ free port of Singapore to adopt a similar measure. The Colonial Office in London declined to accede to this request. I mention the circumstance merely as an instance of the expedients to which India is driven by reason of her reliance upon the opium revenue.

11. Nearly seven millions of the total net revenue is derived from salt. I believe salt to be a legitimate source of revenue, and I think that it may properly constitute the financial reserve upon which the Government of India should fall back in times of emergency. But in order that our salt policy should be sound, and that the salt revenue should constitute a real reserve, it is essential that

	£
Salt receipts, 1879–80	- 7,266,000
„ expenditure, 1879–80	- 341,000
Net revenue	- 6,925,003

the duty should not be too high. There is good reason for supposing that over a large part of Southern India the recent increase of duty has diminished consumption, or has at all events stimulated illicit manufacture. Much has of late years been done towards the equalisation of the salt duties, but I cannot think that our fiscal policy in respect to salt can be considered thoroughly sound until we have arrived at a uniform rate of Rs. 2 per maund. I need hardly point out that to arrive at this rate would involve a considerable sacrifice of revenue, and, although we may no doubt look to a certain steady growth of revenue, I cannot think that there is much hope of giving practical effect to the policy for a long time to come unless we reduce our expenditure.

12. The time cannot be far distant when almost the whole of our sea customs duty will have to be abandoned. I will not now attempt to discuss the advisability or otherwise of the partial repeal of the cotton duties. My own opinion is that the measure, however desirable in itself, was financially and politically premature; financially, because I think that India can with difficulty afford the loss of revenue; politically, because I think it would have been wiser to have postponed a change of this nature until the time, which cannot now be far distant, when the natives of India will be to a greater extent associated with us in the government of the country. However that may be, the partial repeal of the cotton duties must inevitably, sooner or later, lead to their total repeal, and eventually, in all probability, to the repeal of the duty on other imported goods. Here again the necessity of a reduction rather than an increase of expenditure is forced upon us.

13. I need not repeat the statements which have been so frequently made, to show that we cannot rely upon new sources of revenue to make good any increased expenditure. Indeed, in the face of the strong opposition which the income or license tax excites in India, it is doubtful whether we shall be able to hold to any system of direct taxation.

14. It has been determined, and I think wisely determined, to provide 1,500,000*l.* a year as an insurance against famine.

15. Lastly, the pressure of the population upon the soil, which year by year increases in intensity, presents an economic difficulty of the first magnitude, with which, indeed, I doubt the capability of Government to cope by any direct means, but which renders it imperative upon us to reduce in every possible way the pressure of taxation.

16. On these grounds I consider not only that it would be in the highest degree unwise to take any steps which would have for their result a large increase of expendi-

ture of a wholly unproductive nature, but I entertain a strong opinion that the reduction of present military expenditure is of all others the financial question which most deserves the earnest attention of the Government of India.

17. I am aware that it is sometimes argued that the expenditure consequent on the occupation of Southern Afghanistan is only in the nature of an insurance which will guard us against political and financial evils at some future date. Leaving out of account the political arguments, which in my opinion invalidate this plea, I consider that, on purely financial grounds, the argument involves a fallacy. When on analogous grounds Lord Palmerston wished to spend a large sum of money on fortifications, Sir George Lewis objected that in such matters prevention was not better than cure. A precisely similar argument applies in my opinion to the occupation of Southern Afghanistan as an insurance against Russian invasion. The dangers from the side of Russia, even if they be not altogether imaginary, are uncertain and remote. The political and financial evils of occupation are certain and proximate. By the occupation of Southern Afghanistan a stimulus will be given to that spirit of territorial aggrandisement which it is, in my opinion, the duty of English statesmen to check; whilst the immediate result must be to adjourn indefinitely the fiscal reforms of which India stands so much in need, if indeed it be not to necessitate the imposition of burdensome and unpopular taxes. I submit that the interests of the natives of India, to which alone we should look, do not justify us in expending the money derived from the taxes which they pay upon the occupation of Southern Afghanistan.

18. I should add that the surplus revenue of Southern Afghanistan is insignificant compared to the estimated cost of occupation. Colonel St. John estimated the revenue of the provinces of Kandahar, Pusht-i-Rud and Zamindawar, Farah and Kelat-i-Ghilzai for 1880-81 at Rs. 20,50,000, and the expenditure at Rs. 14,50,000, leaving a surplus of only Rs. 6,00,000. The revenue of Pishin Colonel St. John estimated at about Rs. 62,500. Sir Robert Sandeman's estimate is Rs. 45,000. The resources of these provinces would, without doubt, be to some extent developed under British rule, but it is clear that the revenue could not within any appreciable time increase in such proportions as would make good any considerable portion of the cost of occupation. Moreover, all experience has shown that increased expenditure under our costly system of administration generally swallows up any progressive increments of revenue.

19. Allusion has occasionally been made to the commercial advantages of occupying Kandahar. I give in the margin figures showing the trade between Kandahar and British India during the last three years. The imports consist principally of wool; the exports of European piece-goods. No doubt the result of British administration and the construction of a railway would be to develop the trade; to what extent is a matter of conjecture. I cannot, however, think that the indirect financial advantages to be derived on this account could ever seriously counterbalance the direct disadvantages of the expenditure which would be the result of occupation.

20. On these grounds I am of opinion that, independently of other reasons, the necessity of retiring from Southern Afghanistan is, on financial grounds, forced upon us.

E. BARING.

February 19th, 1881.

FURTHER PAPERS

RELATING TO THE

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FURTHER PAPERS.

No. 35 of 1881.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Fort William, February 21, 1881.

WITH reference to paragraph 7 of our Despatch, dated 2nd February 1881,* we have the honour to forward the minutes† of our honourable colleagues, which have been already recorded. Any other minutes which may be under preparation will be forwarded subsequently.

* No. 21.

† By Mr. Whitley Stokes, C.S.I., dated 31st January 1881.

By Mr. J. Gibbs, C.S.I., dated 31st January 1881.

By Lieut.-General Sir D. M. Stewart, G.C.B., dated 31st January 1881.

We have the honour to be,

My Lord Marquis,

Your Lordship's most obedient humble servants,

(Signed) RIPON.

F. P. HAINES.

W. STOKES.

RIVERS THOMPSON.

JAMES GIBBS.

D. M. STEWART.

E. BARING.



Enclosure 1.

MINUTE.

THE present Secretary of State for India has directed us to withdraw our troops from Kandahar on the earliest suitable occasion. Though this order affects, in a high degree, the military, political, and commercial interests of an empire for which the Government of India is primarily responsible, his Lordship has issued it without giving us a chance of remonstrating against a measure to which he must know that all the members of Lord Lytton's Government, and most of the members of Lord Ripon's, are strenuously opposed. To argue at length against a foregone conclusion would be mere waste of words, and I shall therefore confine myself to setting down briefly the reasons which render me unable to assent to the policy which our Despatch of the 2nd of February 1881 accepts without demur.

Those reasons are, first, that in the opinion of strategists, such as Lord Napier of Magdala, Sir F. Roberts, and Colonel Hamley, the retention of Kandahar, with a small space beyond* is desirable for the defence of India against an invading army. I myself know nothing of strategy, but anyone can see the advantage of holding a strong city situate on the only road from Central Asia to India along which wheeled carriages and heavy guns can be moved, the only road on which a railway can be made connecting India with the Caspian or Asia Minor.† Recent events have made it as certain as anything of the kind can be that the Russians will soon be established within a few days' march of the northern frontier of Afghanistan, in a position communicating with the Caspian by a light line of railway; and when this is effected the invasion referred to may almost be said to have already begun.

Secondly, because Abd-ur-Rahman, to whom the Secretary of State proposes to make over Kandahar, seems by recent accounts to be a *roi fainéant*, and is, at all events, not

* Including a portion of the Helmund river with the command of the passage at Girishk.

† See in *The Times* for September 10, 1880, a letter signed "Kandahari," the statements of fact in which are, according to two high authorities whom I have consulted, quite trustworthy.

strong enough to hold it. He cannot even control his own part of the country, though he has had six months to seat himself in the saddle, has been strengthened by our friendly presence at Kandahar, and has been largely helped with money and arms. Our withdrawal will therefore in all probability lead to anarchy and a long civil war in Afghanistan. For these calamities we shall be, and ought to be, held morally responsible. Moreover, as the Secretary of State himself remarks, protracted war in that country will probably cause uneasiness and disquiet in our own dominions and in the States of our Native feudatories and allies.

Thirdly, the result of this civil war will apparently be that Ayub, our bitter enemy, who defeated us at Maiwand, and who has already gathered a considerable force at Herat, will succeed in establishing himself at Kandahar, and ultimately at Kabul, and that we shall then have to enter on another costly war in which, if our relations with St. Petersburg happen to be at all strained, Ayub will be directly or indirectly helped by Russia. Now that General Skobelev has vanquished the Turkomans and taken Geuk Tépé, Russia will soon be at Merv, and then, unless we show an unflinching front, she will occupy Herat, which, as we know to our cost, is within striking distance of Kandahar.

Fourthly, the surrender of the sole prize which we have gained in the late Afghan war will be regarded, not only by the Afghans, but by the people of India, as a confession of weakness, fear, and instability of purpose; and, however glad they may be, individually, to leave Kandahar, the wilful relinquishment of their solitary trophy will disgust and dishearten the men of our native armies. To say, as has been said, that this result will be counterbalanced by the "moral effect" on our native allies "of a scrupulous adherence to declarations" which were made under circumstances totally different from those that now exist, is to use a phrase which will seldom be understood by Orientals, and which, when understood, will, I fear, be received with a smile of derision. The coincidence of the surrender with Skobelev's victory and with the unhappy state of affairs in Ireland and at the Cape, will not, to the native mind, appear a mere accident.

Fifthly, because the withdrawal from Kandahar, opposed, as it is, to the policy of Lord Beaconsfield's Cabinet, will create a belief in this country that our action in matters vitally affecting India is subject to the vicissitudes of English party politics. Nothing can be so destructive of the local influence of the Government of India, except, I would add, the hasty determination of such questions as the present one, without reference to the opinions of the members of that Government.

Sixthly, because, according to many competent persons, our commerce would gain largely by a permanent occupation of Kandahar. This, of course, would involve the completion of the railway from Sibi, and Kandahar would then be only two days' journey from Karáchi. As Kandahar commands the chief trade-routes from India to Persia and Central Asia, it is needless to point out the opening which would thus be made for what some authorities call a great and civilising trade,—for what would, at all events, be a mutually advantageous exchange of British manufactures and Indian teas for Asiatic carpets, wool, silk, dye, and other produce.

These, stated very briefly, are my reasons for wishing to retain Kandahar, as an assigned district, administered mainly by Afghans, if it is thought impolitic to annex it to the Empire.

I shall now mention the reasons given for surrendering Kandahar. They appear to admit of easy answers. It is, in the first place, said that the financial burthen of retaining Kandahar would be more than we could conveniently bear. I believe that this is a mistake. I know that the late Financial Minister thought so; and Lord Napier of Magdala is probably right in holding that if we retreat, the savings thus effected will soon be spent in costly punitive expeditions like those which, down to the commencement of the war with the Amír Sher Ali, we had to send so constantly against the Afghan borderers. Then, with a strong garrison at Kandahar, we might safely diminish our force on the Pesháwar frontier. Besides, as irrigation and agriculture would at once extend under our rule, we should soon derive a fair revenue from Kandahar and its fertile environs, and the financial benefit of increasing our trade with Persia and Central Asia would, no doubt, be ultimately considerable.

It is, again, alleged that our sepoy are unwilling to serve so far from India, and that the occupation of Kandahar will therefore cause what is called "a constant strain on the organisation of the native army." But according to competent judges, this is a mere question of abolishing stoppages and granting a little extra pay. Pay the sepoy, says Lord Napier of Magdala, with sufficient liberality to compensate them for exile in Afghanistan, and there will be no difficulty in getting recruits for a Kandahar force.

Then it is said that we must give up Kandahar, because at the outset of the war which ended with the treaty of Gandamak, we declared that we had no quarrel with the Afghan people, and that their treatment would depend on their own conduct. But, as every one knows, after this declaration was made, Cavagnari was murdered, and a third war broke out, in which the Afghan people, both of the South and of the North, sided with his murderers. In this war we have been victors, and may righteously retain any portion of our vanquished enemy's territory. There is contradictory evidence as to whether, at present, our rule would be popular, or the reverse, with the people of Kandahar. To my mind, this matters little. Our rule would rapidly enrich the citizens, who are mostly traders, and the villagers of the neighbouring valleys, and would therefore soon become popular enough. In any case it seems that if the Kandaharis dislike us, they dislike still more the Kabulis to whom the Secretary of State proposes to deliver them.

It has, lastly, been urged that the military occupation of Kandahar would be more advantageously taken when the advance of Russia makes it clear that not only the safety of India, but the independence of Afghanistan, is threatened. But supposing that we are not then at war with the Afghans, on what pretext are we to occupy Kandahar? Are we to set aside the ordinary rules of international law and seize a neutral's territory for our own defence? Even supposing that the Afghans, also dreading a Russian attack, voluntarily allowed us to occupy Kandahar, we should have no time to make the city and the citadel secure. That, I understand, would be a long business, especially as it ought, I am assured, to be combined with the erection of forts along our line of communication. But this latter supposition is untenable, for when Russia advances against India, she will take care to have the Afghans on her side, bribing them with the promise of the plunder of a country which they have so often looted.

On the whole, the general effect of the arguments in favour of the surrender of Kandahar is (if I may venture to say so) to confirm the conclusion that we should retain it. But if this be not done, it seems to me that the only reasonable course open to us is to restore Yakub Khán to the Amírship, and make Kandahar over to him. I am one of the few persons who have read the mass of so-called evidence against that Amír. I say now, as I have always said, that it does not establish his complicity in the murder of our Envoy, and I therefore think that we should not treat his abdication as irrevocable.

For the reasons stated by Sir Donald Stewart, in his minute of this date, I am also opposed to the surrender of Peshin and the Amran Range, which, in his Despatch of the 3rd December 1880, the Secretary of State has recommended. In fact, with the Sibi Railway prolonged to Gulistan Karez, and a line on this side of the Range from Gulistan Karez to Kila Abdulla, connecting the Gwája and the Khójak passes, we should have a defensive position almost as strong as Kandahar itself.

WHITLEY STOKES.

Calcutta, 31st January 1881.

Enclosure No. 2.

MINUTE by the HON. J. GIBBS.

HER Majesty's Government have decided on the withdrawal of our forces from Kandahar, and the relinquishment of that city and district, leaving it, if possible, in the hands of some settled government.

Abdul Rahman has been offered it, but it seems doubtful if he will be able to take advantage of our offer, or, if he does, to be able to take charge by the middle of April, by which time our troops are to be withdrawn, so as to avoid the great heats on their return march.

Although leaving under such circumstances recalls to one's mind the old saying "après moi le deluge," I can quite understand why the order has been passed, and we have only to obey it. Nevertheless, I must confess it does not shake my faith in the opinion I have long formed that sooner or later we shall hold Kandahar and Herat also, and for similar reasons to those put on record some 30 years ago by the then Lieutenant-Governor of the North-Western Provinces—"It may be wrong, it may seem highly immoral to advance our frontier, but the 'red line' must and will extend, do what we may;" and this I believe will prove to be as true in regard to Southern Afghanistan as it was formerly to the Punjab.

I see many objections to our holding Kandahar now, and many good reasons why we may retire from it with comparative ease, and I do not therefore oppose such a course.

I only trust that we may not, by our retiring in April, throw the country into a more active state of anarchy than generally exists in those parts.

But with regard to Pishin and the territories which lie to the south of the Kojak range, I must say I cannot allow the proposed reply to the Despatch, No. 49, from the Secretary of State, to go without placing on record my dissent from the view taken by Her Majesty's Government at home.

The country within the Kojak range is geographically separated from Kandahar proper by the Kojak Amrum range, and a desert of 80 miles wide, its inhabitants are not numerous, and there are reasons for supposing that amongst them we are more likely to introduce a settled government than any power which may rule at Kandahar. While as regards the country marked on the maps as part of Afghanistan, and which lies to the north-east of Biluchistan proper, although a portion of the Kandahar State, that Government has had less direct hold over it than it had over the other portions of its territory. While as regards Sibi and the territory round it, which was shown in our maps from 1850 to 1870 as an oasis about 20 by 18 miles, coloured green and marked "Kandahar territory," as far as my memory serves me, since 1854, the hold over it was even less direct than over Pishin.*

I think, therefore, that from a geographical point of view, Pishin, and certainly Sibi, do not stand on the same position as Kandahar.

Then our position as regards these parts is from another aspect peculiar. Not long ago it was included in the territory ceded to us under the Treaty of Gandamak, and we informed the people we were going to occupy it, and we have done so, and taken the measures regarding its settlement, which are set out in the fifth paragraph of the reply to Her Majesty's Secretary of State. I feel assured that it will only lead to strife and confusion if we now withdraw from our present position; we should certainly, by so doing, damage our prestige in Biluchistan, not improbably place our ally the Khan of Kelat in a difficult, if not dangerous, position, while our action will be viewed in India in the undesirable light of the natural result of one government succeeding another, and by the inhabitants of the district as the result of minds as unstable as their own, if not as a breach of faith.

I do not want to annex it, but strongly protest against giving it up now. We are holding it "for an indefinite period,"—let us continue to do so. The time may come when we may, with credit to ourselves, add it to a combined and friendly Afghanistan, but the present is certainly not the time for deserting it. We should only add thereby to the confusion which must arise when we leave Kandahar, nor even if Abdul Rahman does take possession, we cannot expect him to do so with the good-will of the people, while to expect Ayub Khan to keep quiet and abstain from trying to regain what he thinks is his own, cannot, for a moment, be expected.

So far from thinking, as the Secretary of State's Despatch lays down, that by holding Pishin as we do now we should keep the Government of India involved in the complications of Afghan politics, and have a temptation or pretext for interfering with its domestic affairs, the contrary in my opinion would be the result—it would be a position easily held, a stand-point from which we could calmly view all that is going on beyond without any need or desire to be mixed up in it, not likely to be interfered with by the Kandaharis, who would have to cross a wide desert and a heavy mountain range to come near us, staying where we are, strengthened by the possession of the good-will of the inhabitants, who will be only too glad of the security our presence affords them.

As to the troops required to hold it, it is of course a military question, but from what I learn, especially from Sir R. Sandeman, our agent at Kelat, I apprehend a very small addition to the force we shall be obliged to keep for some time at Quetta will suffice. It was not a district which used to be held by Kandahar troops; and the knowledge of our force at Quetta will suffice, with a few small detachments, to do all that is required.

This subject also involves the question of the railway. Believing, as I do, that a railroad is one of the greatest of civilisers, and knowing that already the kafilah merchants are making their inquiries regarding it, and remembering how strongly such a line for commercial purposes has been urged on Government from time to time since 1857, and looking at what we have spent and how very little extra will be needed to make it useful as far as Hurnai, while its safety will be provided for by the tribes themselves, many of whom are anxious for it, I think it would be a great mistake not to finish it, at all events up to that point.

31st January 1881.

(Signed) J. GIBBS.

* Note.—I notice that Sir Robert Sandeman puts forward a claim of Kelat to Pishin, on the ground that it was once formally granted to that State, but of this I have no detailed information.—J. G.

Enclosure 3.

MINUTE.

WHEN the question of the occupation of Kandahar was discussed in Council in September last, it will be in the recollection of those who were present at that discussion, that my objection to our retirement from that place was based on the engagements which had been formally entered into with the ruler and people of Kandahar, and from which it appeared to me that we could not honourably withdraw.

Though I am bound to say that some of my colleagues did not appear to attach much importance to these alleged obligations, the point was admitted to be one which required the fullest consideration, and it was eventually decided that the further discussion of that and of the general question should be deferred till Mr. Lyall's return from Kandahar, when the Council hoped to be in a position to come to a satisfactory settlement of them.

Owing, however, to the removal of the Government from Simla to Calcutta and the unfortunate illness of the Viceroy, the Council has not had an opportunity of continuing the discussion of these questions till quite recently.

This is the position in which we find ourselves to-day with regard to the question of the occupation of Kandahar.

I do not myself consider Kandahar to be a place of great strategical value, nor am I an advocate of annexation for any purpose, not even if it could be demonstrated without a shadow of doubt that our frontier would be improved and strengthened by such a measure.

My objection, therefore, to the action of Her Majesty's present Government in regard to Southern Afghanistan is based, not on a disapproval of the effect of that action, but on their disregard of obligations which were formally and publicly undertaken by their predecessors in office in the name of Her Majesty the Queen.

My contention is that whether the policy of the late Government was good or bad, it ought not to be disturbed without the clearest necessity, for nothing can be so destructive of our influence in this country as the creation of a belief that the policy of its Government is subject to the vicissitudes of English parties.

To guard myself from misconstruction, I would desire it to be understood that I do not for a moment pretend to argue that our policy is never to be subjected to change. But I must repeat that the complete reversal of a deliberate policy recognises a principle that must be always inconvenient and sometimes dangerous.

Whether the necessity for a change of policy is or is not in the present instance capable of demonstration it is not my intention here to discuss, because it would serve no useful purpose to enter into a barren disputation on a subject which has not only been finally disposed of by Her Majesty's Government, but which will certainly receive, if it has not already received, the sanction of Parliament, and is therefore beyond the stage of practical criticism.

But the question of the evacuation of Peshin seems to me to stand on a totally different footing. That district has been assigned to us by treaty; and although that instrument may now be considered inoperative, it has led us into obligations with regard to the population of the assigned districts, from which we cannot retreat without discredit, and as I think humiliation, and on this ground I protest against the immediate, or even early rendition of Peshin to any Afghan Government.

The time may come when the district can be restored to Afghanistan with the full consent of the people and without detriment to the interests of the empire; but till that time arrives we are bound to guard those interests by continuing to acknowledge our obligations before the world.

However opinions may differ about the value of Pishin, no one can doubt that the possession of the Amran Range is a very important acquisition to our frontier, and it will not be easy to justify to the country any sacrifice of the advantages which accrue to us from the possession of that mountain barrier.

The retention of our authority over Peshin does not necessarily involve the grave disadvantages and heavy charges, contemplated in the Secretary of State's Despatch of the 3rd December last, No. 49. Those who know the district best believe that it could be held at a very insignificant cost* by a detachment from the Quetta garrison.

* Sir R. Sandeman says it could be ordinarily held by less than a single regiment.

If Her Majesty's Government consider that the conditions of assignment are practically identical with annexation, it would be easy to stipulate that the entire revenues of the district after payment of the civil charges be surrendered to the Afghan Government.

I would ask that this minute be sent home with our reply to the Secretary of State's Despatches Nos. 45 and 49 of 11th November and 3rd December last, respectively.

(Signed) D. M. STEWART,

Calcutta, January 31, 1881.

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RELATING TO THE

AFFAIRS OF AFGHANISTAN,

INCLUDING

THE TRANSFER OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF
KANDAHAR TO AMIR ABDUL-RAHMAN KHAN.

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1881.

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No. 1.

No. 3 of 1881.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Fort William, January 12, 1881.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of papers regarding Sirdar Sher Ali Khan of Kandahar.

2. Your Lordship is aware of the circumstances under which the Sirdar was recognized in March last as independent ruler of the Kandahar province. The authority then assumed by him was lost four months later, when Sirdar Ayub Khan advanced from Herat; and Sher Ali Khan afterwards showed little inclination to resume it. Immediately after the relief of Kandahar by General Roberts, Sher Ali Khan informed Colonel St. John that, while willing to give all the aid in his power for the restoration of tranquillity, he desired to be permitted to retire to India, as he had lost confidence in the people, and as he felt little hope of restoring a good understanding between them and himself. On the 30th October he addressed a letter to the Viceroy in which he stated that, since no immediate settlement of the affairs of the country could be expected, he proposed to withdraw with his family to Kurrachee.

3. Before this letter was received the situation of affairs in Southern Afghanistan had been very carefully considered, and it seemed on the whole advisable that the Sirdar's offer should be accepted. Recent events in this part of Afghanistan had left no doubt that, except with the active and unreserved support of the British Government, Sher Ali Khan was altogether unable to maintain his position as independent ruler of Kandahar. The greater part of his regular military force had deserted him on the approach of Ayub Khan; while the people of the province showed no disposition whatever to assist him, but on the contrary turned with the greatest animosity against the British troops with whom he was acting in the field. It may be admitted that the hostility of the Duranis, who form by far the majority of the population of South Afghanistan, was inspired mainly by their fanaticism, and by the dislike with which they regarded the occupation of Kandahar by foreign troops. But all the circumstances of the outbreak tended to prove that the Sirdar's government had not been popular, and had acquired no intrinsic strength apart from the support which might be given by British arms. His government, if restored in the districts adjacent to the capital, could be maintained only by a general undertaking to defend and uphold the Sirdar's authority against foreign invasion. It is manifest, however, that we could not have entered upon obligations of this nature and extent without embarking upon a course of policy leading towards the indefinite, if not the permanent, military occupation of Kandahar by a British force—a measure to which Her Majesty's Government (as we had been informed by your Lordship's Despatch of the 21st May) entertains the strongest objection. Accordingly, the Sirdar was informed that the Government of India were fully prepared to accord him an honourable reception in British territory, and that nothing should be wanting to ensure his comfort and security so long as he might reside under British protection. On the 29th of November Colonel St. John telegraphed that Sher Ali Khan cheerfully acquiesced in this decision; that he chose Kurrachee as his place of residence; and that he would start as soon as arrangements could be made for his journey. A fortnight later he left Kandahar, and on the 27th of December arrived at Kurrachee. An allowance of Rupees 5,000 per mensem has been settled upon him, and suitable arrangements have been made for his accommodation and that of his family. The

Sirdar has expressed himself much gratified at all that has been done ; nor is there any reason to suppose that he is not in fact very well satisfied with the treatment that he has received.

We have, &c.
(Signed) RIPON.
F. P. HAINES.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON.
JAMES GIBBS.
D. M. STEWART.
E. BARING.

Enclosure 1 in No. 1.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from SIRDAR SHER ALI KHAN, Wali of Kandahar, to His Excellency the VICEROY and GOVERNOR GENERAL of INDIA, dated Kandahar, the 30th October 1880.

After compliments.—Now that the Foreign Secretary has come here, and that I have had several interviews with him, I have understood from him, after much conversation regarding the affairs of this country, that arrangements for it, after recent events, are still undetermined. Some time is required to decide them. Of course the British Government is entitled to act according to its own interests. Under any circumstances I am of one opinion with and agree with the Government in any views they may entertain regarding future arrangements. But since both in former times and recently I have for a long space of time administered the affairs of this Government, and know most of the people thoroughly, (I fear) that, perchance, in this time of uncertainty, some persons may do evil, which may cause the British Government to become cold-hearted towards me, and thus I may be ruined. Therefore, with the permission of the British Government, I, with my family, will proceed to the port of Kurrachee, for is not it also a possession of the British Government? If ever in the future arrangements for this country my services should be required, I shall be ready in the territory of the British Government. But if some other arrangement is come to, no doubt the British Government is entitled to act as it pleases, and I shall always consider myself its sincere friend. Also I heartily assure your Excellency that the British Government may always consider me its sincere friend.

Enclosure 2 in No. 1.

Dated CAMP JACOBABAD, 19th November 1880.

LETTER from His Excellency the VICEROY and GOVERNOR-GENERAL of INDIA, to SIRDAR SHER ALI KHAN, Wali of Kandahar.

I HAVE received the letter addressed to me on the 30th of October by your Highness, and I have given full consideration to its contents.

Your Highness has rightly perceived that recent events have necessarily unsettled the arrangements previously made with respect to the government of Kandahar, and that some time may elapse before the future relations of the British Government with that country shall have been finally determined. And since your Highness has conveyed to me your desire to proceed, under these circumstances, to British India, I reply that I am fully prepared to accord you an honourable reception in British territory, and to make every provision for the entertainment of yourself and family, according to your high rank and dignity, so long as you may reside under the protection of the British Government. Be assured that you will be treated as a friend, and a distinguished guest, and that nothing shall be wanting to ensure your comfort and security.

Whatever arrangements you may wish made regarding your journey and your place of residence, whether at Kurrachee, or elsewhere, should be communicated to my officers at Kandahar ; and they will receive early and ample consideration whenever they are laid before me.

Enclosure 3 in No. 1.

TELEGRAM, dated 15th December 1880.

From COLONEL ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta.

Sirdar Sher Ali Khan left Kandahar this morning. Troops lined the streets from his house to the city gate, where a guard of honour was stationed, and a salute fired. I accompanied him for two miles beyond the city. Very few people were in the street. Major Heyland, of the Quarter-Master-General's Department, accompanied him to Quetta, where Major Conolly meets him. He should arrive on nineteenth or twentieth. His family start to-morrow.

Enclosure 4 in No. 1.

TELEGRAM, dated 28th December 1880.

From MAJOR ARTHUR CONOLLY, Kurrachee, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta.

SIRDAR expresses himself most grateful for handsome allowance, rupees five thousand monthly, and satisfied to settle here or elsewhere, making a pilgrimage perhaps, or visit to Calcutta, or some point of interest in India. The house accommodation here is ample, but space round limited. I hope to obtain sufficient ground for a garden which the Sirdar is anxious to have. I consider an eligible native gentleman quite capable of taking my place, and Sher Ali names Gholam Nukshband Khan as a person he would like. The Sirdar's position as an entirely free agent distinctly intimated to the local authorities.

Enclosure 5 in No. 1.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from SIRDAR SHER ALI KHAN to the ADDRESS of the FOREIGN SECRETARY, dated 28th December 1880.

After compliments.—WHEREAS my request was, through your kindness, granted and complied with, I, in pursuance of the command of His Excellency the Viceroy, which I had the honour of receiving at Kandahar, started without delay and ahead of my family for Kurrachee, where I arrived yesterday, Monday, the 27th December 1880, and I hope my family will also arrive here in ten days.

My honoured friend, I am and shall always be thankful for the honourable treatment which I received at the hands of the representatives of the most powerful Government from the time I quitted Kandahar up to the day of my arrival at Kurrachee. I confidently hope that, if my transient life is prolonged, I shall pass my remaining days with great ease and comfort under the shadow of the glorious Government. I feel certain that this honourable reception has been accorded to me by Government solely through your kindness, and I trust you will also use your best endeavours to better my position in future.

As I think it my imperative duty to inform you of my arrival at my destination, I write this friendly letter to you, trusting that you will always gratify me by the glad news of your good health.

No. 2.

No. 10 of 1881. (Extract)

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Fort William, January 19, 1881.

WE have the honour to transmit, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of correspondence that has taken place with His Highness the Amir Abdul Rahman Khan of Kabul.

2. It will be seen that on the 13th of October last the Amir wrote to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, stating that he had been invited to send governors to the district of Khost and to Kelat-i-Ghilzai, and inquiring whether he could do so with the assent of the British Government. Mr. Lyall was absent at Kandahar when the letter reached India, and only received it at Lahore on his return in November. From Lahore a reply was sent assenting to the Amir sending a governor to Khost, but the question of Kelat-i-Ghilzai was deferred. The opportunity was taken to inform the Amir that the British Government were disposed to reconsider the arrange-

ments that had been made in Southern Afghanistan, and to suggest that the Amir should send a confidential agent to whom these arrangements might be communicated, especially in regard to questions affecting Kandahar. The messenger who took this letter reached Kabul after some delay. He left Kabul with the reply, but it seems that he was way-laid on his return journey, nor is the cause of his disappearance yet known, though enquiry on the matter is still being made. The consequence of this miscarriage has been that some time was lost in obtaining from the Amir a duplicate of his letter which was not received by the Viceroy at Allahabad until early in the present month.

3. The object of this correspondence with the Amir is indicated by Mr. Lyall's letter to him of the 18th November; it is to ascertain whether any, and if so what, arrangements can be negotiated with the Amir for placing Kandahar under his government, whenever the British troops are prepared to withdraw from that city. Your Lordship's despatch of the 21st of May last left no doubt of the intentions of Her Majesty's Government in regard to this withdrawal; while its general tenor leaned substantially towards the policy of restoring Kandahar to Kabul, and against any measures directed towards perpetuating the disintegration of Afghanistan. Under these instructions it became necessary to consider without delay some definite course of action for the establishment of a native government in South Afghanistan; and the problem appeared to offer no other practical solution than some arrangement, as suggested by Her Majesty's Government, for replacing the country under the dominion of Kabul. Upon these considerations it was thought expedient, in order to obtain an opening for preliminary discussions, to invite the Amir to depute a confidential agent to whom the views and intentions of the Government of India might be communicated.

4. Since the correspondence with the Amir was thus initiated, we have received your Lordship's despatch* of the 11th of November, which states much more distinctly the policy of Her Majesty's Government. The concluding three paragraphs contain positive injunctions that Kandahar must be evacuated as early as possible, and express a plain opinion that Kandahar and, if possible, all Afghanistan should pass under the dominion of the Amir Abdul Rahman. When, therefore, the Amir's letter of the 28th of December reached Allahabad, it seemed necessary, as much delay had accidentally intervened, to lose no more time in advancing upon the line of policy prescribed by these despatches. The Amir asked for a personal interview; but the difficulties in arranging immediately so important a business as a formal meeting in India with the Amir of Kabul were obvious, while there is great doubt whether it is judicious to agree to such a meeting, before the basis of a discussion shall have been fixed, and especially before the Amir shall have understood within what general limits the British Government is actually prepared to assist him.

5. The reply, therefore, which has been sent to the Amir postpones the question of an interview, but agrees to his sending a governor to Kelat-i-Ghilzai, a place which, it is to be remembered, formed part of Kabul territory under the Amir Dost Muhammad at a time when Kandahar was still under a separate government, and to which the Amir of Kabul can therefore fairly lay claim. Moreover, its occupation by the Amir Abdul Rahman will place him on the road toward Kandahar, and will test his power and inclination to advance further, if the subsequent course of events facilitates the extension of his dominion in South Afghanistan. And as all accounts represent the Amir to be in straits for money, the sum of five lakhs of rupees has been offered him for his immediate expenses.

We have, &c.
(Signed) R. P. HAINES.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON.
JAMES GIBBS.
D. M. STEWART.
E. BARING.

Enclosure 1 in No. 2.

Khurecta, dated Simla, 10th September 1880.

From His Excellency the VICEROY and GOVERNOR-GENERAL of INDIA to His Highness the AMIR of KABUL.

I HAVE already instructed my officers on the frontier to inform your Highness of the success which has attended the march of Sir F. Roberts to Kandahar, and of the complete dispersion by him of the army of Sirdar Ayub Khan. The knowledge that this victory will assist in the consolidation and strengthening of your Highness' Government, by relieving your Highness from any danger of attack from without by the discontented persons who followed Sirdar Ayub Khan, has caused me additional pleasure.

I rejoice to learn, through my officers, and especially from your Highness' letters to Mr. Griffin, that your Highness is establishing yourself firmly at Kabul, and that you are consolidating your Government there.

Accept my congratulations and rest assured that I shall always be glad to hear of your welfare.

Enclosure 2 in No. 2.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from His Highness the AMIR of KABUL to the address of His Excellency the VICEROY, dated Kabul, 28th September 1880.

After compliments.—I beg to inform your Excellency that I received and perused, on the 25th September 1880, your Excellency's kind letter, dated the 10th idem, containing the happy news of the success and victory gained by General Roberts and of the signal defeat suffered by Muhammad Ayub Khan at Kandahar, and giving expression to your Excellency's wishes for the prosperity and advancement of my rule in Afghanistan. I was exceedingly gratified by the particularly benign sentiments which your Excellency has given expression to. I confidently hope that, by the grace of the Everlasting Sovereign, so long as I live my heart will be cheered and gladdened by the display of conspicuous favours and befitting kindness of the powerful British Government, and that I shall win its perfect confidence day after day by my honest dealings and good deeds.

As regards my children and dependants residing at Tashkend, I wish them to come to the capital, Kabul. Therefore, I request your Excellency to let me know what your Excellency thinks advisable and proper to do in the matter, so that I, acting upon your Excellency's suggestion and advice, may make arrangements for them to proceed to Kabul.

Enclosure 3 in No. 2.

Khurecta, dated Simla, 25th October 1880.

From His Excellency the VICEROY and GOVERNOR-GENERAL of INDIA to His Highness the AMIR of KABUL.

I HAVE received your letter, dated the 28th September, and fully appreciate the friendly sentiments which you have expressed. It is unnecessary for me to write at length in this matter, for you are well aware of the good-will which the British Government entertains for your Highness. But I desire to assure your Highness that it gives me much pleasure to receive your letters, and to be informed of your sincere desire to maintain and strengthen the friendship which now happily exists between the British Government and the Kabul State.

As regards what you have written about your children and dependants, I think your Highness' wishes are natural. Now that your Government has become firmly established, it is fitting that your family should be collected around you; and I have already caused your Highness to be informed that I shall be glad to do anything in my power to facilitate the journey of those members of it now in Kandahar.

Enclosure 4 in No. 2.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from His Highness the AMIR of KABUL to the address of
LEPEL GRIFFIN, Esq., C.S.I., dated Kabul, the 13th October 1880.

After compliments.—I write to apprise you that whereas I have not for some time past addressed a friendly letter to you, I beg to write this to give expression to the most affectionate and cordial sentiments I entertain (towards you), as well as to mention that previous to this I alluded to the matter of Khost in my letter to the illustrious (British) Government. But I have not received an answer yet. The Maliks of Khost have just waited upon me and entreated for a governor. The Tokhi Maliks, too, having come to the capital (Kabul), asked for regulations, rules, and a governor for Kelat-i-Tokhi. Whereas I, having in view the sincere friendship and perfect affection, cannot venture upon such matters without the consent and permission of the representatives of the sublime British Government. I have re-assured and cheered the Tokhi Maliks, and for the present left the affairs of Kelat to them to manage after the usage of their tribe, and having promised them to nominate a governor in a few days, I have dismissed them. I, therefore, write to ask you to inform me, as speedily as possible, of the intention of the representatives of the illustrious Government in regard to the matter of Kelat and Khost, so that, agreeably to the advice and suggestion of the representatives of the illustrious Government, I may assume the administration of those two districts. And whereas seven months have already elapsed of the current year, and their affairs are still in confusion and disorder, the sooner they are arranged and put in order, the more beneficial it will prove to the two allied States.

What more can I write beyond the professions of affection and concord.

Enclosure 5 in No. 2.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from His Highness the AMIR of KABUL to the address of
the FOREIGN SECRETARY, dated 1st November 1880.

After compliments.—I beg to inform you that I have recently received and perused a letter from my worthy friend, Mr. Lepel Henry Griffin, intimating that he is going to England for a few months, and that in his absence I should communicate with, and address my letters to, his Excellency the Viceroy, or to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India. Therefore, agreeably to the wishes of that officer, I always remember and gratify you by addressing friendly letters to you; and in this cordial epistle I beg to state that on the 22nd Shawal (28th September 1880) I wrote to his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, and also to my worthy friend, Mr. Lepel Griffin, regarding my children and dependants, who are in Tashkend, stating that I wished them to come to the capital, Kabul, and soliciting to be informed what his Excellency deemed advisable to do in the matter, so that, acting upon his Excellency's suggestion and advice, I might make arrangements for their journey to Kabul.

It is now 35 days since I wrote, but I have not been informed in reply on the subject by his Excellency the Governor-General, or by Mr. Griffin as yet, so that I may have made arrangements for their departure from Tashkend. As the cold weather has set in, and the roads and passes will be shortly blocked on account of snow and cold, I request you to get a reply from his Excellency the Viceroy as speedily as possible and communicate it to me, so that I may make the arrangements early. Should any delay take place, it is evident that the matter will have to be put off till next year, and this would be the cause of uneasiness and anxiety to me.

Enclosure 6 in No. 2.

Dated 18th November 1880.

From A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign
Department, to His Highness the AMIR of KABUL.

Your friendly letter of the 13th of October, addressed to Mr. Lepel Griffin, has been delivered to me, because before its arrival Mr. Griffin had departed from India to Europe.

In his absence I trust that your Highness, in accordance with the very kind and friendly letter addressed to me by your Highness on the 1st November, considering me

as your sincere friend, will not fail to write to me on matters in which it may appear to your Highness that private communications with the Government of India may be convenient and desirable.

With regard to what your Highness has written about Khost, there is on the part of the British Government no objection to your making the necessary arrangements for the administration of that district, though on the subject of Kuram the views of the British Government have already been explained to your Highness separately.

With regard to Kelat, the Government is not yet prepared to give a definite reply, but in all probability some satisfactory conclusion may by discussion be found. I am authorised to inform your Highness that the course of recent events in Afghanistan has led the British Government to consider whether the general arrangements made in South Afghanistan may not require some modification, and that the Government is desirous that any future necessary changes in these arrangements may be made in communication and consultation with yourself, particularly in regard to questions which affect Kandahar. In this way it is most probable that a satisfactory settlement which may tend to the peace of Afghanistan and to the strengthening of your Highness' power may be arrived at in the interests of both States. But in order that this may be accomplished without inconvenient delay, and with a full knowledge of your Highness' views and wishes, it is of much importance that, if your Highness sees no material impediment, you should lose no time in deputing to India a confidential agent, well acquainted with your Highness' affairs, with whom the whole matter can be discussed, and to whom the intentions of the Government, which are in the direction of your Highness' advantage, and for the confirmation of friendship between the two States, may be explained. These matters cannot easily be transacted by correspondence, and as delay is inadvisable, the coming of your Highness' confidential representative is very expedient for the acceleration of conclusions. If, indeed, your Highness should prefer that a confidential Mahommedan agent should instead be sent to Kabul, this will be done on hearing from you, but for various reasons it is supposed that the preferable course is for your Highness to send an agent here with a letter to myself, though on this your Highness will judge.

The bearer of this letter, Haji Atta-ulla, has not been made acquainted with the precise contents or purport of my communication to your Highness, nor is it necessary that he should know them.

Enclosure 7 in No. 2.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from His Highness the AMIR of KABUL to the address of His Excellency the VICEROY, dated 10th December 1880.

After compliments.—Be it known to your Excellency that I received and perused, at a most auspicious hour, your Excellency's kind and friendly letter, dated the 25th October 1880, in reply to my cordial epistle on the subject of the departure and return of my children and dependants from Tashkend. My heart (warm in affection) was exceedingly rejoiced and gratified at the manifestation of the benign sentiments and esteem by your Excellency. By the perusal of a sentence which occurs in your Excellency's kind letter, *viz.*, "now that your Government has become firmly established it is fitting that your family should be collected around you," I feel greatly indebted and thankful to your Excellency for the fellow-feeling and good-will thus shown by your Excellency. I beg to write that, as the collection of my children and dependants, who are at Tashkend and Kandahar around me, would expand the bud of my benevolent heart and compose my senses (mind), so the dispersion of the evil-wishers and the scattering of the enemies of the two allied States, whether they be of my own or any other family, will tend to the security of the empire, to the advancement of the country, and to my own personal welfare.

Under all circumstances, I sincerely hope that, as long as I live, by the grace of the Omnipotent God, my friendship with the illustrious Government will remain firm and strong, and that, through the friendly attentions and good offices of the most glorious British Government, no doors of commotion and injury, whether domestic or foreign, will be opened to the face of this God-granted Government. Copies of the two letters, one to the Russian Governor-General of Turkestan, requesting him, as a matter of necessity, to allow my children and dependants to leave Tashkend, and another to General Ivanoff, asking him to send Sirdar Muhammad Mohsin Khan from Samarkand, are enclosed in this friendly letter for your Excellency's perusal.

Enclosure 8 in No. 2.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from His Highness the AMIR of KABUL to General VON KAUFMANN, Governor-General of Turkistan, dated 23rd November 1880, sent by hand of Khwaja Ahmadi Jan.

After compliments.—Be it known to your Excellency that since the day I set foot in Afghan Turkistan, whence, with the help of God, I proceeded by regular marches in the direction of the capital, Kabul, I was, through the kindness and good offices of the illustrious British Government, nominated to, and I succeeded in obtaining, the Amirship of this country, and I directed my attention wholly, both day and night, to the administration of public affairs and to the protection and security of the borders and confines. Till now I had no time to address a friendly letter to your Excellency regarding the dismissal of my sons and of those whom I left behind at Tashkend; but now that I have a little leisure from the organization of the State, and as the cold weather is approaching, I write that, during the period of 13 years which I passed in the dominions of his Imperial Majesty the Czar, and under your Excellency's kind protection, I was treated with the utmost honour and respect, and that I returned to my native country and motherland of my own free will and of my own accord. Whereas it is necessary that my sons and those whom I left behind should also return to their mother country and join me, I expect, as a friend, that your Excellency will, on the arrival of the bearer of this letter, namely, my trusted agent, be pleased to give leave to my sons, Sirdars Habibulla Khan, Nasrulla Khan, Muhammad Afzal Khan, and my other dependants, to quit Tashkend, and to Sirdar Muhammad Mohsin to leave Samarkand and to return to the capital, Kabul, so that, before the weather gets cold and the rigor of the atmosphere prevents travelling, they may cross the Amu and set foot on their own soil.

Enclosure 9 in No. 2.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from the AMIR of KABUL to General IVANOFF, Governor of Samarkand, dated 23rd November 1880, sent by hand of Khwaja Ahmadi Jan.

After compliments.—I have at this moment written a letter to General Von Kaufmann, Governor-General of Turkistan, and despatched it by the hand of my confidential agent,* regarding the dismissal of my children and those whom I left behind from Tashkend, and the dismissal of Sirdar Muhammad Mohsin Khan from Samarkand to the capital, Kabul. I hope that his Excellency will be so good as to give them leave to return to their native country and motherland before the cold weather sets in.

* Khwaja Ahmadi Jan.

No doubt, after the perusal of my letter, the authorities of the sublime (Russian) Government will not delay in dismissing them. I also write to ask you to allow Sirdar Muhammad Mohsin Khan to leave Samarkand as soon as this letter reaches you, so that he may accompany my sons, Habibulla Khan, Nasrulla Khan, Muhammad Afzal Khan, and other dependants of mine, to these quarters.

Enclosure 10 in No. 2.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from His Highness the AMIR of KABUL to the address of the FOREIGN SECRETARY, dated 11th December 1880.

After compliments.—Be it known to you that previous to this, when my valuable and esteemed friend, Mr. Lepel Griffin, was going to England, he gratified me by a letter intimating that, in the event of my having anything to represent or wanting anything to be done, it would be fitting and desirable that I should write to his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India or to the Foreign Secretary. Accordingly, I therefore write this friendly letter to you, unreservedly stating what I have in my mind, viz., that the disturbed state of Afghanistan and the embarrassed affairs of this country are apparent and well known to all the representatives of the sublime Government. When I had an interview with Mr. Griffin at Zimma in the Kohistan district, and we talked on the confusion of the affairs of Afghanistan and on the welfare of the two States, that officer gave me the promise and good tidings of a grant of 100 lakhs of rupees by Her Imperial Majesty's Government, (saying) that shortly and in a little while the above-mentioned sum would reach the Afghan Government from the Imperial Treasury, so that the breaches made in the empire may be closed up as before, and that advantages may soon accrue from it (the grant) to the two allied States. But four months have now elapsed since my arrival at the capital, Kabul, and I have received only 17 lakhs in all out of the subsidy promised by Government. The whole of the amount

received has been applied to the necessary expenses of the troops and to the improvement of the country, but not one-tenth of the ravages brought on the country has yet been repaired. Undoubtedly large sums of money are indispensably necessary for the conduct of the affairs of the State and for the maintenance of the army, the payment of the troops being one of the imperative duties. I therefore write and ask that, if the British Government intends paying and remitting the sum promised for the promotion of the interests of Afghanistan, the sooner it is remitted the more advantageous it will prove. Should there be any delay in transmitting the same, please inform me, so that I should disperse (dismiss) the soldiers who have collected and be content with a few only; for out of the revenues of the country nothing has come or will come to my hand that may be applied to the payment of the troops. Those who have appropriated the revenues to their own use would not disgorge it in any way. They would not pay it willingly, nor can it be realised from them by pressure or force. After I have deliberately and minutely weighed and examined the income and expenditure of Afghanistan I find that (after paying all the income) there will be still due by me a large sum on account of the pay of troops and other necessary expenses.

The degree and extent of the desolation of the country and the destruction of the materials of the Afghan Empire are such that they cannot be restored and replaced with little money and small funds. Reparation of all this waste depends upon immense sums of money and upon the kindness and favour of the glorious British Government; and in demanding the promised subsidy I have not and will not have any other object in view than to organise the affairs of this State and to strengthen the basis of the friendship subsisting between the two allied States.

Enclosure 11 in No. 2.

TELEGRAM, dated 24th December 1880.

FROM COMMISSIONER, Peshawur, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta.

News has reached me which appears fairly trustworthy, that Haji* left Kabul about 16th, and something has happened on the road. Haji not heard of as yet

* The bearer of the letter of 18th November to Amir.
beyond Gandamak.

Enclosure 12 in No. 2.

TELEGRAM, dated 26th December 1880.

FROM COMMISSIONER, Peshawur, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta.

I am of opinion that the Haji is probably dead. His followers arrived at Gandamak have no trace of him. Have written to Jellalabad directing information to be sent to Amir, and requesting recovery and forwarding of any papers.

Enclosure 13 in No. 2.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from the AMIR of KABUL to the COMMISSIONER of PESHAWUR, dated 25th Moharram 1298 (=28th December 1880).

After Compliments.—Be it known to you that Haji Atta-ulla Khan, who was deputed to me by the British Government, brought a friendly letter from the Government of India (to my address) which I received and perused. Two or three days afterwards I wrote a reply to the address of His Excellency the Viceroy, and handed it over to the Haji, who started in that direction on Wednesday, the 15th December 1880. Now, from the letter received from Sirdar Abdul Rasul Khan, Governor of Jellalabad, on Monday, the 21st idem, I learn that the Haji has not reached his destination, and that nothing is known as to his whereabouts, or about the Government letter. I have, therefore, sent you Sirdar Abdul Rasul Khan's letter in original, so that you may be fully informed of the Haji's state.

I have written a second reply to the Government of India, to the address of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General, in the sense of the first letter, without any addition or diminution, and forwarded by the post of this God-granted Government. The second reply bears date Tuesday, the 28th December 1880. It is hoped that you will acknowledge its receipt as soon as it reaches you.

Enclosure 14 in No. 2.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from His Highness the AMIR of KABUL to the address of His Excellency the VICEROY, dated 28th December 1880. (Extract.)

After compliments.—Your Excellency's gratifying and sublime letter, dated the 16th November 1880, which shows that your Excellency kindly bears me in mind and sympathises with me and the people of Afghanistan, reached me and was perused by me at an auspicious moment. I have fully and thoroughly understood the matters mentioned therein. With regard to Khost, your Excellency has been pleased to say that it should be organized and administered by me. With respect to Kuram, this matter was referred to in a previous correspondence. Regarding Kelat-i-Tokhi, your Excellency wrote that this matter required consideration. The above points (matters) which your Excellency has deemed it advisable and expedient to communicate have caused me much pleasure. As regards what your Excellency wrote, that certain changes in the administration of the affairs of Afghanistan are under your Excellency's consideration, it is clear and evident that the representatives of the illustrious British Government are striving hard day and night to set the affairs of myself and of the people of Afghanistan on a permanent footing, so that it may advance, and that its affairs may be properly and well administered. What your Excellency may have in contemplation for the well-being of Afghanistan cannot but be appropriate and good.

As for Kandahar, whatever arrangement may be considered beneficial to the interests of the two States would also be approved by me. But I will state a few things which I have in my mind—

First, that I desire to have an interview with your Excellency and wish to confer personally with you. The affairs of Afghanistan are in such a deranged state that they cannot be properly represented through the lips of another person, and that, unless I represent them myself, my affairs will remain unaccomplished, and I shall incur loss of reputation.

Secondly, that there is no qualified man in Afghanistan to whom I could impart the secrets of my heart, and who has such an insight into public matters that he could know and give suitable answers to questions relating to State affairs and thus bring matters to a conclusion with your Excellency, without the necessity of a personal interview between myself and your Excellency.

I have myself set on foot the work and given it direction; after this some one (else?) may be appointed to complete it. I have, therefore, written this letter, so that your Excellency may be made fully aware of the real situation of affairs in this country. When I have an interview with your Excellency, then, as soon as every kind of question susceptible of discussion has been determined, I will pass from possibilities into action. I have adduced and brought forward so many arguments simply because I am afraid lest some unworthy act may again be committed by the people of Afghanistan, whereby I, who am sincere and straightforward in my dealings with the illustrious British Government, and who devote my time both day and night to endeavouring with all my heart and soul to improve Afghanistan, should be brought thus into everlasting disgrace.

The foundation of the government of Afghanistan has been laid anew, and I apprehend and fear lest some untoward circumstance should supervene to cause a change among the people of Afghanistan.

I have written what has occurred to me, and if your Excellency wishes me in any case to depute an agent, please God he shall be sent without delay.

I have not even communicated anything to Haji Ata-ulla Khan, and why should I do it?

Enclosure 15 in No. 2.

Khureeta, dated 7th January 1881.

From His Excellency the VICEROY AND GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA to His Highness the AMIR ABDUL RAHMAN KHAN of KABUL.

YOUR Highness' friendly letter to me, dated 28th December 1880, reached me yesterday, after some accidental delay in Afghanistan; and I have much pleasure in sending a speedy reply.

It is a matter of great gratification to me that your Highness should have so clearly appreciated the desire of the British Government to lend its aid toward concerting arrangements for the restoration of permanent tranquillity in Afghanistan, and for the

strengthening of your Highness' authority in a manner that may be acceptable to your Highness, and in conformity with the wishes of the people. I observe also, with satisfaction, that your Highness declares yourself fully prepared to enter into the views of my Government upon the subject.

With regard to your Highness' kind expression of anxiety for a personal interview with me, I recognize thoroughly the advantages that might follow free and confidential conversation upon these matters at a meeting between your Highness and myself. I look forward to the prospect of meeting your Highness before long; and I will certainly endeavour so to form my plans that, upon my return to Northern India, this desirable object may be fulfilled at an early opportunity. But there are various reasons connected with the affairs of my Government and with the present state of my health which make it impossible to avoid delay in arranging for such an interview. On the other hand, it is essential to expedite the consideration of sundry matters that may become important and urgent; while it is manifest that by some preliminary discussions with, and explanations to, a confidential agent of your Highness, the ground may be cleared for an understanding of the general views and intentions of the two Governments. For these reasons I earnestly advise your Highness to lose no time in deputing to India some confidential agent, through whom I may transmit with security the communications which I desire to make to your Highness.

It is possible, however, that in the matter of Kelat-i-Ghilzai, to which your Highness referred in your letter of the 13th October, to Mr. Griffin, the interest of your Government may suffer by further delay. I therefore acquaint you that the British Government sees no objection to your nominating a governor to that place, according to the request of the Tokhi tribe. On receiving information of the approach of your governor, with a sufficient force, my officers in Kandahar will use their influence in aiding him to establish himself in Kelat-i-Ghilzai, and will declare that he has come with the assent and countenance of the British Government.

Enclosure 16 in No. 2.

TRANSLATION of the purport of a Letter addressed by the Commissioner of Peshawur to the Amir of Kabul on the 11th January 1881.

I HAVE just received a kharita from his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India to your Highness' address. I beg to forward it with this friendly letter.

Further orders have been issued to me by the Government of India that five lakhs of rupees should be kept in readiness at Peshawur for your Highness' necessary and immediate expenses; and accordingly the sum has been kept in readiness at the Peshawur Treasury. Your Highness should warn and inform me in what manner the aforesaid sum may be remitted (*lit.* made over).

No. 3.

(No. 12 of 1881.)

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Fort William, January 26, 1881.

IN continuation of our despatch, dated the 12th January 1881, we have the honour to inclose for your Lordship's information copies of memoranda upon the position of affairs at Kandahar in October last, submitted by Mr. A. C. Lyall, Secretary to Government, Foreign Department, and Sir R. Sandeman, Agent, Governor-General, Biluchistan.

We have, &c.

(Signed) RIPON.
F. P. HAINES.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON.
JAMES GIBBS.
D. M. STEWART.
E. BARING.

Enclosure 1 in No. 3.

MEMORANDUM regarding the PRESENT POSITION of AFFAIRS at KANDAHAR, dated Camp Kandahar, 31st October 1880.

I UNDERSTAND that the chief military reasons, brought forward by military men in favour of the retention of Kandahar, are briefly as follows:—The recent marches of General Stewart from Kandahar to Ghazni and Kabul, and of General Roberts from Kabul to Kandahar, and of Sirdar Ayub Khan from Herat to Kandahar, have shown the possibility of moving considerable armies through Afghanistan. It is argued that, were the British to hold Kandahar with an army, the power of the future Amirs of Kabul would be hopelessly destroyed, and as I heard an officer, who was arguing for the retention of the country, express it, the backbone of the country would for ever be broken. It is further considered desirable to keep a strong force within striking distance of Kabul and Herat, for it is believed that, were the Afghans to feel themselves within our power, they would cease to be a dangerous enemy, and by degrees we should overcome the determined hostility they have everywhere, from Kandahar to Kabul, shown towards us. Finally, it is said that the retention of Kandahar by the Liberal Cabinet would satisfy the Conservative party, and put a stop for ever to the chances of the Afghan war again breaking out with a change of ministry.

Whatever may be the value of these arguments, one thing is certain. The British Government cannot now, lightly, give up the possession of Kandahar, and, if it does surrender it, this ought only to be done after such arrangements have been made with the Afghans themselves as will secure to the British Government much that it has fought for, and for which it has expended much blood and treasure. I would, therefore, be in no hurry to evacuate Kandahar, although I would endeavour to arrange a programme that would enable me finally to give to the Amir Abdul Rahman the richest portion of his late grandfather's kingdom, which he must feel is needful to secure his hold upon his throne, and to place his alliance with the British Government in the eyes of his countrymen on a sound footing. It should not be forgotten, in considering this, that the people of Afghanistan did not object to the Amirs, Dost Muhammad and Sher Ali, receiving a substantial subsidy at the hands of the British Government. Friendship, accompanied by substantial material aid, the country would not reject.

The Amir himself, whoever he may be, can never be our friend so long as the most valuable portion of the Afghan kingdom is in our possession. It is, therefore, from every point of view desirable, if we intend Abdul Rahman to be a strong and successful ruler, and one acceptable to his people, to place his power on such a foundation as would enable him really to feel that we are the true friends we profess to be of himself and country.

With this object it seems necessary to maintain our hold on Kandahar until the chance of further attempts on the part of Sirdar Ayub Khan to regain his brother's lost kingdom are over. We should certainly lose no time in making Muhammad Ayub Khan feel that his hold on Herat is a most insecure one. I would begin this by encouraging the present Amir, by every means in our power, to make a bold attempt to recover Herat. It would doubtless be very necessary to break our views, with regard to the restoration of Herat and Kandahar, cautiously to the Amir, but if he is worthy of our support I would certainly give it heartily, and introduce a policy that would have for its aim the placing of our relations with the Afghans on such a footing that we would secure their friendship instead of their hostility.

With our improved military position at Quetta and in Pishin, and with Kandahar in our possession, to be disposed of at our will, we ourselves, as well as the Afghans, must be different from other races if we fail to come to an arrangement that will secure to both sides what they have so determinedly fought for.

The English Government, whether Conservative or Liberal, has declared that Afghanistan must be friendly to England, or cease to exist as an independent kingdom. The other power has shown, by great sacrifices, its determination to be independent. A great many will say the friendship of the Afghans is impossible, that we have gone too far, and can never make them our friends. I can only say, in reply to this argument, that I do not agree with them. The people showed no determined hostility towards us until we deported their Amir, Yakub Khan, and created a ruling prince at Kandahar. Since then, at the latter place, the change in the attitude of the people towards us has been so marked that there can be no longer a doubt as to Wali Sher Ali having been unanimously rejected by the people as their ruler. Late events, in addition to this unpopularity, have doubtless convinced the Government of India of the impossibility of re-establishing, with any chance of success, the late Government.

If this supposition is correct, as a preliminary step and before surrendering, on a fixed agreement, the country to Amir Abdul Rahman, I would summon the principal chiefs of the three most important clans, namely, the chiefs of the Barakzais, Popalzais, and Alkozais, and consult them as to the future, but I would do it in such a way as to leave no doubt of our intention to support the Amir we have recognised. I would also employ them, where possible, as long as we remain at Kandahar, in administering the country.

I have heard it argued that there are no leading chiefs to summon. The facts are, however, the reverse of this. In no country are there so many leading chiefs and heads of families as in South Afghanistan, as is shown by the list which accompanies this note. When Sirdar Sher Ali was created, from being Governor under the ex-Amir Yakub Khan, to be a despotic prince, the chiefs and heads of the great families were never consulted. A prince was thrust upon them. There were many reasons why Sher Ali was distasteful to the Popalzais as well as to Barakzais, and only those who wilfully blind themselves to this most unpopular act of our Government wonder at the whole country crying out against it, and calling in Ayub Khan to aid them to drive Wali Sher Ali and our small contingent of troops from the country, for one and all believed that the force left at Kandahar by the British Government was given to Sher Ali to enable him to rule over them, and was not a British army of occupation in the proper sense of the word.

Directly the Amir becomes strong enough, I would make over the country to him on terms to be fixed between his Government and the British. The real difficulty in surrendering Kandahar to the Amir Abdul Rahman is the almost certainty, under present circumstances, that directly we had marched from Kandahar Sirdar Muhammad Ayub Khan would make another effort to possess himself of the country. Until he is driven from Herat by Abdul Rahman, or, at all events, until the extent of his power becomes known, it seems to me almost impossible to surrender our military hold on Kandahar.

It is now necessary for me to say a few words with reference to the carrying on of the government of the province until affairs are ripe to enable the British Government to hand it over. I have already shown the undesirability of again placing the Wali Sher Ali in power. Without examining too closely into the motives that induced Sher Ali, the late Governor under Amir Yakub Khan, to accept the province as a gift from the British Government, we may well here consider briefly past events from the time of his assuming the government until now. These events have shown, and at the time of the Wali's instalment there were many who prognosticated that they would do so, that the country was greatly startled by what we had done. Outrages at once became frequent along the line of communication, culminating in the brutal murder of Major Waudby, the Road Commandant, who had gone to Dubrai to meet certain Malikis who had been heavily fined by the Wali for having been concerned in an outrage. Some said that the fine imposed by the Wali was so heavy that the people had become desperate, and many had joined the enemies of the British Government who took the opportunity offered of murdering a British officer. We, however, continued to trust the Wali implicitly, and bestowed on him arms and munitions of war, besides a battery of guns and some money.

Having raised an army, he proceeded with it to Girishk to meet and repel the advance of Muhammad Ayub Khan from Herat. It soon, however, became evident that he was entirely unable to cope in the field with Sirdar Muhammad Ayub Khan, and the next demand the Wali made on our Government was for assistance in troops, which we gave.

I need hardly allude to the fact that, by complying with the demand of the Wali for the support of our troops, we split into two bodies the Kandahar garrison. One portion was sent to the Helmand to support the Wali, the other portion being retained at Kandahar, thus offering to Muhammad Ayub Khan the opportunity of defeating our troops in detail. As the Helmand was fordable at many places, it is difficult to understand why our troops went there at all, and why the Wali did not, instead, retire from Girishk on finding this to be the case. I have seen no explanation of the causes that led to our action in this matter.

I pass over briefly the disastrous results of these moves; suffice it to say, the Wali's troops mutinied, were attacked by our troops, and a number killed, the guns (our gift) captured, and it was believed the Wali's army had, to a great extent, dispersed; subsequent events have shown that this was not the case. Our force then retired to a position some distance from the Helmand, fought Ayub Khan at Maiwand, and was defeated. The Wali fled from the field, and on reaching Kandahar visited General Primrose, and advised that officer to retreat at once, and surrender the country to Sirdar Muhammad Ayub Khan.

Under present circumstances it is surely very desirable to consider carefully these occurrences and the true value we are able to place on the Wali as a ruler, before we

again restore him to power. It is well known that the whole of the surrounding country, in addition to the Wali's army, took part in the battle of Maiwand, and it is generally admitted that the leading men of Kandahar had, for months, been in correspondence with

* Surteep Nur Muhammad headed a large party. Had such Chiefs joined the Wali, the heads of the Popalzai and other families might have been induced to do so also. Muhammad Ayub was only induced to march on Kandahar on hearing that the country was ready to join him. I was, however, told at the time that the Kabuli troops would not fight for Ayub Khan for reasons given me, and the result proved the truth of the statement made.

(Signed) R. G. SANDEMAN.

Sirdar Muhammad Ayub Khan, who had been invited by them* to advance from Herat with the object of overthrowing the Wali's government. In short, the rising in the country amounted to a general insurrection.

The military situation at Kandahar, after the defeat of Maiwand, would have been very serious indeed, had it not been for the alarm previously taken by General Phayre at the state of affairs in the country. He had despatched from the line of communications, some days previous to the defeat at Maiwand, the 4th and 28th Bombay Native Infantry to Kandahar, where they arrived just in time to replace those killed at Maiwand.

To finish my short narrative of events it is desirable to add that General Primrose did not adopt Wali Sher Ali's advice. He was besieged by Muhammad Ayub Khan until the arrival of General Roberts' force within a short distance of Kandahar. After the battle of Mazra, in which Ayub Khan's forces were defeated and dispersed, the Wali asked to be relieved of his Waliship. I am informed that he was requested to take charge of the city, but refused to do so, and that Major Protheroe was appointed to carry on the duty of provisional governor of the town.

The events here briefly recorded should, of themselves, teach us the great danger of again putting up Wali Sher Ali. But in restoring him there would be also an entirely different danger to be met, if we care to examine and probe deeper into the politics of the country. Wali Sher Ali is not only an old adherent of the late Amir Yakub Khan, but it is well known that he and the present Amir Abdul Rahman are, for reasons unnecessary to record, bitter enemies. It is to be presumed that Sher Ali and the Amir, to some extent, know our views and intentions with regard to the permanent retention or not of Kandahar, the wealthiest province of the Afghan kingdom. Both fully know the past. Our action at the present time is, therefore, of vital importance. If we restore Wali Sher Ali, with a view to leaving the province in his hands when we retire, it amounts to placing the country actually at the disposal of Ayub Khan; for there can be little doubt that this would be the result of such a step. The present Amir will then have to meet in the field his enemies, Sher Ali and Ayub Khan, the former strengthened by the influence and money he must have accumulated during the time we have placed the country and its revenues at his disposal. Should the result prove fatal to Amir Abdul Rahman, we will have the knowledge that through our own acts we have destroyed our own work at Kabul. The position is not an enviable one in whatever way we may consider it, but common justice to the Amir whom we have recognised, if not care for our own interests, should prevent us from again trusting to the broken reed the late Wali Sher Ali has proved himself to be. If not very careful, we may destroy Abdul Rahman, and injure, in consequence, our own influence and position in the country, as it was injured during the first Afghan war. Moreover, to put it mildly, justice towards the Amir should prevent our committing an act that must, of itself, weaken him, and may possibly result in ultimately driving him from Kabul.

In the interests of all concerned, I think it very desirable that the Government of India should lose no more time in announcing to the country at large, from a general point of view, their intentions with regard to the disposal of Southern Afghanistan. I believe the continued reticence of our Government as to what their ultimate intentions really are with regard to the disposal of the province must prove detrimental to the very important interests at stake.

(Signed) R. G. SANDEMAN, Major,
Agent, Governor-General, Biluchistan.

Enclosure 2 in No. 3.

NAMES of the SIRDARS of the DURANI CLANS of KANDAHAR and their different sections.

Name of Clan.	Name of Section.	Names of the Sirdars of Clans and Maliks of Sections.	Remarks.
BARAKZAI -	Muhammadzai -	(1) Sirdar Sher Ali Khan, son of Sirdar Mehrdil Khan. (2) Sirdar Mir Afzal Khan, son of Sirdar Purdil Khan. (3) Sirdar Gholam Mohiyuddin Khan, son of Sirdar Kondil Khan.	These three are the chief Sirdars of the Barakzai clan. Sirdars Mir Afzal Khan and Gholam Mohiyuddin Khan are refugees in Persia. Sirdar Sher Ali Khan is the Wali of Kandahar.
		(4) Sirdar Muhammad Hossein Khan.	* Note.—For three years during Amir Sher Ali's reign Sirdar Sher Ali was the recognised Civil Governor of Kandahar, but two other Sirdars were associated with and watched over him, namely, Sirdar Safter Ali, Pharseewan, who was Commandant of the army, and Sultan Muhammad Khan, Pharseewan, Chief of Finance and Collector of the Government Revenue. Sher Ali was removed by the Amir and deported to Kabul for corrupt practices. (Sd.) R. G. S.
		(5) Sirdar Muhammad Hossein Khan.	This Sirdar is the brother of Sirdar Sher Ali Khan, and is at Kandahar.
		(6) Sirdar Shirindil Khan -	These Sirdars are the sons of Sirdar Khushdil Khan, and nephews of Sirdar Sher Ali Khan, and are living in Kandahar.
		(7) Sartip Nur Muhammad Khan.	
		(8) Sirdar Ahmed Khan -	This Sirdar is the nephew of Sartip Nur Muhammad Khan, and is now at Herat.
		(9) Sirdar Abdulla Khan - -	Is the son of Sirdar Sultan Ahmed Khan, and is now at Herat with Sirdar Muhammad Ayub Khan.
		(10) Sirdar Abdul Wahab Khan -	The sons of Sirdar Mir Afzal Khan, now at Herat with Sirdar Muhammad Ayub Khan.
		(11) Sirdar Abdulla Khan - -	
	Sherzai -	(1) Atta Khan - - -	These two men are the Maliks of the Sherzai section. They are living in the village of Chaplani, about eight miles from Kandahar.
		(2) Bhaodin Khan - - -	
	Angezai -	(1) Abdulzahir Khan - -	The headmen of the Angezai section, and are living in the village of Chaplani.
		(2) Muhammad Umar Khan -	
	Malikdinzai	(1) Gholam Muhammad Khan -	These two men are the Maliks of the Malikdinzai section, and are living in the village of Rawani, about eight miles from Kandahar.
		(2) Syud Muhammad Khan -	
	Nasratzai -	(1) Muhammad Sadik Khan -	These four men are the Maliks of the Nasratzai section. Muhammad Sadik Khan is living at Gundi Mansoor, Muhammad Jan and Sher Ali Khan at Robat, and Gholam Muhammad Khan at Khaja Ali.
		(2) Muhammad Jan Khan -	
		(3) Sher Ali Khan, son of Lal Khan.	
		(4) Gholam Muhammad Khan -	
	Umarchanzai -	(1) Saifulla Khan - - -	These three men are the Maliks of the Umarchanzai section. Saifulla Khan is living at Maroof, Mir Adam Khan at Mard Killa, and Shahghassi Sarwar Khan at Tirri.
		(2) Mir Adam Khan - - -	
		(3) Shahghassi Sarwar Khan -	
	Khwanchezai -	(1) Akram Akhundzada - -	These three men are the Maliks of the Khwanchezai section. Akram Akhundzada and Muhammad Nacem live in the town of Kandahar, and Haji Khushdil resides at Deh Gholaman, about six miles from Kandahar.
		(2) Muhammad Nacem Akhundzada.	
		(3) Haji Khushdil - - -	
	Garjezni -	(1) Azizulla Khan - - -	These are the Maliks of the Garjezni section, and live at Rawani.
		(2) Aminulla Khan - - -	
	Bahlolzai -	(1) Sher Muhammad Khan -	The headman of Bahlolzai section, and is living at Karezak, about four miles from Kandahar.
	Surpayi -	(1) Dost Muhammad Khan -	Malik of the Surpayi section, and is living at Deh Gholaman, about six miles from Kandahar.
	Gaibizai -	(1) Mir Afzal Khan - - -	Malik of Gaibizai, and lives at Timrau, about six miles from Kandahar.

Name of Clan.	Name of Section.	Names of the Sirdars of Clans and Malik of Section.	Remarks.
POPALZAI -	Ayubzai -	(1) Taj Muhammad Khan - (2) Gholam Muhammad Khan - (3) Amir Khan - (4) Jan Muhammad - (5) Sirdar Khan -	These are the Maliks of the Ayubzai section. Taj Muhammad Khan and Gholam Muhammad Khan live at Kandahar, Amir Khan at Zakir, Jan Muhammad at Karz, and Sirdar Khan at Kulchabad. Taj Muhammad Khan is also the chief Sirdar of the Popalzai clan.
	Bamazai -	(1) Kalandar Khan -	This man is the Malik of the Bamazai section. He resides at Kandahar, but is now at Tirri.
	Badozai -	(1) Gholam Muhammad Khan - (2) Attaulla Khan - (3) Akhtar and Muhammad Akbar Khan. (4) Fakrudin Khan -	These are the Maliks of the Badozai section. Gholam Muhammad Khan lives at Killa Azam, Akhtar, Muhammad Akbar Khan, and Fakrudin Khan at Bilandi, and Attaulla Khan at Mashore.
	Ismailzai -	(1) Shah Muhammad Khan -	Malik of the Ismailzai section, lives at Mashore.
ALKOZAI -	Khalozai -	(1) Habbo Khan - (2) Paind Khan - (3) Abdul Hakim Khan - (4) Akram Khan - (5) Zakriya Khan - (6) Saadat Khan -	These are the Maliks of the Khalozai section. Habbo Khan and Paind Khan are also the chief Sirdars of the whole Alkozai clan. All these Maliks live at Jaldak.
	Panazai -	(1) Pir Muhammad - (2) Sartip Saleh Muhammad Khan - (3) Muhammad Halim Khan - (4) Majid Khan - (5) Karram Khan - (6) Nur Muhammad Khan - (7) Amir Khan - (8) Muhammad Sadik - (9) Dost Muhammad Khan - (10) Pir Muhammad Khan and Dost Muhammad Khan. (11) Azad Khan and Muhammad Azim Khan.	Resident of Sardeh. Do. of Chargolbah. Do. of do. Do. of Manara. Do. of do. Do. of Panjwahi. Do. of do. Do. of Rambasi. Do. of do. Do. of Deh Bagh. Do. of do.
	Zedan -	(1) Shahgassi Muhammad Jan -	This man is the Malik of Zedan, and lives at Kandahar.
	Kotezai -	(1) Makko Khan -	Malik of Kotezai, lives at Naghan.
NURZAI -	Talokzai -	(1) Abu Saced Khan - (2) Son of Adam Khan - (3) Muhammad Usman Khan, 1st - (4) Muhammad Usman Khan, 2nd - (5) Abdul Aziz Khan - (6) Majadulla Khan - (7) Shah Hussein - (8) Jehangir -	Resident of Kadni. Do. of do. Do. of Washir. Do. of do. Do. of do. Do. of do. Do. of do. Do. of do.
	Jamalzai -	(1) Jumna Khan - (2) Muhammad Akram Khan - (3) Son of Sherdil Khan - (4) Nizamuddin Khan - (5) Faizu Khan -	Resident of Kadni. Do. of Dherawat. Do. of do. Do. of do. Do. of do.
	Pirakzai -	(1) Akbar Muhammad Khan -	Malik of the Pirakzai section, lives at Kadni.
	Gurg -	(1) Faizu Khan - (2) Shah Passand -	Headmen of the Gurg section, live at Rohat.
ALAZAI -	Alazai -	(1) Son of Majid Khan - (2) Dost Muhammad Khan - (3) Najibulla Khan - (4) Abdul Hakeem Khan - (5) Sahib Khan - (6) Mukhtiyar Khan - (7) Timur Shah Khan - (8) Muhammad Akbar Khan - (9) Muhammad Faihm Khan -	The son of Majid Khan is the chief Sirdar of the Alazai clan. The others are minor Chiefs of the clan. All these chiefs live in Zamindawar.

(Signed) THOMAS HOPKINS,
for Agent, Governor-General, Beluchistan.

Quetta, the 4th November 1880.

Enclosure 3 in No. 3.

MEMORANDUM ON KANDAHAR.—(Extract.)

I UNDERSTOOD that the chief object of my visit to Kandahar would be to acquaint myself generally with the actual situation of affairs in South Afghanistan, by personal consultation with the British officers at Kandahar and at Quetta, and by availing myself of the opportunity of meeting Sirdar Sher Ali Khan and any other Afghans of note belonging to the place. It was not possible, by a rapid journey and a short stay at Kandahar, to obtain much information at first hand from the people, or to make any wide observation of the feelings of the country. Not two months had passed since the whole neighbourhood had been in arms against us, and since our troops had been besieged in the city. The principal persons of the Durani tribe—which includes by far the greater majority of the population of the country, and almost every man of influence—had joined the rising in support of Ayub's advance, and most of these had fled or were keeping aloof. The people close round Kandahar had signalized themselves by the massacre, at the end of July, of every British soldier or camp-follower who fell into their hands, and by fighting against us throughout August. The town and district adjoining were more or less under military occupation; there was no regular government beyond the suburbs of Kandahar; and the complete uncertainty among Afghans of every class as to the intentions of the British Government regarding their country made them very cautious about speaking their mind. All these circumstances added to the difficulty of getting at the real state of affairs. Nevertheless, it was of much use to be able to discuss everything with our officers on the spot; while there were at Kandahar a certain number of Afghans with whom it was useful to talk, and I had several long interviews with Sirdar Sher Ali Khan. I proceed to state my general conclusions upon what I saw and heard.

In the first place, it appeared evident that the movement of the Duranis in favour of Ayub Khan had been considerable and widespread. It seems to have been preconcerted by correspondence between his party at Herat and a number of the leading men of the tribe in the Kandahar country and in Zamindawar, who encouraged him to endeavour to expel the English and to upset Sher Ali Khan. I was told that Ayub Khan had long been meditating the advance, and that he would probably in any case have marched at harvest time; but that, as a matter of fact, he had received numerous invitations, promises of support on his arrival, and assurances that the English garrison was very weak. Sher Ali Khan had lost his popularity in the country by his open acceptance, from us, of the rulership of Kandahar as a separate State, which associated him with the foreigner, and placed him in direct conflict with the hereditary claims of the late Amir's family. He incurred the odium of having made a compact which kept us in Afghanistan, and enabled him to usurp the place of the sons of the Amir. His administration was probably as good as any Afghan Sirdar's rule usually is; but he is said to have taken no special pains to conciliate the jealousy of the other Sirdars, or to make himself acceptable to the people; and any Sirdar in his position, surrounded by foreign bayonets, would have become equally unpopular. The consequence was that on the appearance of Ayub Khan the whole country fell away rapidly from the Wali; his authority beyond the Helmund, where he had been attempting to collect the revenue (an unpopular function of government), collapsed at once; and his troops, except 500 cavalry, deserted to the enemy. When we retired into Kandahar after the Maiwand rout most of his cavalry broke up and withdrew for the time to their homes; and for the week before Ayub arrived the British Army was besieged in Kandahar by hordes of ghazis and armed peasantry. Sher Ali represents, not unreasonably, that he never expected to keep the country in hand under such an unforeseen contingency as the total defeat by Ayub of a British force in the field; and he told me distinctly that the rising was, in his opinion, more against us than against him—that it was the *ghazá*, or religious hostility to infidels, that raised the people. Nevertheless, although nothing has been proved against his good faith, and though he undoubtedly kept our force on the Helmund well supplied until it broke up, while the country was fairly quiet until we were defeated—yet it has been made clear that he could give us no help whatever in a crisis, and that he failed even to keep his troops together in the face of Ayub. Our alliance seems to have been materially damaging to both parties. The Wali suffered from the odium of adhering to foreigners and infidels, and of abetting their occupation of the country. On the other hand, we became responsible both for his civil administration (without exercising any control over it) and for his political antagonism to the late ruling family; while so far was the Wali from helping us in the field (except as to

supplies) that we might have fared better against Ayub Khan had we relied altogether on our own resources.

Since Kandahar has been relieved, and Ayub defeated, affairs in the country round have remained in much political confusion.

It is to be remembered that, when the separation of the Kandahar State from the rest of Afghanistan was originally contemplated, it was supposed that this province would, by the transfer of Herat to Persia, become conterminous on the west and north-west with Persian territory, which would manifestly have made the frontier much less liable to foreign invasion. The policy of the British Government was so to manage the constitution of the new State as to avoid unnecessary interference with its internal affairs, and this, it was thought, might be effected by continuing in power an Afghan Sirdar of the Kandahari family, who had before governed the place successfully, and who had been sent there as governor by Yakub Khan.

But the projected transfer of Herat to Persia fell through; and at this moment we have, instead, that place in the hands of an influential Sirdar, the rival of Abdul Rahman, who has crossed swords with us twice, and who, it is openly said at Kandahar, has only to appear again on the Helmund to be joined by the country side. All my information leads me to the conclusion that at this moment Ayub is by far the most popular candidate for rule in South Afghanistan, and that Sher Ali weighs little or nothing against him. In these circumstances Sher Ali would have little or no prospect of consolidating any authority at Kandahar, except under our complete protection, and unless we undertook the preservation of order and the guard of his frontiers. But this would inevitably involve a far greater degree of interference with the internal administration of the province than was originally proposed; and would imply much more direct and constant support than is compatible with independent rulership. Such a system would be of no advantage to us, and would please nobody, not even the Sirdar himself. We should be holding Kandahar against the will of the Duranis, and much to the dissatisfaction of the old ruling family, whether Herat were united under Kabul, or separate. The political objections to such a position seem to me sufficiently strong to outweigh any advantage that may be attached to the strategical position of Kandahar, or to the weakening of Afghanistan by dismemberment. I believe that the Duranis of Kandahar are now much opposed to our occupation, either indirectly through Sher Ali or any other nominee, or directly through our own officers. They have been for generations the dominant class, although the Amirs of Kabul latterly did their best to weaken the local power of the Sirdars, so that very few men of influence or wealth are now left, and our presence in the country is very unwelcome to them. They have a very distinct leaning toward the family of the late Amir Sher Ali; but I could not make out that they held any very deep objection to returning again under the Kabul Amirship. I mention this last point because it has been more than once argued that the Duranis of South Afghanistan would favour any arrangement that should release them from the yoke of Kabul. I may be wrong, but my impression is that no such feeling prevails among them to any degree worth setting against their dislike of foreign domination or interference; though toward the end of the Amir Sher Ali's rule they had become very sore at his despotic rule through the Kabuli soldiery, and at his revenue exactions. At this moment, there is no civil government worth the name outside the Kandahar suburbs. Under the orders contained in my letter to Colonel St. John of the 3rd August, all questions concerning our future relations with South Afghanistan were, and still are, reserved. The Sirdar has not resumed the authority which he lost in July and August last; he has now no regular troops, no arms or munitions of war. He has some 500 horsemen of his own clan at his disposal, and could, with money, raise a much larger number. The surrounding districts, east of the Helmund, are only so far under control that collections of revenue grain and the purchase of supplies go on under a sort of joint acquisition signed by Colonel St. John and the Sirdar. Across the Helmund there is no kind of government; Seistan is under its local chiefs, and Kelat-i-Ghilzai has been intrusted to the Tokhi Ghilzais. Thus the Sirdar only exercised about four months (from March to July) the authority which we recognized in March last. As soon as the Kandahar siege was ended he told Colonel St. John that, while willing to give all aid in his power to the restoration of tranquillity, he desired to be permitted to retire to India. Colonel St. John was instructed, in reply, that the Sirdar's wish to retire should not be discouraged, but should be treated as matter reserved for subsequent consideration.

During my stay in Kandahar, I had several confidential interviews with the Sirdar Sher Ali Khan, in which the state of the country, and the Sirdar's own position, were discussed. I admitted to the Sirdar—what was, indeed, a plain inference from the fact

that he had not been asked to resume the government of the country after Ayub had been driven off—that recent events, and particularly the behaviour of the Duranis, had led the Government of India to review their position at Kandahar. I referred to the Sirdar's expression, in September, of his desire to retire to India, and I said that the Government had reserved their reply until the whole situation could be deliberately considered. I added that I was now empowered to speak with the Sirdar on the subject, and to report the result to the Government of India, by whom he would be treated, in any case, with friendship and liberality.

The tenor of the Sirdar's answer was that he held himself entirely at the disposition of the British Government, that he had kept faith and done what he could during the recent disturbances; but that, whatever might be the future plans of the British Government, he was quite ready to acquiesce in them. The British Government, he said, had incurred vast expense and trouble in Afghanistan, and, having now gained at least long and varied experience of the country, should be able to judge what was best for its interests to do now. If the British Government wished him to leave Kandahar, he was prepared to withdraw—or to stay, if this were desired; and he intimated that he would have no objection to stay, with our protection and active support to his governorship. He gave me to understand that his policy would be to rely upon us for holding Kandahar as a secure basis for his operations, and then to push westward with his own resources and friends, so as to extend his authority beyond the Helmund, and even, he hinted, to Herat. This, he seemed to think (and probably he was right), would be necessary to the permanent consolidation of his authority at Kandahar and in the adjacent districts. Being asked whether he felt able to deal with the Duranis, who had so recently betrayed and attacked him, he rejoined that the country rose, out of fanaticism, against us more than against him; and that by a severe régime he could keep the people in order. He was naturally anxious to discover the intentions of the British Government regarding Kandahar before committing himself finally to any declaration regarding himself; and he wished to find out whether we were likely to annex the country ourselves. He was informed, in reply, that no definite decision had been taken, that some time might pass before our final arrangements were determined; but that his own future position should receive ample consideration. He repeated that he should make no sort of objection to the wishes, whatever they might be, of the British Government.

Throughout our interviews the Sirdar used no expression indicating that he held the British Government to be under any obligation to remain in Kandahar merely in order to restore and uphold his authority; nor did he appear to have any argument of this nature in his mind. His object appeared to be to discover what course the Government were likely to take; and he supposed, as most of the Kandahari people supposed, that I had come with authority to decide and declare what should be done with Kandahar. Pending this decision, the Sirdar was naturally averse to stating explicitly what he himself would prefer; since his conclusions must necessarily depend much on our line of action; nor was he prepared to admit that he had failed in his government, or that he could not resume it until he should have learnt as much as possible of what might be the effect on his own prospects of such an admission. At a later interview, however, I explained that the Government might still require some time before coming to a decision on Kandahar affairs, and determining what might be best for the interests of all concerned. I asked the Sirdar whether I should report to the Government that he left the whole question, so far as he was concerned personally, in the hands of the British Government, always understanding that he was himself sure of liberal treatment. The Sirdar answered that this might be stated; that he had placed himself unreservedly in the hands of the British Government, but that if the Government were to ask him to do anything beyond his power, and he were to ask to be excused, he hoped the Government would not be annoyed, and would accept his excuses as made through inability, not through unwillingness, to comply. He proceeded to make some remarks as to the general condition of the country. He said that it was suffering from want of administration and the general political uncertainty that prevailed—his meaning being evidently that we ought to waste no time in making up our minds as to the country's future. I told him that I must report in person to his Excellency the Viceroy the result of my visit to Kandahar, but that a settlement would be made as soon as possible. Hitherto the Sirdar had not been pressed in regard to his request, in September, to be allowed to retire to India; nor had he expressly repeated it. But it is probable that, when he clearly understood that I was not empowered to settle anything, and that I was returning very speedily to make a report to the Government, he thought it wise to secure his retirement on good terms. He informed me, through Nawab Hassan Ali, that he was prepared to write a letter to the Viceroy, and he made some allusion to the subject of his retirement. When

I met the Sirdar on the day before my departure, I told him that I thought a letter would be a convenient record of his own wishes and of the general result of our conversation. He said that such a letter would be written; and he went on to say that he had now no will or power of his own apart from the will of the British Government, and that the Government should look upon him as their sincere friend. With regard to the future arrangements for the country, if the Government wished him to do any service, he was ready to undertake that service as he had done before, and to administer the affairs of the country with the support of the British Government. If, however, some time must elapse before Government could come to a decision, he begged to be allowed to proceed to Kurrachee with his family until that decision was come to. If afterwards the Government wanted his services for the country he would undertake the service and come back from Kurrachee. Should, however, the British Government not require his services, he begged for a pension and for leave to enjoy it in any country he might choose to live, either here or in India, or any other country.

I told the Wali that these conversations would be submitted to the Viceroy at Lahore, and that in any case he might rely on the friendship of the British Government.

I asked the Wali why he wished to go to Kurrachee until the Government came to a decision. He replied that during the interval, if he remained here and were not Governor, the people might do something that might get him into trouble.

He said he would never turn his face away from the British, and that he was not afraid that they would do him any harm, but that he was afraid of his own people, who had already brought him into trouble, and might do so again, that it was simply a precaution, and that he did not wish to remain in the country during the interval. He said, "Until now I have served the British Government with loyalty, and I am afraid that the people may do something that may be the cause of a bad name and grief to me."

The letter was delivered to me on the evening of the same day; and on the next morning I left Kandahar.

The general impression that I formed of the Wali's position at Kandahar was that it had become untenable without our active and unreserved support. He had probably relied too much on us from the beginning, and had thus neglected to conciliate the Sirdars; but under the circumstances he can hardly be blamed for the failure of the experiment which placed him in charge of the government. Any Afghan Sirdar, situated as was Sher Ali Khan, would have incurred unpopularity; and in the present condition of Afghanistan the independent ruler of Kandahar would be exposed to intrigues and attack both from Herat and from Kabul. Against such opponents, who appeal both to fanaticism and to the loyalty of the Duranis to the old ruling family, Sher Ali Khan has no standing ground whatever; nor is it to be wondered that he has no independent hold upon the country. I much doubt whether he could secure the allegiance of any considerable body among the people by promising to protect them from the Kabul domination. He could only succeed by our subduing, in his name, the whole country which we might desire him to govern, and by our undertaking to repel foreign invasion and to put down insurrections; and to this extent I do not think we can, consistently with our own interests, pledge ourselves to support him. It may have been represented at Kandahar, as one advantage of a separate State, that the separation would free them from Kabul; but the people of Kandahar have themselves turned, at the first opportunity, so violently and treacherously against the British and Sher Ali that no room is left for supposing that they preferred his rule (which of course they consider inseparable, as it is, from foreign occupation of Kandahar) to being replaced under an Amir of Kabul. I believe that, as a matter of fact, they would again join any leader of an attack upon us and upon him, if he were restored to power at Kandahar; nor do I think they would do otherwise to any other Sirdar in his situation.

I append a memorandum, prepared at my request by Colonel St. John, upon the principal Durani Chiefs in and about Kandahar. It shows what men of influence there are in the country, and what has been their conduct during the late disturbances. There are, it will be seen, very few prominent men of considerable wealth and rank; and some of the leading personages joined Ayub, or have absented themselves permanently from the place. The paucity of influential Sirdars indicates the difficulty of joining any strong party for separate rule in South Afghanistan, and even of ascertaining clearly the wishes of the people generally. I have impressed upon Colonel St. John the importance of establishing, as soon as possible, a wider range of communication with the representatives, such as are to be found, of the Duranis. So far as I could judge at Kandahar, we needed larger information as to their general feelings and disposition, with more extensive intelligence as to what was going on in the

outlying districts. We are likely also to require the co-operation of the headmen of the clans and districts in the matter of procuring supplies during the winter. I instructed Colonel St. John that any persons who had not specially compromised themselves in the late attacks upon us, and whose presence at Kandahar might be useful, should be induced to come in, or to communicate with him. He was empowered to explain that they would not be molested, so long as they abstained, directly and indirectly, from attempts to molest us; and that their interest lay in aiding the British officers to preserve the tranquillity of the country, and to introduce such permanent arrangements as might hereafter be decided upon.

(Signed) A. C. LYALL.

November 1880.

Enclosure 4 in No. 3.

No. 554, dated Kandahar, 3rd November 1880.

From Lieut.-Col. ST. JOHN, R.E., Resident, Southern Afghanistan, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

As requested by you, I have the honour to enclose a memorandum on the principal Durani chiefs in and about Kandahar.

MEMORANDUM ON, and TABULAR LIST of, PRINCIPAL PERSONAGES in, or connected with, the PROVINCE of KANDAHAR.

WITH one or two exceptions, all the offshoots of the reigning family resident in Kandahar are descendants of the five Kandahari brothers, Purdil Khan, Kuhndil Khan, Shirdil Khan, Rahmdil Khan, and Mihrdil Khan. Of these, Shirdil Khan left no offspring; and Rahmdil Khan's children took to mercantile pursuits, dropped the title of Sirdar, and so faded into comparative obscurity, though their mother, the Walidah, Bibi Hawa, a first-cousin of the Amir Dost Muhammad and his brothers, is still alive and enjoys a high consideration. Muhammad Sadik, the eldest son of Kuhndil Khan, the most eminent of the five brothers, died before his father, leaving a son, Gul Muhammad Khan. Another son of Kuhndil, Gholam Muhaiddin Khan, is still alive; but he is a person of little importance, the wealth and power of the Kandahari branch of the Muhammadzais having passed to the families of Purdil Khan and Mihrdil Khan.

The son of the first, Mir Afzal Khan, is now a man of sixty-five or seventy, and enjoyed great influence in the province till he became Governor about eight years ago; but he had little power, the revenue being collected independently of him by officers deputed specially from Kabul. The exactions carried on by these men made Mir Afzal's government most unpopular, and his efforts to raise the country against us in January 1879 met with no success. He fled to Farrah when we arrived before the city; waited there till he heard of the deportation of Yakub, when he retired to Persia, where he has since been.

He is said to be of a kindly disposition, though very fanatical, and has a large number of wives and concubines. He had but little landed property in Kandahar. His daughter, as is well known, married the late Amir, by whom she had the Waliahd, Abdullah Jan. She is now in Farrah with Hashim Khan; but it is said intends to join her father at Meshed.

Mir Afzal has several sons, all of whom retired with him to Persia; but one, Abdul Wahab Khan, returned to Herat at Ayub Khan's invitation, and governed the city during that Sirdar's absence on his Kandahar campaign.

Sirdar Mihrdil Khan, the youngest of the Kandahari brothers, left several sons. The eldest, Khushdil Khan, died two years ago, leaving four sons, all of whom are men of some weight, though none have shown much signs of capacity. They are—

Muhammad Hasan Khan.		Shirindil Khan.
Muhammad Anwar Khan.		Roshndil Khan.

The first three returned to Kandahar a few days after our arrival in January 1879; they have always professed themselves faithful adherents of the British Government, and I have had no reason to doubt their sincerity. Shirindil Khan is a man of more capacity than the others, and has some talent for business, but has no more backbone than the

majority of the family. Roshndil Khan was in Kabul during the earlier part of our occupation, but followed his uncle, Sher Ali, down to Kandahar.

Of the Wali Sher Ali Khan it is unnecessary to speak.

His brother, Muhammad Husain Khan, is, I believe, the ablest of the family; but is no favourite in the country generally, and is certainly not to be trusted too far.

The Wali's eldest son, Haidar Ali Khan, is a lunatic, but has a son of eighteen or twenty, by name Ahmad Ali Khan. He ought, I suppose, to be the heir, but it is evident that the Wali's favourite is his second son, Nur Ali Khan, a young man of six or eight and twenty. He has pleasant manners and is certainly intelligent, but does not seem to have much force of character.

Of the Muhammadzai Sirdars not belonging to the Kandahar branch, but resident in the province, the principal was the Sartip, Nur Muhammad Khan, son of Talmur Khan. He had been on bad terms with the Kabul party for many years, and had no pension from the late Amir; nevertheless, he led the tribal cavalry to resist our advance and commanded at the affair near Takht-i-Pul on the 4th January 1879. He fled to Farrah with Mir Afzal Khan, but returned when Sirdar Sher Ali came down from Kabul, and was apparently one of his warmest supporters. His treachery in going over to Ayub was quite unexpected, and a great blow to the Wali, who had trusted him implicitly. He has a numerous family, including one very able son, Sher Muhammad Khan.

Sirdar Ghulam Muhaiuddin Khan, son of Kuhndil Khan, is a debauchee prematurely aged. He had little influence or property in the province, but enjoyed a very large pension, nearly Rupees 50,000 per annum. He fled with Mir Afzal to Farrah, and returned with the Sartip towards Kandahar; but, instead of coming into the town, halted at a village a few miles distant, and sent in to Sirdar Sher Ali demanding the order (*barat*) for his pension. This, he was told, would not be given unless he came for it, on which he retired again to Farrah, which he left with Mir Afzal for Persia. He has two grown-up sons. One, Dastgir Khan, deserted the Wali and went over to Ayub. The other, Nasir Jan, frightened at a demonstration made against him by the military authorities on some false information, fled to the hills, whence he went to Ayub Khan's camp; but he took no active part against us, and is only waiting my permission to come in to Kandahar.

Sirdar Gul Muhammad Khan, son of Muhammad Sadik Khan, and grandson of Kuhndil Khan, is our sincerest partizan out of the Wali's family. He has large property and considerable influence on the Helmand. I put him at Girishk in March 1879 as a sort of Governor, and he was very useful in keeping the country quiet and in obtaining information. He is not a very warm friend of the Wali, and would, I believe, prefer our annexing the country to any other arrangement.

The paucity of influential chiefs among the Duranis of Kandahar has often been a matter of wonder to me, and I have spoken much on the subject to such leading men as there are. They admit that all the tribes and subdivisions of tribes had recognised heads under the Sadozais, and say that the *Khan Khels*, as they were called, are still known. In many cases, however, they have fallen into obscurity, and in one only have retained their old position. This solitary exception is Ahmad Khan of Lash-Jowain, head of the Ishakzai clan, who is allowed the title of Sirdar and enjoys semi-independence at Lash Jowain. No doubt the strength of their fortified capital and its vicinity to the Persian frontier have alone enabled the family to retain its position. The present chief Sirdar, Ahmad Khan, is not an old man, but is paralyzed. The family have always been well affected towards the British Government, and I have been in constant friendly communication with the Sirdar and his eldest son, Shamsuddin Khan. A younger son was sent by him to the Wali with a few sowars in June last, and was in Kandahar during the siege. Another son, either of his own accord or to keep up relations with both parties, joined Ayub Khan, and was present at Maiwand and Kandahar. After the battle of Mazra he returned to Lash Jowain, where he had a quarrel with his eldest brother, Shamsuddin Khan, and shot him dead. Not long afterwards I received a letter from Sirdar Ahmad Khan informing me of Shamsuddin's death, and of his having made his uncle, Muhammad Hasan Khan, his heir, to the exclusion of his younger sons.

In Kandahar and the neighbourhood the most important and influential man among the Duranis of late years was no doubt Fathi Khan, Achakzai. The family have been actively employed in the service of the reigning family, whether Sadozai or Muhammadzai, for more than a century, and have taken a leading part in events. Fathi Khan was Governor of his native province for about two years under the late Amir, having succeeded in procuring the disgrace of Sirdar Sher Ali Khan, the present Wali, who had held it for many years. He was disgraced in his turn and kept under open arrest at

Kabul till the British occupation. He made frequent requests to be allowed to return to Kandahar, but at the Wali's request I asked General Stewart to retain him in Kabul. His son, Muhammad Hasan Khan, and nephew, Haidar Khan, took an active part against us during the siege, and are still in hiding on the Helmand. Fathi Khan's object in wishing to return to Kandahar was no doubt to intrigue in favour of the sons of the late Amir. He was an unpopular Governor, less from what he did than from having been the first under whom nominees from Kabul managed the revenue of the province.

Other members of the same family are Muhammad Aslam Khan of Kalah Abdullah, now under arrest at Jacobabad; and Haji Sarbuland Khan, who has done us good service throughout our occupation.

A second family of great importance is known as the Shahghassi Khel; they are Barakzais, but not of the reigning family, and have large estates in Tirin. Having, however, been generally employed at Kabul and in Turkistan, they are not much known in Kandahar. Their chief is the Luinab Khushdil Khan, formerly Governor of Balkh. He is about thirty years of age, and said to be a great debauchee. He is now in Herat with Ayub Khan. His younger brother, Yusuf Khan, was sent by Ayub to Farrah after Mir Afzal Khan left it, and is said to have been a man of talent and character. He was killed on the 12th August during a sortie.

A first-cousin of these is the Shahghassi Sarwar Khan. As is so common in Afghanistan, he was on very bad terms with his relation, the Luinab, and entered the Wali's service. He was not in Kandahar during the siege, but took no part against us, and is now in Tirin making arrangements for sending in supplies.

The most influential family resident in Kandahar is, perhaps, that of Taj Muhammad Khan, Popalzai, and his brothers, Ghulam Muhammad Khan and Fathi Muhammad Khan. The two latter have been in Kandahar since our arrival, and took measures to protect the arsenal from the mob during the two days that elapsed between Mir Afzal's flight and our entry. Ghulam Muhammad Khan is in Kandahar, and Fathi Muhammad has been for the last six weeks in Khakrez, collecting and grinding wheat, and sending it in to me here.

Taj Muhammad Khan, the eldest brother, is a man of considerable capacity, and accompanied Sirdar Sher Ali Khan from Kabul as principal adviser. They are not on such good terms now, Taj Muhammad's advice not having been taken on two occasions, in both of which he was certainly in the right. He would not take employment under us unless he knew we were going to remain in the country.

This really concludes the list of prominent Durani Chiefs in Kandahar proper. Across the Helmand there are several in Zamindawar, on the Helmand and in Farrah. The first-named district is almost exclusively inhabited by Alizais, but none of their chiefs have the same paramount authority that was enjoyed by Akhtar Khan forty years ago. His son, Dost Muhammad Khan, head of the Hasan-zai sept, has comparatively little influence. Majid Khan, Chief of the Khaluzais, last of the three septs of the Alizais, rebelled against the Wali in May last, was defeated, and died on the way to Herat. The most influential man after him is Sahib Khan, head of the Pirzais, who sent his brother in to me two days ago, offering his services. He has been asked to come in to Kandahar, bringing as many others as possible. Najibullah Khan, though his relation, Dost Muhammad, is the head of the Hasan-zais, enjoys greater influence. Abdul Rahim Khan, also a Hasan-zai, is a man of importance. Mukhtar Khan, Pirzai, and Taimur Shah Khan, Khaluzai, are said to be influential chiefs. These are the only men of rank and influence in Zamindawar, though there are a number of minor chiefs who accompanied them to Kandahar in the two visits they paid to General Stewart. All are now in Zamindawar, but may shortly be expected in Kandahar.

It may be noted, however, that, though the Alizai Chiefs of Zamindawar hold a high position among the Duranis, they have notoriously little real power over their clansmen, the most turbulent race in this part of the country. Abubekr, popularly known as "the thief" (dozd), has become a very prominent personage in the last two years. He is an Alizai, but of low origin, and until March 1879 was only known by his exploits on the high road. In that month he murdered Colonel Moore's Munshi at Haidarabad on the Helmand, and shortly afterwards followed General Biddulph's rear guard to Kushk-i-Nakhud, with a mob of 1,500 ghazis and villagers. After the defeat by Colonel Malcolmson he hung about Kandahar for some time; but when the Alizai chiefs gave in their submission returned to Zamindawar, where he was falsely reported to have been killed by a fall from his horse. He took part in the rebellion against the Wali in May, and was very active against us in July and August. He is said to be about 40 years of age, and is no doubt an enterprising partisan leader. After the battle of Mazra he

collected a band of Ayub's dispersed regulars and began his old trade of highway robbery, but was forced to leave the country by the Alizai Chiefs, unwilling to do anything to bring an army on them. He has now gone to Herat.

The minor chiefs among the Duranis on this side of the Helmand are very numerous. On reference to a transcript from the Amir's pay list for the year 1878, made when I first arrived, I find that 48 Barakzais, nine Achakzais, 26 Alikozais, two Ishakzais, two Alizais, 15 Popalzais, and six Nurzais, drew pay for tribal sowars from the treasury. Of these the principal are the following:—

Barakzai-Muhammadzais—Hasanuddin Khan, the brother of Saifuddin Khan, who while alive was the most influential man in Maruf, where Hasanuddin has still some authority. Is a man of 45, and has not been to Kandahar since our arrival.

Habibullah Khan, nephew of the Sartip Nur Muhammad, took an active part against us lately, but more from enmity to the Wali and affection for his uncle, who is also his father-in-law, than dislike to us. He is in Tirin, and has written asking for pardon and orders. He is a man of capacity. I have told him to remain quietly in his home and send us supplies.

Abdul Kadir Khan lives near Kandahar, where he still is.

Muhammad Alan Khan, formerly Kotwal of the city, a clever man, and made himself very useful to us. Being suspected of intriguing with Ayub's party, both before and after the siege, he was placed in arrest. No proof being forthcoming, he has been released.

Barakzai-Umarkhanzai—Saifullah Khan, a man of some influence at Maruf.

Barakzai-Malikdinzai—Saifuddin Khan, also at Maruf, where he is the most influential man.

Barakzai-Angozai—Amir Muhammad Khan and Muhammad Umar Khan reside near Kandahar, and have occasionally been employed in Government service.

Alikozai tribe—Shahghassi Muhammad Jan, a man of 70, and of considerable influence amongst his fellow tribesmen, who are very numerous about Kandahar, lives in Kandahar.

Nur Muhammad Khan, a man of 50, lives at Panjwai, 15 miles from Kandahar down the Arghandab.

Majid Khan, about 60 years of age, lives at Minara, six miles from Kandahar.

Nurzai—Muhammad Umar Khan, son of Sirdar Ahmad Khan, is about 45 years old, lives for the most part in the city.

The only remaining notables among the Duranis of Southern Afghanistan are on the Helmund and in Farrah. A considerable section of the Barakzais is located on the banks of the former at and below Girishk. Its Chiefs are—

Yar Muhammad Khan, Angizai, a man of 40, possessed of considerable influence; he paid me a visit last year, but joined Ayub Khan after Maiwand. He has left his home on the Helmund and gone towards Khash. Agha Jan Khan, Angizai, Muhammad Hasan Khan, and Muhammad Husain Khan, brothers, Malikdinzais, are also men of consideration. Sultan Muhammad Khan, Khanchehzai about 45 years old, is the principal man of his sept. He visited me in Kandahar last year and is now at his village on the Helmund near Kalah-i-Bist.

Fathi Muhammad Khan, also a Khanchehzai, has nearly, if not quite, as much influence as the last.

Minor chiefs of the same sept are—

Musa Khan and Ahmad Khan.

At Naozad, a place not shown on any of our maps, but which is on the north-west border of Zamindawar, and appears to be the most important in that part of the country, a Barakzai named Jabar Khan is said to be a man of wealth and importance.

The most numerous tribe of Duranis beyond the Helmund are the Nurzais; their principal man is Muhammad Umar Khan, who resides at Farrah, where he has more influence than any other chief. He accompanied Ayub to Kandahar, and has, I believe, returned to his home.

(Signed)

O. ST. JOHN, Lieut.-Col.,
Resident, Southern Afghanistan.

Kandahar, 3rd November 1880.

No. 4.

No. 17 of 1881.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's
Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Fort William, February 2, 1881.

WE have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's Despatch, No. 46, of the 19th November last, regarding the withdrawal of British troops from Kuram and the Khyber Pass.

2. Her Majesty's Government, in assenting to the proceedings of the Government of India, reported by our former despatch, desire to be informed in whose possession the Peiwar Kotal remains, as the papers before them do not indicate with clearness whether that position is within the lands of the Jajis or those of the Turis.

3. We have the honour to inform your Lordship that the Kotal is within the lands of the Jajis. The Turis used to hold the valley to a point a little above the village of Peiwar, and there has always been a strong feeling of antagonism between the two tribes in regard to the upper portion of the Pass, so much so that at one time the posts upon the Kotal were held for both by a small body of independent Mangals located there for this express purpose. But there can be no question that the Kotal is within the recognised nominal limits of Jaji territory, and as a matter of fact the Jajis at once took possession when our troops left it. We have no information to show whether the posts are now held by the local levies or by the Amir's regular troops, but the ridge is believed to be in the possession of the Kabul Government, and is certainly not held by the Turis.

We have, &c.
(Signed) RIPON.
F. P. HAINES.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON.
JAMES GIBBS.
D. M. STEWART.
E. BARING.

No. 5.

No. 22 of 1881.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE the MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's
Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Fort William, February 2, 1881.

IN our despatch of the 19th January last,* we reported the correspondence which had taken place, up to that date, with the Amir Abdul Rahman in connexion with the affairs of Kandahar.

* No. 10.

2. The Amir did not reply immediately to the Viceroy's letter to him of the 7th January; and information received from Kabul indicated that he had been disappointed by the adjournment of the interview proposed by him. But it appeared to the Government of India to be important that His Highness should be placed, without delay, in possession of the general views and intentions of the British Government with regard to Kandahar; since the time for discussing them is materially limited by the prospect of an early withdrawal of the British forces from South Afghanistan. On the 30th January, therefore, the Viceroy addressed to the Amir the letter, of which a copy is herewith inclosed, explaining the basis upon which the Government of India are prepared to enter into arrangements for making over the Kandahar province, at the departure of the British troops, to the Government of the Amir of Kabul.

3. This letter had scarcely issued when a telegram was received from Peshawur, communicating the substance of a reply sent by the Amir to the Viceroy's letter of

the 7th January. There appears, however, to be in this letter, so far as can be judged from the abbreviation, nothing which might require the Viceroy's last letter to His Highness to be detained or modified.

We have, &c.
 (Signed) RIPON.
 F. P. HAINES.
 W. STOKES.
 A. R. THOMPSON.
 JAMES GIBBS.
 D. M. STEWART.
 E. BARING.

Enclosure in No. 5.

From His Excellency the VICEROY and GOVERNOR-GENERAL of India to His Highness
 AMIR ABDUL RAHMAN KHAN, Amir of Kabul.

Fort William, January 30, 1881.

IN my letter of the 7th January to your Highness, I explained the reasons which constrained me to consider advisable the adjournment of the personal interview proposed to me by your Highness' friendly letter of the 28th December. And I repeated my earnest recommendation that, if there were no great objection, a confidential agent should be sent by your Highness to my Government in India.

2. There has as yet been scarcely time for the arrival of your Highness' answer. But it is clear that correspondence with Kabul is uncertain, and in a former letter your Highness mentioned the difficulty of selecting a perfectly competent representative. And since it has become necessary that the British troops should move out of Kandahar in the early spring, any further delay in acquainting your Highness with the policy and wishes of the British Government might be prejudicial to your Highness' interests. I therefore address your Highness again without waiting for a reply to my last letter, and I desire to place you, as fully as is possible through the medium of a letter, in possession of the views of the British Government with regard to the future government of Kandahar.

3. The Government of Her Majesty the Queen Empress recognize that it is desirable, in the province of Kandahar as it was in Northern Afghanistan, to assist, if this be found possible within a limited time, in the establishment, before the departure of the British troops from Kandahar, of some settled administration in that province. They would contemplate with satisfaction the restoration of Kandahar to the dominions of Afghanistan, and they will agree to the extension over the province of your Highness' authority. If, therefore, your Highness is willing at once to undertake measures for receiving from the British officers at Kandahar, as last year at Kabul, the charge of the administration, it is important that your Highness should lose no time in completing preparations necessary for occupying Kandahar and establishing your government there. The British Government are, on their side, ready to admit your officers, to declare their recognition of your government when established, and generally to assist your Highness, in the same manner as they assisted you at Kabul, by a subsidy of money at Kandahar, and by the present of some artillery and other munitions of war. They will also exert influence with the Sirdars of the country to induce them to adhere to your Government.

4. If on receipt of this letter your Highness determines, as I hope, to accept and act upon this offer, you should take measures for moving toward Kandahar whatever forces you may think necessary; and Colonel St. John, my resident at Kandahar, should receive direct information by an agent of your plans and movements. It is also manifestly expedient that your Highness should send me very early notice of your intentions.

No. 6.

To His Excellency the MOST HONOURABLE THE GOVERNOR GENERAL OF INDIA
IN COUNCIL.

No. 10.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

London, February 11, 1881.

I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of the letter from your Excellency's Government, No. 3 of 12th ultimo, explaining the circumstances under which Sirdar Shere Ali Khan has retired from his position of Wali of Kandahar, and the arrangements sanctioned by your Excellency in Council for the accommodation and sustenance of the Sirdar and his family at Kurrachee.

2. Having so recently laid before you in my despatch of the 11th November last the views of Her Majesty's Government on the general question of the disposition of Kandahar and the future administration of the province, it is sufficient now to say that they entirely approve the proceedings of your Government in the matters under report.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HARTINGTON.

No. 7.

No. 27 of 1881. (Extract.)

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's
Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Fort William, February 14, 1881.

IN continuation of our despatch of the 2nd February,* we have the honour to enclose, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of the
* No. 22. reply, referred to in the 3rd paragraph of that despatch, sent by the Amir of Kabul to the Viceroy's letter, dated 7th January. The Amir's reply is dated January 26th, and it will be seen that His Highness agrees to depute an agent to confer with the Government of India, although no authority is given to him to decide or settle anything. The agent named is General Amir Ahmad Khan, of whose arrival on the frontier of India we have not yet heard.

2. We also enclose copies of telegraphic correspondence with the Resident at Kandahar on the subject of the transfer of Kelat-i-Ghilzai to the Government of the Amir of Kabul. It will be seen that Muhammad Sadik Khan, the Ghilzai Chief, who now holds Kelat-i-Ghilzai temporarily on our behalf, has written that he has been ordered by the Amir to leave a representative in the place, and to go himself to Kabul. But as it seemed inadvisable that the fortress should be made over to any one not specially nominated or appointed by the Amir, Muhammad Sadik Khan has been instructed to reply to the Amir that he will await the arrival of the Amir's officer; and the Viceroy has addressed a letter direct to the Amir of Kabul in explanation of the orders which have been issued.

3. We enclose also copy of a telegram received from Kandahar informing us that Sirdar Ayub Khan is sending messengers to our Resident there. We have instructed Colonel St. John to receive them civilly, but to inform them that no overtures on their part concerning Kandahar can be entertained.

We have, &c.

(Signed)

RIPON.

F. P. HAINES.

W. STOKES.

A. R. THOMPSON.

JAMES GIBBS.

D. M. STEWART.

E. BARING.

Enclosure 1 in No. 7.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from the AMIR of KABUL to the Address of His Excellency the VICEROY, dated 26th January 1881.

After compliments.—I have received your Excellency's very kind letter, dated the 7th January 1881, and mastered its contents from the beginning to the end. The friendly sentiments expressed in your Excellency's letter with a view to consolidate the basis of friendship and concord between the two sublime Governments, and your Excellency's good wishes for the prosperity of my State and the permanence of my government, have indeed afforded me great pleasure and comfort, and caused me both inward and outward satisfaction. I highly appreciate the divers kindnesses of the illustrious Imperial Government, and most gratefully acknowledge its daily increasing favours, and confidently hope that as long as I live I shall not, please God, propose, think of, or determine anything which may be against the will and wish of the representatives of the illustrious Government.

As regards the postponement of the proposed interview between your Excellency and me, for the several reasons explained by your Excellency, to some other time and to a favourable opportunity, and with respect to your Excellency's wishing me to depute an agent to India for the purpose of preliminary discussions regarding Afghanistan, I have, agreeably to the wishes of the representatives of the sublime Government, appointed to this service General Amir Ahmad Khan, whom I thought a loyal, truthful, proper, and worthy man. But he is authorised and empowered only to carefully listen to the proposals of the representatives of the sublime Government, and to report to me the facts and the substance of the discussions, but not to settle and decide anything with the representatives of the sublime Government according to his own opinion, since the affairs of Afghanistan are embarrassed to such an extent and degree that they cannot be set to rights through anyone but myself. The reason why I asked with urgency for, and insisted on, an interview, and why I still do so, is that I wish that the first stone of the foundation of the structure of sincere friendship between the two Governments be so firmly and strongly laid that it should not, for hundreds of years, see the face of destruction or suffer desolation. I still confidently hope that a friendly interview will take place between your Excellency and myself at some convenient time and on a suitable occasion, and that our affairs will be arranged according to our wishes. I am exceedingly thankful to the sublime British Government for their allowing me to take in hand the administration of Khelat-i-Ghilzai, which act of kindness they have done for the advancement of my State, and I sincerely hope that they take great interest in my welfare and prosperity.

Regarding the arms and ammunition, which had been plundered or destroyed, I had a talk with Mr. Lepel Griffin during the interview I had with him at Zimma. I feel certain that he has made your Excellency fully aware of the circumstance. Since the last six months I have been endeavouring to collect the guns, and I have succeeded in procuring some, which, after being repaired, will prove useful.

As regards the ammunition, I have none. The two lead mines in the neighbourhood of Kabul have not been worked during the last two years of confusion and anarchy, and the people have no lead in store which might be taken. This being the winter season, no gunpowder can be manufactured; and the little ammunition I require I procure with the greatest difficulty. I therefore expect, as a friend, that your Excellency will be pleased to grant me whatever quantity of ammunition your Excellency may think proper, and to strengthen me as soon as possible.

I am resolved upon two things, from which I will never swerve. *First*, I will never undertake anything without the consent of the British Government. *Second*, I will keep the British Government informed at all times of the state of affairs in Afghanistan, whether good or bad, exactly as it is, without any addition or diminution.

Enclosure 2 in No. 7.

From Lieutenant-Colonel W. G. WATERFIELD, C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur Division, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated 4th February 1881.

FORWARDS a memorandum regarding General Amir Ahmad Khan.

AMIR AHMAD KHAN is the son of Shahabuddin Khan, who went from Hindustan to Kabul in 1830, and there took service with Dost Muhammad Khan, at that time a Sirdar in Kabul. When Dost Muhammad was sent to India, Shahabuddin Khan remained in Kabul. On Dost Muhammad's return as Amir he appointed each of Shahabuddin's two sons to offices in the artillery, sending Amir Ahmad Khan, whom the present memorandum concerns, to Turkistan to serve as General of artillery under Sirdar Muhammad Afzal Khan, father of the present Amir, and then in charge of Turkistan. Sirdar Muhammad Afzal Khan, however, became displeased with Amir Ahmad Khan, having heard that he was teaching Abdul Rahman, the present Amir, to smoke opium, &c.; Amir Ahmad Khan, therefore, left for Kabul. Shere Ali Khan, who, though only heir-apparent, had considerable power, then appointed him to a post in the artillery. Subsequently, during his contest with Afzal Khan for power, Shere Ali Khan became suspicious of the two brothers, and on his return from India gave them no office, but made them some small allowance.

Since then Amir Ahmad Khan and his brother do not appear to have been heard of, and have, perhaps, lived in obscurity.

Peshawur, the 4th February 1881.

(Signed) W. G. WATERFIELD,
Commissioner and Superintendent,
Peshawur Division.

Enclosure 3 in No. 7.

TELEGRAM, dated 7th February 1881.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta.

MUHAMMAD SADIK KHAN writes from Kelat-i-Ghilzai that a letter has reached him from Amir (that) that place has been given to him by (the) English, and ordering him to leave a representative there and come himself to Kabul. Muhammad Sadik asks for orders.

I propose to tell him that it is true we have given Kelat-i-Ghilzai to Amir, and that if he thinks he can safely leave fort in charge of any one else he had better go to Kabul, but, if not, to write that if he leaves before Amir sends a governor and troops there fort may be taken possession of by Ayub's party.

Enclosure 4 in No. 7.

TELEGRAM, dated 9th February 1881.

From FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta, to Colonel ST. JOHN, Kandahar.

Your telegram 7th. Muhammad Sadik should be instructed to reply to Amir that British authorities have directed him to make over Kelat-i-Ghilzai only to a governor nominated by Amir; therefore, pending receipt of Amir's further orders, or arrival of governor, he will hold the place for Amir. Letter in this sense goes direct from hence to Amir.

Enclosure 5 in No. 7.

TELEGRAM, dated 7th February 1881.

From Colonel ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta.

A MESSENGER has just arrived from Herat, in six days, bringing letter from Ayub, dated 31st January, announcing departure on that day for (Kandahar?) of Abdulla Khan, Nasiri, and Omar Jan, Sahibzada, as envoys.

Enclosure 6 in No. 7.

TELEGRAM, dated 9th February 1881.

From FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta, to Colonel ST. JOHN, Kandahar.

YOUR telegram 7th. Ayub's envoys may have civil reception, but should be informed that you can entertain no negotiations about Kandahar, and Viceroy desires you to be strictly careful that your language shall hold out no hope to them present or prospective thereupon. You will consider how long envoys can be safely permitted in interests of our present policy to stay at Kandahar.

Enclosure 7 in No. 7.

Dated, Fort William, 11th February 1881.

From His Excellency the VICEROY and GOVERNOR-GENERAL in India to His Highness AMIR ABDUL RAHMAN KHAN, the Amir of Kabul.

THE British Resident at Kandahar has reported to me by telegraph that a letter from your Highness has reached Muhammad Sadik Khan, who is now holding charge of the fort of Kelat-i-Ghilzai. It is understood to be your Highness' wish that Muhammad Sadik Khan should place a representative in charge of the fort, and should himself proceed to Kabul.

I am glad that your Highness has taken such early steps for assuming charge of Kelat-i-Ghilzai, and it is the desire of the British Government that your Highness should be established there as soon as possible.

But for this object, and to prevent accidents or mistakes, or the danger of the place falling into the hands of your Highness' enemies, it seems advisable that the person who should receive charge of the fortress from Sadik Khan should be nominated or approved by your Highness; and Muhammad Sadik Khan has been directed, accordingly, to await your Highness' further orders on this point. He has been told that, as soon as he is informed of the person to whom your Highness would be willing that the fortress should be entrusted, he should immediately deliver charge to that person.

No. 8.

No. 39 of 1881.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Fort William, February 28, 1881.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of papers regarding the arrangements which have been sanctioned for the future security of the Khyber Pass.

2. In the despatch from the Government of India, No. 208, of the 14th September last, your Lordship was informed that we proposed to withdraw all British garrisons from the Pass, and to entrust the protection of the road to the Khyber tribes, whose independence was to be formally recognized. This proposal was accepted in your

Lordship's despatch, No. 46, dated 19th November 1880. The whole of the arrangements necessary to carry it into effect have now been completed, after long and careful negotiations with the tribal representatives, and we trust that they will be approved by Her Majesty's Government. The total cost to the British revenues will be under two lakhs of rupees per annum—the sum of Rupees 87,540 being given in allowances to the different sections of the Afridis, and Rupees 87,392 being allotted to the payment of a corps of Jezailchis which the tribes desire to maintain. In consideration of these payments the Afridis have covenanted to undertake entire and exclusive responsibility for the freedom and security of the road, and to occupy with the Jezailchis Ali Masjid and other important posts as far as Lundikhana. Beyond this point their responsibility does not extend, Lundikhana being the defined western limit of the independent tribal territory in which, for the purpose of keeping open and free of interruption the passes into India, the authority of the Kabul Government is not recognized.

3. It will be observed that the right of levying tolls upon traffic passing through the Khyber is specially reserved, by the agreement with the tribes, to the British Government. The Commissioner would defer for a few months the collection of these tolls or transit dues, but the Lieutenant-Governor is unable to see any sufficient reason for not levying them at once, upon the ground that the public will in any case look to our Government for the protection of convoys, and that the levying of tolls indicates that this responsibility (which cannot, in Sir R. Egerton's opinion, be disavowed) is accepted. There can be no doubt that a regular collection of dues by the British Government will induce the toll-payers to believe that they have secured our protection; while, conversely, to abstain from the demand may be interpreted as an admission, on our part, of some uncertainty as to whether our arrangements will effectually provide for the safety of convoys. It is, moreover, obviously desirable that the entire scheme shall be introduced and put on its trial from the beginning; nor is it improbable that if the British Government waives, even for a time, its acknowledged right to collect the tolls, they will be levied by the Afridis themselves, or by some authority beyond the territorial limits of these arrangements. We have therefore instructed the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab that on this point his opinion is accepted, and that he should issue the requisite orders, at his discretion, to the Commissioner of Peshawur.

4. With regard, however, to the question of responsibility for particular robberies committed within the Pass, our opinion does not altogether coincide with the views expressed in the 4th paragraph of the letter of the 14th February from the Punjab Government. The Commissioner, it will be observed, would at once throw upon the tribal union all responsibility for the safety of convoys traversing the pass, would decline, on the part of the Government, any direct liability to the traders in the event of losses, and would insist that the tribes must be left to protect the convoys and to award compensation for depredations. If robberies occur, the complaints are to be referred to the headmen for their remedy; the British officers assisting by their influence and advice, and holding in reserve the power, in the contingency of failure by the tribes to act up to their agreement, of stopping the allowances, disbanding the Jezailchis, and closing the pass. His Honour, the Lieutenant-Governor, on the contrary, would authorise the political officer to inquire into individual complaints, and to award the proper compensation. The view taken by the Government of India is that it is preferable, at the beginning, to follow strictly the procedure laid down by the agreement, and to refer all complaints, in the first instance, to the jirgahs. The 8th clause of the agreement appears to entrust the jirgahs with the power of award and of levying penalty, and they should have full discretion in exercising this power. If in any particular case they fail in the performance of their duty, it will be time to bring pressure to bear upon the united jirgahs of the tribes, reminding them that they have undertaken to award compensation which (when awarded) may be deducted from the allowances, and that the maintenance of the whole agreement may depend on their fulfilment of an essential condition belonging to it.

5. All these arrangements must, in our opinion, be regarded for the present as experimental, until they have undergone trial, and the result shall have been practically ascertained. If the system works well, and the tolls are regularly collected, the annual cost of securing the proper fulfilment of Colonel Waterfield's agreement with the tribes will, we submit, have been well and advantageously expended. To keep the Khyber Pass safe and open, to encourage traffic and intercourse with Afghanistan, to establish our political influence over the Afridis, and to exclude the authority of Kabul from the independent border lands, are all objects for which the money payment, if by it they can be secured, is well worth making. It is known that the Afridis have been subsidized from time immemorial by all governments to whom the management and

political control of these passes have been a matter of importance; and that the tribes consider their services to be due to the authority that undertakes payment of these subsidies.

6. The Lieutenant-Governor, in his letter to the Commissioner of the 13th December (paragraphs 4-5), lays stress on the importance of trying the system of holding the pass through Jezailchis. In that letter, and the correspondence accompanying it, all the arguments for and against the employment of Jezailchis will be found very fairly stated. The special advantage of the plan is understood to be that it will preserve unity of action among the tribes, will give a frame-work and cohesion to the intertribal arrangements, and will provide with regular employ and duties five hundred men, who might otherwise be disposed to plunder and disorder. It appears to be, moreover, the decided opinion of the frontier officers that, unless the tribes are in this manner encouraged and assisted by us in their attempts at self-organization, they must inevitably fail in combining to fulfil their joint responsibilities. We have therefore determined that the assent of the British Government may be given to the establishment of the Jezailchi corps and to the agreement that our officers shall engage to pay the men and to do what may be practicable in the way of aiding the headmen to equip and organize it. But we have stipulated that the tribal headmen must take actual charge of the corps, and of its recruiting and ordinary management; the British political officers merely assisting by advice and by their general influence, supported, of course, in this case by the understanding that the allowances are liable to be forfeited or suspended if the arrangements break down. The essential principle of the whole agreement is distinctly declared to be that the tribes undertake certain specified duties and responsibilities in exchange for certain stipulated payments.

7. The British troops now in the Khyber will be withdrawn with the least possible delay; though it is considered desirable that an alternative route between Lundikhana and Dakka, lying entirely in independent tribal territory, should be opened up before the pass is finally evacuated. We have also ordered the survey of another route through the Mohmand country, which could, in case of necessity, be used as an alternative to the whole Khyber line. But there is no reason to apprehend that these operations will retard the withdrawal of the troops beyond the close of the cold season.

8. The question of the political establishments permanently necessary for the conduct of our relations with the Khyber tribes has not been finally settled; but the estimates submitted by the Punjab Government appear to be capable of reduction.

We have, &c.

(Signed) RIPON.
F. P. HAINES.
W. STOKES.
RIVERS THOMPSON.
JAMES GIBBS.
D. M. STEWART.
E. BARING.

Enclosure 1 in No. 8.

No. 412 S., dated 6th September 1880.

From W. M. YOUNG, Esq., Secretary to the Government of Punjab, to COMMISSIONER and SUPERINTENDENT, Peshawur Division.

IN my telegrams of the 1st and 2nd September preliminary instructions were conveyed to you regarding the measures immediately necessary for giving effect to the orders of the Government of India, on the relations which will, in future, be observed with the Afridi tribes of the Khyber Pass for maintaining the road through the pass open and free of interference. I am now desired to forward copy of a letter No. 2980 E.P., dated 31st August, from the Secretary to the Government of India, in the Foreign Department, and to communicate in detail the orders of his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor in pursuance of the instructions therein contained.

2. In the first place, as explained in my telegram, Sir Robert Egerton desires that you will take the earliest opportunity of summoning the headmen of the Khyber tribes to Peshawur and explaining to them the intentions of the Government of India, so far as they are definitely communicated in the Foreign Secretary's letter. You will observe that the wording of the second paragraph of this letter differs in a few details from that of my telegram, and in so far as this difference exists you will be guided by the letter,

which is herewith forwarded in supersession of the instructions conveyed by telegram. The *Id-ul-fits*, Muhammadan festival, falls on the 7th September, and it will probably be convenient to choose an early date thereafter for assembling the Maliks in Peshawur. The summons should extend to that portion of the Shinwari tribe which holds Loargai and Lundikotal, but not to the Shinwari tribe generally, or to any of the tribes connected with the upper portion of the Khyber between Lundikotal and Dakka. In regard to this portion of the pass, the management of which is intimately affected by our relations with the Mohmands and the Mohmand Chief, the Khan of Lalpura, instructions will be separately communicated as mentioned in paragraph 5 of the Government of India letter.

3. The main facts which it will be your duty to communicate to the headmen of the tribes are contained in paragraph 2 of the letter enclosed. The British Government has determined upon keeping the pass open, and ensuring securing of life and property to travellers. In effecting this object, relations are to be maintained with the tribes to the exclusion of all other influence or interference. The independence of the tribes is at the same time to be recognised and maintained. With them will rest the responsibility of preserving order and affording security on the road, and when the Government is satisfied that their arrangements for doing so are sufficient, the troops at present located in the Khyber will be withdrawn.

4. On these points the intentions of the Government are clear, and you will have no difficulty in communicating them to the assembled Maliks. On other matters mentioned in the second paragraph of the Foreign Secretary's letter, you will not be able to proclaim the intentions of Government with equal definiteness, and on these subjects I am to convey, in some detail, Sir Robert Egerton's views, in order that your communications with the tribal representatives may be as re-assuring to them as the circumstances will permit without unduly pledging the Government to specific promises which, in the course of the discussion, may have to be somewhat modified.

5. It is stated in the letter which accompanies this reference that, in consideration of the proper performance of the duty of preserving the Khyber road open and undisturbed, the Government of India are prepared to settle with the tribes the compensation allowances that should be paid for tolls in the Khyber, although the permanent adjustment of these allowances will probably involve some modification of the present rate of compensation. In regard to this subject care will be required to avoid any misapprehension. During the occupation of Kabul by the British Government in the first Afghan war, an allowance of Rupees 1,25,000 was made to the Khyberis in consideration of their keeping the pass open. All duties levied on merchandise were realised and appropriated by the Government. After the withdrawal of the British from Afghanistan, the Amir Dost Muhammad assigned Rupees 25,000 as allowances to the heads of the tribes, but this allowance, about three years before the death of the Amir, was discontinued owing to the misconduct of the Khyberis, who did not allow free passage to all travellers. In reporting the arrangements made in 1878 for the management of the pass, the late Sir Louis Cavagnari adverted to the arrangements above described, and appears to some extent to have accepted the subsidy of Rupees 1,25,000 paid in the first Afghan war by the British Government, as the basis of his negotiations with the Afridi Maliks. The subsidy finally arranged for distribution among the tribes, adjoining the Khyber between Jamrud and Lundikotal, amounted to Rupees 87,540, of which a detail was given in my No. 1143, dated 29th October 1879, to the address of the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India. In consideration of this subsidy, the elders of each tribe signed a written deed, appointing their representative Chiefs, and set themselves to protect the Khyber road and the telegraph wire, declaring that none of the tribe should commit dacoity, or robbery, or murder in the Pass or in British territory, and expressing their willingness to pay compensation for such offences, and to restore stolen property.

6. In the measures which have been adopted at different times to induce the Khyber Maliks to guarantee the safety of the Pass, the right of the Khyber Maliks to levy tolls has never been admitted to co-exist with their receipt of the subsidy. It is necessary to keep this fact carefully in mind in giving effect to the orders of the Government of India conveyed in this letter. The claim to compensation allowances on account of tolls could only be put forward by the Khyber tribes, in the event of the subsidy being withdrawn which was intended to compensate them for the abandonment of the levy of such duties, as well as for ensuring the safety of travellers. So long as the subsidy is paid to the tribes, the right of collecting tolls, if it exists at all, rests with the British Government. In regard to the question of subsidy, you are authorised by the instructions of the Government of India to inform the tribal representatives that the arrangements under which they have engaged to maintain the security of the Pass remain intact, and the

allowances of which they are at present in receipt will be granted to them in future as long as, and provided that, they are able to secure the Pass for the passage of travellers. But it rests with the British Government to decide whether in future the right of levying tolls, which belongs to it alone in virtue of such arrangements, shall be put into exercise or not. This is one of the subjects upon which your opinion is desired, and the communications which you make to the tribes should not pledge the Government in any way in regard to its action in this matter. Sir R. Egerton is inclined upon the whole to think that, if the Government abstain from exercising its right of levying tolls, the only result will be that traffic passing through the Khyber will be taxed in other places to the full extent of the burden which the trade is capable of surviving, and that to forego the levy of tolls in the lower Khyber would only be to increase indirectly the profits of those who collect such imports further westward. If the tolls are re-imposed, a further matter for consideration will be whether the collection of them should be made over to the Afridi tribes, a corresponding reduction being made in their subsidy, or whether they should be levied by means of their agency. On these questions also the Lieutenant-Governor will be glad to receive your opinion.

7. The next point which calls for some remarks is the allusion made by the Government of India to the possible retention of Jezailchis, or similar levies for the protection and tranquillity of the Pass. You are aware that throughout the correspondence which has taken place on Khyber management, the principle has been recognised that the Afridi tribes are bound, in consideration of the subsidy which they receive, to provide for the safety of travellers, and that the entertainment of a Jezailchi corps with officers was devised as a temporary expedient, on the distinct understanding that it would be possible greatly to reduce, if not entirely to put a stop to, this charge when the arrangements entered into with the tribes should be proved sufficient for their object, and brought into full working order. In considering, therefore, what arrangements should be made by the British Government to provide levies for the future security of the Pass, this fact must be kept prominently in view, and you cannot too firmly impress upon the Afridi representatives that this duty properly falls upon them, in virtue of the obligations incurred by the receipt of handsome allowances from the Government.

The cost of the Jezailchis which is now defrayed by Government was fixed in the letter above quoted at Rupees 72,100 per annum. The late Sir Louis Cavagnari apparently contemplated that Rupees 1,25,000, the traditional sum said to have been paid as subsidy during the first Afghan war, would be the extreme limit of expenditure required to subsidize the Pass, and was of opinion that a portion of the pay of the Jezailchi corps raised during the former British occupation of Afghanistan must have been included in this amount. But the aggregate amount, which has been paid by the Government on account of Pass allowances and Jezailchis, is Rupees 1,59,640 per annum. The Government has taken upon itself the duties of safe conduct (*badagga*), which it was entitled to claim from the tribes as one of the results of the subsidy. This has been done as a temporary measure, and your aim should be to secure the full equivalent for the allowances paid in the future. To what extent it may be necessary to provide for the retention of Jezailchis or similar levies, the precise mode in which they shall be paid, and their discipline,—these are points upon which it will be your duty to report fully to Government. The question, whether it may be possible entirely to withdraw the troops from the Khyber at an early date, is one on the decision of which this subject hinges; probably for a time a more or less organized militia will be indispensable in the absence of military garrison.

8. The foregoing portion of this letter deals with subjects on which you will have either definitely or indirectly to address the Khyber Maliks when they are assembled at Peshawur. Other points noted in the Government of India letter will call for deliberation and decision as time goes on, and according as circumstances shall indicate. The first of these is the question as to the time at which it may be possible for the troops to be entirely withdrawn from the Khyber. This is a question which will depend upon the completeness of the arrangements, which you may be able to effect with the tribes for the safety of the road after their withdrawal, and upon the time which it will take to give effect to such arrangements. Upon this question the Lieutenant-Governor desires to have your opinion.

9. All other questions noted in paragraph 4 of the Government of India letter will also require your careful consideration—how the fortifications and other buildings in the Khyber shall be disposed of. It will be desirable to obtain a list of the former buildings from the military authorities, and to record your opinion regarding each.

10. As regards the westward limit to which we should extend our arrangements with the tribes for their independent charge of the road, the Lieutenant-Governor has no

doubt that Lundikhana must be included within the boundary, as otherwise the water-supply of Lundikotal will be deficient.

11. It remains to consider in what manner the political relations of the Government with the Khyber tribes shall be conducted in future. The Lieutenant-Governor is of opinion that for the present, at all events, there must be a political officer as heretofore under the orders of the Commissioner of Peshawur, whose residence it will probably be convenient to fix at Jamrud, and who should be instructed, as long as he can do so with safety, to visit the Pass from time to time, and ascertain that the arrangements for maintaining tranquillity and a free passage to travellers are sufficient.

12. Should you find it necessary to ask for further instructions in regard to the matters mentioned in paragraphs 6 and 7 of this letter with a view to explaining these matters to the tribal assemblage, I am to suggest that the telegraph may be freely used for this purpose, as an immediate solution of all doubt on these subjects is necessary. On the other points you will be able to report at more leisure when you have formed your opinion.

Enclosure 2 in No. 8.

No. 76 C.P., dated 14th September 1880.

From COMMISSIONER and SUPERINTENDENT, Peshawur Division, to W. M. YOUNG, Esq.,
Secretary to the Government of Punjab.

IN reply to your No. 412 S., dated 6th instant, forwarding a copy of letter, No. 2980 E.P., dated 31st August 1880, from the Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department, to your address, I have the honour to state that, in accordance with your telegram of the 1st instant, I at once summoned the full jirgahs of the tribes concerned, to meet me at Peshawur on the 14th instant. I may note here incidentally that this summons will prove to some extent a test of the influence exercised among the Khyber Afridis by Sayad Mir Bashir, who has lately been agitating in Tirah, and of his position towards us; should the latter be, now, one of declared hostility, and should full jirgahs of every clan come to Peshawur in defiance of his attempts to prevent their compliance with my summons, it may be presumed that his authority is on the wane.

Upon arrival of the representatives of the tribes, the wishes of Government will be communicated to them as indicated in the instructions received from the Government of India.

2. My telegram, however, of the 11th instant to your address will have explained how the objects, that have to be attained, concurrent with the relinquishment by our troops of the Khyber Pass seem to me to be two—the first being the maintenance of our relations with the Khyber Afridis to the exclusion of influence or interference from any other quarter, while at the same time their independence continues recognised as heretofore; and the second being the continuance of the existing arrangements with them for keeping the Khyber Pass open for trade, modified as circumstances may now require owing to the withdrawal of our troops.

3. The Government is, I know, aware of the difficulties attendant upon the attempt to effect a coalition of the Afridi tribes concerned, in a systematic engagement for the independent management of the Pass.

Of the strength and stability of the tribal combination and of the measures proposed by the Afridis for the management of the Pass, we shall scarcely be able to form an accurate opinion until our troops have actually quitted the Khyber, and the system has been put to the test of practical working. Having regard to this element of uncertainty I am inclined to think that it may be advisable to disconnect the question of maintenance of exclusive relations with the Afridis from a matter that may assume various phases and the arrangements regarding which may be liable to change. The permanence of our relations with the Afridis is of essential importance, yet it cannot fail to be injuriously affected, if interlated with the question of Pass management by the tribes alone. For this reason, and in order to separate the two objects to be attained, I intended to suggest that the Government assuming the former position of the Amirs of Kabul with the Afridis should grant to them certain comparatively small subsidies quite irrespective of, and distinct from, any sum to be paid to the tribes as compensation allowance for keeping open the Khyber.

Thus whatever vicissitudes befall the management of the Pass and the compensation allowance, the maintenance of exclusive relations would remain unaffected.

4. It seemed to me that should the Afridis perceive the withdrawal of our troops from the Khyber to be conditional upon their decision regarding arrangements for the Pass, it was to be apprehended that they might endeavour to make capital, for party purposes, out of this fact, and that it would materially bias their decision. Yet to construct the durable tribal combination which is to work the object in view, it would seem important to exclude such influences, leaving the tribes to be guided by their pecuniary interests. Another possible aspect of the question seemed to be that the Afridis believing us desirous of quitting the Pass might stand out, trading on our supposed anxiety for retirement, and endeavour to dictate terms.

5. I considered that it would materially conduce to the possible success of the negotiations, if the tribes understood that our movements were not dependent upon their conduct, and that although it would be most desirable for purposes of trade, to keep open the Pass, yet that failure on their part to effect this need not necessarily lead to a re-occupation of the Pass, but might, according to circumstances, perhaps cause the total and permanent extinction of their compensation allowance, and the closing of the Khyber and the opening of other and parallel trade routes with Afghanistan such as through the Mohmand country in which they have no interests, and from which they can derive no benefits. The hand of Government would not then be tied in any way, no party among the Afridis could work on our relinquishment or re-occupation of the Pass for its own ends, and the only forces capable of producing coherence among the tribes after withdrawal of our troops, *viz.*, doubts as to the action we should under these circumstances take, and self-interest in retaining the compensation allowance in preference to other tribes profiting by the opening of parallel trade routes, would be appealed to.

6. The reply of the Government by telegram, does not, I think, meet my view of possible difficulties, but the instructions given will be of course carefully adhered to.

It seems to me possible that the Maliks, with the object of retaining troops in the Pass, and their present position and allowances, may plead difficulties in exclusive tribal management, or that under pressure from those who are not profiting by and are not interested in our occupation, they may declare their ability and willingness to keep the Pass open and safe as we desire, with the object of securing our departure in the belief that we shall not return, or that influenced by our supposed anxiety to withdraw from the Pass, they may bid for more favourable terms. The presence of our troops suffices to keep open the Pass, and until they have actually withdrawn, the tribal arrangements cannot come into working order. Should they fail, the Pass may become unsafe. The Government should, I think, consider now what it will do under contingencies that may not impossibly arise.

Quite agreeing with his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor that the tribes may be anxious to make satisfactory arrangements and may start them, we must reflect how we shall act in the possible event of failure.

7. It was on this account that I suggested in my telegram that we should keep separate two matters, which perhaps it may be better to call independent of each other. If difficulties arise in the Pass, and we have to withhold the compensation allowance, it might be still wise and very advisable to continue the tribal subsidies, and hold the tribes to us; we should thus keep up continuous influence in the tribe, through which the Pass arrangements might be again brought straight.

8. It will be a matter of some time and trouble for such a large body as the Afridis to work out a system that will have to meet with the approval of a preponderating section of the tribe, and it was on this account that it seemed to me advisable to think now whether it would not be better to give them a sufficient period within which to complete their arrangements, and then to withdraw the troops, throwing the entire responsibility of the road upon them, and leaving them to be guided by their own interests (as I have little doubt they will be) in doing their best to keep open the trade route and secure the compensation for transit dues. We should test their capabilities, humour their spirit of independence, and yet be able at any time to act as we may find convenient.

Enclosure 3 in No. 8.

No. 486 S., dated 20th September 1880.

From W. M. YOUNG, Esq., Secretary to the Government of Punjab, to
COMMISSIONER and SUPERINTENDENT, Peshawur Division.

I AM desired to acknowledge receipt of your No. 76 C.P., dated 14th September, on Khyber Pass arrangements.

2. Your telegram of the 18th current announces the arrival and reception in Durbar at Peshawur of 180 Khyber Maliks, from which fact his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor gathers that full jirgahs of every clan have come in to receive the communications of Government, and that no adverse influence has availed to hinder them.

3. On the subject to which reference is made in paragraphs 4 and 5 of your letter, the instructions of his Honour conveyed in my No. 412, dated 6th instant, will have sufficiently informed you. It was never intended that the Khyber Maliks should be given to understand that, in default of their making satisfactory arrangements for the safety of the Pass, the troops would be retained there. But any doubt which may have existed in your mind on this subject after a perusal of my letter of the 6th September, will have been removed by the Government of India letter conveyed with my No. 475 S., dated 18th September, and there is no need to dwell further on the subject than to state that Sir Robert Egerton concurs with your views as expressed in paragraphs 4 and 5 of your letter under reply, which are in accordance with the test of the instructions contained in paragraph 2 of the Government of India letter No. 2980 E.P., dated 31st August last.

4. With your proposals regarding the treatment of the allowances to the tribesmen, the Lieutenant-Governor is not able to agree. His Honour understands that you would propose to pay small subsidies, equivalent in amount, or nearly so, to those paid by the Amirs of Kabul in former times to the headmen, as a sort of retaining fee for their allegiance, independent of their success in keeping open the Pass and protecting traffic, and that the further payment of tribal subsidies should depend on these last-named considerations. The Lieutenant-Governor is not prepared to accept this arrangement. His Honour is not aware of any advantage to be gained by payments to the Afridis, except the security of the Pass road, and unless this is effected, there appears to be no excuse for making such payments. The headmen who would receive their allowances, independently of the consideration whether they kept the Pass open, would no doubt maintain professions of friendship, while their tribesmen might be committing raids and making the road impassable.

5. On the subject, therefore, of the future subsidizing of the Khyber Afridis, I am to request that you will be guided by the above remarks, and by the line of policy laid down in my No. 412 S., dated 6th September last.

Enclosure 4 in No. 8.

No. 5030 P., dated 9th November 1880.

From Lieut.-Col. W. G. WATERFIELD, C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent,
Peshawar Division, to SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, Punjab.

IN continuation of my No. 76 C.P., dated 14th September 1880, to your address, I have the honour to report as follows upon the preliminary negotiations with the maliks and representatives of the Khyber Afridis in regard to the proposals for arrangements to keep the Pass open in independent charge of the tribes upon the withdrawal of British troops.

2. My telegram of the 18th September has acquainted you with the arrival at Peshawar on that date of 180 maliks and greybeards of the Khyber Afridis and Loargi Shinwaris. Subsequently their number was swelled to 314, by later arrivals from the more distant parts of Bara and Maidan. The summons to fetch them had been somewhat hurried, and not much time could be given to the Afridis, who are at present many miles distant in Tirah and busy with the autumn harvest, for the collecting of a large number of influential men. But for the purpose of being informed of the proposals of Government the tribes were adequately represented.

3. Shortly after arrival I met the maliks and representatives of the tribes, and after a few introductory remarks, informed them that they had been summoned to hear certain wishes of Government, which I then proceeded to explain. They were told that

their relations with the British Government, to the exclusion of all other influence or interference, would be continued, and their independence would, as heretofore, be recognised; that although British troops would, for the present, remain at their stations in the Pass, they might, and in all probability would, be soon withdrawn, independently of, and not in connexion with, any reply that they might now make to Government, and without any reference to their present or future attitude; that the action of Government in this matter was perfectly free and dependent upon weightier issues and broader considerations than the comparatively unimportant matters connected with the Khyber Pass; that should British troops be withdrawn, the Government intended to maintain in force, subject to such modification as might be required, the existing arrangements with the Afridis for holding the independent charge of the Khyber Pass and keeping it open and free of interference; and that, in consideration of proper performance of these duties, the Government was prepared to settle with the tribes compensation allowances for tolls reasonably chargeable on trade passing through the Khyber.

The proposals were stated to them at some length, and they were invited to discuss them and ask for explanation, where required, from me and the Political Officer in charge of the Khyber, and to meet me again a few days afterwards when they had thoroughly considered the new arrangements.

4. Before the meeting broke up, two or three of the leading maliks, especially Abdulla Nur Khan, Kuki Khel, spoke at some length touching upon the points I had mentioned. All stipulated that they should be permitted to return to their homes in order fully to discuss everything with their tribes. They had come more or less ignorant of the intentions of Government, and could not return a reply, binding upon the tribes or concurred in by all, without consultation with the main body; that, in fact, they were not prepared to give a definite answer on the spot. This request to be permitted to consult with their tribesmen present and absent being reasonable and proper, was conceded to. The speakers then proceeded to point out that it was impossible for the Afridis to keep open the Pass themselves, that therefore they could not undertake independent charge of the Khyber; in fact, that the proposals regarding Pass arrangements subsequent upon the withdrawal of troops were impracticable, and would not be accepted by them; that they could not, by reason of internal feuds and want of concord and the evil habits of Afridis as a nation, keep the Pass open for traffic themselves, and would not engage to do so; that failure in carrying out their engagements would cover them with shame and give rise to imputations of bad faith. Finally, they said if the Afridis were able to keep open the Pass themselves they would have done so long ago for the sake of the profits arising from transit dues, but that they had not been able to do this.

In reply, I told them to confer together and with me and the Khyber Political Officer in charge of the Khyber, and meet me a few days hence.

5. On the 26th September I again met the jirgas. In reply to my remarks that they had had full opportunity for clearing up doubtful points, they said that they continued to believe that it was impossible for them to hold the Pass, unless indeed with the assistance of Government. Questioning showed that by "assistance" they meant the forcible coercion by British troops of any recalcitrant tribe, interfering with tribal Pass arrangements, and punishment, by expeditions, of marauders and raiders. This was somewhat more satisfactory, as they had modified, in the interim, their former absolute refusal to accept independent charge of the Pass. They clearly had entertained the plan of forming a combination for the control of the tribes, which was to receive the active and forcible support of Government. The objection of course to that would be, with the proverbial instability of Afghan and particularly Afridi coalitions and combinations, the aid of Government might and probably would be constantly invoked. This was, to say the least, an undesirable arrangement. In reply, I told them that Government should be informed of their difficulties, but that the whole matter lay in their hands. To this Abdulla Nur Khan pointedly replied that the Afridis could never preserve concord in independent charge of the Pass, and for himself he would not undertake engagements he could not fulfil. At their request a month was given to the jirgas, after expiration of which they are to return to Peshawar with the final reply of the tribes.

This month it was anticipated would be very useful in ascertaining the currents of political feeling among the Afridis prior to their definite decision.

6. In my letter No. 76 C.P. of the 14th September, and in my telegram No. 996 of the 11th September, I anticipated that the proposals of Government would present themselves to the tribes as involving questions of considerable difficulty (*vide* paragraph 3

of above letter). The difficulties are no doubt of serious magnitude; but I think it was not alone the awkward problem of tribal management that induced the maliks and tribal representatives to give their categorical refusal. Partly no doubt by standing out the Afridis hoped to raise the amount of the compensation allowance, in the belief that the keeping open of the Pass was a matter of much solicitude to Government; but I am of opinion this motive was opened out and disposed of by pointing out to them that other trade routes existed from Dakka to Peshawar. A further motive lies no doubt in the earnest wish of the maliks and others, who monthly benefit by our occupation, to prevent our abandonment of the Khyber, and by refusing to hold the Pass themselves, the maliks may hope to keep the troops there; but this consideration, I think, weighed less than the one I am about to state.

The Afridis no doubt received with satisfaction the announcement of the maintenance of the Government relations with them, to the exclusion of other influence. But if their subsidies were to depend upon their holding the Pass open, which they suppose to be a matter of no certain success, they probably felt that the time might sooner or later come when their Pass arrangements would break down temporarily or permanently; that this would involve the stoppage of the compensation allowance, and that they, cut off from Kabul, would, as a nation, not only have lost the subsidies which they received from Kabul, but also their allowances from the British Government. They would have fallen between two stools.

It was this consideration that led me to make the proposals in paragraph 3 of my letter No. 76 C.P. of the 14th September. In fact, the more ignorant men in the jirgas at first rather suspected that Government, seeking some good excuse for stopping the Khyber allowances and thus saving money, was endeavouring to induce the Afridis to accept proposals of considerable difficulty, and to entrap them into entering upon engagements that they would be unable to fulfil.

These proposals to separate the two questions of the maintenance of our future exclusive relation with the Afridis, and the continuance of the existing arrangements for the keeping open of the Pass, were made with two objects—first of all to assist the present negotiation, and secondly, in order to secure those future exclusive relations with the tribes in the event of failure of the Pass arrangements.

Irrespective of the manner in which the present negotiations may have been affected by the amalgamation of the above two questions, I take it that our future relations can be better secured by the measure which I proposed.

I have already entered fully into the reasons, but regarding the advantages to be gained by payments to the Afridis beyond the security of the Pass road, and the excuse we may have for making any such payments, I think that, having been detached from Kabul and losing permanently the allowances formerly granted by the Amir, they will expect to receive an equivalent from us, and if they should not succeed in their endeavours to keep open the Pass, or if it were temporarily closed by the party in opposition, they, in forfeiting the compensation for tolls, would lose everything that connected them with the Government, and we should retain little hold upon them except through their dealings generally with British territory and their fear of possible coercion.

The maliks and jirgas would not unnaturally turn again to Kabul, and whether successful or not in recovering any of their lost position, we could scarcely expect them to assist us in our further dealings with the Afridis on our border.

I therefore think that, whether or no satisfactory arrangements regarding the Pass are brought about, it may be a question whether Government should not at the time grant certain small personal allowances to the headmen distinct from Pass compensation for tolls, also having in view possible failure in obtaining such arrangements, it may not be wiser to grant their allowances now in consideration of past services, as there may arise difficulties in making any such concessions hereafter.

8. To return to the progress of the Khyber Pass question. In my telegram No. 1077, of the 26th ultimo, reporting that a month's grace was required by the representatives present to discuss the whole question with the tribes in Tirah, I asked if it would suit Government, in support of the Pass maliks, to hold, perhaps but temporarily, Jamrud and Ali Masjid, and the intervening posts with two native regiments, the present Jezailchi force being maintained and the tribal posts. In reply, I was asked by your telegram of the 7th October whether the maliks wish this, and whether I consider it desirable, and whether I propose to make the retention of these posts one of the conditions of our arrangements with the maliks, or merely suggest it as a measure which may be desirable in our own interests apart from the compact. I would reply by referring to paragraph 4 of this letter.

9. I will explain that before leaving Peshawar, the headmen at separate interviews and also together expressed themselves to me personally as hopeful of effecting the necessary arrangements with their tribesmen for the keeping open of the Pass; more especially Abdulla Nur, Kuki Khel, who is by far the most energetic of the maliks, and takes the most prominent part in all discussions, assured me that they would do their utmost to bring about a combination against the Khusrogi and other malcontent sections, and in their own interests endeavour to satisfy the Government.

It seems to me that the objections raised by him at first in the presence of the rest of the tribe may have been made with the object of increasing his own importance in their eyes, as one capable of making terms with Government and assisting Afridi interests.

The maliks, however, suggested that they would require the support of the Government Jezailchi force, perhaps somewhat increased. They do not draw any distinction between Jezailchis and native troops. All they wished to obtain was the co-operation of Government in some visible form.

10. It may not, however, be advisable to rely entirely upon the Jezailchis for the purpose, and I would prefer to propose that native troops be employed. In a separate letter, which I hope shortly to despatch, I shall consider whether it is desirable to hold the posts referred to by troops or by Jezailchis, or whether, once the tribes have taken independent charge of the Pass, it may not be advisable and expedient to throw the entire onus and responsibility of keeping the Pass open on to their shoulders, and to preserve Government from a jointly responsible position with reference to the Khyber.

11. I saw at the departure of the jirga that there were reasons for anticipating possible difficulties which have since occurred. Sayad Mir Bashir, the Tirah leader, appears to have taken advantage of the absence of the headmen at Peshawar, and to have recovered some of his old influence, and, tampering with the Malikdin Khel tribe, to have made a bid for some share in Pass allowances. He also appears to have endeavoured to gain over Saleh Muhammad, the Qambar Khel Malik; but the latter, though willing to join Mir Bashir in any attack upon the Shiah Orakzais, is said to have adhered to his agreements with us, and to have warned Mir Bashir that he was not to be expected to act against the Government.

In this letter I have confined myself to a mere narrative of the course of events in the negotiations with the tribes, without considering what measures may be proposed for the future in the interests of Government, which I trust to do in the separate but accompanying letter to your address.

The last news then from Tirah is that considerable difficulty has been experienced in uniting all the Khyber clans, especially the Malikdin Khel and greater part of the Zakka Khel, to return a joint reply to Government, and in consequence the arrival of the jirgas will be delayed till after the Id-uz-zuha on the 15th instant. In the meanwhile I propose on the 7th to have an interview with the Afridi Maliks at Jamrud, and there to personally ascertain the position of affairs and the proposals the maliks are prepared to bring forward.

Enclosure 5 in No. 8.

No. 5030½, dated 9th November 1880.

From Lieut.-Col. W. G. WATERFIELD, Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawar Division, to SECRETARY to the GOVERNMENT of PUNJAB.

IN continuation of my No. 5030 P., dated 9th November 1880, to your address, I have the honour further to lay before Government those proposals in regard to the future arrangements connected with the Khyber Pass, which may be appropriately submitted for consideration, before the receipt of the reply about to be made by the Afridi clans to the views of Government, as expressed in paragraph 2 of letter No. 2980 E.P., of the 31st August 1880, from the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to your address.

2. In my letter No. 5030 P. of 9th November 1880, I have informed you that, at the last interview with the tribal representatives, they desired that the tribal management of the Pass should be aided by active Government assistance in the forcible coercion by our troops of evil-doers or recalcitrant clans, and in the form of a body of Government Jezailchis distributed throughout the Pass, as the garrisons of posts and escorts to caravans and travellers. In connexion therewith, in my telegram, No. 1077, of the 26th ultimo, I inquired if it would suit Government to hold, perhaps but temporarily, Jamrud and Ali Masjid and the intervening posts with troops; for in fact the request of

the Afridis for Government assistance in the form of troops or Jezailchis resolved itself into a demand that the road from Jamrud to Ali Musjid should be held by Government. It seems to me, therefore, that three practicable courses are open to Government, which I proceed to state together and to discuss *seriatim* :—

- (1.) The first plan would be to hold the road from Jamrud to Ali Musjid by troops and from Ali Musjid to Lundikotal by Jezailchis, or to hold the whole road by Jezailchis ; in short, to divide with the tribes the task of guarding the Pass, and to assist the tribal coalition which is to work the Pass arrangements.
- (2.) A second course would be to throw entirely upon the tribes the responsibility of protecting a Pass of which they are to take independent charge, and continue to hold only the fort of Jamrud with a suitable garrison.
- (3.) A third proposal is to abandon the Khyber altogether, retaining our hold on Jamrud, and to open out routes parallel to the Khyber for trade purposes, upon which difficulties with the tribes concerned do not exist.

3. Before considering the first course that I have suggested, I would note that the Government of India apparently contemplates a complete retirement of British troops from the Pass, but leaves optional the retention of Jezailchis. It is, however, immaterial whether, as I have mentioned, native troops hold as far as Ali Musjid, or whether Jezailchis alone garrison all the posts ; the fact would remain that a corps in the pay and uniform of Government would join the tribesmen in the protection of the road, *i.e.*, Government would visibly and really share with the tribes the duty of carrying out their engagements. Now, for reasons that I shall give below, grave difficulties present themselves in the purely tribal management of the Pass by a united committee, as it were, of the six clans composing the Khyber Afridis, so that Government might at any moment find itself pledged to assist and prop up a coalition of sometimes doubtful strength. And with the proverbially fickle and unstable character of Afridis, the undesirable necessity may frequently arise of the Government servants in the Pass having to defend themselves against the attacks of malcontent sections and clans, or of Government having to take active measures towards the support of its friends or the punishment of offenders. In short, so long as a man in direct Government pay and uniform continues in the Pass, any infringement of the Pass arrangements or attacks on the road would, by Afridi public opinion, be construed to be, and in effect would be actually, an act of hostility towards Government, though perhaps only personal and not necessarily tribal. And I need scarcely remark that the withdrawal of a strong brigade from the Pass and the substitution of a comparatively small and poorly-armed Jezailchi force (which in times of general tribal excitement cannot be safely relied upon) will strengthen and encourage any opposition to our proposals which may exist among the Afridis, and loosen the bonds now imposed on their rapacious instincts.

An entire withdrawal of all direct Government interference beyond Jamrud would keep Government free from being mixed up in the tribal Pass arrangements, and from being drawn into possible complications, from which it would seem highly desirable that we should stand aloof, unless we are prepared to enforce our position by arms if necessary. I will not enter into details, such as the question of preserving the efficiency of a Jezailchi force scattered through the independent territory of the Khyber up to a point (Lundi Khana) 20 miles distant from our nearest post of Jamrud. Were Government to decide to hold the Pass with regular troops as far as Ali Musjid, the Khyber would undoubtedly remain open, not, however, necessarily owing to tribal management, but more to the force and influence of Government. Whether, with a view to the considerations stated below, a half measure of this nature is worth the trouble and expense thereby incurred, is a question for Government to determine.

4. This leads me to the second issue, *i.e.*, the question of leaving the undivided and independent charge of the Pass in the hands of the tribe, unassisted by Government ; as an instance in point, I would mention the manner in which the Kohat Pass (between Peshawar and Kohat) is held by the Gail Khel. There can be no doubt that it would be most desirable in the interests of trade and civilisation if the Afridis were to agree to keep open the Khyber (either themselves levying tolls or receiving compensation therefor from Government), and I have strong hopes that the manifest advantages of doing so, and their self-interest, may induce them to form engagements for this purpose. It cannot be denied that changes, even in the short space of two years, have come over them, and that they are now more amenable to control and more civilised than they were. That this process of improvement would be much accelerated by dealings with us, is certain. Still the problem is one fraught with much difficulty and requiring great consideration. The only manner in which it can be managed is by a tribal combination. But to effect a coalition, even for a temporary object, of six clans, of different interests,

different politics, and different strength, numbering in the aggregate about 13,000 or 14,000 fighting-men of notoriously lawless and wild character, is of itself a work of some magnitude. Trouble has been experienced in collecting representatives from all the tribes to bring a joint reply to Peshawar in answer to the proposals of Government.

It would be sanguine to hope, if the tribes accept the proposed arrangements, that dissensions will not break out within a year requiring careful handling; and our experience on the frontier shows that a resolute tribal minority can do much to thwart the wishes and bind the acts of a majority, who, from the fear of incurring personal and lasting blood-feuds, hesitate to resort to force. It must also be remembered that any proposal in the supposed interest of Government is sure to meet with the bitter opposition of fanatics and bigots, of whom there are many, even among the irreligious Afridis. To illustrate the state of affairs, I would refer to the history of the past summer, when a semi-religious leader arose in Tirah and was checked only by a timely display of force from attacking the Khyber; and, although the Pass is now being held by five regiments, yet a great part of the Zakka Khel has continued up to this in an attitude of hostility. When the troops retire from the Khyber, the Zakka Khel will be less capable of control by us. In the future there is no certainty that any section or tribe may not, for selfish purposes, or from the sheer love of robbery, infest the Pass and upset the tribal coalition; moreover, the tribes most likely to do so are those dwelling furthest from our border and least under our hand. Or again, a general religious agitation may at any time arise. It cannot, therefore, be predicted that tribal management of the Pass will enjoy an unshaken and sure career. Tribal coercion can only go to a certain length, and with the withdrawal of British troops, the overawing element compelling upon all the preservation of order will disappear. During our occupation of the Pass, fear, and love of gain, have united to restrain and influence the Afridis; in the future, self-interest alone will remain. Were there some central power in the clans that could force fickle or discontented factions to subordinate their inclinations to the interests of the whole, the matter would be easy; but, as I have said above, in the absence of such a *vis major* (which during the campaign has been supplied by our troops), we cannot reckon upon intertribal coercion as always, or even generally, effective to control the minority. It may be replied that, should a section misbehave, we would stop its allowances, and, enforcing joint responsibility, proceed to deal in the same manner with those of the other Khyber clans closing the Pass, and thus bring pressure on all to reduce the hostile section. But there is still some fear that the clans may be unable to cope vigorously and at once with the malcontent party, or may hesitate to involve themselves in complicated feuds on behalf of the British Government; or some other motives may stifle the suggestions of self-interest in keeping the Pass open; in that case the stoppage of allowances would be bitterly resented by the friendly sections, who might complain that, for not having effected an organization that could scarcely with reason have been expected from them, they had lost their subsidies. To this it may be replied that the clans had agreed to joint responsibility (for that condition is a *sine quâ non* to any independent tribal management of the Pass), and they will answer that, with the best intentions, they had found themselves unable to perform their promises. At the present moment, with a large force in the Pass, I must still call it doubtful whether a tribal coalition will bring the malcontent Zakka Khel to give hostages and pay a fine. On the other hand, certainly those who benefit by the Pass arrangements, and especially the maliks, would do their utmost, as they told me [*vide* paragraph of my No. 5030 P. of 9th November 1880], to keep open the Khyber; but it may judiciously be doubted whether their influence is able to meet every emergency without extraneous aid from Government. I must admit, then, that independent tribal management of the Pass is a problem of doubtful success; that at uncertain periods the Pass may become closed by the failure of the system; and that, if Government were to pledge itself to assist the tribes or join in their responsibility for the Pass, it might at any time find itself involved in some complications, and, perhaps, be called upon to act decisively by a resort to force. My endeavours, then, will be to initiate and introduce a system which will satisfy the Afridis, give sufficient strength to the Government party, and yet save Government from any direct responsibility.

5. If our efforts were being made solely for the purposes of protecting trade, the risk and uncertainty attaching to the Khyber might be considered too great, and not worth the advantages to be gained, and it might seem advisable to select some parallel line of road which, though presenting greater physical difficulties to transport than the Khyber, entirely turns the Afridi question and relieves Government of dealings with the Khyber tribes. Such a one exists in the road leading from the Shagai police station in the Peshawar district, by the Shilman Valley to Kam Dakka and thence to Dakka; in regard

to which I would refer to the separate correspondence showing the advantages of this route, based on the reports of Mr. Scott, of the Survey Department, Mr. Merk, assistant political officer, and the officers of the engineer department, who made the Inzari Pass road from Dakka to Lundikotal in the Khyber. By adopting and improving this route, Government would cease to have any dealing with the Afridis of the Khyber, and would have need only to maintain such exclusive relations with them as have been already declared shall be continued.

6. But it is not merely a question of the protection of trade. The Government clearly sees the advantages attaching to permanent and close relations with the Afridi nation who overhang the Peshawar and Kohat districts, hold the Khyber and Kohat Passes, and give us the most dashing recruits for our best native regiments, and in war the most reliable among our native officers; and Government has most wisely determined to maintain a political hold upon them to the exclusion of all other influence or interference.

The Afridis themselves, knowing that we no longer require the Pass for our army communications, are perfectly well aware that our desire to retain it is as much to enhance our military repute and political influence as in the interests of trade. They openly speak of this, and say, "You want to do what has never been done yet, that which Dost Muhammad and Amir Sher Ali could not do, and it is your *namus* (renown) you think of, and for this you must pay." They know we shall not interfere with their independence, and that we do not look to the income from transit dues. The Government party in the Khyber does not resent this. It has received nothing but increased honour and consideration at our hands, and much wealth. Upon them the more distant Afridis, who do not enjoy the profits, look with jealousy and aversion, and they are taunted with entering the "service of the unbeliever."

Were Government from fear of future responsibilities to withdraw its support from the Khyber maliks and not to force them into the mutual organization they have so much difficulty in agreeing to, it would perhaps have to regret a breach in the relations we desire to maintain which it might be difficult to repair. The Afridis, however much they might be compelled to admit that they had failed in fulfilling their part in the contract, would, I believe, feel resentful of our throwing over the Pass arrangements, opening any other route, and withdrawing, as a matter of course, their compensation for tolls.

This, it is said by competent native judges, would lead at once to raids upon our border, and, perhaps, military expeditions to coerce. Recruiting would be interfered with, desertions would follow, and anxieties and discontentment would prevail among the Afridis in our regiments.

It is generally supposed that the gathering last summer around the fanatic leader in Tirah, Mir Bashir, would have assumed alarming proportions had it not been for the stronger counterinfluence of the Government party in the Khyber.

And even if we were able to efficiently protect our border and did threaten or use expeditions to coerce, not only should we be losing day by day the most beneficial effects upon the national character, and generally civilising results, of their constant intercommunications with ourselves, but we should certainly find the Afridis gravitating towards Kabul and bringing a strain upon our relations with the Amir himself.

Certainly, if personal tribal subsidies were separated from the compensation for tolls, as I have recommended on previous occasions, Government might still maintain exclusive relations with a certain party in the tribe, who have hitherto done us most excellent service; but our influence would be weak compared with that which we retain when we support them in holding their Pass open to trade, and manage for them the large income realisable as transit dues and paid as compensation in lieu; and our well-wishers would be bitterly disappointed.

We must also recollect two other important points. In retaining 500 of the young blood of the tribe in a tribal if not Government Jezailchi corps for the protection of tribal interests, we are withdrawing these men from lawless livelihood and robbery, and are not losing the opportunity of disciplining many of the rising generation.

Further, had we hereafter at any time to re-occupy the Pass, though doubtless we could not be prevented from doing so, still there are obvious advantages in being able to advance to Lundikotal without having to obtain again the permission and consent of tribes.

Thus my conclusions are that, although trade might filter down by other channels than the broad Khyber road, which it does not absolutely require, and though we might, from fear of possible responsibilities and owing to difficulties raised by the Afridis themselves, withdraw without any breach of faith from negotiations for the keeping open of the Pass, we should be unwise to do so, and short-sighted in our policy.

The difficulty is to prevail upon the Afridis to accept the entire responsibility, or rather to reduce that of Government to a minimum, and yet retain our hold upon the tribes and strong and permanent relations with them.

As I have before said, to effect this every effort will be made.

Enclosure 6 in No. 8.

No. 2140, dated Lahore, 13th December 1880.

From W. M. YOUNG, Esq., Secretary to Government of Punjab, to COMMISSIONER and SUPERINTENDENT, Peshawur Division.

I AM desired to acknowledge the receipt of your letters, reporting on the progress of negotiations with the Khyber Pass Afridis for the maintenance of exclusive relations with the British Government, and for the protection of the Pass hereafter.

2. The Lieutenant-Governor fully appreciates the extreme difficulty of the subject on which you have given your opinion and advice in these letters, and shares with you the anxiety which your letters evince to place our relations with the Afridi tribes upon some permanent and satisfactory basis. If on some points his Honour has framed conclusions different from your own, he is not unaware that the success of the measures which he advocates must still be regarded as doubtful, and the preference which he has for these measures is due merely to the belief that they are more likely in the end to avoid complications and secure the object which you, in common with his Honour, desire to bring about.

3. The courses which you consider open to Government to follow, in order to effect the solution of this important question, are as follows:—

1st.—To hold the road from Jamrud to Ali Musjid by troops, and from Ali Musjid to Lundikotal by Jezailchis, or to hold the whole road by Jezailchis; in short, to divide with the tribes the task of guarding the Pass, and to assist the tribal coalition which is to work the Pass arrangements.

2nd.—To throw entirely upon the tribes the responsibility of protecting the Pass, of which they are to take independent charge, and to continue to hold only the fort of Jamrud with a suitable garrison.

3rd.—To abandon the Khyber altogether, retaining our hold on Jamrud, and to open out routes parallel to the Khyber for trade purposes, on which difficulties with the tribes concerned do not exist.

4. With reference to the question of retaining troops in the Khyber Pass, the Lieutenant-Governor would remark that what is required is the safety of the road through the Pass for our own purposes and for trade. The Government has no desire to occupy the lands of the Afridis, nor the road, for any other object. If, in order to secure the safety of traders in the Pass, it is necessary to occupy positions with troops, it would hardly be worth while to secure this end at so great a cost. In such a case, it would probably be more advisable to abandon the Khyber route altogether and resort to other and safer routes. The issue as to the best mode of securing safety in the Khyber Pass is therefore narrowed to the question how a protective force, not composed of British troops, can best be organized and maintained. The Jezailchi force, as at present constituted, is admirably suited for the purpose of such protection; and it is extremely desirable, if this force is to be maintained, that the present arrangements for its organization and disposition should be utilized, and the advantages likely to accrue from the continuousness of these arrangements fully secured. There would, of course, be no objection to our helping the Afridis to organize their own system of protection if they should determine to initiate an entirely new organization for the defence of the Pass; but the experience which has been afforded to them of the efficiency and good work done by the Jezailchi corps will probably lead them to desire no change of system, but rather to continue a method which has been adopted with so much success.

5. The Lieutenant-Governor therefore thinks it most important that some trial should be made of holding the Pass with Jezailchis. His Honour thinks that this should be done in a way which may be easily altered if necessary, and in the way which is least likely to embarrass our relations with the tribes. Sir Robert Egerton thinks that these objects may be secured by retaining the present Jezailchi force on a somewhat different footing. These levies would no longer be considered as Government servants, or representatives of Government authority, but rather as a superior kind of tribal badragga, such as used always to be furnished by the tribes on payment for the safe conduct of traders going through the

Pass. It will no doubt be necessary that the Political Officer should see that the men are paid; but this will not make them Government servants. The money given to the Jezailchis as wages would form part of what would otherwise be paid to the tribes as compensation for the tolls the levy of which they forego, and as an equivalent for the protection of the road which it is the object of Government to secure. It is only reasonable that the Government should distribute this amount in such a manner as to ensure the proper performance of escort duty by the tribes.

6. The Lieutenant-Governor has a few remarks to add regarding the details of the arrangements which in his opinion would facilitate the maintenance of the Jezailchi force conjointly by the tribes and the British Government. It has generally been assumed in the correspondence on the subject that a *sine quâ non* of Government interference in Pass arrangements is the maintenance of perfect security and immunity from attack at all portions of the road and at all times of the day. But the Lieutenant-Governor does not regard this as in any way imperatively necessary. The tribes may be informed that the traffic may be regulated in any way which may be convenient to themselves. Convoys may be collected and despatched once a day, or more or less often, under escort in such a manner as to minimize the trouble of guarding them, and the responsibility of the tribes will extend to the safety of such traffic as shall be so escorted. Cases might arise in which the tribes would still be held responsible, notwithstanding violation of the rules for traffic, but, generally speaking, the safety of convoys despatched under escort in accordance with arrangements definitely made and agreed upon would be all that need be demanded from the tribes who engage for the security of traffic.

If the Jezailchi guard is recruited solely from the tribal population, there will be less risk of escorts being attacked, for the reason given in paragraph 4 of your second letter, namely, the dread of incurring blood-feuds; while for offences committed by the escort the remedy will be to proceed against the tribal allowances.

7. For the above reasons, the Lieutenant-Governor would maintain the Jezailchi Corps on the terms and in the manner now described. If this Corps does not answer, it will still be possible to fall back upon the second plan which is proposed in your letter, and to leave the escort arrangements to be carried out solely by the tribes themselves. It will be easier to revert from the maintenance of the Jezailchi force to mere tribal escorts than, after abolishing the former and after the failure of the latter, to reorganize the Jezailchi Corps.

8. The opinion of Sir Robert Egerton upon the proposal to grant personal allowances to the maliks, independent of the consideration whether the Khyber Pass is kept open for traffic or no, has been already conveyed to you in a recent communication. His Honour does not think it would be prudent to grant such allowances unconditionally. It is doubtless advisable to keep men of influence in our interests, but, inasmuch as their influence is the consideration which Government requires in return for such payments, it must be exercised in the manner most useful to the British Government, namely, in the protection of the road through the Pass; and Sir Robert Egerton would not be willing to grant any allowances independently of the question whether the Pass were safe for traffic or not. The total amount of the allowances to be granted must depend upon the completeness of the arrangements which the maliks find it possible to make for the protection of the Pass during ordinary times for purposes of trade. The Lieutenant-Governor does not think that Government should be advised to subsidise the Afridis, or to pay personal or other allowances to any of their maliks, for abstaining from attacks upon British territory. It has not been the custom of the British Government to pay for such exemption, and his Honour would be sorry to see such a system inaugurated. Whatever sum may be fixed for the tribal allowances, over and above the amount payable to the Jezailchis, would be a payment in part for the same object as that effected by the maintenance of the Jezailchi Corps, *viz.*, the safety of the road and the protection of travellers. The payment of both of these items should be no doubt affected by the general conduct of the tribes, not only in the Khyber Pass, but also on the border, and within British territory; but neither of them should be fixed with any reference to immunity from attack, or from the commission of offences, as though the Afridis possessed an inherent right of raiding upon British territory or committing offences therein. Not long ago, while the Khyber was perfectly quiet, a gross outrage was committed by some of the Khyber tribes in British territory. The daughter of a Police officer was kidnapped, and was not recovered until a ransom had been paid. The Lieutenant-Governor has not received any report of the measures adopted in this case, which is only quoted as an example of what may be expected to occur in future if some condition is not attached to the Khyber allowances which will secure good behaviour, not only in the Pass itself, but

also on the border generally. This subject therefore should not be lost sight of in the present negotiations.

9. In regard to the third alternative mentioned in your letters, you have previously acquainted the Government with your views, and the Lieutenant-Governor, acting upon your suggestions, has recommended that, as a measure of precaution, the alternative route from Lundikotal to Dakka, through the Shilman country, should be put into repair, for use in the event of the Khyber route becoming unsafe. But no definite proposals have yet been received for the adoption of a route which will entirely avoid the Afridi country. Should it be necessary to resort to an alternative route which does not lie through territory held by the Afridis, the Lieutenant-Governor is of opinion that they should no longer continue to reap the advantages which are contemplated in the event of their affording a safe road for traffic, and that their subsidy should be altogether withdrawn.

10. In conclusion, the Lieutenant-Governor considers that any agreement which may be made with the Afridi tribes should reserve to the British Government the power of occupying the Pass with troops, should the British authorities desire so to do, and should the protection of trade through Afridi agency be found to be impracticable.

Enclosure 7 in No. 8.

No. 5,767 P., dated 24th December 1880. (Extract.)

From Lieut.-Col. W. G. WATERFIELD, Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur Division, to W. M. YOUNG, Esq., Secretary to the Government of Punjab.

IN continuation of my No. 5030 $\frac{1}{2}$, dated 9th November, reporting the progress of negotiations with the Khyber Pass Afridis, and with reference to your No. 2,140 of the 13th December in reply, conveying the views of his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor upon the above reports and his directions for the continuance of the negotiations:

2. I have the honour to state that I had to a very great extent anticipated the instructions of his Honour, and to my proposals I had asked sanction in telegrams in which I endeavoured to give the substance of the arrangements to which I found the headmen of the Khyber tribes were finally prepared to agree, and which also approved themselves to me as likely to be in accordance with the views and objects of Government, and I asked sanction to place them before the deputations of the tribes assembled in Peshawur and numbering about 700 men.

I will first explain at some length the arrangements abstracted in the above mentioned telegrams, and I will then consider the subsequent instructions of his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor.

3. The proposals embodied in the following paragraph were the result of discussions and consultations extending over some months, and to which I found the headmen were finally prepared to consent. The suggestions are partly ours and partly theirs. They were put before the headmen in the form of questions, and their answers and remarks were separately recorded, so that there might be no room for doubt as to their knowing what had been proposed and as to our being assured of what they understood and accepted.

It was supposed that these proposals would hereafter find their place in an agreement* dulydrawn up, and would receive the seals and signatures of the headmen and, perhaps, also of the elders of the tribes. It was perfectly well understood that these proposals emanating from ourselves locally would be subject to modifications and alterations by the Government, but it was believed that little change would be found necessary.

4. The headmen expressed themselves as understanding the proposals to be much as follows:—

(1.) Relations will be maintained by Government with the tribes to the exclusion of all other influence or interference, while, at the same time, their independence is to be fully recognized.

(2.) In consideration of their receiving certain allowances, the amount and distribution of which will be fixed hereafter, the tribes undertake the responsibility of preserving order, and affording security on the road.

(3.) All matters affecting the Pass arrangements, and especially the security of the road, are to be submitted to a combined jirgah of all the Afridi tribes. This council will arrange for the safety of the lives and property of all travellers, who use the Khyber

* For agreement finally signed see page 74.

road, without distinction; local traffic, by which is meant the traffic of the Atridis, Shinwaris, and other tribes living in or near the Pass, being entitled to protection, no intertribal or personal feuds will be allowed to be pursued near the road.

(4.) No goods or travellers are to be permitted to enter the Pass from either direction without an order authorizing them to proceed which will be furnished to them with a sufficient guard of men. Should it be considered by the tribal jirgah or council at any time that owing to the existence or likelihood of a disturbance on or near the road, it would be hazardous to allow a passage to either goods or men, they are responsible for closing the road, notice to that effect being given to the Khan of Lalpura and to the Political Officer, Jamrud, while careful provision must be made for the safety of any passengers or traffic that are already inside the Pass.

(5.) The arrangements which the tribes are to make for the maintenance of security on the road will be wholly independent of any material aid in the way of Government troops, and Government is at liberty to retain its troops within the Pass, or to withdraw them and to re-occupy at pleasure.

(6.) The tribes urge that Government must maintain a certain number of Jezailchis, who will assist the tribal badraggas or escorts to preserve the road from attack. It has been considered that these Jezailchis must at present number about 531 men, including the mounted levies for escort, &c., the tribes being responsible for providing the men. This corps will have its head-quarters at Jamrud, and will be under the supervision of the Political Officer, whose approval of all arrangements for the distribution of their duties will be necessary. It is understood that these Jezailchis are not a Government force, but are maintained, although at Government expense, yet merely for the better enabling of the tribes to keep their engagements. When it is desired to employ them on any other duty than that of protecting the road, the permission of the political officer must be obtained.

(7.) The tribes will agree that so long as they are paid the Khyber allowances, the right of collecting tolls rests with the British Government, inasmuch as the receipt of a subsidy or allowances excludes all claim to any other payments.

(8.) All offences on the road will be dealt with by the united tribal jirgahs, whether committed by an individual or by a section of a tribe. Punishment will be inflicted according to the tribal customs, and compensation will be awarded to the injured party. The measures taken are to be reported to the Political Officer, Jamrud, through whom any money, which he and the jirgah have adjudged as compensation, will be paid. Such sums are liable to be deducted by him from the allowances made to the tribes.

(9.) The tribes will continue to bind themselves as hitherto not to commit dakoiti, highway robbery, or murder in British territory, will agree to restore stolen property and pay compensation for such offences, their allowances being liable to forfeiture on their account.

(10.) Subject to the foregoing conditions, all details of management by which the tribes will insure the fulfilment of the responsibility which they have undertaken, are left to the discretion of the tribes who will have to secure the approval of the Political Officer. The tribes will be informed that the traffic may be regulated in any way which may be convenient to themselves and the public. Convoys may be collected and despatched so as to minimise the trouble of guarding them, the responsibility of the tribes extending to the safety of all trade and travellers within the Pass.

(11.) With regard to the standing posts or chowkis hitherto kept up along the road by the tribes, and paid for from the allowances, these will be maintained; the tribal watchmen occupying them being still required either to guard certain localities or to form part of the escort of the periodical convoys.

(12.) Regarding the Government buildings in the Khyber the tribes will agree to take charge of some on behalf of Government, the remainder being dismantled.

With reference to Ali Musjid, the gate, as it were, or keep of the Pass; on the supposition that Government will be prepared to make a special allowance of 100 Jezailchis for the purpose of protecting and holding this fort, the tribes on their part agree to undertake this duty.

(13.) The tribes will also guarantee the safety of the Political Officers or any other official who may be required from time to time to visit the Khyber Pass; notice always being given previously of such proposed visit to the tribal jirgah who will have to make special arrangements for escort, &c.

(14.) They have been informed that the territory to which their responsibilities extend may be fixed from time to time by Government. For the present the boundary fixed by the Treaty of Gundamak, or a little west of Lundikhana, will be considered the limit.

(15.) Arrangements will be made by the tribal jirgah by which any expresses or posts will be conveyed through at all times night or day.

(16.) The tribes may be considered ready to take charge of the Khyber Pass in the manner above indicated from Lundikhana to Ali Musjid, and again from Ali Musjid to Jamrud, at once, or so soon as Government directs the withdrawal of its troops from the whole of this road or any part of it, meanwhile, until such withdrawal has been effected and any new arrangements have been introduced, the tribes will agree to preserve intact their present obligations regarding the Pass and their relations with Government.

5. Turning to the views and instructions of his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor, as contained in your letter, No. 2140, of the 13th December, it will be seen that it is proposed by me to retain the Jezailchi corps as at present existing, organised by the Political Officer, and paid through him, but recruited by, and, to some extent, under the control and management of the Khyber jirgahs.

The great advantage of this is that the Jezailchi force being representative of the various tribes responsible for the Khyber stands as the sign and perpetual reminder of their unity, combination, and mutual responsibility for maintaining the safety to all of the Khyber route. The corps will be placed on a different footing, and will be utilised in conjunction with the tribal watchmen as a special guard to convoys. This is understood to be what his Honour desires. The corps will further be almost entirely recruited from the tribes, a sufficient leaven of outsiders being perhaps maintained to make the organisation somewhat more reliable.

6. It had also been decided previous to the receipt of his Honour's suggestions that the convoys and caravans should be periodical; the details of their working can be laid down hereafter, but it seems at present advisable that general convoys proceeding westwards should only leave Jamrud about twice a week, halting one day in the Loargai Valley, and the next at or beyond Dakka. Return convoys eastwards in the same manner leaving the Loargai Valley for Jamrud twice a week only on fixed days. This will leave two bye-days to provide for accidents or possible delays, and will leave the Sundays as days of entire rest. This will be arranged in communication with the Khan of Lalpura, and is liable to alteration as found most convenient to the tribes and the public.

7. It will be always possible by not filling up the vacancies to reduce the numbers of the Jezailchi corps, when the system is in full working order, and if the force is found to be unnecessarily strong at first, a reduction can be made. The sudden withdrawal of all troops from the Khyber will give tribes and Jezailchis ample duties and responsibilities.

8. Regarding the personal allowances to the maliks and the separation of such allowances from the actual compensation for tolls, if the Government see objections to it, I admit that difficulties will not perhaps arise until the Pass arrangements fail, and this I do not anticipate. If the Pass should by any chance have to be closed, and the headmen are not held to be absolutely and personally responsible for their failure, there will not, perhaps, be any great difficulty in maintaining to them the personal allowances which they already enjoy in specified sums from the total amount now granted as the so-called compensation for tolls.

Government might still through such allowances be able to keep up their party among the Afridi tribes and retain sufficient influence to prevent the entire rupture of our political relations with the Afridis, although the Pass may be closed.

But it was never proposed by me that such personal allowances should be granted unconditionally, or in order to secure for British territory immunity from attack by the Afridis. In my opinion if our Pass arrangements were to fail, and the allowances were consequently forfeited, the tribes would at once become out of hand and would raid on British territory. The personal allowances might not save us entirely from this, but they would keep together in our interest the leading men and their immediate following and party, and facilitate the management of the Afridis generally, and the settlement of difficulties without recourse to coercion by the employment of military expeditions.

9. I have carefully considered whether it would be possible to make any reduction in the allowances to meet the charge for Jezailchis, and I am convinced that it is not so. The allowances are subdivided roughly under these heads: 1st, the personal allowances to the headmen for management for their services and expenditure on their followers; 2nd, the payments to the tribal watchmen and guards, representing each tribe within its local limits who protect the road and will have to assist in the guarding of caravans; 3rd, the balance that is distributed, at the discretion of the managing headmen, among the influential elders of the tribe who are neither headmen nor watchmen. These last-mentioned sums are all that fall to the majority of the tribesmen as compensation for their share in the profits from tolls and transit dues, not to say as their indemnity for abstention from plunder. There is no margin from which Jezailchis could be maintained. The share which any receive is exceedingly small and would not be reduced. And even if this deduction from the allowances hitherto received by them were forced upon the

tribes and they accepted the charge, I could not myself report that such an arrangement had my confidence, and that I considered it safe or satisfactory. The increased trade will offer too great temptations to Afridis holding the Pass without the restraining influence of British troops, and the tribes would begin to feel that the reduced allowances were no equivalent for the tolls and dues resigned. I do not believe that any arrangement which does not give the tribes their present allowances and also the Jezailchi force in support of their new tribal organisation could stand for a month. Nor do I allow that the Jezailchis so paid will have other than hard and harassing duties; but I believe that difficulties will be found in supplying the ranks.

10. I also assert that it would be far from wise to drive a hard bargain with the Afridis, and that it must still be our last recourse to throw them over and open up other routes to Afghanistan. The Afridis do not profess to enjoy any inherent right to raid or commit offences in British territory, but it is only the influence of their leading men that will prevent their offending, and these headmen require to be firmly attached to Government. They have no great fear of expeditions and retribution.

It has been a special condition attached to the Khyber allowances since my agreement with them in October 1879 that the tribes shall not commit murder, dakoitis, or robberies in British territory, and these conditions have been, in my opinion, so well observed as to give great promise for the future. The particular outrage alluded to by his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor, the kidnapping of the daughter of a police officer, was committed by the Khusrogi section of the Zaka Khel; to coerce this section the Khyber tribes are now proceeding from Peshawur, but rupees 3,920 out of the allowances have been held back pending the settlement of this case with the tribe. It has not been forgotten, and the conditions regarding good behaviour upon the border generally again find their place in the proposed as in the former agreements.

11. With regard to what is spoken of as the third alternative, the using of other routes than the Khyber. Definite proposals for preparing the Shilman route for adoption were submitted to Government with my No. 5025 of the 9th November. I recommended the rough survey of this route with a view to the expenditure upon it of a small sum of money which would render it passable for laden camels. It has been reported upon both by Mr. Scott of the Survey and Mr. Merk, late Assistant Political Officer, and their reports are before Government.

12. The final direction of his Honour had been also anticipated, and the Afridis expressed themselves as prepared for the re-occupation of the Pass at any time by troops should they be temporarily withdrawn.

13. I now proceed to the expenditure. I propose that the allowances already sanctioned by the Government of India in 1879 should be continued unaltered. I see no grounds for reduction. It is of great importance to introduce as little change as possible, as the tribes are ready at any moment to bring forward antiquated claims to a re-distribution, and this would at once lead to difficulties. They amount monthly to Rupees 7,155, and yearly to - - - - - Rupees 85,860 with special sums liable to fall in at the death of the grantees of - - - - - „ 1,680

87,540

14. I also propose that the sum expended hitherto upon Jezailchis and mounted levies should be continued. This was sanctioned in the same correspondence as follows :—

Per mensem - - - - - Rupees 6,009
or per annum about - - - - - „ 72,100

I am proposing some slight alteration in the organisation, viz., a reduction in the mounted levies and a slight increase among the footmen in order to allow 400 Jezailchis for the road and 100 for the garrison of Ali Musjid. But by substituting a Native Commandant on Rupees 500 a month for the British officer, Captain Gaisford, now in command, the proposed expenditure remains almost exactly the same, or about Rupees 7,267 a month, or Rupees 87,392 a year.

I have already given in this correspondence my reasons why it would not answer to reduce their expenditure. It costs less than one Native regiment, and besides having to escort caravans and convoys through the Pass; it is supposed that if the buildings at Ali Musjid can be saved by a company of 100 men, it will be but a small expenditure compared with the results. This plan will prevent the quarrels of the Khyber tribes over their asserted individual rights in the place itself. It will hold directly for Government the place of most historical importance in the Khyber, and I hope it will save the buildings. I could not advocate their demolition. The effect would be unsettling upon the tribes. For the escorts I do not consider that less than 400 men will suffice, and a

few mounted levies must be retained for escorts and expresses, and to convey information quickly from post to post. The pay of the mounted levies will probably have to be raised from Rupees 18 to Rupees 25 a month, as no rations will be available.

I fully anticipated that their numbers and expenditure may be hereafter somewhat reduced when the present arrangements are in full working order, but not now. For the Native Commandant I desire to employ Ressaldar-Major Mahomed Aslam Khan, at present Native Assistant Political Officer at Lundikotal, on the pay of Rupees 500 a month, consolidated.

Regarding the political expenditure. It is proposed that the present Political Officer Major Conolly, and the Native Assistant Political Officer, Mahomed Akbar Khan, on Rupees 400 or 500 a month, should stand fast at Jamrud, together with their office establishment. The expenditure on the above account will be about Rupees 2,500 per mensem, or Rupees 30,000 per annum, as the staff will have to be somewhat strengthened. This expenditure again is liable to reduction at any time, but at the outset the above will be required. There will be much to organise, and to weaken the hands of the Political Officer will be to court failure.

16. Regarding the buildings in the Pass I propose, after the Government sanction has been received, to consult the Brigadier-General and the Engineer Department regarding the demolition of any which it may be thought unadvisable to retain in the hands of the tribes, or the wood-work of which it may be worth while to remove.

I may mention here that I doubt if it will be wise to stipulate in any way for the protection of cemeteries or graves. If it were desired to do so, a special charge would be required of about Rupees 10 a month at Lundikotal, which might save the gates of the enclosure and the headstones, but it is doubtful. The tribes will not, I believe, guarantee their safety from damage by individuals.

17. Regarding transit dues, I believe these should be taken a few months hence at Jamrud, but I leave this for future settlement, and will submit proposals. I do not desire to take their tolls at present for the following reason: I cannot be certain of the security of caravans, and I intend to avoid the responsibility that would attach to Government if I were to take these tolls. On the withdrawal of troops all trade and travellers will be referred by the Political Officer to the Khyber maliks for information as to the safety of the road, and I intend that these maliks should satisfy the public. When the system has worked safely for a few months we can take the tolls and accept the responsibility.

18. As I am finishing this report I have received your telegram No. 26 C. of the 23rd instant. With reference thereto, and a suggestion that a sum of Rupees 1,25,000 per annum might suffice for the Khyber expenditure, including Jezailchis and allowances, I feel unable to say that I believe such a sum will suffice at starting for such arrangements as either I or the Government could consider worthy of confidence. The sum of Rupees 1,25,000 said to have been paid as a subsidy forty years ago, during the first Afghan war, is specially called "traditional," but the details have never been discovered. It is supposed by some to represent in Kabul coinage the equivalent of the allowance in British rupees. There are no good grounds for supposing that this sum included the payment of any Jezailchis; and I suggest that it can help little to the settlement of the present expenditure. At that time Colonel Mackeson and his establishment were engaged in the management of the Khyber, and to it their pay, as now, would be justly debitable. Also I suggest that when that sum was being paid to the Afridis a European officer and troops occupied Ali Musjid and Dakka or Peshbolak, also Jezailchis held Loargai.

I doubt if any comparison between the two periods and circumstances can be a safe guide in determining the present expenditure.

It seems to me very important that failure and the consequent complications should be avoided; and on this account I suggest that the new management should be so started as to satisfy the tribes and the Government that there is every chance of success. If it succeeds, reductions can follow, and meanwhile the income from tolls or transit dues can be tested. It is supposed that these will cover most of the expenditure.

19. I solicit the acknowledgments of Government for the work of the Political Officer, Major Conolly, and his Assistants. They have been in direct communication with the tribes, and have brought matters to this point in the negotiations.

I enclose Major Conolly's estimates of present and future expenditure in the Khyber.

If Government accept my proposals, there is no local reason why the withdrawal of troops from the Pass should not at once begin.

Enclosure 8 in No. 8.

PROPOSITION FOR THE REVISION OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE POLITICAL OFFICER, KHYBER, INCLUDING JEZAILCHI CORPS.

Office to which Proposition refers.	PRESENT SCALE.			PROPOSED SCALE.			PERMANENT.		Grounds of Proposition.
	Authority.	Detail.				Increase per Mensom.	Decrease per Mensom.		
Political Officer, Khyber, under orders of Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawar Division. Punjab Government, No. 1143 C., of 29th October 1879, and No. 1183 of 31st July 1880, to Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawar Division.									Required to suit new proposed Khyber arrangements. To take effect as soon as proposed arrangements with tribes receive the sanction of Government.
				</					

* + 90 has however been applied for as travelling allowance, so real difference is only Rs. 10.

† A good man will not stay except for a liberal salary.

‡ This extra pay in addition to Jezailchi pay is absolutely necessary to secure efficient orderlies.

§ Exclusive of savings as recorded further on.

|| Increase one Subadar on Rs. 60.

¶ Increase one Jemadar on Rs. 35.

** 2 Duffadars reduced and pay of remaining increased by 5 each.

†† 26 Sowars at Rupees 25 substituted for 48 Sowars at Rs. 18.

Khyber,
The 21st December 1880.

(Signed) E. R. CONOLLY, Major,
Political Officer.

Enclosure 9 in No. 8.

No. 11 C., dated Camp, 4th January 1881.

From W. M. YOUNG, Esq., Secretary to the Government of Punjab, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

In continuation of my letter, No. 2140, dated 13th December, regarding the progress of negotiations with the Khyber tribal representatives, I am now desired to address you with reference to a letter, No. 5767 P., dated 24th December, from the Commissioner of Peshawur, on the same subject, a copy of which has been sent to you direct by Colonel Waterfield.

2. This communication contains the result of negotiations which have been recently held at Peshawur, in regard to the most prominent matters, the determination of which was required in your No. 2980, dated 31st August 1880. The elaboration of these arrangements, as far as some of the minor details are concerned, still remains to be accomplished, and these will be reported in due time.

3. Colonel Waterfield's letter describes fully the proposals which are made by him with a view to establishing, in the future, security to travellers and convoys in the Pass, and it is unnecessary to repeat at length the substance of them. They are based primarily upon the instructions of the Government of India contained in your letter above quoted; and secondarily upon the instructions of the Honourable the Lieutenant-Governor from time to time in letters and in various telegrams, of which copies have been furnished to the Government of India.

4. The points upon which Sir Robert Egerton has certain remarks to offer will be briefly noticed. The groundwork of the Commissioner's proposals has his entire approbation and concurrence. Colonel Waterfield's reasons for fixing the future subsidy at Rupees 87,540 per annum are, in his Honour's opinion, sufficient. The Lieutenant-Governor has never contemplated the possibility of reducing to any considerable extent the amount of these subsidies which are paid in cash. The reduction of the amount payable to each of the tribes or to sections of tribes would, without doubt, furnish to the minds of ignorant and grasping tribesmen abundant ground for seeking to overthrow the whole arrangement or for resorting to plunder in preference to a reduced maintenance obtainable by honest means. The alteration of the total amount would, moreover, involve a redistribution which, however closely it followed the proportions previously obtaining, would be likely to result in disputes and intertribal feuds. The amount, further, is not more than may fairly be held to represent the value of the tolls which are surrendered by the Afridis in virtue of the present agreement. This portion of the proposals is, therefore, recommended for sanction by the Lieutenant-Governor.

5. Regarding the establishment required for working Pass arrangements, and which comprises, first, the Political Officer's establishment, and, second, the Jezailchi force, the Lieutenant-Governor does not feel able to support in the same way the proposals made by the Commissioner. The office establishment of the Political Officer is, in his Honour's opinion, on too extravagant a scale. The duties of the appointment will be diminished, rather than increased, under present arrangements. The increase to the pay of the English clerk and reader, as well as the new appointment of a writer on Rupees 40, seem to be unnecessary. For the two writers on Rupees 35 each, who are to keep the accounts of the Jezailchi force, the Lieutenant-Governor would substitute pay Havildars enlisted in the force. To this extent the Lieutenant-Governor would reduce the establishment of the Political Officer, and an amended statement is accordingly attached to this letter, showing the strength proposed to be entertained.

6. The rate of pay of the Jezailchis themselves, Rupees 9 per mensem each, seems to be high for men serving so near their homes. It is more than the pay of a sepoy in a Native regiment, and there would ordinarily be no difficulty, his Honour believes, in obtaining recruits for this service on a lower rate of pay. The duties of the corps will be lighter than before, and the number of convoys, which will probably not exceed two in a week, will not give them much work beyond the duties of watch and ward. At the same time, considering that the pay of the Jezailchis is in reality a part of the subsidy granted to the tribes, and that some difficulty has no doubt been experienced during the past two years in retaining the men at their posts, on the pay originally sanctioned, in

so much that rations have had to be distributed for the past year on payment of a portion of the cost, similar to that levied from Native troops, the Lieutenant-Governor will not object to this part of the proposals; but for the present recommends that the rate, Rupees 9 per mensem, should be accepted as the pay of a sepoy of the Jezailchi force.

7. Sir Robert Egerton is unable to see any sufficient reason for not at once levying tolls on convoys escorted through the Khyber. Inasmuch as the British Government is now undertaking the regulation of the Khyber traffic, upon it must devolve the responsibility of safety of convoys, however impossible it may be to guarantee them against all attack. The headmen of the Afridi tribes are responsible to the Government, in virtue of their agreements, for the safety of this traffic; but the public will look to the Government through whose instrumentality these agreements have been procured, and the responsibility must be accepted. It would be better, in his Honour's opinion, to show from the first that this is the case, by levying tolls, and not to shake the confidence of the public in the new arrangements by referring traders to the headmen of the tribes, as is proposed by the Commissioner.

8. The views of the Lieutenant-Governor on the subject of the grant of personal allowances to the headmen have been expressed on previous occasions. Sir Robert Egerton thinks that those which have been hitherto paid should be continued; they are small in amount, and are doubtless looked upon by their recipients as a privilege which naturally results from any engagement which may be made with the British Government. But the Lieutenant-Governor is not disposed to recommend the extension of this system of personal allowances any further. Whether in case of failure of present arrangements the headmen should be absolved from responsibility, and whether it may be expedient in such an event to retain their influence on our side by continuing a portion of the subsidy to them as a personal allowance, are questions which, in his Honour's opinion, may well be left to be decided when the Pass arrangements shall prove to be deficient. It is undesirable at the outset of the new arrangements to do anything which will lead the headmen to suppose that they are separate from the tribe, either in their interests or their responsibilities. Every measure should be taken to promote tribal unity and cohesion, as it is upon this that the success of the arrangements must chiefly depend. Some malcontents there will be in every tribe, who can be kept in order only by the force of the general opinion of the tribe. The headmen are of use in leading such opinion, and for this purpose they must act with the tribes, and not separately. To allow the headmen to think that their allowances would be granted, even if the tribe misbehaved, would be to take away one of the most cogent motives which they have for working by means of their tribe, and in accordance with the general feeling entertained by the members of it.

9. The arrangements proposed by the Commissioner for the disposal of Government buildings are, his Honour considers, sufficient, and measures can be taken hereafter in accordance with his recommendations. As regards the cemeteries, which contain the graves of Europeans who have fallen during the campaign, it is probable that no engagement with the tribes will ensure their safe custody; and the result of a breach of such engagement could only be the infliction of a fine, which would be no real compensation for dishonouring the graves. Sir Robert Egerton, therefore, thinks that the gravestones should be moved to Jamrud or Peshawar, and the ground left without any memorial which could excite the fanaticism or cupidity of the ill-disposed; while the monuments would remain in a place of security as a record of the persons who have been buried in the Khyber Pass.

10. In conclusion, the Lieutenant-Governor desires to express his high sense of the ability with which Colonel Waterfield, C.S.I., has conducted these negotiations. He has shown the utmost patience and forethought throughout a settlement which the Lieutenant-Governor thinks will ensure the safety of the Khyber, and will enable the Government to withdraw its troops from the Pass. This settlement will also have the great advantage of bringing the Khyber tribes within our influence more even than before, and will tend gradually to promote civilization among them.

11. His Honour would also bring to the notice of the Government of India the services of Major Conolly, Political Officer in the Khyber, and his Assistants, who have been in direct communication with the tribes, and have acted in these negotiations under Colonel Waterfield's orders.

Enclosure 10 in No. 8.

No. 48.

(AMENDED.)

PROPOSITION FOR THE REVISION OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE POLITICAL OFFICER,
KHYBER, INCLUDING JEZAILCHI CORPS.

Office to which Proposition refers.	PRESENT SCALE.		PROPOSED SCALE.	PERMANENT.	
	Authority.	Detail.		Increase per Mensem.	Decrease per Mensem.
Political Officer, Khyber, under orders of Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawar Division. Punjab Government, No. 1143 C, dated 29th October 1879, and No. 1183 of 31st July 1880, to Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawar Division.		Rs. A. P.	Rs. A. P.	Rs. A. P.	Rs. A. P.
		1 Political Officer - - - - - 1,616 0 0	1 Political Officer - - - - - 1,616 0 0	-	-
		1 Native Political Assistant - - - - - 400 0 0	1 Native Political Assistant - - - - - 500 0 0	100 0 0	-
		1 English clerk - - - - - 80 0 0	1 English clerk - - - - - 80 0 0	-	-
		1 Reader to Political Officer - - - - - 40 0 0	1 Reader to Political Officer - - - - - 40 0 0	-	-
		6 Orderlies - - - - - -	6 Orderlies - - - - - 14 0 0	14 0 0	-
		1 Mohurrir for Native Political Assistant - - - - - 30 0 0	1 Mohurrir for Native Political Assistant - - - - - 30 0 0	-	-
		Total - - - - - 2,166 0 0	Total - - - - - 2,280 0 0	114 0 0	-
		JEZAILCHI CORPS.	JEZAILCHI CORPS.		
		1 Commandant - - - - - 924 0 0	1 Commandant - - - - - 500 0 0	-	424 0 0
		1 Second in Command - - - - - 100 0 0	1 Second in Command - - - - - 100 0 0	-	-
		2 Subadars at 60 each - - - - - 120 0 0	3 Subadars at 60 each - - - - - 180 0 0	60 0 0	-
		1 Jemadar at 35 - - - - - 35 0 0	2 Jemadars at 35 - - - - - 70 0 0	35 0 0	-
		1 do. at 30 - - - - - 30 0 0	1 do. at 30 - - - - - 30 0 0	-	-
		2 Subadars at 40 - - - - - 80 0 0	2 Subadars at 40 - - - - - 80 0 0	-	-
		2 Jemadars at 20 - - - - - 40 0 0	2 Jemadars at 20 - - - - - 40 0 0	-	-
		20 Havildars at 13 - - - - - 260 0 0	22 Havildars at 13 - - - - - 286 0 0	26 0 0	-
		20 Naiks at 11 - - - - - 220 0 0	22 Naiks at 11 - - - - - 242 0 0	22 0 0	-
		452 Jezailchis at 9 - - - - - 4,068 0 0	552 Jezailchis at 9 - - - - - 4,968 0 0	900 0 0	-
		6 Duffadars at 25 - - - - - 150 0 0	4 Duffadars at 30 - - - - - 120 0 0	-	30 0 0
		2 Lance Duffadars at 21 each - - - - - 42 0 0	2 Lance Duffadars at 21 each - - - - - 42 0 0	-	42 0 0
		48 Sowars at 18 each - - - - - 864 0 0	28 Sowars at 25 each - - - - - 650 0 0	-	214 0 0
		Total - - - - - 6,933 0 0	Total - - - - - 7,266 0 0	1,043 0 0	710 0 0
		MISCELLANEOUS EXPENSES.	MISCELLANEOUS EXPENSES.		
		1 Tent pitcher - - - - - 7 0 0	1 Tent pitcher - - - - - 7 0 0	-	-
		1 Sweeper - - - - - 6 0 0	1 Sweeper - - - - - 6 0 0	-	-
		Stationery - - - - - 30 0 0	Stationery - - - - - 30 0 0	-	-
		Office contingencies Jezailchi Corps - - - - - 25 0 0	Office contingencies Jezailchi Corps - - - - - 25 0 0	-	-
		Total - - - - - 68 0 0	Total - - - - - 68 0 0	-	-
		SAVINGS.	SAVINGS.		
		English Political Assistant - - - - - 1,160 0 0	English Political Assistant - - - - - -	-	1,160 0 0
		Native Assistant to Political Assistant - - - - - 100 0 0	Native Assistant to Political Assistant - - - - - -	-	100 0 0
		1 Thanadar - - - - - 100 0 0	1 Thanadar - - - - - -	-	100 0 0
		1 English clerk - - - - - 60 0 0	1 English clerk - - - - - -	-	60 0 0
		Stationery - - - - - 10 0 0	Stationery - - - - - -	-	10 0 0
		Total - - - - - 1,420 0 0	Total - - - - - -	-	1,420 0 0
		PRÉCIS.	PRÉCIS.		
		1 Political Officer's establishment - - - - - 2,166 0 0	1 Political Officer's establishment - - - - - 2,280 0 0	114 0 0	-
		2 Jezailchi Corps - - - - - 6,933 0 0	2 Jezailchi Corps - - - - - 7,266 0 0	1,043 0 0	710 0 0
		3 Miscellaneous establishment - - - - - 68 0 0	3 Miscellaneous establishment - - - - - 68 0 0	-	-
		4 Political Assistant's establishment - - - - - 1,420 0 0	4 Political Assistant's establishment - - - - - -	-	1,420 0 0
		Total - - - - - 10,587 0 0	Total - - - - - 9,614 0 0	1,167 0 0	2,130 0 0

Net saving Rs. 2,130 less 1,167=973 or deduct 300 for contingencies, leaves a net saving of Rs. 673.

(Signed) E. H. L. CLARKE,
Assistant in charge, Camp Office.

Enclosure 11 in No. 8.

Telegram, dated 9th February 1881.

From COMMISSIONER, Peshawur, to FOREIGN, Calcutta.

In accordance with instructions contained in Punjab telegram 98 of 6th instant, the agreement, a draft of which accompanied my 576 of 24th December, and which has been slightly modified under instructions received, has been duly signed on the 8th instant by the Afridi headmen without any demur. A final paragraph had been previously added to the agreement as follows:—We understand that we are exclusively responsible for the future management of the Khyber, and that Government in no way shares in this responsibility, and this position we accept.

Enclosure 12 in No. 8.

No. 284, dated Lahore, 14th February 1881.

From W. M. YOUNG, Esq., Secretary to the Government of Punjab, to
A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I AM desired to forward, for the consideration of the Government of India in the Foreign Department, copy of a letter, No. 471 P., dated 25th January 1881, from the Commissioner, Peshawur.

2. The heavier portion of the work of the Political Officer, Khyber, hitherto has been the direct result of the actual occupation of the Pass by British troops and the presence therein of British camps, bazaars, and camp followers. It appears to his Honour self-evident that the duties of the Political Officer will of necessity be greatly lightened by the termination of the military occupation of the Khyber, and for similar reasons the work of the Jezailchi corps will be less than formerly, and the Lieutenant-Governor sees no reasons to alter the views expressed on this question in my letter above quoted.

3. Nor does Sir Robert Egerton consider that there is any force in the arguments adduced by the Commissioner of Peshawur against the speedy imposition of tolls upon traffic in the Pass. There seems to be no object in making to merchants and traders the concessions proposed by Colonel Waterfield; nor would it in reality be a very substantial boon, seeing that, if we refrain from taking transit dues for that portion of the Pass which is managed by independent tribes under our Political control, the difference will be levied by the Khan of Lalpura at Dakka or by the Amir at Jellalabad; the merchants will probably pay the same as heretofore, while the loss will fall on the British Government.

4. With regard to responsibility for robberies within the Pass, the Lieutenant-Governor is of opinion that if traders suffer from raids in the Khyber, east of Lundikotal, they will naturally prefer their complaints to the British Government, which cannot be satisfied by referring them to the tribes, but should after the necessary enquiries award compensation out of the tribal subsidies. Unless some such arrangement is carried out, the Khyber may remain as insecure as in the days before the campaign of 1878, while the British Government will be paying for its safety.

Enclosure 13 in No. 8.

No. 471 P., dated 25th January 1881.

From Lieut.-Col. W. G. WATERFIELD, Commissioner and Superintendent,
Peshawur Division, to W. M. YOUNG, Esq., Secretary to the Government of Punjab.

I HAVE now received with your No. 11½ C., of the 4th January, a copy of your letter, No. 11 C., of the 4th January, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, forwarding my No. 5767, of the 24th December, regarding the progress of negotiations with the representatives of the Khyber tribes for the future management of the Pass.

2. With reference to paragraph 5, in which his Honour expresses an opinion that the office establishment proposed for the Political Officer is on too extravagant a scale, I would suggest that we are not yet aware of the amount of work that will fall upon the Political Officer when taking up his new duties at Jamrud. I would invite attention to the enclosures of this office, No. 35 of the 5th January and the Political Officer's, No. 88 of the 20th January, forwarded in original with my No. 475 P., dated 25th January

1881, I think Government would be wiser to allow temporarily and subject to report six months hence the scale proposed by me, than to reduce the establishment now, in anticipation of possible diminution of work. If office difficulties and arrears of work are added to the anxieties of the Political Officer at Jamrud, I think that his health will give way, and that the new tribal management will not receive the attention and care that it certainly will require. I cannot, therefore, advise that a saving should be effected at the present moment in the staff of the Political Officer, who has lost some strength in the abolition of his European assistant Political Officer and his European Commandant of Jezailchis. I also doubt if trustworthy and educated pay Havildars are to be found among the Khyber Afridi tribes.

3. Nor do I think that the Government can be justified in any supposition that the duties of the corps of Jezailchis will be lighter than before; on the contrary, I think they may be increased, certainly during the winter half of the year, for I am inclined to think that two convoys a week will not be nearly sufficient for the traffic as it increases.

4. Again I trust that his Honour will reconsider the views expressed regarding the immediate taking of the tolls, or transit dues, by the British Government. Difficulties might arise which I would be glad to avoid at starting. The tribes will be more reconciled to the new arrangement if they see that we do not at once begin to reap any direct profit from it. A great impetus may be given to trade by the fact that the Khyber is at present free. It would be a kindly concession on the part of Government to the merchants and carriers, whose trade and profits have no doubt suffered much during the last two or three years. It will have a widespread and favourable effect if these transit dues are not immediately levied, and give perhaps an exaggerated view of the generosity of the new rulers. I suggest, therefore, that the levy of tolls should be suspended until the affairs of Afghanistan are more settled, until a general reconsideration of the whole question of such transit dues has been brought about, and perhaps a commercial treaty has been negotiated with his Highness the Amir.

Also, as the winter has so far advanced I do not think it is worth while to introduce the Khyber duties until at all events the opening of a new season in the autumn of this year. During the summer there is little or no trade, and the income would be exceedingly small compared with that of the cold season following. The above reasons are irrespective of those adduced by me in my previous report, to which I now turn.

5. With the greatest deference to the views of his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor, I am not able to see that upon the British Government need devolve the responsibility for the safety of traffic through the Khyber, because it has undertaken to regulate the traffic on behalf of the Khyber Afridis. I would throw the entire responsibility upon the tribes, and they will be all the stronger and better for it. I am quite prepared for the merchants and traders endeavouring to force this responsibility upon the Government, but I would refuse it, and hold the tribes entirely responsible for satisfying the public. It is quite possible that some large caravans may at starting decline to be satisfied by the assurances of the tribes, and take the alternative routes, paying for the same, but some will use the free Khyber and will pass in safety, and others will at once follow the example. As the security of the convoys without doubt can be absolutely ensured by the headmen and the tribes, for instance by their accompanying any specially valuable convoy in person and in large numbers, or by their taking hostages from malcontents, I am unable to see why Government should accept any responsibility whatever. I would maintain to the tribes that Government had nothing whatever to say to the public, but were in the interests of trade, and the public, endeavouring to make with the Afridis such arrangements as would give them (the public) sufficient confidence in the route, and that the penalty of failure on the part of the Afridis might possibly be the stoppage of the allowances, disbandment of the Jezailchis, and closing of the Khyber. As it is impossible for the Government to be certain of Afridis, I would leave the public, who are much more likely to be able to form an accurate opinion, to judge for themselves.

6. I would confine the duties of the Political Officers entirely to other matters. They should be the referees in all points of dispute, should see that the tribes are carrying out their arrangements in accordance with their agreements, should endeavour to hold the tribes together, smoothing over difficulties and advising them regarding the system which the tribes themselves approve and adopt. The officer commanding the Jezailchis would have as his special duty to see that the force was maintained to full strength, equipped, organised, and fittingly officered and armed by the responsible tribes, that the men were present for duty, sufficiently drilled, and that they regularly received the sums allowed by Government to the tribes for the maintenance of the corps. Without some such supervising authority the tribes could not be safely entrusted to carry out the duties they had accepted.

The work of the Political Officers should be in fact confined to supervision of tribal arrangements. It was this that I endeavoured to bring about, and the tribes understand it so and accept it, and the agreement which they are prepared to execute is in accordance with this view of the entire responsibilities of the tribes and the limited control of the Government.

7. Regarding the personal allowances to headmen, I have admitted that what I consider to be the defect of the system that has been approved by his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor will not be apparent until difficulties arise. But suppose the Khyber closed on account of opposition in Tirah with which the headmen have not at the moment been able to cope, and suppose an alternative route adopted, the headmen and their party among the Khyber tribes honestly doing their best, and though unable to keep the Khyber open, yet desirous of maintaining exclusive relations with the Government, of keeping themselves detached from Kabul, and of refusing all other influence or interference. If the subsidies of the headmen and the tribes disappear in the forfeited compensation for transit dues, what hold would Government have over those who may be considered really at heart of their own party? The latter would be irritated, and instead of making honest and what might appear to them fruitless endeavours to recover their position, would probably join with the opposition who had lost nothing, and endeavour to bring pressure to bear upon the Government by active hostilities upon the border, appealing to the Kabul ruler to re-accept their allegiance. The Khyber arrangements failing, it will be exceedingly difficult to make allowances to the headmen and the Government party without their concluding that we were more actuated by fears of their opposition than by any desire to treat them at the moment of failure with consideration on account of past service. I admit that I have not latterly pressed this point, because I remembered that the present allowances are to some extent subdivided into personal allowances to the headmen of Rupees 300 a month and Rupees 1,000 subsidies to each tribe, and I have always felt that if the difficulty came, for which I would now provide, the Government might forfeit the tribal irrespective of the personal allowance, and probably would do so. Government can be no more bound to keep up the personal allowance than the tribal subsidies in the case of misbehaviour or neglect, and I myself do not understand that the headmen would be any the less inclined to carry through the present negotiations, if they saw that by the payment of personal allowances the British Government was desirous of securing their personal allegiance and good conduct, as well as the safety of traffic through the Khyber.

Believing however as I do in the stability of the present arrangements, in the future disinclination of the Government to close the Khyber and throw over the Afridis, and in the improbability of any such crisis arising, I admit that I am more defending my proposal than anxious to carry my view against that of the Government as if it were of vital importance to the scheme.

8. Regarding the cemetery at Lundikotal, I think that the tablets may be removed to Peshawur, and perhaps be attached to some memorial near the church; that a careful plan of the cemetery should be made by which hereafter the position of every grave could be at once ascertained with certainty. The Loargai Shinwaris are not likely to allow of the destruction of the monuments and graves which will be left to their care, a watchman being specially remunerated for this duty, and I would leave them as they stand.

No. 9.

No. 44 of 1881.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Fort William, March 14, 1881.

WE have the honour to inclose, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copies of correspondence and other papers relating to the affairs of Afghanistan.

2. These papers show the measures that have been taken, or are in progress, in prosecution of the policy adopted by Her Majesty's Government for the withdrawal of

the British troops from Kandahar at the earliest suitable opportunity, and for the establishment, if possible, within a limited time, of some settled government at Kandahar.

3. The substance of our correspondence with the Amir of Kabul has been transmitted to your Lordship, from time to time, by telegraph. On the 20th of February the Amir's letter, dated 10th February, from Kabul, was received in Calcutta. The Amir at last announced the departure of the confidential agent whom he had been repeatedly asked, since November last, to send to India; and from the tenor of his letter it is to be inferred that he has very willingly entertained the offer, made by the Viceroy in January, to place him in possession of Kandahar; but he represented that, owing to great deficiency in arms and material of war, his position, unless he should be aided in this respect by the British Government, would be very difficult. As the list of the different kinds of ammunition required, which accompanied this letter, was not easily intelligible, it was necessary to await the arrival of the Amir's agent, General Mir Ahmed, who reached Calcutta on the 25th February. It then appeared that Mir Ahmed's instructions were very simple and closely circumscribed; that upon the general political views and intentions of the Amir he was not empowered to deliver any message, and that his particular business was confined to obtaining the ammunition already asked for, and to receiving and transmitting any communications that the British Government might address to his master. In his conversation with the Viceroy the General declared his conviction that the Amir fully intended to send troops to Kandahar at once, but he admitted that this was his personal belief, and that he could state nothing on this point with authority. The result has been that the deputation of the envoy has effected little toward the removal of the manifold impediments by which, for the last five months, the progress of our arrangements with the Amir has been unavoidably hindered. The great delay inseparable from the interchange of letters between Kabul and India, and the consequent difficulty of establishing with the Amir the free and frequent communication so essential to a clear understanding upon an important and complicated subject, and to the speedy and accurate combination of plans and movements, had necessarily affected the conduct of our negotiations, which it had been hoped that the presence of a confidential agent would have much expedited. The ammunition required was, however, immediately supplied to the Amir's agency at Peshawar, so far as it could be given from the British arsenals (for much of it was of a kind not to be found in our military stores), and General Mir Ahmed has been informed that more will be placed at his disposal; but carriage is wanting beyond the frontier for the immediate conveyance of any large additional quantity to Kabul.

4. The particular business upon which the envoy had, apparently, been sent to India having been thus completed, there seemed to be no advantage in detaining him in Calcutta. On the other hand, as the Viceroy had been able, in two interviews, to explain to him the general wishes and intentions of the Government of India regarding the affairs of Afghanistan, especially the urgent importance, to the Amir, of an early despatch of troops from Kabul to Kandahar, it was advisable that the envoy should rejoin the Amir as speedily as possible. With this opinion the envoy himself altogether concurred; and he accordingly left Calcutta on the 8th March, carrying with him a letter for the Amir, of which a copy is herewith enclosed. We have taken, it will be seen, this opportunity of proposing to depute to Kabul a native representative of our Government, in accordance with the intimation conveyed to us by the last sentence of your Lordship's despatch, No. 48, of 3rd December, that Her Majesty's Government would be glad if this could be arranged.

5. In the expectation that the arrival of a confidential agent from Kabul would so far clear up and define the Amir's situation that the Government of India might be enabled to proceed with a full knowledge of his exact position and resources, we have, it will be seen, been disappointed. It became immediately manifest that we could risk the loss of no more time in ascertaining positively whether the Amir was able and prepared to act upon the Viceroy's letter to him of the 31st January, whereby Kandahar had been offered to Abdul Rahman, with assistance in money and munitions, but with the warning that he would be required to occupy it early in the spring. The Commissioner of Peshawar was therefore directed by telegram to despatch a letter by express courier to the Amir, informing His Highness that his agent had been received, that the ammunition asked for had been sent, and that troops from Kabul of sufficient strength for the establishment of the Amir's government should reach Kandahar some days before the 15th April next. The reply to this letter we are now awaiting. We have heard through private correspondence that the Amir is actually preparing a force for Kandahar, and that he hopes it may set off from Kabul about the middle of March. But we

thoroughly realize the difficulties of military equipment and organization against which the Amir has, in the present condition of his affairs, to contend; and we are ready and anxious to afford him every assistance. A sum of ten lakhs has been placed at his disposal for immediate expenses; and all possible measures will be taken to assist and strengthen his Governor and his troops on their arrival at Kandahar.

6. In the meantime Colonel St. John had been directed to consider carefully beforehand the ways and means of introducing the Amir's authority into Kandahar in the event of his accepting and acting effectually on our offer. Colonel St. John's two letters, which are inclosed with this despatch, present an interesting description of the state and prospects of parties in South Afghanistan, and of the probabilities of the establishment at Kandahar of some settled government after our departure. The general effect of these letters is to produce the impression that, if the Amir Abdul Rahman can succeed in placing at Kandahar, before the withdrawal of the British troops, a fairly equipped force of about 4,000 men, and if he acts with judgment, energy, and promptitude, the task of bringing the Kandahar Province under his authority, and of establishing his government in all the cis-Helmand district, should not be difficult. It is of course impossible to forecast the course of events after our evacuation, or to calculate what external attacks the Amir may have subsequently to encounter.

We have, &c.

(Signed) RIPON.
F. P. HAINES.
W. STOKES.
RIVERS THOMPSON.
JAMES GIBBS.
D. M. STEWART.
E. BARING.

Enclosure I in No. 9.

No. 27, dated Kandahar, 15th January 1881.

From Lieut.-Colonel O. B. ST. JOHN, R.E., Resident, Southern Afghanistan, to
A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign
Department.

I REPORTED to you by telegram on the 10th instant that considerable excitement prevailed in the city in consequence of a rumour that orders had arrived for the immediate evacuation of Kandahar. This rumour was due to that passage in Reuter's telegraphic summary of Her Majesty's speech on opening Parliament which refers to Kandahar, and spread from the garrison through the Hindoos of the city to the population generally.

2. Your telegram of the 11th enabled me to inform the notables of the place at the usual morning public assembly yesterday that the report that orders had arrived for the evacuation was untrue, and that, though I could not assure them that we should not leave Kandahar, I could with truth declare my entire ignorance as to whether or not the army would be withdrawn before the coming hot weather, during which, as they knew, it was impossible for us to move troops to India. I further promised that all our friends should have ample notice in case of our quitting Kandahar, to enable them to make any arrangements they might desire for the convenience or safety of themselves or their families. This assurance allayed the excitement in the city, but the report of an immediate evacuation had gone abroad; and will, it may be taken for granted, increase the uneasy and excited feeling already existing in the Helmand districts. The despatch of a small force to Maiwand and its retention there for a few weeks, which I am to-day informed by General Hume has been sanctioned by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, will, it may be expected, suffice to prevent the excitement spreading, and give the people time to quiet down.

3. It appears to me an object of much importance, both in our own interests and those of the Amir, should Kandahar be made over to him, that the Helmand districts, as well as the country immediately about the city, should remain tranquil as long as possible. The likelihood of the province being ceded to the Amir is very generally known and discussed; and the Western Duranis are, without exception, partisans of Ayub as against Abdurrahman, to whom they would, in their present temper, undoubtedly prefer our direct rule.

4. In the course of the last few days I have taken advantage of the uneasy feeling prevailing to ascertain as far as possible the ideas of the leading men as to the result of the evacuation of Southern Afghanistan should such take place in the course of the next three months. All are entirely unanimous as to the impossibility of the Amir holding his own in Kandahar without active support from us.

5. Reports, no doubt exaggerated, of the harshness of his rule, and the disfavour with which he regards Duranis, have been widely spread; and there are now but two parties in Southern Afghanistan, one hoping that we shall remain, the other ready to rise in favour of Ayub, but both equally opposed to Abdurrahman.

6. The two Sirdars, Muhammad Hasan Khan and Muhammad Hosain Khan, brother and nephew of the Wali, who, having been implicated with him in his antagonism to Ayub, have naturally no prepossession in the latter's behalf, told me that, though they themselves would prefer Abdurrahman, as they would have no difficulty in coming to terms with him, it was impossible to deny that the Durani country generally was becoming more and more indisposed to accept him. They believe that, if we leave without establishing his authority by force of arms, a rising in favour of Ayub will take place before our rear guard has reached Pishin. They do not think he can himself leave Kabul or spare any considerable number of troops. The only chance they consider that he would have would be for us to hold Kandahar during the summer while he attacks Herat through Turkistan, an attack which would, in their opinion, be successful. As long as Herat remains in Ayub's power any attempt of Abdurrahman to hold Kandahar must, they consider, inevitably result in failure, with the probable consequence of his expulsion from Kabul.

7. Another Afghan of considerable shrewdness and a half-declared friend of Abdurrahman told me that the supremacy would probably lie with whichever of the two rivals was able to take the initiative. If the Amir contents himself with holding Kandahar after our departure, he will infallibly lose both Kandahar and Kabul. But if he comes with, or sends down to Kandahar, a sufficient force to garrison the city and advance straight on Herat, that place will fall before him, and he will remain undisputed master of the whole country.

8. The feeling of the principal men may be gauged by the fact that all are making preparations to send their families either to the remote northern districts, or the Hazara frontier, or to Pishin, in case of our leaving Kandahar, and I have reason to believe that the majority would hold themselves aloof from the struggle for supremacy which must inevitably ensue, in the confident belief that Her Majesty's Government will at no distant date find itself forced to resume the direct rule of Southern Afghanistan.

9. Advices received to-day from Sirdar Gul Muhammad Khan at Girishk appear to indicate that the country in the immediate vicinity of the Helmand is quieting down, though he speaks with some apprehension of the arrival of sowars from Farrah in Washir to levy revenue from the districts of Kandahar between the Khash and the Helmand. I do not think that Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan, to whom this movement is due, will persevere in it when he finds that the British garrison is still in Kandahar and making a show of force at Maiwand. From Tirin, Shirindil Khan reports, as telegraphed to you to-day, that a nephew of Anbiar Khan of Taiwara, by name Muhammad Khan, had arrived there with thirty-six sowars. They at first took refuge in a village, from which Habibullah Khan, a nephew of the Sartip Nur Muhammad, tried to get the villagers to give them up; and at last succeeded in obtaining possession of the person of Muhammad Khan. A certain Yahiya, Akhunzadah, formerly governor on behalf of the Wali, and a man of considerable influence and ability, though no real friend of ours, got together some Ghilzais and rescued Muhammad Khan from Habibullah Khan. He and his sowars will probably arrive here in a few days.

10. Sirdar Shirindil Khan, who had instructions from me not to venture into danger, has crossed the Kotal-i-Paj into Nish. He writes that the Nish maliks are willing to submit and pay their revenue, but are afraid of the Tirin people, while the latter are divided into two parties, the Barakzais being favourable to him, and the Popalzais against him. He was, however, hopeful of a satisfactory settlement. The false report of our proximate departure, which will no doubt spread to Tirin, will probably have an unfavourable effect there; but a letter which I have sent Shirindil Khan to-day, announcing the early despatch of a force to Maiwand to support his authority on one side, and that of Gul Muhammad Khan on the other, will, I trust, arrive in time to counteract it.

11. I may add that there is but one opinion among the Sirdars and chief men as to the tranquillizing and healthy effect of the movement of a force to Maiwand.

Enclosure 2 in No. 9.

No. 96, dated Kandahar, 14th February 1881. (Extract.)

From Lieut.-Col. O. B. ST. JOHN, R.E., C.S.I., Resident, Southern Afghanistan, to A. C. LYALL, Esq. C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

KANDAHAR and the neighbouring country remain fairly tranquil under the prospect now universally credited of a very early evacuation by our troops. The 16th proximo having been fixed by the military authorities as the date at which the return march to India may possibly commence, it is generally believed in the city, on the strength, it may be assumed, of information gathered from subordinates of the Transport and Commissariat Departments, that our final departure is arranged to take place at that date. A few Hindus (of Shikarpur) and a lesser number of Farsiwans have already left the city with their families; and a very general exodus of these two classes may be anticipated.

2. Public opinion is much divided as to the candidate to whom it is intended to make over the government, Ayub Khan, the Amir, Sharif Khan, and the ex-Amir, Yakub Khan, being all mentioned as our possible successors. The better classes, I believe, incline generally to the idea that the Amir will receive Kandahar from us, led thereto more by the inherent probability of the case than by the report of the Amir's letter to Muhammad Sadik, Khan of Kelat, which, however, was generally known and excited much comment.

3. The return of the column from Maiwand, on the 12th, completed an expedition for which, I think, entire success may be claimed. It has given nearly a month's rest to the overtaxed resources of the Commissariat by taking away two-thirds of the animals for which they had to find forage; and by opening the roads has enabled them to increase the amount of their purchases. A considerable reserve is now in hand, and the posts on the road are being gradually stocked for the march to Pishin. The presence of the force enabled me to get in some revenue that would otherwise have been lost, and to levy the fine of Rupees 5,000 on the villagers of Kushk-i-Nakhud. Mr. Merk, whose exertions in obtaining supplies deserve great praise, reports that not only were there no cases of ghazeeism, or attempts at annoyance, such as firing into the camp at night, but that not a single instance of serious dispute between the people and the soldiers and camp-followers was brought to his notice during the three weeks the force was absent. This would appear to indicate that the temper of the people is not at present dangerous. Nevertheless, an unfortunate occurrence at the other extremity of the province shows the risk of attempting to control the country whenever the people believe they are not liable to the presence of troops. Sirdar Muhammad Hasan Khan had sent an accountant to Dahlah, north-east of Kandahar, with the local governor of the district. They went together to Tanachob, a village on the verge of the Hazara country, but inhabited by Duranis. Some report of the British leaving Kandahar appears to have reached the people, and the unfortunate writer (a Farsiwan) was shot in a mosque in the presence of the governor. His Farsiwan companions, five in number, who had been left at a little distance, escaped at the time, but were caught up the next morning, induced to surrender on their pursuers taking an oath on the Koran to spare their lives, and then brutally murdered, after being reproached with being the instruments of taxing the people for the Kafirs, who were themselves leaving the country.

4. After this experience it will, I think, be inadvisable to make any further attempts to raise revenue, except in the immediate neighbourhood of the city.

5. The result of the withdrawal of the force from Maiwand remains to be seen. As far as can be judged from the report of Sirdar Taj Muhammad Khan, Scistani, of whom more hereafter, Gul Muhammad Khan will be unable to remain at Girishk more than a few days longer, and the country, at all events, as far as the Helmand, will be entirely closed to traffic. Before Taj Muhammad's arrival I had written to Gul Muhammad Khan, telling him of our intention to leave Kandahar on or shortly after the Naoraz (the 21st March), and assuring him that, whoever succeeded us, his interests would be properly cared for. He will probably retire at once to his own fort of Jui-Sirkar, near Kalah-i-Bist, and remain there for the present. It is to be feared that the roads to Tirin and Nish, which have lately re-opened, will again be closed, and that we shall be dependent on the districts immediately round Kandahar for supplies. With the reserves now in hand these will be able to feed the force if too severe a strain be not thrown on the Commissariat by

the detention for political reasons of the extra carriage now on its way up to Kandahar from Sibi. It is timed to commence arrival about the 15th March, unless detained by bad weather, and should begin its return journey as soon after as possible. If a large amount of carriage be massed at Kandahar for weeks, or halted on the road, very serious difficulty in feeding it is to be anticipated; and it is thus of the greatest importance that the negotiations with Kabul for the occupation of Candahar should not be protracted. If the final evacuation of the place is not effected by the end of March, it may become absolutely necessary to move troops to the Helmand to obtain grain and forage.

6. The execution of the Alikozai Sirdars, Taimur Khan, Dost Muhammad Khan, and Behbud Khan, was not, I believe, a politic move on the part of Ayub Khan and his advisers. It will certainly still further estrange the Duranis of Herat from him, and may not improbably throw the Alikozais of Kandahar, the most numerous and powerful clan among the Duranis, after the Barakzais, into the ranks of his enemies. It is said to be strongly condemned by Hashim Khan. Yaluntush Khan, son of Khan Agha, Jamshidi, has invoked the aid of the Saruk Turkomans, and is menacing the northern frontier of Herat. Much apprehension of an attack from Turkistan is also felt there. The Aimaks are, of course, ready to rise. The reports that Ayub's followers are industriously spreading over the country that we are about to make the province over to him may betoken conscious weakness; and altogether it may be that an immediate occupation of Kandahar, followed by a prompt initiative in the Herat direction, might place the whole country at the Amir's feet in spite of the ill-will of the vast majority of the Duranis.

Enclosure 3 in No. 9.

No. 102, dated Kandahar, 16th February 1881.

From Lieutenant-Colonel O. B. ST. JOHN, R.E., C.S.I., Resident, Southern Afghanistan, Kandahar, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

YOUR telegram of the 3rd instant directs me to consider carefully and report by post on the ways and means of introducing the Amir's authority into Candahar, in the event of his accepting and acting effectually on the offer made him to assume its government on our departure.

2. I have delayed submitting the conclusions at which I have arrived for some days, in order to consider the subject carefully in all its bearings, and ascertain as far as possible what measure of support the Amir is likely to receive from the leading men left in the country.

3. The main point is that he should act *effectually* on the invitation given him to assume the government; and I would define *effectually* to be the early despatch of a sufficient body of infantry to occupy Kelat-i-Ghilzai, Kandahar, and Girishk. The minimum number required at first would be 3,500 for Kelat, 1,500 to remain at Kandahar, and 1,000 to go on to Girishk. This total should of course be largely increased, as soon as possible, in view of an attack from or an advance to Herat; but would suffice to keep the country up to the Helmand quiet. It is clear that we cannot make over more to the Amir than we have chosen to take for ourselves, and it may, therefore, be convenient to commence by describing the extent and nature of our hold on the province. Over the outlying districts of Pusht-i-Rud and the Helmand we have no authority whatever, beyond the fact of the fort of Girishk being still occupied by Sirdar Gul Muhammad Khan, an occupation which may cease at any moment, and can hardly be prolonged till the arrival of the Amir's troops. Unless, however, it is occupied by Ayub Khan's regular troops from Herat, of which there would seem no danger, the place is not defensible against artillery, and can be occupied at any time by an adequate force from Kandahar.

4. Over the three northern districts of Tiri, Nish, and Dehrawud, we have likewise no authority. From the north-north-eastern districts of Jaldak, Mizan, and Dahlah, I have been able to obtain a certain amount of revenue, but the hold on them is very slender. Lastly come the home district of Kandahar and those immediately adjoining it, Kushk-i-Nakhud, Khakrez, Tarnak, Arghastan, and Kadanai, which are as yet entirely under my control.

5. The eastern half of the home district, together with Tarnak, Arghastan, and Kadanai, are governed by Sirdar Muhammad Husain Khan, the Wali's brother; and its western half with, Kushk-i-Nakhud, by Sirdar Muhammad Hasan Khan, his nephew. Both of these consider themselves hopelessly compromised with Ayub Khan's party, and will attach themselves to that of the Amir as the nominee of the British Government. As regards the transfer of the districts now actually governed by us, there will, therefore, be no difficulty; Khakrez, the remaining district, is at present managed by Fath Muhammad Khan, a Popalzai chief, of whose family more hereafter, and who will follow any directions given him. The governors, duly warned beforehand, will simply transfer their allegiance to the Amir's representative; and, as far as the people are concerned, there need be no apprehension of overt resistance, always supposing that he is accompanied by an adequate force. The occupation of Kelat-i-Ghilzai, which must precede that of Kandahar, will suffice to establish the Amir's authority over the neighbouring districts of Jaldak, Mizan, while that of Dahlah is of comparatively small importance.

6. As regards the districts of Nish, Dehrawud, and Tirin, I am not prepared to give an opinion whether they will submit to the Amir's authority without a struggle. They will not, I think, attempt to resist an armed occupation; but will hold aloof until conclusions have been settled with their neighbours across the Helmand, the Alizais of Zamindawar, even if they do not actively join them in resistance.

7. The transfer of authority in the city will be as simple as it was in August 1879, when I made over charge to Sirdar Sher Ali Khan. Our Kotwal, a Pathan Subahdar of native infantry, is the only official who will require to be replaced; all the others are natives of the city. Almost the only reform I have made in the revenue system is that the entire receipts are paid daily into the treasury, instead of running accounts being kept with the collectors as under the native government. The whole establishment will be paid up to the date of transfer and made over to the new governor.

8. The land revenue accounts are more complicated; but the fact of the late Wali's Mustaufi, or head accountant, being the Amir's unaccredited agent in Kandahar will render their transfer from my office comparatively easy. He will simply resume the position that he gave up only two months ago, the minor officials remaining unchanged.

9. It will be necessary to give the Amir's representative some pecuniary assistance towards carrying on the government till the next harvest; and this, taking into consideration that the total revenue of the province is only thirteen and half lakhs, I should be inclined to fix at a lakh of rupees to start with, and half a lakh per month for April and May, after which the annual revenue will again be falling due. This would be independent of any special assistance it may be advisable to give to aid in repelling an invasion from Herat, or for an advance in that direction.

10. Until the Amir's troops have actually reached Kelat-i-Ghilzai at least, it will not be advisable to proclaim him in Kandahar. It will not be necessary for our troops to remain in Kandahar for longer after the arrival of those of the Amir than will suffice for a detachment of the latter to occupy Girishk, say a week or 10 days. The interval would be profitably occupied in assisting the Kabul governor in making his arrangements for the nearer districts. If, as there is reason to fear, the Zamindawaris should seize Girishk in Ayub's name, it would be of great assistance to the Amir's authority were the troops sent there to expel them accompanied by a British column; but this would involve a further delay of a week.

11. As before-mentioned, the two Sirdars, Muhammad Hasan Khan and Muhammad Husain Khan, are prominently assisting me in the government of the country. Both are willing to lend their support to the Amir, and Muhammad Hasan's brothers, Shirindil Khan, Anwar Khan, and Roshndil Khan, would, no doubt, follow them. I have not thought it advisable to write to ask Sirdar Gul Muhammad Khan for his views on the subject; but his antecedents make it certain that he would prefer Abdurrahman to Ayub.

Taj Muhammad Khan, Popalzai, and his brothers, are also prepared to transfer their allegiance to the Amir.

Fathi Khan, the Chief of the Achakzais, is already in Kabul; and the most influential man of the clan now in Kandahar, Haji Sarbuland Khan, although no friend of Fathi Khan's, declares his willingness to support the Amir's government. Among doubtful men now here are the Shahghassi Sarwar Khan and Syud Nur Muhammad Shah, son of the late Prime Minister. The latter would, however, I am nearly confident, join the Kabul party.

Beyond the Helmand the Amir would find many supporters, Ahmad Khan of Lash Jowain, with all his tribe, the Ishakzais, the Biluchis of Chakansur, Kalah-i-Fath, and Sistan, with a majority of the Alikozais, besides the Char Aimak tribes. Of the latter

the Taimunis are already preparing to re-occupy Taiwara, whence the regular troops have been recalled to Herat, and it is reported that Yaluntush Khan, Jamshidi, has re-occupied his father's place of Kushk.

12. Thus the Amir, as our nominee alone, be it understood, would have a considerable party in his favour in Southern and Western Afghanistan. It would be for himself or his representative to secure its continued support. The line of conduct pursued by him towards the Duranis and others at Kabul will certainly not do this; but if, on the other hand, efforts are made to attach our friends to himself, and to conciliate the Duranis generally, many of the waverers in Herat as well as here will assuredly pass over to his side; and if, either by direct attack on Herat or by threatening it through Turkistan, he is able to stave off the attack by Ayub, which is sure to be attempted, he should have no difficulty in consolidating his rule.

Enclosure 4 in No. 9.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from the AMIR of KABUL to the Address of His Excellency the VICEROY, dated 10th February 1881.

After compliments.—I have received your Excellency's kind letter, dated the 30th January 1881, which your Excellency was graciously pleased to address to me, asking me to depute an agent.

I wrote to your Excellency that a thoroughly confidential man, as your Excellency was well aware of the nature (of the people) of Afghanistan, did not exist in this country. But as your Excellency has again written that it is necessary to send a man for certain important matters, I have deputed General Amir Ahmad Khan, and entrusted him with certain important proposals. While I had not yet been informed by your Excellency of his arrival in India, I received your Excellency's kind letter regarding the taking over of the government of Kandahar. Having the well-being of the British Government and of Afghanistan in view, I have given publicity to the contents of your Excellency's letter. All the people wished success. I have repeatedly represented to your Excellency in writing the embarrassed condition of Afghanistan, and I again represent it now, as I find it necessary to do so.

Your Excellency has been pleased to say that arms, cash, and all necessary aid, will be given to my officials who will be appointed in Kandahar. May God ever keep your Excellency exalted. But the state of Kabul is this that when the British troops entered Kabul all the arms and ammunition that existed there were so completely destroyed that no vestige of any implements of war was found in the arsenal. Neither is one-hundredth part of the arms and ammunition forthcoming which was granted to Amir Sher Ali by the British Government.

Howsoever vigilant I may be, yet this world is the world of means. I have neither any good guns nor ammunition which may be usefully employed against an enemy. The muskets of every description that I have collected are without their usual accoutrement, and only exist in name.

I have given a brief account of my circumstances; and, unless the illustrious British Government helps me with ammunition, I should find myself in a very difficult position. Therefore it is necessary that your Excellency should kindly send me ammunition as per list annexed, either 100 cartridges per gun, or more or less, so that my weakness be not* exposed, and the troops have their proper equipment.

* Literally, screen may not be removed from the matter.

I have written what has occurred to me.

Enclosure 5 in No. 9.

TRANSLATION of an ABSTRACT of a LETTER addressed by the COMMISSIONER of PESHAWUR to the AMIR of KABUL, dated 27th February 1881.

After Compliments.—I have received telegraphic orders from his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India to address a letter to your Highness to the following effect:—

His Excellency has, with much pleasure, perused your Highness' friendly letter, dated the 10th February 1881.

General Amir Ahmad Khan, your Highness' confidential agent, has arrived at Calcutta, and has had the honour of waiting upon his Excellency the Viceroy.

His Excellency understands from the said letter that your Highness accepts the offer of the British Government made to you in his Excellency's letter, dated the 30th January 1881, to occupy Kandahar. His Excellency also finds that your Highness is in great want of ammunition at Kabul. Conformably to his Excellency's orders, I write to inform your Highness that cartridges, the nearest possible to those described in your Highness' list, are held in readiness to be made over to your Highness' officials at Peshawur or at Khyber.

His Excellency says that your Highness may remember that it was stated in the previous letter that the British troops intended to abandon Kandahar at the commencement of the (next) spring, and that, as your Highness has accepted and still accepts his Excellency's offer, your Highness should despatch troops to Kandahar. His Excellency now informs your Highness that it is necessary that troops, which are able to uphold your Highness' kingdom, should reach Kandahar before the 15th April 1881, and that a governor should be appointed to accompany them, and should be empowered to take over the administration from the British officers. The British Government cannot undertake to keep Kandahar in possession for your Highness after the 15th April. If arrangements are not made by your Highness to take over the administration of Kandahar before the 15th April, the British Government will not hold itself responsible.

Enclosure 6 in No. 9.

Dated Fort William, 8th March 1881.

From His Excellency the VICEROY and GOVERNOR-GENERAL of India to His Highness the AMIR ABDUL RAHMAN KHAN, Amir of Kabul.

YOUR HIGHNESS will already have been prepared, by a letter from the Commissioner of Peshawur, for the return of your representative, General Mir Ahmad Khan, who has satisfactorily discharged the mission entrusted to him, and has obtained all the military stores mentioned by your Highness as immediately needed for the equipment of your Highness' troops.

He has also been made fully acquainted by me, in two interviews, with the views and proposals of the British Government regarding the immediate occupation of Kandahar by your Highness' troops. Under these circumstances it is considered very desirable that he should now return to Kabul with the least possible delay, and report in person to your Highness regarding the state of affairs in general, and the wishes of the British Government. He accordingly leaves Calcutta this evening for Peshawur, with the intention of proceeding direct to Kabul. If, after he has presented himself to your Highness, you desire that he should return to India, it will give me much pleasure to receive him again in Simla, to which place I shall myself proceed from Calcutta in a few days.

In proof of the friendship which now exists between your Highness and the British Government, I am desirous of sending to your Highness' court Wazirzada Muhammad Afzal Khan, a gentleman of good family and position, who is personally known to your Highness, and who, on the occasion of his deputation to Turkistan, was of much service in promoting the interests of the two Governments. He will give your Highness information on any matters of detail regarding which your Highness may wish from time to time to be informed; and his presence in attendance on your Highness in Kabul may be useful and advantageous in the transaction of any business with my officers in India.

Enclosure 7 in No. 9.

Dated 25th February 1881.

From Lieutenant-Colonel O. B. ST. JOHN, R.E., C.S.I., Resident, Southern Afghanistan, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

THE only event of importance that has occurred since the despatch of my letter of the 14th has been the arrival of Sirdar Muhammad Ayub Khan's envoys, who appeared somewhat unexpectedly on the 23rd.

The fact of their approach having become known in the city, a considerable number of people went out to meet them by the Herat gate, and I, therefore, had them brought

in by the citadel entrance. No demonstration, however, took place; but some excitement was caused by a servant of the Sahibzada's, who preceded them by some hours, shouting a religious war cry as he passed through the streets.

The envoys were accompanied by about seventy horsemen and thirty menial attendants. They are lodged in Sirdar Sher Ali Khan's house, which is close to that in which I live. At their own request city people are not allowed free access to them, but anyone they ask to see is permitted to visit them.

Owing to indisposition, I was unable to see them till yesterday (the 26th), when they called on me. They commenced by saying that they had particular orders to express the profound grief of the Sirdar at the death of Lieutenant Maclaine, which he did not hear of till some time after his arrival in Herat. They also affirmed that Lieutenant Maclaine could, if he wished, have gone to the British camp. They then presented Ayub Khan's letter, of which a copy, with translation, is attached. I made no comment on it, and after some conversation on ordinary topics they retired. There is reason to believe that without invitation they will not deliver the message with which they have been charged by Muhammad Ayub Khan; and I propose to ask them what they have to say next Monday, the 28th, when I shall see them again.

With regard to their mission, a correspondent in Herat writes on the 6th instant that when Ayub's messenger, Nihang, arrived, bringing my letter of the 14th December (a simple acknowledgment of his apology for Lieutenant Maclaine's murder), the Sirdar announced in Durbar that the English had written to say that they would give him Kandahar and ten lakhs of rupees; but that he was not satisfied with this, as twenty lakhs would not recoup him for all he had lost at Mazra, and that he also wanted the whole country as far as Quetta. His friends at Kandahar continue to write to him that the English are about to leave, and that, in spite of his defeat, he has a reputation among them greater even than that of the Wazir Muhammad Akbar Khan. His councillors represented to him that it will be to his advantage to send envoys to Kandahar under any circumstances, for, if they failed in their negotiations, they would be able to stir up the people against the English. This, of course, was to be expected, and indicates, I think, the advisability of not dismissing the envoys too hastily. Ayub's pretensions are, of course, mere swagger to cover the act of humility in sending envoys uninvited.

A letter from Hashim Khan to Mirza Hasan Ali Khan, shows that he is uneasy, and that there are two parties at Herat, one consisting apparently of Hashim himself, the two envoys, and probably General Hafizulla Khan, in favour of coming to terms with us; and the other, whose prominent members are, it may be conjectured, the Sartip Nur Muhammad Khan (who believes that his treachery to the Wali will never be forgiven by us) and the Luinab Khushdil Khan, whose proclivities are Russian, who wish to continue hostilities. It is also clear that great apprehensions are entertained in Herat of an advance of the Amir's troops through Maimenab. The Taiwara people also appear to be inclined to renew their rebellion; and between the two it would be very difficult for Ayub Khan to move any of his small force of regulars towards the Helmand for some time.

As anticipated, Sirdar Gul Muhammad Khan has left Girishk, and gone to his own fort about fifteen miles to the south, though it does not appear that there was urgent reason for his doing so. The Alizais are, he states, assembling; but unless they stop supplies coming in to Kandahar, of which there is at present no sign, their hostile demonstrations, having no objective, are of little consequence. The fort of Girishk is not tenable against regular troops with artillery.

The only news from the Kabul side is that the Amir, having remitted the poll-tax on the Tarakis, they have submitted to his governor. The report of a considerable body of troops having arrived at Ghazni was untrue. I learn indirectly through the envoys that Asmatullah Khan, General Taj Muhammad Khan, and other Ghilzai chiefs, are in regular correspondence with Herat.

The long expected rain has fallen abundantly during the last week, and has removed all fear of a failure in the spring crops, though very little unirrigated land has been sown. The Commissariat has still no difficulty in obtaining supplies, though their increased demand for grain has during the last few days somewhat raised its price. They have not, however, as far as I can gather, more than a week's supply in hand beyond what is required to store the first three posts on the line of communications, which is to be done from Kandahar.

Enclosure 8 in No. 9.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from SIRDAR MUHAMMAD AYUB KHAN to the RESIDENT, Southern Afghanistan, dated Herat, 2nd Rabi-ul-Awal, corresponding to 2nd February 1881.

After compliments.—I have perused, in original, the kind letter which you sent to my respected brother, Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan. From its contents, which display the signs of kindness towards me, I am sure that you have always been disposed to be kind and friendly. Nevertheless (consequently?), since both before this I was desirous of, and inclined for, the friendship of the British Government, and since now also I desire it, I take the liberty of sending to you, without delay, Hazrat Umr Jan Sahib and Sirdar Abdulla Khan, who possess my complete confidence, and are acquainted with the secrets of my private wishes; so that, while they have the honour and advantage of seeing you, they may also make known to you the representations and friendly wishes which I have communicated to them. And from these representations and sincere statements I have a hope that the bond of friendship between myself and the British Government will be satisfactorily restored. Please God, misunderstandings have come to an end, and the permanent friendship that may be arranged between us will remain firm and undisturbed.

Whatever my special messengers may tell you in regard to my wishes please consider to be the unmingled truth.

Enclosure 9 in No. 9.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from the AMIR of KABUL to the address of His Excellency the VICEROY, dated February 1881.

After compliments.—Your Excellency's kind letter, dated the 11th February 1881, in reply to my friendly epistle conveying thanks for Kelat-i-Ghilzai, has reached me, and made known to me your Excellency's benign and friendly sentiments. Your Excellency has written that it is the wish of the illustrious British Government that my authority should be strongly established in that place (Kelat) as speedily as possible. I also earnestly desire to attain this important object, (*viz.*) to organize fully and in the best way the government of the Kandahar districts with all possible despatch, with the friendly attention (assistance) of the British Government. And I hope to obtain such an aid from Her Imperial Majesty's Government as would suffice for the settlement of affairs in that direction. The affairs of Kelat, please God, will soon be arranged, and when a man (governor) is nominated by me to take over charge of Kelat-i-Ghilzai, it will be manifest that no mistake has been made. Your Excellency may rest assured.

No. 10.

No. 50 of 1881.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, March 27, 1881.

IN continuation of our Despatch,* dated 14th March 1881, we have the honour

* No. 44.

† Dated 6th March 1881.

‡ Dated 18th March 1881.

to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copies of a letter† from the Amir of Kabul to the Commissioner of Peshawar, and of the letter‡ from the Viceroy to His Highness.

2. We also forward copies of a letter§ from the Resident at Kandahar, giving an account of his meeting with the envoys sent by Sirdar Muhammad Ayub Khan, and the message delivered by them.

§ Dated 2nd March 1881.

We have, &c.

(Signed)

RIPON.

WHITLEY STOKES.

D. M. STEWART.

Enclosure 1 in No. 10.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from the AMIR of KABUL to the COMMISSIONER of PESHAWUR, dated 6th March 1881.

After compliments.—I have perused your two friendly letters, dated the 25th and the 27th February 1881 respectively, which made known to me your friendly sentiments. Your first letter informed me of Amir Ahmad Khan's arrival at Peshawur and Calcutta, and set my heart at rest. The second letter, which contained a telegraphic communication from his Excellency the Viceroy respecting the Kandahar question, was fully understood by me.

With regard to the ammunition granted by the glorious Government, it is necessary that it should be made over to my officials at Lundikotal, (*viz.*) it should be brought through the officials of the British Government as far as Lundikotal, whence the men of the Governor of Jellalabad will take charge of it, and will, please God, bring it to Kabul quickly.

I have understood what you wrote that the British troops will abandon Kandahar early in spring; that his Excellency the Viceroy urges that my officers and troops should reach Kandahar before the 15th April, and that the British troops will not undertake to occupy it for me after the 15th April. But I do not know why and wherefore the representatives of the Sublime Government are so hasty and are going to abandon Kandahar so soon and in such a short time, and why they have placed me in such a

narrow circle.* I have not omitted and will not omit anything in respect to the administration of Kandahar. I gave wide publicity to the contents of his Excellency the Viceroy's letter

on the day it arrived, and notified to (all) far and near that the glorious Government has made over and granted Kandahar to me; and forthwith I employed myself in getting ready accoutrements for the troops appointed. I had no ammunition. I applied to the Sublime Government for it. I had no camels. I called upon Lughman, Jellalabad, and the suburbs of Kabul, to furnish each their quota. The hire of a camel used to be Rupees 7 per month formerly. I have promised to pay Rupees 40 for a month's journey. Men have been appointed to go in every direction to bring camels. The troops appointed are now ready and prepared; camels will also, please God, arrive; the ammunition will also be brought from Lundikotal to the capital, and the troops will march to Kandahar, where they will arrive five days before or after the 15th April. My affairs are confused and in a very bad state from want of material and resources. It is not that my affairs, like those of the British Government, are in good order, and that I am showing apathy and indifference. Such is the embarrassed state of Afghanistan, and such is the determination of the British officers! However, I will, please God, use my endeavours so long as there is life in the body. Rest assured. But I cannot guarantee the entry of my troops in Kandahar punctually and for certain on the 14th April. As soon as the camels arrive I will put the troops in motion. Should the officers of the British Government lay the blame upon me to-morrow (afterwards), saying that as my troops did not arrive at Kandahar within the fixed period the British troops gave up the possession of Kandahar, I shall not consider myself liable to blame. Should the British Government have anything else in view it will not also give me cause to grieve, nor will it hurt my feelings. I look upon the pleasure of the British Government as my own pleasure.

Although I wish my own advancement, and desire to see my State well administered, I wish more to maintain my good reputation and to be true to my word.

Enclosure 2 in No. 10.

Khureeta, dated Umballa, 18th March 1881.

From His Excellency the VICEROY and GOVERNOR-GENERAL of INDIA to His Highness AMIR ABDUL RAHMAN KHAN, Amir of Kabul.

YOUR Highness' friendly letter addressed on the 6th March to the Commissioner of Peshawur has been forwarded to me. I reply to it direct, since, although on some occasions it has been necessary, to save time, that the Commissioner of Peshawur should be instructed by telegraph to send letters on my behalf, yet I take every opportunity of corresponding with Your Highness direct.

In regard to the ammunition, General Mir Ahmed has been already informed that not only has the supply required been despatched, but a further supply is available, if required. And if on the arrival of Your Highness' troops at Kandahar it is found that rifles and more ammunition are needed for the equipment of your troops there, these will also be forthcoming, in addition to the artillery already offered, at that place.

Your Highness will now, I trust, feel assured that the British Government is endeavouring in many ways to assist and facilitate your preparations for sending a force to receive charge of Kandahar. It has given me much pleasure to learn that the despatch of this force is only delayed by the want of transport, and that it will reach Kandahar within a few days before or after the 15th April; for, although it is not my intention to circumscribe too narrowly the time within which our joint arrangements must take effect, yet there are very strong reasons why they cannot be delayed.

In the first place, I desire to explain to Your Highness that the greater part of the British troops now in Kandahar must leave Afghanistan in time to march to India before the extreme heat begins; otherwise they will suffer greatly on the road, and Your Highness, who is experienced in military matters, knows the paramount importance of caring for the health of an army. It is solely through my solicitude for Your Highness' convenience that I have deferred the movement until the middle of April; and it is even now to be feared that some of the British troops will be exposed to grave hardship.

Secondly, there is a great and manifest advantage in giving effect, as speedily as possible, to whatever arrangements have been settled between the two Governments in respect to Kandahar. The determination of Her Majesty's Government to offer Kandahar to Your Highness cannot fail to become speedily known; indeed Your Highness has already announced it to your people; so that now the wise and prudent course is to act rapidly upon the plan that has been adopted, lest delay should be prejudicial to Your Highness' interest, and lest the minds of men should become unsettled and the solution of affairs should become less opportune.

I trust, therefore, that Your Highness will perceive that, in advising you earnestly that your troops should reach Kandahar by the middle of April, I have been actuated entirely by a regard for the joint interests of both States and by my sincere desire for the success of this important undertaking.

Enclosure 3 in No. 10.

Dated Kandahar, 2nd March 1881. (Extract.)

From Lieut.-Colonel ST. JOHN, R.E., Resident, Southern Afghanistan, to
A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I HAVE this morning telegraphed to you the substance of the message from Sirdar Muhammad Ayub Khan, delivered to me yesterday evening by his envoys. As anticipated in my letter of the 26th, they did not attempt to give it until invited. I, therefore, asked them to visit me yesterday, and requested them to communicate any further message they might have from the Sirdar. Abdulla Khan, Nasiri, then said that the Sirdar had ordered them in the first instance to express his profound regret for Lieutenant Maclaine's murder, and, secondly, to give me the following message. That he considered that Yakub Khan was in the first place the lawful heir of their father, the late Amir; and that this was the view of the Government was shown by their making over the country to him. Fate so willed it, that, either on account of his faults or because Government judged it advisable in their own interests, he was deposed and deported to India. This being the case, Ayub Khan considers himself the next in succession and the rightful heir to the sovereignty of Afghanistan. Nevertheless, he places his affairs unreservedly in the hands of the British Government, looking upon himself as its friend and servant; and will accept any measure of kindness it is pleased to bestow on him, whether it gives him the whole of Afghanistan, half of it, Kandahar only, or a village of Kandahar.* If the English Government accept his friendship, his endeavour and desire will be to do it service, and he will look upon its friends and enemies as his own.

* NOTE.—This would appear only an expression of humility without any definite meaning.

2. Umr Jan, Sahibzada, then said that he was not a person of official rank, but a poor man and a Mullah. Nevertheless, he was able, should the British Government come to terms with Sirdar Muhammad Ayub Khan, to exhort the people of his own race and faith to hold fast to the friendship of the British Government, and look upon its enemies as their enemies. For the British being a great Government and a

near neighbour to their country has power of good and evil over it. The interest of Afghanistan, therefore, lies in obtaining the good-will of the English Government.

3. I said to the Sahibzada that I was glad to see that he had so just an appreciation of the true interests of his country, by disregarding which the late Amir had brought about his own ruin. As regards the Sirdar's message, I told the envoys that they were, no doubt, aware that I could say nothing in reply on my own account, but that I would faithfully transmit it to his Excellency the Viceroy of India. They replied, begging my good offices with his Excellency, to which I gave no answer.

No. 11.

No. 51 of 1881.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON,
Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, March 27, 1881.

IN continuation of our despatch, No. 39,* dated the 28th February 1881,

Letter from Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur Division, No. 1104P., dated 21st February, 1881, and enclosure.

Letter to the Government of the Punjab, No. 479E.P., dated 12th March 1881.

we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of the papers noted on the margin, regarding the arrangements finally concluded with the Khyber Afridis for the

future security of the Khyber Pass.

We have, &c.

(Signed) RIPON.
WHITLEY STOKES.
D. M. STEWART.

Enclosure 1 in No. 11.

From Lieut.-Colonel W. G. WATERFIELD, Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur Division, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated 21st February 1881.

I HAVE the honour to forward two copies of the Pass Agreement with the Khyber Afridis, corrected in accordance with instructions and finally signed by them.

Enclosure 2 in No. 11.

AGREEMENT with GOVERNMENT signed by the KHYBER AFRIDIS.

WE agree as follows :

1. On the understanding that the British Government maintain political relations with us, while at the same time our independence continues to be fully recognized, we are bound to exclude all other influence, and not to admit the interference of any other power between ourselves and the British Government.

2. In consideration of receiving certain allowances, the amount of which Government has engaged to fix, we hereby undertake the responsibility of preserving order and security of life and property within the Khyber Pass.

3. All matters affecting the Pass arrangements and especially the security of the road shall be submitted to a combined council of all the Afridi tribes. Through this council, arrangements will be made such as will provide for the security of the lives and property of all who use the Khyber road without distinction of class or race, local being entitled to equal protection with foreign traffic; and care will be taken that no intertribal or personal feuds are pursued on or near the road or posts.

4. No trader or travellers will be allowed to enter the Pass without an order authorizing them to proceed, which will be furnished by the persons responsible, together with a sufficient guard for protection.

Should any prospect of danger present itself, owing to the existence or likelihood of any disturbance on or near the road, we will be responsible for closing the Pass, giving notice to that effect to the Khan of Lalpura, and to the Political Officer at Jamrud, and will further make due provision for the safety of any trade, or travellers within the Pass.

* See page 34.

5. Our responsibility for the security of the road is independent of aid from Government in the form of troops. It lies with the discretion of Government to retain its troops within the Pass, or to withdraw them and to reoccupy at pleasure.

6. We will provide such number of men as Government may direct to carry on the duties of Jezailchis, of whom some force is absolutely necessary to enable us to render the road secure.

These men, having their head-quarters at Jamrud, will be subject to the inspection of the Political Officer, and all arrangements which we make for the distribution of their duties shall be reported to him. Should we wish to employ them on any other duty than that of protecting the road, the permission of the Political Officer must be obtained.

We fully understand that these Jezailchis are not a Government force, and that, although maintained at Government expense, they are being allowed merely as an additional means of enabling us to fulfil our engagements.

7. So long as we are in receipt of the Khyber allowances the right of collecting tolls rests with the British Government alone. We cannot claim any payments of traders or travellers.

8. All offences committed on the road shall be dealt with by the united council of all the tribes, whether individuals or sections of tribes are concerned.

The council shall inflict punishment after the manner of our tribal customs, and compensation will be awarded to the injured party or parties.

The action taken on the commission of any offence or in regard to the punishment of the offenders shall be reported to the Political Officer, through whom any compensation that is awarded will be paid. If necessary, fines and compensation can be enforced by deductions from the allowances made by Government.

9. In consideration of the allowances of which we shall be in receipt, we further bind ourselves not to commit dacoity, highway robbery, or murder in British territory. Any transgression of this condition will make our allowances liable to forfeiture in payment of fine or compensation due on this account.

10. All arrangements that we make in fulfilling our responsibility for the protection of the road shall be reported to the Political Officer.

All convoys wishing to proceed through the Pass shall be despatched periodically under a guard, and we are responsible for all trade or travellers admitted within the Pass.

11. We will maintain until further orders the standing posts or chowkis which have hitherto been kept up along the road by the tribes and have been paid for from the allowances. The tribal watchmen who occupy them will be employed either in guarding their assigned localities, or in forming part of the escort on the periodical convoys.

12. Of the Government buildings situated in the Pass we consent to take some under our charge, guaranteeing their security; the rest should be dismantled by Government.

We engage to hold the fort of Ali Musjid, understanding that Government will grant an additional company of 100 Jezailchis for this special duty.

13. We undertake to guarantee the safety of the Political Officer, or other official who may have occasion to visit the Khyber Pass; provided that sufficient notice be given us beforehand.

14. It is understood that the boundary fixed by the Treaty of Gundamak, west of Lundikhana, is the limit of our responsibilities. This is liable to subsequent alteration at the discretion of Government.

15. Permanent arrangements will be made by which posts or expresses can be forwarded at any time night or day.

16. We are prepared to take charge of the Khyber Pass in the manner above indicated from Lundikhana to Ali Musjid, and again from Ali Musjid, to Jamrud at once, or so soon as Government directs the withdrawal of troops from the whole of this road or any part of it. Meanwhile the tribes will preserve their present obligations.

17. We understand that we are exclusively responsible for the future management of the Khyber, and that Government in no way shares in this responsibility; and this position we accept.

(Signed) W. G. WATERFIELD, Lieut.-Colonel,
Commissioner and Superintendent,
Peshawur Division.

Enclosure 3 in No. 11.

No. 479 E.P., dated Fort William, 12th March 1881.

From A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary of the Government of India, Foreign Department, to SECRETARY to the GOVERNMENT of PUNJAB.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letters, reporting the final arrangement which it is proposed to make for the future security of the Khyber Pass. I have already communicated with you by telegram regarding certain parts of the plan which required immediate orders, and I am now to convey to you the orders of the Government of India upon the whole subject.

2. The arrangements impose upon the Afridi tribes entire and exclusive responsibility for the security of the road which passes through the independent tribal territory where the authority of the Kabul Government is not recognized. A subsidy of Rupees 87,540 per annum is to be given in allowances to different portions of these tribes, and a body of jezailchis is, in compliance with the wish of the Afridis, to be maintained at a yearly cost of Rupees 87,392 to the British Government. In consideration of these payments the Afridis undertake all responsibility for management of the Pass in accordance with their agreement, and are bound to occupy with the jezailchis Ali Masjid and other important posts as far as Lundikhana. His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor has declared that the groundwork of the Commissioner's proposals has his entire approbation and concurrence, and this opinion, which of course carries, upon such a subject, great weight with the Government of India, the Governor-General in Council has determined to accept.

3. There were, however, certain points of detail which appeared to require special consideration. The correspondence submitted by you showed some divergence of views as to the expediency of levying tolls upon traffic passing through the Khyber. The Commissioner would have deferred for a few months the collection of these tolls, on the ground that by collecting them we assume a more direct responsibility than is contemplated by the agreement for the safety of the convoys traversing the Pass; while his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor sees no sufficient reason for not levying the tolls at once, observing that, whether we do so or not, the public will virtually hold the Government of India responsible for the safety of the Pass. The Governor-General in Council concurs with his Honour in preferring that the tolls should be levied at once. The terms of the agreement expressly reserve to the British Government the right of levying tolls, and it is possible that, if at the commencement this right is waived, it may not be altogether easy to levy them hereafter should it be thought advisable to do so; while the suspension of the exercise of our right may be interpreted as an indication of some uncertainty whether the arrangements made with the tribes will have effectually provided for the security of the road. Further it is hardly to be expected that the exemption from transit dues will procure any advantage to travellers and caravans using the road, as the tolls which we should forego would in all probability be exacted by the Afridis themselves, or by some authority beyond the territorial limit of these arrangements. Under these circumstances, the Government of India approve the recommendations of his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor on this point, and I am to request that the necessary orders may be issued at his discretion to the Commissioner of Peshawur.

4. A second question arises as to the responsibility for particular robberies committed within the Pass. The Governor-General in Council observes that the Commissioner of Peshawur would throw upon the tribal union all responsibility for the safety of convoys traversing the Pass, and would decline, on the part of Government, any direct liability to the traders in the event of losses. If robberies occur, the complainants are to be referred to the headmen for their remedy, while the British officers assist them by their influence and advice, and reserve the power, in case the tribes fail to act up to their agreement, to withhold the allowances, disband the jezailchis, and close the Pass. His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor would, on the other hand, authorize the Political Officer to enquire into individual complaints, and, after the necessary enquiries, award compensation out of the tribal subsidies. After attentive consideration of the opinion of his Honour upon this particular question, the Government of India have formed the conclusion that it is most expedient, on first bringing these arrangements into operation, to follow strictly the procedure laid down in the agreement, and to refer all complaints in the first instance to the jirgahs. Article 8 of the agreement entrusts the jirgah with the power of award and of levying penalties, and they should have full discretion in exercising this power. If in

any particular case they fail in the performance of their duty, it will be time to bring pressure to bear upon the united jirgah of all the tribes, reminding them that they have undertaken to award compensation which (when awarded) may be deducted from the allowances, and that the maintenance by the British Government of the whole agreement may depend on their fulfilment of an essential condition belonging to it.

5. In a previous communication from you, and in the telegrams from this Office, the advisability of retaining a body of jezailchis for service within the Pass has been discussed. In sanctioning the retention of the force, the Government of India has been mainly influenced by the argument used in your letter to the Commissioner of Peshawur, No. 2140, dated 13th December 1880, and in the letter of the Commissioner to which it is a reply. The special advantage of the plan is understood to be that it will preserve unity of action among the tribes, will give a frame-work and cohesion to the intertribal arrangements, and will provide with regular employ and duties more than 600 men, who might otherwise be disposed to plundering and disorder. It appears to be, moreover, the decided opinion of the frontier officers that, unless the tribes are in this manner encouraged and assisted by us in their attempts at self-organization, they must inevitably fail in combining to fulfil their joint responsibilities. The sanction of the Government of India under certain conditions has already been conveyed to you by telegraph, but I am now to repeat that his Excellency the Governor-General in Council assents to the establishment of the jezailchi corps and to the agreement that our officers shall engage to pay the men, and to do what may be practicable in the way of aiding the headmen to equip and organize the force. But it is understood that the tribal headmen must take actual charge of the corps, and of its recruiting and ordinary management; the British political officers merely assisting by advice, and by their general influence, supported, of course, in this case by the understanding that the allowances are liable to be forfeited or suspended if the arrangements break down. His Excellency the Governor-General in Council would again point out that the essential principle of the whole agreement is distinctly declared to be that the tribes undertake certain specified duties and responsibilities in exchange for certain stipulated payments.

6. I am to inform you that his Excellency in Council agrees with Sir Robert Egerton in thinking that it is not possible, at any rate for the present, to reduce to any considerable extent the amount of the subsidies to be paid in cash to the Afridis for the protection of the Khyber Pass. The Governor-General in Council feels that the arrangements must, to a certain extent, be regarded as experimental. The objects of the Government of India are to keep the Khyber Pass secure and open, to encourage traffic and intercourse with Afghanistan, to establish our political influence over the Afridis, and to exclude the authority of Kabul from the independent border lands. If the arrangements adopted work well and succeed in securing these objects, his Excellency in Council is of opinion that the money payments which may be necessary are well worth making.

7. You also treat of the establishments required by the Political Officers in charge of the Khyber Pass arrangements, and of the rate of pay of the jezailchi force. With reference to the latter point, I am to inform you that the Government of India accepts his Honour's recommendation to retain for the present the rate of Rupees 9 per mensem as the pay of a sepoy in the jezailchi force; and will be glad to receive your further proposals on this subject. As regards political establishments, I am to remark that the estimates submitted by you seem to be capable of material reductions; but the Governor-General in Council will reserve the whole subject for separate consideration.

8. In conclusion, I am to inform you that his Excellency the Governor-General in Council fully concurs in the high estimate which Sir Robert Egerton has formed of the ability with which Colonel Waterfield, C.S.I., the Commissioner of Peshawur, has conducted these negotiations. The settlement which he has effected by the exercise of great patience and address in dealing with the tribes will, if it proves stable and otherwise permanently successful, be a lasting memorial of valuable services rendered by Colonel Waterfield in his political administration of the frontier of the Peshawur Division of the Punjab.

9. I am also directed to acknowledge the good services of Major Conolly, Political Officer in the Khyber, and of his Assistants, and I am to inform you that the work done by them will be borne in mind.

No. 12.

No. 54 of 1881.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON,
Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, April 3, 1881.

IN continuation of our despatch,* dated 27th March 1881, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copies of a letter† from the Commissioner of Peshawur to the Amir of Kabul, and of two letters, dated, respectively, 12th and 16th March 1881, from the Amir to the Commissioner.

* No. 50.

† Dated 8th March 1881.

We have, &c.

(Signed)

RIPON.

WHITLEY STOKES.

RIVERS THOMPSON.

J. GIBBS.

D. M. STEWART.

E. BARING.

Enclosure 1 in No. 12.

TRANSLATION of a Copy of an Abstract of a LETTER addressed by the COMMISSIONER of PESHAWUR to the AMIR of KABUL, dated 8th March 1881.

After compliments.—A telegram, dated the 7th March 1881, has been received from the Foreign Secretary to the effect that, according to his Excellency the Viceroy's command, I should address a friendly letter to you, intimating that General Amir Ahmad Khan has discharged the duties entrusted to him satisfactorily, and has become well acquainted with the views and sentiments of his Excellency the Viceroy, and has succeeded in obtaining the ammunition, mention of which is made in your Highness' friendly letter. It is now deemed advisable that the above-named General should wait in person upon your Highness and represent minutely and in detail the conversations that he has had with, and all that he has heard from, his Excellency the Viceroy respecting matters in general. His Excellency the Viceroy intends leaving Calcutta for Simla in a few days, and so the General has quitted Calcutta this day, the 8th March, with the object of proceeding direct to Kabul to wait upon your Highness, provided he receives no further orders from your Highness on the road. Should your Highness again depute him to India after he has waited upon, and paid his respects to, your Highness, his Excellency the Viceroy will receive him with pleasure at Simla.

His Excellency the Viceroy's friendly letter to your Highness has been made over to the General, who will deliver it to your Highness when he waits upon you.

General Amir Ahmad Khan will reach Peshawur on the 13th March, if he is not delayed on the road.

Enclosure 2 in No. 12.

TRANSLATION of Copy of LETTER addressed by the COMMISSIONER of PESHAWUR to the AMIR of KABUL, dated 12th March 1881.

After compliments.—I wrote to your Highness in my previous letter of the 27th February 1881 that cartridges, the nearest possible (to the descriptions given), were held in readiness to be made over to your officials either at Peshawur or at Khyber. Mulla Abu Bakr and Muhammad Akbar accordingly got the camels, received the cartridges from the Peshawur Arsenal, and sent off 202 camel-loads on the 3rd March 1881, and 153 loads on the 6th idem. These were convoyed as far as Lundikhana by a British guard, and thence they were taken over by the men of the Khan of Lalpura, who sent them on.

The detail of the descriptions of the cartridges, &c., will be learned on a perusal of the list enclosed and of the receipt of the above-named persons.

Enclosure 3 in No. 12.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from His Highness the AMIR to the COMMISSIONER of PESHAWUR, dated 16th March 1881.

A FRIENDLY letter from you, dated the 8th March, came to hand on the 13th. This letter announced that General Mir Ahmed Khan, after the conclusion of all necessary business, had taken leave of his Excellency the Viceroy. Whatever his Excellency communicated to him and enjoined on him will, no doubt, be a source of benefit for both powers.

Whereas it is necessary to inform the representatives of the British Government regarding the appointment of the Kandahar troops, their officer in command, and his subordinates, I write that 1,000 cavalry, 4,000 infantry, artillery, and khasadars, in all 5,000, have been appointed to proceed in that direction (Kandahar). Of these the cavalry leaving here on the 20th Rabi-ul-Sani (21st March) will arrive in Kandahar between the 2nd and the 5th of Jamaat-ul-Awwal (2nd and 5th April), while the infantry and artillery and khasadars will proceed by regular marches to their destination.

With regard to the governor, the General, and other subordinate officers, General Amir Ahmed Khan was instructed by the representatives of the sublime Government that only such men should be selected to fill these posts who are wholly free from any charge of wrong-doing and have no designs of their own. Accordingly, after thinking the matter over very carefully, and giving one preference over another, I have decided on appointing my cousin, Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan, the son of my uncle Amir Azim Khan, as governor, and nominated Sirdar Shams-ul-din Khan Muhammadzai, Ghulam Hyder Khan Sahibzada, Kazi Said-uddin Khan, and several others, for the subordinate posts of government. General Ghulam Hyder Khan, Tokhi, Commander-in-Chief of the God-granted Government, has been appointed to take charge of the troops.

These men, please God, will serve as an excellent guarantee for the good management of the country. Anything that the officers of Government leave in Kandahar in the way of money, material, tools, and arms, and entrust to my agents, will be made over to these men whose names I have mentioned above. They will arrive with the cavalry first, and General Ghulam Hyder will come up afterwards with the infantry and artillery.

I also write to inform you previously I had appointed Sirdar Muhammad Yusuf Khan in the place of Muhammad Hashim Khan as governor of Kandahar, but the officers of the God-granted Government, and those who were intended to proceed to Kandahar, unanimously voted that Yusuf Khan was not fit for a post of such responsibility and importance, and the only result of sending him will in all probability be a complete failure. His appointment was therefore cancelled.

No. 13.

To His Excellency the MOST HONOURABLE the GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA IN COUNCIL.

No. 13.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

London, April 8, 1881.

IN conveying to you, in my Despatch of the 19th of November last, the assent of Her Majesty's Government to your recognition of the independence of the tribes who inhabit and border on the Khyber Pass, after the withdrawal from that position of the British troops, I informed you that I left the details of the arrangements to be thereupon made with those tribes with entire confidence in the hands of your Excellency's Government.

2. You now report those details in your letter, No. 39 of the 28th February last, from which I learn that you have concluded a formal agreement with the headmen of the Pass which concedes to their tribes a proper independence within recognized limits, admits the exercise of our own influence over them to the exclusion of that of any other power, invests them with the sole responsibility for the future management of the road, reserves to Government a proper discretion as to withdrawal or possible re-occupation of the Pass, and places the future security of the Khyber on a clear and recognized basis.

3. To effect these objects you have, whilst retaining in your own hands the right of collecting tolls in the Pass, consented to grant annual allowances to different sections of the Afridis to the amount of Rs. 87,540, and to allot a further yearly sum of

Rs. 87,392 to the payment of a corps of Jezailchis which the tribes desire to maintain. You have further arranged to withdraw the British garrisons from the Pass at an early date after the survey of certain alternative routes to Lundikhana and Dakka.

4. Your proceedings appear to be well calculated to effect the objects which Her Majesty's Government have at heart, viz., the proper security of the Khyber Pass and a safe transit through it, with the least possible interference on the part of Government. I have, therefore, to intimate to you their full approval of those proceedings, and their sense of the care with which the arrangements have been conducted and completed by Colonel Waterfield, Commissioner of Peshawur, under the orders of the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab.

(Signed) HARTINGTON.

No. 14.

No. 57 of 1881.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

TO the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, April 10, 1881.

IN continuation of our Despatch,* dated the 3rd April 1881, we have the honour

* No. 54, Secret.

† No. 162.

to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of a letter from the Resident at Kandahar, dated the 22nd March,† enclosing letters from Sirdar Muhammad Ayub

Khan and the Amir of Kabul, and submitting remarks on the course of affairs in Kandahar during the preceding three weeks.

2. We forward also copies of papers and telegrams relating to the instructions issued for the evacuation of Kandahar and to the transfer of the civil administration to the governor appointed by the Amir of Kabul. It will be seen that letters have been addressed to the Amir of Kabul, commending to his care and protection the Sirdars and other persons who have served or otherwise assisted the British Government during the occupation of Southern Afghanistan, and who will remain at Kandahar; and that instructions on the same subject have been simultaneously sent to Colonel St. John.

We have, &c.

(Signed)

RIPON.

D. M. STEWART.

W. STOKES.

RIVERS THOMPSON.

J. GIBBS.

E. BARING.

G. T. CHESNEY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 14.

No. 162, dated Kandahar, 22nd March 1881 (Extract).

FROM Lieut.-Col. O. B. ST. JOHN, C.S.I., Resident, Southern Afghanistan, Kandahar, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

IN forwarding the enclosed copies of letters from Sirdar Muhammad Ayub Khan to me, from myself to his Highness the Amir, and from his Highness to me, I take the opportunity of submitting a few remarks on the course of affairs in Kandahar during the past three weeks.

2. After the interview with Muhammad Ayub Khan's envoys, of which I had the honour to give an account in my letter of the 2nd March, I refrained from seeing them until the receipt of your telegram of the 20th ordering their dismissal. No restraint was placed on their movements, but they voluntarily remained in the house placed at their disposal, fearing, at least so Abdulla Khan stated, that their presence in the streets or mosques might occasion disturbances which would prejudice the cause of their master. It was not till the 17th that Sahibzada Umr Jan asked leave to visit his father's grave, situated in a garden outside the town. His passage through the streets, being unexpected, excited little curiosity or comment, and the next day (being Friday) he requested permission to say his prayers in a neighbouring mosque. But the envoys' followers,

circulating freely in the town, brought to them the rumours which have been current for some days past of the approach of the Amir's troops, and for the last week they have been very uneasy as to the success of their mission.

3. After receipt of your telegram of the 21st on the same day, I sent at once for the envoys, and told them that Her Majesty's Government, after careful consideration of the circumstances, believed that the best course in its own interests and those of Afghanistan would be to confer the sovereignty of Kandahar on the Amir Abdurrahman Khan; that they had therefore invited him to send a representative and troops to Kandahar as soon as possible, shortly after whose arrival the British army would retire across the Khojak. The envoys stated that the rumour current in the town had prepared them for the announcement I had made; to which I replied that, with the exception of myself and themselves, no one in Kandahar was aware of the settlement made with the Amir, and that I had not lost a day in communicating it to them. Abdulla Khan said that they regretted the decision of Government, both on account of their country and the English, as it would have been a far preferable arrangement to have left Abdurrahman in possession of Kabul and Turkistan, and to have acknowledged Ayub Khan as ruler of Kandahar and Herat. I replied that there could be no use in discussing the matter now; and that for the present the only advice I could give them was to refrain from any attempt to create disturbances, which could only result in detaining the British troops in the country, and to recommend Sirdar Ayub Khan to come to terms, if possible, with the Amir. The envoys then asked when they should leave. I told them that it depended entirely on themselves; and, after a short discussion, it was agreed that they should start to-morrow, the 23rd.

4. The very seasonable and abundant rain which has fallen during the last three weeks has dispelled the apprehension I expressed in former letters of the difficulty, or even impossibility, of feeding the large number of transport animals massed here to provide for the movement of the force on the 15th April. The green crops and young corn, which is here cut for forage, are not only more abundant, but a full fortnight earlier than usual; while the prospect of a good harvest has made sellers anxious to bring their corn to market as soon as possible.

While on the subject of supply, I may mention that the existing contract machinery of the Commissariat should enable them to feed from Kandahar and the neighbourhood a considerable force at Gulistan Karez and Kilah Abdulla, and materially lessen the necessity of bringing large supplies from India for the troops at Quetta.

5. The town revenue, which fell from Rupees 61,000 in December to Rupees 29,000 in January, and again to below Rupees 20,000 in February, is now showing signs of recuperation, the collections for the first 21 days of the current month amounting to nearly Rupees 20,000.

Enclosure 2 in No. 14.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from SIRDAR AYUB KHAN, dated 10th Rabi-ul-Sani=
11th March 1881.

After compliments.—On the evening of the 7th, I received the kind letter of 26th instant (ultimo ?) which you sent me by Yar Muhammad Khan, Peshkidmat. I was very glad to hear that you were well and in good health. The account you give of the honourable treatment you were good enough to show towards my special envoys tends still more to the increase of friendship. It is certain that a man, who puts his hope in, and trusts himself to, the great Government, will succeed in gaining their friendship, and will obtain proper treatment and perfect comfort. Now that Rubullah Khan, Peshkhidmat, is going in your direction, I trouble you with this letter to say that, please God, from your display of hearty kindness, the important business (now in hand) will be settled, and the bond of friendship made strong and enduring. I have nothing else to trouble you with. You will always make me happy by the news of your good health.

Enclosure 3 in No. 14.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from Lient.-Col. O. B. ST. JOHN, C.S.I., Resident, Kandahar, to His Highness the AMIR ABDUL RAHMAN KHAN of Kabul, dated Kandahar, 19th March 1881.

After compliments.—Having informed Sirdars Muhammad Husain Khan, Muhammad Hasan Khan, and others of the descendants of Sirdar Mihrdil Khan that the British

Government has it in contemplation to confer the sovereignty of Kandahar on your Highness, these Sirdars ask me to forward the enclosed letter to your Highness, and I trust that your Highness will return them a speedy and kind answer. They have faithfully served the British Government, and, if treated with kindness and consideration, will, I have no doubt, be equally loyal to your Highness.

Time does not admit of my communicating with Sirdar Gul Muhammad Khan, grandson of Sirdar Kohindil Khan, who is in the neighbourhood of Girishk, but I have no doubt that he will welcome your Highness' accession to power here and do good service as he has done to the British Government. Other supporters upon whom your Highness may count are the Popalzai Chiefs, Taj Muhammad Khan, and his brothers, Ghulam Muhammad Khan and Fathi Muhammad Khan, Shahghassis Sarwar Khan and Sarbuland Khan, Achakzia. In the direction of the west, many people are prepared to welcome your coming. Ismail Khan, Taimuni, brother of Anbia Khan of Taiwara, is with me in Kandahar, and his brother writes that he is ready whenever I give the word. Abdulla Khan, Taimuni, is also here; and it is probably known to you that the Chiefs of the Firuzkohis, the Jamshidis, and the Hazaras are all in rebellion. Sirdar Ahmad Khan, Ishakzai, of Lash Jowain, Ibrahim Khan, Biluch, of Chakansur, Sharif Khan of Kalah-i-Fath, are all devoted to the British Government and ready to support its friend. Taj Muhammad Khan, Seistani, is also here with me. It would be well if your Highness wrote letters of kindness and consideration to all these people, so as to bind them to your interests. About other people, such as the Alizais of Zamindawar and other Duranis, as well as the Mullahs, Mustaufi Abdul Ghias Khan is writing to you.

Enclosure 4 in No. 14.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from the AMIR to the RESIDENT, Kandahar, dated
25th March 1881.

After compliments.—I have to inform you that I have received a despatch from his Excellency the Viceroy, dated 30th January 1881. With great kindness he has given me the news that I am to have the government of Kandahar, and has informed me that the English Government will support me with money and munitions of war. He also urges me to make speedy arrangements for the affairs of that province. I have made known the Viceroy's joyful communication to all the people in Turkistan and Afghanistan, and it also seemed necessary that I should write and send letters to the people of Kandahar and Pusht-i-Rud, and inform them of the real object of the Government, and of its kindness towards me. Therefore I have written friendly letters to all the nobles and great people of the province, and sent them by my own messengers, and I have ordered Sirdar Muhammad Hassan Khan, son of the late Khushdil Khan, and Mirza Abdul Ghias Khan, son of the late Mirza Ahmed Khan, to distribute them to the individuals and tribes concerned. For messengers to carry these letters to Pusht-i-Rud, Pishin, and other districts, they will require some money, so (I hope) you will give them Rupees 2,000 from the treasury. Please God, henceforth I will inform you from time to time of any arrangements I may make for the government of the country.

Enclosure 5 in No. 14.

Specimen (*translated*) of Amir's circular letters.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER addressed by AMIR ABDUL RAHMAN KHAN to SYUD SHERDIL and SYUD MARWAND of Kandahar, dated February 1881.

After compliments.—Certainly you are aware that I set foot in Afghanistan at a time when the misfortune and trouble of the tribes and the people of Afghanistan had reached their zenith; and that for the well-being of the people I laid the foundation of sincere friendship with the sublime British Government, so that the people of Afghanistan might benefit by any advantages to be derived from (the friendship of) that Government. During the last seven months of my rule in the capital, Kabul, you have surely heard of the remission of "Sarmarda"* and other remissions granted to the Ghilzais, the Kohistanis, and the other tribes, as well as of the abolition of arbitrary exactions and of other favours and benefits conferred by me.

* Capitation-tax on men.

The sublime British Government has recently handed over† the government of Kandahar to me. It is therefore necessary to gratify and gladden you by communicating this happy news to you, and to acquaint you with my intentions and wishes. Whereas I look upon you as my devoted well-wishers, whose interests are identical to mine, I intend to spend these few days of my life in promoting your happiness and welfare and in sympathizing with you. For the purpose of defending your honour, and enhancing your reputation and dignity, I deem it advisable and expedient to administer Kandahar. Rest assured that, as long as you live, you will enjoy happiness, comfort, and prosperity, under the shadow of my kindness and mercy. No doubt you will reply to this speedily; and, in doing so, you will also write regarding your own circumstances.

Enclosure 6 in No. 14.

Khureeta, dated Simla, 2nd April 1881.

From His Excellency the VICEROY and GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA to His Highness the AMIR of KABUL.

THE city of Kandahar has now been for more than two years in the occupation of the British troops. During this period the British officers have received assistance in various ways from different Sirdars and other persons residing in the country, who have given their services in the maintenance of good order in the town and the adjacent districts, and who have generally shown their friendship and good-will toward the British Government. And since the administration of Kandahar is now to be made over to your Highness' officials, the security, in person and property, of all people in whom the British Government is thus interested, and who will remain at Kandahar and in the neighbourhood after the withdrawal of the British troops, becomes a matter of particular concern to the Government of the Queen-Empress.

I therefore write this letter to commend earnestly all such persons to your care and protection, and to request that your Highness, regarding as your own friends all friends of the British Government, may be pleased to issue speedily the necessary instructions to your governor at Kandahar, enjoining him to consider under his special charge, and to treat with proper consideration, all persons on behalf of whom my representatives there may desire his good offices.

Colonel St. John, who is the British Resident at Kandahar, has been directed to communicate upon this subject with your Highness' governor as soon as he shall have arrived at that place.

Enclosure 7 in No. 14.

No. 618 E.P., dated Simla, 3rd April 1881.

From A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to Colonel O. B. C. ST. JOHN, C.S.I., Resident, Kandahar.

I HAVE the honour to inclose, for your information and guidance, copy of a letter addressed by his Excellency the Viceroy to the Amir of Kabul. You will observe that his Highness has been asked

Dated 2nd April 1881. to lose no time in issuing instructions to his officers at Kandahar for the proper protection, in person and property, of Sirdars and others who have adhered to the interests of the British Government during the period of our occupation of Kandahar, and who will remain there after the administration shall have been transferred to the Amir.

2. I am to request that you will communicate the substance of this letter, in anticipation of orders from Kabul, to the Amir's representatives at Kandahar, that you will impress upon them the importance attached to the matter by the British Government, that you will consider what arrangements may be best adapted for giving effect to the Viceroy's wishes, and that you will submit a report of your conclusions. It is not probable, under the circumstances, that any persons in South Afghanistan who may have identified themselves with our administration will find it necessary to withdraw with our troops, but for such cases, if they occur, you are authorised to make proper temporary provision.

3. I am also to instruct you that all practicable measures should be taken for the preservation of the graves of British officers and soldiers at Kandahar and elsewhere in the vicinity.

No. 15.

No. 60 of 1881.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's
Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, April 17, 1881.

IN continuation of our despatch,* dated the 10th April 1881, we have the honour
to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government,
* No. 57. copies of three letters from the Amir of Kabul to his Excellency

the Viceroy, dated, respectively, the 28th and 29th March and the 1st April, and of the
Viceroy's reply to his Highness.

We have, &c.
(Signed) RIPON.
D. M. STEWART.
W. STOKES.
RIVERS THOMPSON.
J. GIBBS.
E. BARING.
G. T. CHESNEY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 15.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from the AMIR of KABUL to the address of His Excellency
the VICEROY, dated 28th March 1881.

After compliments.—I have perused your Excellency's kind and friendly letter, dated the 18th March 1881, corresponding to the 17th Rabi-ul-Sani. The benign expressions contained therein have gladdened my heart. It is indeed an excellent (arrangement) that your Excellency on certain occasions, in order to save time, telegraphs your Excellency's messages to the Commissioner of Peshawur, who communicates them to me. I too find it necessary in some matters to write to the Commissioner to report them to your Excellency by telegraph.

Regarding the ammunition, your Excellency has written that, besides the quantity requested by me, which has already been sent, if I want any more, it is also ready and available. Your Excellency is very kind indeed. The quantity of ammunition I asked for, and which your Excellency sent, I required for the muskets I had in my possession.

Now that I consider it incumbent upon me to organize Kandahar and strengthen that province, while the affair of Herat stares me in the face, and should not be lost sight of, or be easily passed over, the things that I require and are indispensably necessary are

12,000 rifles and two batteries of breech-loading* guns
of superior English manufacture. Out of the number
12,000, 3,000 should be cavalry carbines and 9,000
infantry muskets. Therefore I beg to apprise your

Excellency, who is my kind benefactor and who sympathizes with me, that if this my object is fulfilled, *viz.*, guns and rifles are granted, I hope, by God's grace, that all the affairs of Afghanistan will be completely arranged, and that all difficulties will be solved. The fulfilment of this important object is in your Excellency's hands. Your Excellency has the power to grant as many (rifles, &c.) as you like, more or less (than the number requested). The artillery will prove useful and be very acceptable, wherever Your Excellency may be pleased to grant it, whether at Kabul or at Kandahar. The equipment of an army, which I can move and march personally, and which may be equal to great occasions, depends upon muskets.

In regard to the taking over of Kandahar from the British authorities, I have despatched my governor and other civil and military officers with 5,000 well-equipped troops. The cavalry will arrive at Kandahar first, and the infantry, the artillery, and the Jezailchis, afterwards. It is hoped that my troops will enter Kandahar in good condition, and that the British forces will leave it cheerfully and successfully at the appointed time for their destination.

Enclosure 2 in No. 15.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from the AMIR of KABUL to the address of His Excellency the VICEROY, dated 29th March 1881.

After compliments.—Whereas it is absolutely necessary to arrange the affairs of Kandahar, and the question of Herat is one that, under all circumstances, must be faced,* all my attention and energy must, with the divine help, be devoted to that quarter, so that we, who have the same interests and cares,† may be relieved from anxiety by the completion of its arrangements. But large sums of money will be expended on the materials (required) and on the said arrangements. The five lakhs of rupees, now available at Peshawur, will have to wait there for some time owing to the want of order in the Khyber‡ Pass; but they will shortly arrive by hundis (bills). The five lakhs payable at Kandahar will not be sufficient for the arrangements I have in view. I hope that fifteen lakhs may be granted to me on (my)§ arrival at Kandahar from the Government Treasury. These fifteen lakhs, with the five lakhs payable at Kandahar, will answer all important purposes. All expenses (of the march) from Kabul to Kandahar will be defrayed from the money I have in Kabul. In short, I have acquainted your Excellency with the real state of my affairs, so that at the time of carrying out important projects I may not find myself arrested and embarrassed, and that I may commence the business and engage in the project with my mind at ease.

* i.e., demands immediate attention.
—A. C. L.

† This hints that the two Governments have equal cause for anxiety.—
A. C. L.

‡ The money passed at once through the Khyber, which is in complete order.—
A. C. L.

§ May be, arrival of my troops.—
A. C. L.

Enclosure 3 in No. 15.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from the AMIR of KABUL to the address of His Excellency the VICEROY, dated 1st April 1881.

After compliments.—I have received your Excellency's kind letter of the 8th March 1881, sent by the hand of General Amir Ahmad Khan, who also communicated to me your Excellency's verbal orders. I have been extremely pleased at your Excellency's kindnesses.

With regard to Kandahar I have been, and am, day and night, busy with preparations and arrangements for despatching troops there.

I divided the troops into three parts. I sent the cavalry, 1,000 strong, with the governor and experienced men first. I then despatched General Ghulam Haidar Khan with three infantry regiments, 600 strong each, and five pieces of artillery, and Sikandar Khan with 1,000 khasadars (irregulars) on the 24th March; and I shall wait myself till the arrival of the first division. I will let your Excellency know what I think proper to do hereafter. I shall take with me to Kandahar as many troops as I can provide with transport and other equipment, as also all the tribal Chiefs of Kabul, whose presence here may be considered injurious, and shall leave faithful servants and conscientious officials at Kabul.

Also your Excellency has been pleased to propose that your Excellency's agent, Sirdar Muhammad Afzal Khan, Suddozai, should reside at my court. This is very considerate of your Excellency. The immediate presence of your Excellency's agent will have no other effect but to conduce to my welfare, to the good management of the affairs of Afghanistan, and to the prosperity and peace of this country. There are many advantages in the presence of your Excellency's agent (here). It will stop the tongues of the enemies from slander and idle talk. But the ignorance of the evil-minded persons, the unwisdom of the principal persons in Afghanistan, and the short-sightedness of this nation, are manifest. They incite the people to tumult and commotion, and drive them out of the path of humanity. A wise man is unwise in their sight. They lead people astray, and for the sake of a trifling gain they prefer disorder and tumult. For, when there is an established ruler in the country, they cannot serve their own ends and cannot make heavy purses. From these ill motives they do not love peace, and prefer disquietude and confusion. For their own selfish ends they wish to see the whole world desolate and ruined. From their ignorance they do not know and see what would tend to their lasting comfort.

For all these reasons, and at this time, when the name of Herat still exists,* and the affair of Kandahar is not yet settled, I feel apprehensive lest something should proceed from the ignorance of the people of this country, in consequence of which the labour of the British officers and my exertions, and the pains I have taken during the last eight months, may be, God forbid, utterly thrown away. In my opinion it would be appropriate, advisable, and advantageous, if your Excellency would kindly defer this matter till I go to Kandahar, and, having arranged its affairs, despatch troops to Herat. Then on my return to Kabul I will bring Sirdar Muhammad Afzal Khan with me, and, God willing, all matters will (then) be properly arranged. Should your Excellency even now think Muhammad Afzal Khan's presence at Kabul beneficial to the interests of your Excellency's Government, I have no objection. He will be received at Kabul with all due respect. I have written these few remarks as my judgment and reason have directed me. As I am only one person, this is all that my mind has suggested to me. The illustrious British Government has many intelligent and experienced men. Should they think otherwise it will not also be far from right; for they have seen and tried the Afghans well, and are well versed in civil and military affairs. I will agree to whatever they think right. I have expressed my opinion in the matter. I trust, by God's grace, that I shall always be true to my word, that your Excellency will continue to be kind to me, and that I shall maintain my good reputation.

I have postponed deputing General Amir Ahmad Khan (to India) till I hear from the Commissioner of Peshawur. Should your Excellency wish him to come, your Excellency will be good enough to ask the Commissioner by telegraph to let me know, and I will send him.

Further, I continually pray to God for your Excellency's good health.

P.S.—After I finished this letter it occurred to me that your Excellency might suspect that I do not like to receive Muhammad Afzal Khan, and so I assure your Excellency that there are no other reasons than those mentioned above for not receiving him. Should your Excellency depute the Sirdar alone for a week, so that he may interview me and then go back, your Excellency can do so.

Enclosure 4 in No. 15.

Khureeta, dated 16th April 1881.

From His Excellency the VICEROY and GOVERNOR-GENERAL of INDIA to His Highness the AMIR of KABUL.

I HAVE had the pleasure of receiving lately three letters from your Highness, dated respectively the 28th and 29th March and the 1st April 1881, concerning the affairs of Afghanistan, and particularly in regard to the measures which you have adopted for the establishment of your government at Kandahar.

2. It is a matter of much satisfaction to the British Government that the arrangements for the despatch of your Highness' troops to Kandahar have been ordered with vigour and promptitude. I have issued the necessary instructions to my officers to make over to your Highness' Governor the administration of that city; and the time for the final withdrawal of the British troops has been so fixed as to allow time for the arrival of your Highness' troops from Kabul.

3. With regard to your Highness' representations regarding arms and ammunition, and a further subsidy of money, they have received my careful attention, and I have had much pleasure in making some provision for your Highness' present requirements at Kandahar. Three batteries of artillery and a number of rifles with ammunition are now being sent from India to Kandahar for the equipment of your Highness' forces at that place.

4. I have also caused your Governor at Kandahar to be informed that, besides the five lakhs already given to him there, his resources will be supplemented by a temporary allotment from the British Government of Rupees 50,000 monthly for his expenses in establishing his administration. The question of additional pecuniary assistance hereafter will be fully considered, although in regard to arms the matter is not free from difficulty, and I am at present disposed to recommend your Highness to use every endeavour to purchase arms within Afghanistan itself.

5. I observe that your Highness entertains some doubt as to the expediency of Sirdar Afzal Khan's deputation at the present time to Kabul. Under existing circumstances,

I am willing to defer to your Highness' judgment and to your experience and appreciation of the present condition of Afghanistan. Therefore, since your Highness considers that it will be good policy to adjourn for the present the Sirdar's deputation to Kabul, I agree that the arrangement may be postponed until the settlement of the country shall have been more completely accomplished.

6. In the meantime, as it appears from your Highness' letter that the return of General Mir Ahmad Khan to India is adjourned until you shall have heard again upon the subject, I reply that I shall be happy to receive again in India Mir Ahmad Khan, or any other representative whom your Highness may depute to reside near my government.

No. 16.

No. 64 of 1881.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's
Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, April 24, 1881.

IN continuation of our despatch,* dated the 17th April 1881, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of a

*No. 60. letter from the Amir of Kabul to his Excellency the Viceroy, dated the 12th April 1881.

We have, &c.
(Signed) RIPON.
D. M. STEWART.
W. STOKES.
RIVERS THOMPS
J. GIBBS.
E. BARING.
G. T. CHESNEY.

Enclosure in No. 16.

TRANSLATION OF LETTER from His Highness the AMIR to His Excellency the VICEROY and GOVERNOR-GENERAL of INDIA, dated 12th April 1881.

YOUR Excellency's kind letter, dated April 2nd, recommending the Sirdars and other residents of Kandahar who have rendered service and aid to the British Government during the last two years, to my protection and care, has been received and perused by me, and I have fully understood its contents.

Your Excellency may rest quite assured that I have no other than kindly intentions and benign feelings towards the Sirdars and Chiefs and nobles, and all the people of Afghanistan, especially towards those people of Kandahar who have made themselves conspicuous for their friendship and assistance to the British Government. I have every wish to show consideration and sympathy for them; but with regard to the Sirdars and Chiefs of Kandahar one condition is necessary, namely, that they should show me such devotion and sincerity as cannot be surpassed, for they have been friends of yours as am I, and I sympathise also with them. If under the cloak of friendship they plot mischief and work enmity against me, then shall I, without doubt, punish and chastise them. I will leave no source of disturbance in my kingdom. And as the representatives of the sublime British Government have bespoken my good offices for them, so I hope they too may be directed to practise sincerity and obedience to me, and not to allow vain thoughts or absurd ideas to enter their heads. Please God, provided they obey me and act in concert with me, they will be treated with the greatest consideration and kindness. A list of those persons who have done service for both Governments should be sent to me, so that they may be recognised and treated with kindness.

No. 17.

To His Excellency the MOST HONOURABLE THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA
IN COUNCIL.

No. 20.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

India Office, London, April 29, 1881.

Para. 1. I have to acknowledge the receipt of letters of your Excellency's Government, Nos. 21, 35, and 40, dated respectively the 2nd, 21st, and 28th February, reporting the measures adopted or proposed by you, with the object of giving effect to the policy of Her Majesty's Government in respect to Kandahar and the assigned districts of Pishin and Sibi, and transmitting minutes recorded by some of your Excellency's colleagues on the subject.

2. It may be necessary for me, on a subsequent occasion, to make some observations on the minutes above referred to. If I abstain from discussing them in this despatch, I adopt that course from no want of respect to the writers, or from a failure to appreciate the weight attaching to many of the arguments adduced. No good purpose, however, would be served by prolongation of controversy upon a question which had of necessity to be finally determined upon the responsibility of the Home Government, in regard to which much conflict of opinion was known to exist amongst the advisers of your Excellency, and upon which the ultimate decision was not formed without the most attentive consideration of the arguments on both sides, and of the views of the dissentient members of your Government, with the general nature of which your Excellency had taken care to make me acquainted in an unofficial form. As regards Kandahar, moreover, the most authoritative objections appear to me to be less to the principles of the policy enjoined than to details of its execution; while the question of Pishin has, I think, been discussed under some degree of misapprehension as to the immediate purpose of Her Majesty's Government.

3. The question of greatest urgency at the date of my despatch of the 11th November was that of the disposal of the city and province of Kandahar. That despatch, while stating at length the reasons which led Her Majesty's Government to regard as highly impolitic either the annexation of the city and adjacent territory to the British dominions, or the maintenance of a British garrison in support of a native ruler, suggested the transfer of the province to the Amir, Abdul Rahman, as the arrangement which seemed to offer the best guarantees for permanence, and the avoidance of internal dissensions. In opening communication, therefore, with the Amir, in view to an early assumption by him of authority over the city and dependent districts, your Excellency in Council adopted a course which was in complete harmony with the wishes of Her Majesty's Government, who equally approve of your determination that the retirement of the British forces, having been decided upon in principle, should not be postponed beyond the date when the movement could be effected without grave risk to the health of the troops.

4. I reserve for a later period, when the movements now pending shall be completed, such remarks as may be required upon the course of the correspondence which has passed with the Amir, and in regard to the arrangements connected with the occupation of Kandahar by his Governor and troops. I content myself at present with expressing the satisfaction of Her Majesty's Government that, notwithstanding indications to the contrary, the Amir should ultimately have found himself able to collect and despatch a force, sufficient, apparently, for the immediate purpose, within the period specified by your Excellency, and that, so far as appears from the latest telegraphic reports, the actual transfer has been effected without difficulty or disturbance. Her Majesty's Government feel that the tranquillity which at present prevails can scarcely be expected to remain unbroken, but if, as they trust will be the case, the character of the Amir's internal administration is such as to render the people disinclined to afford active support to attempts that may be made to subvert his authority, his Highness, with the liberal aid in money and material which he will have received from the Government of India, should be enabled to maintain and consolidate his power.

5. As regards Pishin and Sibi, which were assigned to the British Government under the Treaty of Gandamak, and have since been administered by British Officers, my despatch of the 3rd December last stated shortly the reasons which seemed to Her Majesty's Government to recommend retirement from those districts, as from Kandahar, and deprecated the "continuance of any part of an alternative policy which was not distinctly justified on its own merits, or of which the only recommendation consisted in its forming part of a larger scheme, the more essential points in which had been rejected by Her Majesty's present advisers;" but no such positive instructions were conveyed to your Excellency in Council as to preclude you from full consideration of the

question on its merits, or from expressing to Her Majesty's Government your deliberate views in regard to it; and you have rightly understood them as leaving to the Government of India a large discretion as to the time and manner of giving effect to the policy which Her Majesty's Government were desirous should be pursued.

6. From paras. 5 and 6 of your letter of the 2nd February, and from the papers enclosed in subsequent communications, I learn that, while accepting in principle the severance of our political connection with Pishin and Sibi when circumstances permit, your Excellency and the majority of your colleagues are decidedly of opinion that our occupation of those districts cannot immediately be terminated without risk of great injury to the interests of the people, and that its continuance for the present, while of no disadvantage to the British Government, need not involve the serious political embarrassments contemplated in my despatch of the 3rd December. Representations in the same sense have been made to me by Sir R. Sandeman, your Excellency's Agent in Biluchistan, who is now in this country.

7. While, therefore, Her Majesty's Government are not prepared to change their opinion as to the inexpediency of the permanent retention of the assigned districts, they recognize the difficulties in the way of immediate or early withdrawal from them, and they are fully sensible that, in this respect, their policy must be influenced by considerations which did not apply in the case of Kandahar. At no time were the people of that province led to expect the maintenance, in any shape, of direct British rule; while such pledges as were given in regard to the future native government of the country were subject to conditions which were almost immediately violated. In Pishin and Sibi the case is different. The people have no doubt, as your Excellency in Council observes, been encouraged to believe that British rule would continue; their relations with our officers have been conducted upon that assumption; and their behaviour has been generally good. While, therefore, it is the hope of Her Majesty's Government that retirement from these districts, as from the rest of Afghan territory, may take place at no distant date, the decision on the question must evidently in some degree depend upon the course of events at Kandahar. As under these circumstances the existing administrative arrangements will have to be maintained for the present, it is not desirable that the minds of the people should be disturbed by anticipations of immediate change; and I, accordingly, on the 14th instant, authorized your Excellency by telegraph to abstain from any announcement of final retirement, unless you deemed such an announcement to be expedient.

8. In thus communicating to you the assent of Her Majesty's Government to the postponement of the relinquishment of Pishin and Sibi, I rely on your Excellency to take care that no step will be taken which might place any permanent obstacle in the way of the ultimate fulfilment of the policy indicated in my despatch of the 3rd December last. I shall be glad to be furnished at an early date with a full statement of the measures which you propose to adopt for the temporary administration of the districts, with details of the arrangements for their military protection, and that of the line of communication, together with a statement of the estimated cost of those arrangements and of the civil administration, as well as particulars of the extent of the country to be temporarily retained under British control. Upon none of these points have I received any information, either in the political or the military department. From your Excellency's telegrams I learn that Her Majesty's troops will continue at present to hold the positions commanding the passes of the Amran range, by which I understand positions on the western side of the Khojak. I should wish to be informed whether it is contemplated that this arrangement will be necessary for any length of time, and which of the posts to be held are within the recognized limits of Pishin. The strength of the force which, according to apparently authoritative statements in the public press, has been detailed to remain at Quetta and along the line from Chaman to Sibi is largely in excess of what Her Majesty's Government had anticipated would be required, even temporarily, and seems to be inconsistent with the opinions expressed in the papers under acknowledgment as to the facility with which the assigned districts could be held. The retention, therefore, beyond the frontier for any length of time of a force not required for objects of a purely local character, such as from the tenor of your Lordship's despatch you appear to have had mainly in view in desiring to postpone the evacuation of the territory in question, might tend to a belief that it is designed for purposes of possible future intervention in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, which are no less opposed to your Lordship's views and intentions than to those of Her Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HARTINGTON.

No. 18.

No. 68 of 1881.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's
Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, May 1, 1881.

IN continuation of our despatch, dated the 24th* April, we have the honour to
forward copy of a letter† from Lieut.-Colonel St. John,

* No. 64.

† Dated 15th April 1881, No. 211.

submitting, with reference to the instructions sent him
on the 3rd April, a report on the measures adopted by
him in regard to the proper protection, in person and
property, of Sirdars and others, remaining in Kandahar, who have adhered to British
interests during our occupation of the province. It will be seen also that Colonel
St. John has taken steps for the preservation of the graves of British officers and soldiers,
and for the care of the cemeteries at Kandahar.

We have, &c.

(Signed)

RIPON.

D. M. STEWART.

W. STOKES.

RIVERS THOMPSON.

J. GIBBS.

E. BARING.

G. T. CHESNEY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 18.

No. 211, dated Kandahar, 15th April 1881.

From Lieut.-Colonel O. ST. JOHN, C.S.I., Resident, Southern Afghanistan, Kandahar,
to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign
Department.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 618 E.P., of the
3rd instant.

2. After announcing to the Sirdars and other notables that the administration of the
province has been committed to the Amir's representatives, I took the opportunity of
stating publicly that His Excellency the Viceroy had written to His Highness the Amir,
commending to his protection and favour all our adherents of every rank in Kandahar.
Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan replied that he had special instructions from His Highness
not only to afford full protection to all friends of the British Government, but to treat
them with marked favour and distinction.

3. I have no doubt of the sincerity of this declaration, and as long as the Amir's
authority is recognised in Kandahar I believe that our adherents will have nothing to
fear. The best proof of this is in the action of the people themselves, the majority of our
adherents deliberately preferring to remain in Kandahar instead of accompanying us to
Pishin. The only exceptions are a few individuals who, having amassed large sums as
contractors or employés of the Commissariat, prefer placing themselves and their
fortunes in perfect security by retiring with the army to Quetta. It may also be
surmised that they have future profits in view, and will continue their trade as purveyors
to the army as heretofore. This class does not deserve any particular consideration
at our hands. The only other emigrants are certain of the Farsiwan Mirzas, who have
been in the confidential employ of the political department as writers and collectors of
revenue, and consider that they have made themselves particularly obnoxious to the
Afghans. All are people of substance, and for some I shall be able to find employment
in Pishin. None are however permanently breaking off their connexion with Kandahar;
but are leaving members of their families in charge of their property, alleging a pilgrimage
to Kerbala or their duty to us as excuses for leaving the country. A year or two hence,
or less, when Afghanistan has settled down, they believe that they will be able to return
without risk.

4. The following measures appear to me advisable for the protection of their
property. I am having a list made out of all persons, natives of Kandahar,
who have obtained permission to retire with the troops to Quetta, with a statement
of their property and the names of the agents left in charge. This I propose to

forward to the Amir's governor with a letter informing him that Her Majesty's Government expects him to protect the property of the individuals therein named, as well as to secure any person in Kandahar from suffering injury or oppression on account of any part he may have taken on our side in the events of the last two and a half years.

5. Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan's verbal assurances leave no doubt that the answer to this letter will guarantee to the utmost power of the Amir's officials the safety of the lives and property of adherents of the British Government. I am in addition giving letters of recommendation to all those of our friends remaining in Kandahar.

6. The subject of the conservation of the graves of British officers and men has for some time engaged my attention, and has recently formed the subject of correspondence between General Hume and myself. Six places in Kandahar have been used at different times for the interment of Christians of the force. A detailed description of them will be found in the Appendix attached. The first three are in public land. The next two, in which the victims of the sortie of the 16th August are buried, are on private property. I have therefore bought the land from the owners, and obtained formal deeds of sale from them in duplicate. One copy will be left with our agent here, and the other deposited in the records of the office of the Agent to Governor-General at Quetta. Besides the ordinary formula for the transfer of land, the deeds set forth that the ground, being consecrated to a purpose considered holy by Mussulmen and Christians alike, is "wakf," and the fact of its being so is attested on the deed by the principal mullahs of the town. The graves of Colonel Nicholletts and Lieutenant Widdington at Kokeran are on the private property of the Sartip Nur Muhammad Khan. This is at present confiscated, and as long as it is so the graves will be looked after in the same way as those elsewhere. Should the owner return, I do not think that there is any fear of his not protecting the graves from desecration.

7. All the cemeteries in Kandahar are carefully walled in, and will be committed to the care of the agent left here. Before leaving I intend visiting them all in company with the deputy governor to commit them formally to his charge. I have also asked certain respectable merchants to visit the cemeteries from time to time and inform me at Quetta if they are not respected.

8. I have no fear of the burying places being desecrated except in case of an early popular outbreak against the Amir's rule, in which case fanaticism might take the form of destroying the monuments over the graves of the infidels who made the country over to him. But this is hardly probable, and I trust that the measures taken will be efficacious in preserving the graves and monuments from injury and desecration.

Enclosure 2 in No. 18.

LIST OF BURIAL PLACES AT KANDAHAR.

1. PRINCIPAL cemetery. This is situated about a thousand yards north of the city, exactly opposite the Idgah gate, and near the middle of the large area taken up by Muhammadan grave-yards. It encloses the site of the cemetery used by General Nott's force in 1839-42, which was discovered without difficulty by us in 1879. The surrounding wall had been levelled, and the monuments, if there were any, destroyed; but the graves themselves had not been disturbed, and were easily recognisable by their lying east and west, instead of north and south. This cemetery now contains 437 graves, including those of the following officers, as shown by inscriptions:—

Lieutenants Farrington and Harris, 15th Foot.
 Surgeon Walsh, B.M.D.
 Captain Weigall and Lieutenant Bishop, 11th Foot.
 Lieutenant-Colonel Daubeny, 7th Fusiliers.
 Captain Chisholm, 59th Foot.
 Surgeon-Major Bolton.
 Lieutenant-Colonel Brownlow, 72nd.
 Captain Frome, 72nd.
 Captain Stratton.
 Lieutenant-Colonel Shewell, Bombay S.C.
 Lieutenant Anderson, 25th P.N.I.
 Major Powys, 59th Foot.
 Captain Sargent, 78th Foot.

There are also monuments to 5 officers and 64 men of the 7th Fusiliers, killed or died of wounds or disease in Afghanistan; and to 2 officers, 7 sergeants, 5 corporals, 3 drummers, and over 100 privates of the 11th Foot, died of disease.

The cemetery is enclosed by a high wall with a solid gate.

2. The second cemetery is in the open ground inside the city, west of the citadel, now used by the Commissariat as a store-yard. It contains 62 graves, including those of Lieutenant Hennell, B.S.C., and Lieutenant Lendrum, R.A.

3. The third burial place is the garden of the citadel, in which are interred the bodies of Major Reynolds, Sind Horse, and Lieutenant Willis, R.A.

4. No. 4 is a piece of ground on the south side of the city, and was taken up as a burial place during the siege. It contains 26 graves, including those of—

Major Vandeleur, and Lieutenant Wood, 7th Fusiliers.

Major Trench, and Lieutenant Hayner, 19th Bombay N.I.

Lieutenant Maclaine, R.H.A., and the Rev. Mr. Gordon.

I have purchased the ground and enclosed it with a wall.

5. No. 5 is a spot about 700 yards outside the town, and 300 from the village of Deh Khoja. It contains but two graves, in one of which are buried the bodies of the Englishmen, and in the other those of the natives of India left behind in the retreat from the sortie of the 16th August. They were discovered on the 25th, and buried the same afternoon in the nearest convenient spot to where they fell. Among them are Lieutenant-Colonel Newport, 28th Bombay N.I., and Captain Cruickshank, R.E. The graves are covered in with masonry, and I am now having them surrounded by a substantial wall.

6. The only graves out of Kandahar are those of Colonel Nicholletts, 29th Bombay N.I., and Lieutenant Widdington, 10th Bombay N.I., which are on the estate of the Sartip Nur Muhammad Khan at Kokeran, seven miles from Kandahar. They are about 60 yards in front of the main entrance of the Sartip's house.

(Signed) O. B. ST. JOHN, Lieut.-Colonel,
Resident, Southern Afghanistan.

No. 19.

No. 80 of 1881.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, May 22, 1881.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government,

* Dated 13th May 1881. copies of two letters from the Amir of Kabul to the Viceroy, dated respectively the 29th April 1881 and the 3rd May 1881, and of his Excellency's reply* to the first letter.

We have, &c.

(Signed) RIPON.
D. M. STEWART.
W. STOKES.
RIVERS THOMPSON.
J. GIBBS.
E. BARING.
T. F. WILSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 19.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from the AMIR of KABUL to the Address of His Excellency the VICEROY, dated 29th April 1881.

After compliments.—Your Excellency's kind and friendly letter, dated the 16th April 1881, corresponding to the 16th Jamadi-ul-Awal 1298 H., has reached me; and I am exceedingly gratified at your Excellency's conspicuous favours and befitting kindnesses. I have fully understood all that your Excellency has written in reply to my epistle regarding my want of arms, of ammunition, and of money, (viz.) that at present three batteries of artillery and a certain number of rifles with ammunition have been made

over to my officials; and that, in addition to the five lakhs of rupees, a monthly subsidy of Rs. 50,000 will be granted for expenses to the governor of Kandahar for some time; and with regard to the arms your Excellency intimated that I should use my best efforts to procure them within Afghanistan itself.

I have also understood what your Excellency wrote, that you have, agreeably to my opinion (wishes), deferred deputing (to Kabul) Sirdar Muhammad Afzal Khan; and that I should appoint an agent to reside near your Excellency's Government in India.

My real object and chief aim in cultivating a sincere friendship and a cordial affection with the sublime Government is to secure credit and character for veracity, faithfulness, and a strict observance of the duties of an engagement. I have never the eye of cupidity and covetousness fixed on worldly pomps and pageants. Had not the resources of Afghanistan (collected) in 100 years been destroyed, and had the old house of our forefathers remained in a flourishing state, I should never have troubled the representatives of the sublime Government about pecuniary aid and the munitions of war. Now that all that constituted the glory and lustre of the Afghan empire has vanished, and that all the accoutrements of the army have disappeared and fallen into many hands, it is impossible to collect the arms that have dispersed and to recover the property that has been plundered and is scattered in the highlands and the outlying districts. Whereas the two Governments have joint interests, I wrote previously what I am writing now, and I write (again) that money, guns, and ammunition, are not such things as can be procured with ease and facility and in a short time in this country. It is absolutely necessary to administer the affairs of Afghanistan (at once), and so this matter cannot be kept in abeyance and deferred to a future time. Further, the matter rests with your Excellency. The more your Excellency attends to, and thinks with care of, the welfare of Afghanistan, the more beneficial it will be to the interests of the two States.

In compliance with your Excellency's wishes, I will certainly appoint a confidential agent to India with the greatest pleasure, and I will shortly arrange this matter. What more can I write than the professions of friendship?

P.S.—Whereas the officers of the sublime Government have, by making over to me the administration of Afghanistan, imposed an important duty on me and entrusted me with a grand project to carry out, of which they and I are well aware, my urgent solicitations for putting to rights the affairs of this country are not for (the exigencies of) to-day, but they are made with regard to the future. The reason why I write so frequently and repeat the subject is that I feel apprehensive for the future, lest, peradventure, when the honourable (British) officers call upon me to perform that important service, I should fail to acquit myself well. The people of Afghanistan are of such a nature that they step beyond the bounds of subjection and aspire to the position of rulers.

Under these circumstances, and with such people, and having regard to my solicitude for the morrow, my demand is not out of place.

Enclosure 2 in No. 19.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from the AMIR of KABUL to the Address of His Excellency the VICEROY, dated 3rd May 1881.

After compliments.—I beg to inform your Excellency that from the day of the arrival of my Sirdars, officials, and troops, at their destination, Kandahar, up to the moment Her Imperial Majesty's forces marched away and departed from that city, whatever friendship, the community of interests, affection, and concord required was done to the officials of this God-granted Government through the friendly exertions of Colonel St. John, the Resident of Kandahar, and of Nawab Hasan Ali Khan, his assistant; and that the officials of this God-granted Government express themselves, in their letters received by me, pleased and satisfied at the civility and courtesy shown to them by the above-mentioned two officers. Therefore, relying upon (the contents of) those letters, I express what I have in my mind, and write to inform your Excellency that I am exceedingly pleased and satisfied with the Colonel and the Nawab alluded to above, and my pleasure will undoubtedly cause joy and delight to your Excellency's benevolent heart.

Enclosure 3 in No. 19.

Dated Simla, the 13th May 1881.

From His Excellency the VICEROY and GOVERNOR-GENERAL of INDIA to His Highness the AMIR of KABUL.

After compliments.—I have received and given careful consideration to your Highness' friendly letter, dated 29th April.

I learn with pleasure that your Highness proposes shortly to arrange for the deputation of a confidential agent to India.

It has been a matter of gratification to me that I have been able to inform Her Majesty's Government that, on the withdrawal of the British forces from Kandahar, the administration of the province was placed in the hands of your Highness' governor, and that the city was left in the occupation of your Highness' troops. And since the expenses incidental upon the rapid despatch of a force from Kabul to Kandahar, and upon other arrangements necessary for the assumption of the government of the province, may have caused some temporary pressure upon your Highness' finances, I have directed the sum of 5 lakhs to be placed at once at the disposal of your Highness at Peshawur. The Commissioner will await your Highness' instructions regarding the money.

I trust your Highness will accept the assurance of my sincere wish for your welfare and for your success in the administration of the affairs of Afghanistan.

No. 20.

No. 84 of 1881.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, June 3, 1881.

WE have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's Despatch, dated the 29th April, upon the subject of the retention under British administration of the assigned districts of Pishin and Sibi.

2. In the second paragraph of this despatch, some doubt is expressed whether, when the question of Pishin was discussed in your previous despatches, the immediate purposes of Her Majesty's Government had been rightly apprehended. We understand, however, that your Lordship is nevertheless generally disposed to approve and to acquiesce in the views and arguments submitted by our letter of the 2nd February. Her Majesty's Government, while adhering to the policy laid down by your Lordship's despatch of the 3rd December, and while looking forward to the retirement at no distant date of the British troops from these districts, recognizes the difficulties in the way of early withdrawal, and the necessity of maintaining for the present the existing administrative arrangements. And your Lordship desires to be furnished at an early date with a full statement containing all the details of the military and political measures proposed by the Government of India for the temporary administration of the country to be thus retained.

3. Before proceeding to lay our proposals before your Lordship, we think it may be convenient to dispose of a subsidiary point, which is touched upon at the close of your despatch now under acknowledgment. It appears to us important to explain that the retention at the present moment of a force of considerable strength at Quetta, and along the line from Chaman to Sibi, is in no respect inconsistent with the opinions expressed in the papers to which your Lordship has alluded.

4. When, in the minutes transmitted with our despatches of February, the opinion was expressed that Pishin might be held with comparative facility, the subject-matter then under discussion was undoubtedly the indefinite retention under assignment of that district. And although in the sixth paragraph of our 2nd February despatch the view taken was that our political authority might be upheld temporarily in Pishin by a detachment supported from Quetta, yet neither in the minutes nor in the despatch were the references to this question intended to have any bearing upon the state of affairs that might immediately ensue upon the withdrawal of our troops from Kandahar to the Kojak line. It would have been impossible, we submit, to calculate early in last February what proportion of the troops returning from Kandahar might be detained in Pishin and about Quetta during the summer, and, as a matter of fact, the attempt was not made. For, in the first place, if Pishin were to be held at all (and our despatches

assumed that Kandahar and Pishin would not be simultaneously relinquished), the precise strength that might be required in the district was obviously a military question, connected with the general operation of retirement, and dependent, as a mere measure of precaution, on the course of events that might immediately follow our evacuation of Kandahar. In the second place, it was not then practicable to calculate whether there would be time for withdrawing a large proportion of the troops through the Bolan pass and the Sind desert in the spring and early summer. The date at which the evacuation of Kandahar could begin was then far from settled; it had to be adjusted, within certain limits, to the movement of the Amir's troops from Kandahar, and, as the Amir's preparation required all the time that could be allowed, the contingency that a large portion of the Kandahar troops might be unable to reach India before the extreme heat set in had from the first caused much anxiety to the Government of India. The project of withdrawing our surplus regiments by the higher and cooler route of Thal-Chotiali was at one time entertained, but the re-appearance of a force on that line seemed likely to create disquietude among the tribes, so that for this and other reasons the plan was dropped. Meanwhile the state of the weather and the tardy arrival of the Amir's garrison delayed the evacuation until late in April.

5. In these circumstances we decided that sanitary exigencies required us to detain for the summer a large proportion of the force on the high plateau of Pishin and Quetta, and that only those regiments could be brought back at once to India whose passage through the Bolan could be conveniently and prudently managed. That these regiments have fortunately reached India with little or no loss or suffering from the extreme heat is due mainly to the excellent arrangements of the military and the railway authorities concerned.

6. We trust that the foregoing explanation may have satisfied your Lordship that the reasons which determined, in April, the present temporary disposition of our force above the passes are not inconsistent with the opinions recorded in February regarding the ordinary garrison of Pishin. We are anxious that a clear appreciation of these reasons should leave no room for such a misapprehension of the situation as would be involved in the supposition that the strength at which this force happens to be now maintained has any connexion with the future maintenance of an advanced military position towards Afghanistan. Such a supposition would be altogether inconsistent with our view of the policy which should be followed, and would be entirely foreign to the real considerations upon which we desire that our proposals, and the decision of Her Majesty's Government, in regard to the retention of Pishin and Sibi, should be understood to proceed. These considerations, so far as they were stated in our letter of the 2nd February, have been already approved by your Lordship's despatch now under reply, so that we need not again enlarge on the responsibilities imposed upon us by our past relations with the people of the two districts. It is sufficient here to repeat that both districts were taken under our Government at the end of 1878, that they were formally assigned to us by treaty in 1879, and that consequently the inhabitants, who have been frequently assured that they might count upon our protection, have every right to expect that, as to the time and manner of their restoration to Afghan rule, their wishes and interests shall be carefully consulted. The question of ultimate retirement cannot, as your Lordship has observed, be disconnected from the course of events at Kandahar, and the actual condition of parties in South Afghanistan certainly does not yet authorize us to anticipate unbroken tranquillity in that quarter. If a settled and friendly government establishes itself at Kandahar, there will then be no difficulty in concluding such arrangements for the administration of this district as may be deemed advisable; but if affairs take a different turn it cannot in our judgment be either to the interests of Pishin or to our own interests and credit that we should choose such a time for abruptly abandoning this district. Our departure would expose the country to disorder, and our friends to the consequences of having dealt faithfully with the British Government. All the considerations of this nature, by which the British Government was induced to prolong, at some risk and much expense, the occupation of Kabul, of Kandahar, and of Kuram, appear to us to apply with redoubled force to the case of the districts now in our possession in South Afghanistan.

7. Moreover, we are bound to recollect that our responsibilities for the protection of friends and allies from the possible consequences of any confusion that may follow directly upon our recent withdrawal are not confined to Pishin. From the Khan of Kelat and from his leading Sirdars we have received the most unreserved and valuable support during the whole of our operations across the Afghan frontier of Biluchistan. That frontier has a long border line with the lands of Pathan tribes; while Quetta

itself is more or less surrounded by Afghan or independent territory. It is thus of importance that at Quetta we should, for the present, be in a position to assist effectually in keeping the peace and in securing the Khan's territory against incursions or reprisals; and for these objects the advantages of continuing our military and political occupation of the broad valley which interposes between Quetta and the Amran range appear to us incontestable. Our attitude will be entirely precautionary and defensive, but if any troubles are impending in Afghanistan we shall be far better able to hold ourselves clear of complications by confining all disorder to the western side of the range than by allowing it to overflow up to the Biluch frontier.

8. In short, we consider that some prolongation of our present tenure of Pishin and Sibi is necessary, not only for the acquittance of our obligations to those districts, but also in order that during a period of uncertainty we may be able to retain our present influence over the tribes of that frontier, and generally to fulfil the treaty engagement whereby, in return for the subordinate co-operation which we have a right to demand from the Khan of Khelat, and which he has very freely given to us, we are bound to protect his territories from external attack.

9. With regard, therefore, to the extent of country to be temporarily retained under British control, our proposals are to keep the districts of Pishin and Sibi, with any strip of intervening territory that may be clearly necessary for maintaining the communication between the two districts. Their administrative boundaries are so inaccurately defined, and have so often varied, that it is not possible to determine positively whether the two areas actually meet at any point. But in the records examined at Kandahar the Sibi district is described in leases as Zawa Sibi and Thal; while the Barozai Sirdars, who have long been the grantees of Sibi, always lay claim to Hurnai and Thal-Chotiali. The Zawa of the Kandahar records is the valley stretching from the lower end of the Chappar mountain by Spin Tangi down the Nari river. As a matter of fact, however, the Afghan government had, for many years before our latest occupation of Sibi, exercised little or no jurisdiction in the district; the constant incursions of the Marris, and the lawlessness of the lesser tribes, kept the upper valley in confusion, and the lower valley suffered greatly from their depredations. But since the British Government took possession of the district in 1878 our posts have been established along the open tract which runs by Spin Tangi, Hurnai, and Kach, up to where the Chappar hills close in upon it. This tract has now been brought regularly under our administration, and its revenue is quietly collected; while the position of our posts along the northern border of the district, in a climate healthy for the troops, maintains order among the petty Pathan tribes beyond the line, keeps the peace in the country within it, secures our communication with Pishin and Quetta, and effectually preserves the Bolan pass from molestation. The occupation of this border has also opened out an excellent road from India by Sibi toward Pishin and Kandahar, which is already very largely used by traders in preference to the Bolan route.

10. We consider it advisable, for these reasons, to retain our posts upon the Hurnai line, and to treat as included within the Sibi district, for the purpose of temporary control and management, the plain country up to the foot of the hills beyond that line, and all the country within it, over which we now exercise jurisdiction. The appended sketch map will show roughly the northern boundary up to which it seems necessary, for the proper protection of Sibi and the Bolan pass, for restraining the Marris and other border tribes, and for the general political supervision of the Biluch frontier toward Afghanistan, that our authority should, for the present, be maintained. It will probably be found difficult to withdraw, for some time to come, the troops now stationed at Thal and Chotiali on the frontier of Sibi toward the north-east. But the object of these posts is exclusively to check and coerce the powerful Marri tribe, by taking up points whence their country can be easily entered, and their retreat cut off, if they attempt any marauding expeditions. And as the arrangements for controlling the Marris must be settled with reference not only to the Sibi administration, but also to the proper system of defence for the Indian border, and the Khan's territory adjoining the Marri country, it would not be convenient in this letter to deal finally with the question of keeping stations at Thal or Chotiali. From your Lordship's despatch upon the subject of the settlement recently made with the Marris, we infer that our intention to postpone final decision upon these provisional arrangements, until our general position upon the border shall have been permanently determined, will be approved.

11. The measures at present in operation for the civil administration of the districts of Pishin and Sibi will not require immediate material alteration, and their cost will not, so far as can be judged from the accounts now before the Government, exceed the revenues collected. For the last two years and a half the administration of these districts has been carried on under the superintendence of the officers of the Biluchistan Agency, to the staff of which one European and one Native officer have been added to provide for the efficient performance of the additional work entailed by the extension of the jurisdiction of the Agency. Revenue and police establishments on a moderate scale have been entertained for the purposes of civil administration, and certain payments have been made to the chief men of the more important tribes—partly in consideration of the lines of road and telegraph being kept free from molestation, and partly in lieu of allowances formerly made to the more turbulent tribes by the Afghan rulers. The sum total of expenditure incurred on these accounts, *viz.*, the addition of officers to the strength of the Biluchistan Agency, the entertainment of revenue and police establishments, including the cost of police on the open line of railway between the Sind border and the Bolan, and the tribal payments referred to—amounts to about Rupees 1,30,000. This expenditure, however, is more than covered by the revenue collected in the districts, the total collections during the past financial year amounting to about Rupees 1,50,000. The tribal payments in Pishin, we anticipate, will now be very largely reduced, while quiet times and the extension of cultivation in the more fertile tracts of Sibi will result in some increase of revenue. In Pishin, owing to three consecutive years of drought, and partly, no doubt, owing to want of careful supervision, caused by the necessity under which our officers laboured of devoting their principal attention to supplying the wants of the army, the revenue collections during the past three years have shown a slight falling off; but in Sibi the revenue realized in 1880–81 was more than double that of 1879–80, the additional collections having been very largely drawn from increased cultivation. To the feeling of security produced among the people by the recent submission of the Marris, and by the belief that they will henceforward be kept within bounds by a strong hand, this rapid spread of cultivation may undoubtedly be attributed.

12. In regard to the force required for the military protection of the country which, as has been above explained, is to be temporarily retained under British control, it is possible that this may depend, at first, upon the further development of the actual political situation in South Afghanistan. But it is our desire and intention, if political circumstances permit, to reduce the force to be maintained at Quetta and in Pishin, after the next cold season shall have set in, to a normal strength of—

1 Battery garrison artillery.
1 Do. mountain do.

1 Regiment cavalry.
3 Regiments of infantry, of which one would be European.

The precise distribution of these troops would be a detail for future determination; though we may state, with advertence to your Lordship's observation upon this point, that we do not contemplate retaining, beyond the end of this autumn, any positions on the western side of the Khojuk, and that all the posts to be held under the arrangements now proposed will be, as in fact they now are, within the recognized limits of Pishin. With regard to the line of communications, the military authorities attach great importance to the stations on the road *viâ* Hurnai, because, as has already been explained, it turns, covers, and protects the Bolan pass, besides offering easy access at all seasons from Sibi to Quetta and Pishin. For the present, therefore, a regiment of infantry and three troops of cavalry would be detailed to occupy and guard this line; though hereafter a large part of the duties involved might be transferred to a local police force. There is now in Biluchistan the corps of Biluch guides, an irregular corps of about 400 horse, which has performed much useful service during many years past on the Biluch frontier. The present cost of this corps, including the staff pay of the Commanding Officer, amounts to Rupees 10,000 per mensem, and has been defrayed from Indian revenues. We anticipate, however, that it may be found advisable to improve the position and organisation of the corps to some extent, and probably to add to it some footmen in order to provide a local military police such as may relieve the regular troops of various harassing duties.

13. Some troops will also be kept, for the present, at Thal and Chotiali; but for the reasons already mentioned the detachments at these stations are not included in the garrison detailed in the foregoing paragraph; since it is more convenient to deal with them in considering the question of arrangements for the permanent protection of the Sind border.

14. With respect to the cost of the troops to be maintained in Pishin and at Quetta after the beginning of next cold season, we may observe that in any event the regular garrison of Quetta ought to be excluded from the calculation. Assuming the strength

* Garrison of Quetta, 1st July 1878.

2 Regiments native infantry.
Detachment of cavalry.
1 Mountain Battery.

and composition of this garrison to be the same as before the war in Afghanistan,* the additional expenditure involved in the arrangements described in paragraph 12 will be represented by the extra charge of maintaining one regiment of European infantry, part of a regiment of cavalry, and one battery garrison artillery, in these districts instead of in India. The troops now stationed beyond the Sind Frontier are in receipt of certain fixed allowances, which it is intended to discontinue so soon as the force shall have been reduced to its normal strength.

We have, &c.

(Signed)

RIPON.

D. M. STEWART.

W. STOKES.

RIVERS THOMPSON.

J. GIBBS.

E. BARING.

T. F. WILSON.

No. 21.

No. 88 of 1881.



Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, June 10, 1881.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of a letter* from Colonel O. B. St. John,

* No. 249, dated the 31st May 1881.

Officiating Agent to the Governor-General in

Biluchistan, forwarding news received from Kandahar.

We have, &c.

(Signed)

RIPON.

D. M. STEWART.

W. STOKES.

RIVERS THOMPSON.

J. GIBBS.

E. BARING.

T. F. WILSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 21.

No. 249, dated Quetta, 31st May 1881.

From Lieut.-Col. O. ST. JOHN, R.E., Agent, Governor-General, Biluchistan, Quetta, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I HAVE the honour to enclose a free translation of letters just received from Kandahar, a summary of which was forwarded to you to-day by telegraph.

2. With reference to your request that I should, if possible, continue my diary of political events as in Kandahar, I regret to say that I have not found it convenient to do so owing to the intermittent character of the correspondence. Originally I intended to have all letters received from Kandahar literally translated by a native assistant here and submitted to your office with a covering letter of remarks. But this has not worked well; and I find it better to make a free translation of the letters myself directly they arrive, and forward it to you at once with marginal notes and comments, after transmitting a summary by telegraph. This system I have commenced to-day, and I trust it will meet with your approval.

Enclosure 2 in No. 21.

KANDAHAR NEWS.

May 31st.—Regular post arrived from Kandahar with letters of 27th.

Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan writes that a trustworthy person just arrived from Herat has brought him intelligence of affairs there which he has communicated to Mir Hashim for transmission to me. Encloses a circular letter from Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan to the Chief of Zamindawar. Begs that any news reaching me from Meshed may be sent to him at once.

Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan's letter, which is addressed to Sahib Khan, runs as follows:—

"*After compliments.*—By God's favour I have arrived in this place (Farrah) on the 17th Jamad-es-Sani (16th May) with one thousand Herati horsemen. One day I shall halt, and the next, the 18th, I shall advance at the head of two thousand Herat and Farrah horsemen. On the same day his Highness Muhammad Ayub Khan will leave Herat with guns and troops. Under any circumstance, be assured that I shall arrive in your country without delay."

* It is worth remark that both seals are purposely blurred and imperfect, a common practice among Afghans when writing on political matters. It is supposed to facilitate repudiation of the authorship, if advisable.—O. St. J.

This letter* is also sealed by Muhammad Hasan Khan.

Mir Hashim writes as follows:—

"A man whom I had sent to Herat returned to-day, having been 14 days on the road. He states that five Herati regiments were present in the city, of which two had been deprived of their arms some time previously, but had since had them returned. There were two regiments of Kandaharis and Kabulis, each 400 strong. Four iron guns had been made, of which one was complete, the other three unfinished. Three batteries of smooth-bores were also complete. A thousand sowars had been ordered with Muhammad Hashim Khan to Farrah, but only 500 had gone. Muhammad Hashim's orders were to halt only one night at Farrah, and push on to the Helmand at once. It is probable however that he has not come further than Bakwa. Muhammad Ayub Khan was very apprehensive as to affairs on the Turkistan side; and had sent men there to give timely warning of any events that might cause disturbances in Herat. Ayub Khan was intending to leave Herat for Zamindawar on the 10th Rajab (8th June). He had not as yet issued any pay to the regiments. He had reminded Hashim Khan and the Waliahd's mother of their promise to provide him with funds, but they had taken no notice of the reminder. It had been settled that Muhammad Hashim's wife and the Waliahd's mother should go to Anardareh, on account of the heat of the weather it was said; but the real reason is fear of an advance of the Amir's troops from Kandahar.

"The following is the news of Kandahar:—The cavalry regiment ordered to Girishk with two guns and an infantry regiment arrived there on the 26th May. The guns and infantry halted at Sinjiri for some days, but have now gone on. On the 28th Kazi Saad-ud-din was to leave for Girishk with 400 sowars enlisted in Kandahar, to be followed in three days by two guns and an infantry regiment. Six hundred regular cavalry, three infantry regiments, and six standards of Khasadars were to leave Kelat-i-Ghilzai for Kandahar on 28th.

Each *bairah* or standard is supposed to count 100 men.—O. St. J.

"As regards Herat affairs, if the regiments leave Kandahar for the Herat direction quickly, and a simultaneous movement is made from Turkistan, Muhammad Ayub Khan's position will be very difficult; but if there is much delay, his affairs will wear a very different aspect. A certain Sayyid Hussain who was in Ayub's camp bazaar before Kandahar has been accused by him of sending news to Colonel St. John, and his property confiscated. He himself fled to Meshed. Ayub Khan had declared in the public assembly that the Kabulis were Kafirs. The Heratis say that, if it were a case of fighting against the English, they would not fire a shot; but as they have suffered much at the hands of the Kabulis, they will fight them willingly. This is the talk of the common people. Men of wisdom and experience are in favour of the Amir. There is a certain Muhammad Umar of Ghorian. This man was sent by Ayub to the Wali of Maimanah to ask for assistance in men and money. The Wali replied that he could give neither; for if an army moved from Turkistan, it would be as much as he could do to keep his own purdah (*i.e.*, defend himself). Naib Hafiz-ullah Khan had been named

general-in-chief, but the Duranis are much discontented at the appointment. The Herat news communicated by Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan is given separately.

"As regards Kabul, it appears that the Amir was to leave Kalah-i-Kazi* on the 26th May. He was intending to bring all the Ghilzai Khans and Maliks with him. The Turkistan army was at Shibarghan.

* A camping ground, a few miles out of Kabul.—O. St. J.

"Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan, at a recent meeting of chiefs at his house, warmly extolled the kindness and generosity of the British Government towards the Amir." He has asked Mir Hashim to arrange for the payment of the third monthly subsidy of 50,000 rupees through the Hindus of Kandahar.

The account of Herat affairs given by the man mentioned in Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan's letter is as follows :—

Troops.—There are nominally three regiments of Kandaharis and Kabulis in Herat;

† This nearly tallies with number given by the other informant, viz., 800 men.—O. St. J.

The discrepancy between this account and that of the other informant as to these Herati troops is inexplicable; but I am inclined to believe that they have been re-assembled and re-armed. — O. St. J.

command of the troops in the hope

‡ Here again is another discrepancy. I doubt Ayub's having so many guns equipped as the first informant says; but he certainly has some.—O. St. J.

but two of them number only 330 men each, and the third 150 to 200.† These had no arms. There are no Herati troops in Herat, the three regiments brought from Kushk having been disarmed and dismissed to their homes. There is a cavalry regiment, but it has less than 200 men. There were 17 smooth-bore guns, new and old, and two iron guns had been made; but none had horses or equipment.‡ Kazi Abd-es-salam had been given of his paying them something out of his own pocket, but he gave nothing, so was dismissed, and Naib Hafizulla appointed in his place,§ but the Kandaharis were not pleased with him, and for fear of them he had surrounded himself with a body-guard of 70 Kabulis.

After his return from Kandahar,

§ Both informants are unanimous in this point.—O. St. J.

Sahibzadah of Siah Oshan had been sent to Maimanah for help in men and money, but he came back empty-handed, or with only three horses and a postin. Ayub had summoned Hashim Khan from Farrah to get money from him; and it is said that he brought some with him and gave it to Ayub. Khan Agha's brother has been appointed chief of the Jamshidis; but Ayub is aware that the Jamshidis, as well as the Alikozai and Ishakzai Duranis, are his enemies. Sirdars Muhammad Hashim Khan and Muhammad Hassan Khan have left for Farrah, but informant saw their tents, and there were only 12. He does not believe they had more than a hundred horsemen with them. Sirdar Abdul Wahab Khan was at Sabzwar, having left a few regular infantry at Taiwara. It is said that Anbia Khan has assembled a strong force and is on his way to attack them. It was currently reported in Herat that Sirdar Muhammad Ishak Khan had occupied Maimanah, and was moving on Herat, and people looked on Ayub's cause as lost. News had arrived from Kandahar that the English had left, and the Amir's troops arrived; it was also reported that Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan was treating the Kandaharis liberally, and paying the soldiers well. This has excited the hopes of the Heratis in the direction of Kandahar.

Thirty Kandahari soldiers belonging to Maruf, who had gone to Herat for service, saw the state of affairs there and returned. This latter piece of information appears to have been given by Shams-ud-din Khan.

There is not very much of importance in this news. Neither side appears to be showing any remarkable energy, though both are preparing to make the right bank of the Helmand the battle-field. Delay for the present is doing the Amir's cause no harm, but if he has not sufficient force at Girishk to overawe the Alizais when Hashim arrives there, they may rise *en masse*. It is clear that Ayub is very weak, and that the Duranis generally are wavering. Nothing but the most culpable inertness on the Amir's part can prevent his success in establishing himself.

From travellers I learn that the number of *talibs* in or about the city of Kandahar has noticeably increased, in spite of many having left for Zamindawar. This is supposed to portend a rising in Kandahar in case of the Amir's arms suffering a reverse on the Helmand. It is also said that the five lakhs of rupees given to the Amir's representatives have been kept almost, if not quite, intact.

The postal arrangements with Kandahar are working well, letters arriving in three and a half days. Private parties are beginning to avail themselves of the post.

(Signed) O. ST. JOHN,
Lieut.-Colonel.

Biluchistan Agency,
S. Afghanistan Office,
May 31, 1881.

No. 22.

No. 92 of 1881.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's
Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, June 17, 1881.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of the diary of the Resident, Southern Afghanistan, from the 15th to the 27th April 1881.

We have, &c.
(Signed) RIPON.
D. M. STEWART.
W. STOKES.
RIVERS THOMPSON.
J. GIBBS.
E. BARING.
T. F. WILSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 22.

No. 252, dated Quetta, 1st June 1881.

From Lieut.-Col. O. ST. JOHN, R.E., Officiating Agent, Governor-General, Biluchistan,
to SIR ALFRED LYALL, K.C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign
Department.

IN forwarding the diary of the Kandahar Residency for the last few days of its existence, I have the honour to make a few remarks on the circumstances attending the transfer of authority to the Amir's representative.

2. The first of the Amir's officials, the Kotwal, made his appearance on the 1st April, followed on the 5th by the deputy governor, Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan, who is practically at the head of affairs, the governor, Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan, being a lad of 19 or 20. He remained encamped with the troops 20 miles east of the city.

3. Kazi Saad-ud-din Khan, who has been Kazi of Kandahar during our rule from January to July 1879, was with Shams-ud-din Khan, and our former connexion, as well as the Kazi's straightforward and sensible character, much facilitated the transaction of business.

4. On Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan's arrival, he at once attempted to induce me to permit him to assume charge of the town, alleging that it would show the people our confidence in the Amir, and the mutual trust and friendship existing between him and the British Government, while if we continued to administer it, and levy customs and other taxes, his cause would suffer serious injury. He also asked whether it could possibly be true that I was collecting the land revenue for the year now just commenced. I may remark that I was doing so for two reasons; *first*, to balance the Kandahar accounts, which, owing to entire cessation of land revenue and diminution of proceeds of customs during the winter months, showed a considerable deficit, and *secondly*, to show the people that we were still masters, and intended to be so up to the last moment. On Shams-ud-din Khan making these remarks, I took the opportunity of explaining the situation to him frankly, pointing out that the Amir had absolutely no right whatever in the matter, and no friends among the people, that Kandahar was a pure gift from the British Government to him, and that it was for me as the representative of Government to settle the time and manner of making over charge of the administration. As far as was consonant with our own interests, every regard would be

shown to those of the Amir, which would, however, best be served by showing that he was dependent upon, and not independent of, the British Government. The Sirdar, I said, must be aware that the Amir himself had no power or influence in Kandahar, except as the friend and ally of the British Government, whose material aid alone would enable him to hold his own over the Duranis, who were extremely ill-disposed to acknowledge his authority. As soon as the time had come for our actual departure, and he should have force at his disposal to hold the country, it would be made over to him; but that, as long as any British soldiers remained, I intended to retain the administration of the city in my own hands. As regards levying taxes, it was hardly proper that the Amir receiving lakhs from the British Government should object to their taking thousands from a country of which they were paying the expenses. This lecture had the desired effect, and beyond one or two attempts to persuade me to allow him to collect the customs dues, I had no more trouble with Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan.

5. On the 12th April, the march of the British troops being finally fixed, I formally transferred the administration of the province to Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan, informing him in the presence of the Barakzai Sirdars and others that I should retain charge of the city till the actual withdrawal of the troops.

6. On the 16th the greater part of the cavalry which had accompanied the Amir's officials from Kabul marched to Kohkaran, which had been evacuated by our troops the previous day.

7. The same day Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan came into the city and exchanged visits with me. In the evening he also visited General Hume, who returned the visit the next morning, after which the Sirdar rejoined the cavalry at Kohkaran.

8. On the 20th I made over charge of the customs and octroi to Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan.

9. The next morning, the 21st, the cantonments and citadel were finally evacuated. Between ten and noon all guards on the city and citadel gates were relieved by Kabul Khasadars, and at the latter hour precisely the British flag was hauled down under a salute of 31 guns. Thus closed the second period of direct British administration of Kandahar, lasting nearly seven months from the defeat of Ayub Khan on the 1st September.

10. The next morning, the 22nd, the rear column of the garrison marched for Chaman, which it reached on the 27th without an incident worthy of notice.

11. Nothing could have been more quiet and orderly than the transfer, which was carried out from first to last without the smallest incident worthy of remark. I had no reason to anticipate any serious disturbance, but the result went beyond my expectations, and cannot be regarded as otherwise than very satisfactory, both in the interests of the Amir and our own.

12. As soon as it became known to me that the government of Kandahar would without doubt be transferred to the Amir of Kabul, I did all in my power to pave the way for his reception by the Durani tribes, who were certainly ill-prepared to welcome him. Some weeks have now passed. As yet all is going well, and the Duranis have acquiesced in, and are apparently becoming reconciled to, his rule. Whether they will accept it finally depends, I believe, upon his ability to prevent Ayub Khan from invading Kandahar territory, or, at least, from crossing the Helmand. If the Amir has not sufficient power and energy to block his rival's road to the Helmand, he will, I fear, lose Kandahar, it cannot be said undeservedly.

13. In conclusion, I beg to bring to the notice of Government the valuable assistance afforded me by my assistants, Major the Honourable G. Napier, Captain Yate, Captain Muir, Mr. Barnes, C.S., and Mirza Hasan Ali Khan, Nawab.

14. I also venture to record the obligations I am under to Major-General Hume, C.B., commanding in Southern Afghanistan, for his kind co-operation on every occasion.

Enclosure 2 in No. 22.

DIARY OF THE SOUTHERN AFGHANISTAN RESIDENCY from the 15th April.

15th April.—The 11th Foot and Major Crawford's heavy battery marched to-day for Chaman.

Received a letter from a private correspondent at Kabul, dated 8th March, giving the following news:—Sirdar Muhammad Ishak Khan has not yet occupied Maimanah, but the Wali has sent him presents. The Amir is treating the people of Kabul with justice and moderation, but he is not making himself liked by the nobility. The people of

Jellalabad, Ali Khel, Kurram, and Zurmat are all more or less in rebellion. The Amir has recalled the force he had sent against the Shaikh Ali Hazaras. It is reported that he is about to go to Kandahar, and that Sirdar Muhammad Ishak Khan will come to Kabul, but others say that Turkistan cannot do without him. Letters from certain Kabuli Sirdars to Sirdar Muhammad Ayub Khan had been intercepted, and the writers sent in confinement to Turkistan. The Amir had summoned all the notables of Kabul to a banquet at Shah-Mardan, at which he made a speech asking if they were content with his rule, to which they answered unanimously in the affirmative. It is rumoured that the Amir of Bokhara is dead, and that the Russians have occupied the city. A rumour was also current that Yakub Khan, having been released by the English, had arrived in Kandahar.

A servant of the Amir's mother, writing to his relations at Kandahar, mentions that he is about to start with her for Turkistan in a few days.

16th April.—Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan, the governor, came into the city at 10 this morning. He was met outside the town by the Muhammadzai Sirdars and other notables. Captain Muir received him at the Kabul gate, beyond which a battery of artillery was drawn up, and fired a salute of 15 guns; the street as far as his house was lined with troops; and in the court-yard a guard of honour was stationed.

An hour later he paid me a formal visit accompanied by Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan and Kazi Saad-ud-din. Shams-ud-din Khan informed me that they had received instructions from the Amir to take over from me 18 field guns, and 3,000 rifles with ammunition. I replied that the guns were on the road, and would be made over before our departure, but that I had no instructions about rifles. He whispered to Mirza Hasan Ali Khan to tell me that the Amir had written to him to ask me to permit him to levy the customs dues and city taxes during the remainder of our stay. To this I answered through Hasan Ali Khan that those who received gifts should not make conditions; that it was highly inadvisable to separate the collection of taxes from the general control of the place; and that as long as we paid the expenses and thought it advisable to retain the government of the country so long should we continue to collect the ordinary dues. As regards the soap and other monopolies they had already been made over to him.

Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan delivered a letter from the Amir, stating that his officers had informed him of my advice that his troops should proceed at once, without waiting for our evacuation of Kandahar, to occupy Girishk and Zamindawar. To this he did not agree, thinking it inadvisable that his troops should come in contact with the people till Kandahar was in the hands of his representative.

In the afternoon I returned Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan's visit. He is a heavy-looking youth of twenty or thereabouts, and his manners bear traces of his country education. Later on the Sirdar with all the Amir's officials paid General Hume a visit in cantonments.

Ahmad Jan Khan, brother of Sahib Khan, Alizai, returned with an answer to my letter informing him of Kandahar being made over to the Amir, and recommending submission. He excuses himself from coming to Kandahar at once on the plea of awaiting important news from Taiwara.

Sirdar Gul Muhammad Khan writes from Girishk that a brother of Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan has come to Kulistan to collect revenue, whence he had gone on to Dunsang in Kandahar territory, and was waiting there to intercept the nomad shepherds on their way back to the hills, and levy the sheep tax on them. One of his men had entered Zamindawar, and was spreading mischievous reports.

17th April.—The 8th Bengal Cavalry, the 4th Bengal, and the 10th Bombay N. I. marched this morning under command of Brigadier-General Henderson.

Major-General Hume and his staff visited Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan. A number of Barakzai Khans and Maliks living in the neighbourhood of the city came to pay their respects to the Sirdar. They were persuaded to do this by Sirdar Muhammad Husain Khan, who is very active in the Amir's cause.

18th April.—The 7th R. Fusiliers and field battery Royal Artillery marched this morning. Mr. Barnes, C.S., accompanied them.

Sirdar Gul Muhammad Khan writes from Girishk mentioning that reports had reached him from Farrah, from apparently authentic sources, that a fight had taken place near Herat between the Sartip and Muhammad Hasan Khan on the one side and Ayub's on the other, in which the former was totally defeated. Muhammad Hasan slain. The Sartip, it was declared, had taken sanctuary.

General Ghulam Haidar Khan, Commander-in-Chief of the Amir's forces, writes renouncing his arrival at Gach in the Arghastan. In reply I wrote to him that his troops

should be at Momand, one march from Kandahar, on the 22nd, and that he should send four hundred infantry under a reliable officer to Deh Khwaja on the 20th, to be ready to take over charge of the gates and citadel on the 21st.

To-day I make the following presents :

	Rs.
To Sirdar Muhammad Husain Khan - - - - -	10,000
To Sirdar Muhammad Hasan Khan - - - - -	5,000
To Sirdar Shirindil Khan - - - - -	5,000
also to Sirdar Anbia Khan of Taiwara, through his brother, Ismail Khan -	10,000

19th April.—To-day I requested Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan to appoint some one to take over charge of the customs from to-morrow morning.

Four troopers of the Amir's regular cavalry have deserted from Kohkaran, and are said to have gone to Herat.

This evening I took Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan and Kazi Saad-ud-din with me to visit all our cemeteries and burying places, and committed them to their charge. Sayyid Mir Hashim was also with us.

20th April.—Letter, translation of which is attached, was sent to Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan, regarding the treatment of our friends in the province.

This morning the 78th Foot, 17th Bengal, and 1st Biluch Regiments with 2nd field battery, the whole under the command of Brigadier-General Penton, marched for Pishin.

Letters were sent to Sirdar Gul Muhammad Khan, governor of Girishk, Muhammad Sadik Khan, governor of Kelat, and Sahib Khan, Alizai, of Zamindawar, informing them of our departure, and recommending them to be faithful to the Amir.

400 smooth-bore muskets belonging to the Wali's troops, and collected in the villages were made over to the Amir's people.

The octroi and customs were to-day made over to Shams-ud-din Khan.

21st April.—Eighteen field guns were this morning made over to Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan.

At 10 A.M. the field officer of the day commenced withdrawing the guards on the city gates, each being in turn occupied by a detachment of the Amir's Khasadars. Charge of the entrance from the city to the citadel square was then similarly transferred, and at noon precisely the union jack on the central tower was hauled down under a salute of thirty-one guns, after which the guard on the north or citadel gate was withdrawn, all remaining troops having previously quitted the cantonment and citadel and camped on the plain to the north.

I remained in the city till half-past three, when a considerable number of Sirdars, chiefs, merchants, and others assembled to wish me good-bye; after which I rode through the streets and the citadel to the camp. Except that the gates were closed, and that the Indian camp-followers, usually so numerous in the bazaars, were wanting, the town wore its accustomed appearance. It was noticeable that not the slightest demonstration either of joy or sorrow at our departure was made by the crowd, for, a few minutes before the flag was hauled down, I had walked through the greater part of the bazaars on foot, when I received even more salaams and greetings of respect than usual, accompanied in many instances by expressions of sorrow or good-will; one man only ejaculating a thanksgiving that the rule of the infidel was at an end.

22nd April.—At 7 o'clock Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan and others of the Amir's officers, accompanied by the Kandahari Sirdars, came out to bid me farewell.

The rear guard moved off at 8 a.m., and I waited with them till it had marched. They rode with me a short distance, and then returned to the city. The gates were kept closed, and our departure was only witnessed by a few villagers, who were perfectly quiet and orderly :—

The troops forming the column are—

D.-B. R. H. Artillery.	6-8 Royal Artillery.
13th Hussars.	63rd Foot.
Poona Horse.	3rd Bombay Native Infantry.
9th Bombay Native Infantry.	

A caravan from Herat arrived in Kandahar yesterday. The merchants with it state that there was no truth in the rumour of fighting there. Ayub Khan had ordered the Adraskand and Sabzwar sowars to collect and accompany Hashim Khan to Zamindawar.

23rd April.—Marched from Mund-i-Hisar to Takht-i-Pul. Before leaving, the fortified post was made over to an officer of the Amir, who accompanies us for the purpose with one hundred Khasadars.

24th April.—Marched from Takht-i-Pul to Mel Karez. Post made over as yesterday.

Mir Hashim writes from Kandahar that all has been quiet there up to the present. The day after we left some *talibs* got into the cemetery outside the Idgah gate, and damaged some of the tombs. He immediately informed Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan, who put guards over the cemetery and promises to repair the damage.

Sent a letter to Amir through the Kandahar authorities, informing him of the evacuation of Kandahar on the 22nd, and bringing to his notice the skill and courtesy with which his agents, Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan and Kazi Saad-ud-din, had conducted their share of the transfer to his government. He was also informed that five lakhs and fifty thousand rupees, with 18 field-guns and about 400 muskets, had been made over to his representatives. The arrival of 3,000 rifles at Chaman for him was also notified to him, as well as the appointment of Sayyid Mir Hashim as agent at Kandahar. He was told, moreover, that the fortified posts on the road to Chaman were being made over to guards sent from Kandahar.

A follower of the Poona Horse who had lagged behind sick is reported by the Amir's people with us to have been picked up by them and left in the Mel Karez post in charge of their Khasadars.

25th April.—Marched from Mel Karez to Dabrai.

26th April.—Marched from Dabrai to Gatai.

Six Nurzai Maliks recommended for good service by Major Westmacott, Road Commandant, were given 100 rupees each. They were told that they would find a good market for their grain at Chaman if they would bring it there.

27th April.—Gatai to Chaman. British troops quitted Afghan soil.

The march from Kandahar was entirely undisturbed, save by a few attempted robberies at night.

(Signed) O. ST. JOHN, Lieut.-Col.,
Resident, Southern Afghanistan.

Quetta, May 20, 1881.

Enclosure 3 in No. 22.

True translation of Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel O. ST. JOHN to SIRDAR MUHAMMAD HASHIM KHAN, Kandahar, dated the 20th April 1881.

After compliments.—I have the honour to send herewith a list of persons, natives of Kandahar, who remain in the employ of the British, or wish for their own purposes to retire with the army to Quetta. They are leaving property behind them in Kandahar, and I wish to impress on you the very great importance of protecting it and their families during their absence. If any harm is done by ill-disposed persons to the property of friends and adherents of the British Government, it will weaken the bonds of union between the Government and His Highness the Amir. I beg, therefore, that the persons and property of all our friends absent or present may be carefully and diligently looked after. Particularly I commend to your care the property in houses and land of Sirdar Sher Ali Khan, which he has entrusted to his nephew, Sirdar Muhammad Hasan Khan.

No. 23.

No. 94 of 1881.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's
Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, June 24, 1881.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Govern-
ment, copy of a letter* from Colonel O. B. St. John,

* No. 256, dated the 6th June 1881.

Officiating Agent to the Governor-General in

Biluchistan, forwarding news received from Kandahar.

We have, &c.

(Signed)

RIPON.

D. M. STEWART.

W. STOKES.

RIVERS THOMPSON.

J. GIBBS.

E. BARING.

T. F. WILSON.

Enclosure in No. 23.

No. 256, dated Quetta, June 6, 1881.

From Lieutenant-Colonel O. B. C. ST. JOHN, C.S.I., R.E., Resident, Southern
Afghanistan, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India,
Foreign Department.

I HAVE the honour to forward précis of news received to-day from Kandahar from
independent sources.

Kandahar News, Sunday, June 5, 1881.—(Extract.)

A correspondent writes from Kandahar on the 30th ultimo that the son of an old
servant of their family who died lately at Herat has just arrived from that city,
and states that Sartip Nur Muhammad Khan had been appointed to muster the Herat
sowars and despatch them in the Kandahar direction. It was reported that there would
be between four and five thousand of them. Four Herati regiments, two-and-half of
Kabulis and Kandaharis, with the artillery, were encamped at Pul-i-Malan. Three

† Sic in original. But there can be no doubt
that Heratis are meant.

regiments of *Kabulist*† had had their arms taken
away and been dispersed among the cavalry as
grooms. As informant came along the road

from Herat to Farah and Farah to Washir, he passed parties of 50 and 100 horsemen at
every stage. Sirdar Muhammad Ayub Khan was on the point of moving from Herat
when informant left. It was said that Muhammad Ayub Khan declared that he had no
intention of attacking any one except the English in Pishin, but that of course if any
one tried to stop him he would fight them.

When informant was at Girishk the brother of General Ghulam Hyder Khan, who is
there with a cavalry regiment, searched the caravan with which he was, and found two
men on whom were 150 letters from Muhammad Ayub Khan and Khan Mullah Khan
to the people of Kandahar. On this the General's brother ordered the caravan to be
plundered, but on the merchants declaring their innocence countermanded his order and
contented himself with imprisoning the two messengers.

Kazi Saad-ud-din with one regiment had left Kandahar for Girishk. It is reported
that Amir is on his way to Kandahar.

The son of Muhammad Umar Khan, son of the late Mardan Khan, the Nurzai Chief
of Farah, is in Kandahar under surveillance, but it is not known why he came.

Merchants from Kandahar who arrived in Quetta to-day state that a caravan has
arrived from Herat and another gone there. They also say that the reinforcements
moving to Girishk under Kazi Saad-ud-din consist of one regiment infantry, one of

cavalry, and two guns. There is no traffic with Kabul, merchants being afraid to risk their goods on the road. The Andari and Taraki Ghilzais and the Wardaks were said to be in a very discontented state.

O. B. C. ST. JOHN, R.E.,
Resident, Southern Afghanistan.

No. 24.

No. 105 of 1881.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's
Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, July 15, 1881.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's
No. 261, dated 24th June 1881. Government, a copy of the letters cited in the margin,
263, " " from the Officiating Agent to the Governor-General in
Biluchistan, forwarding *precis* of news received from Kandahar.

We have, &c.

(Signed)

RIPON.

D. M. STEWART.

W. STOKES.

RIVERS THOMPSON.

J. GIBBS.

E. BARING.

T. F. WILSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 24.

No. 261, dated Quetta, June 24, 1881.

From Lieutenant-Colonel ST. JOHN, R.E., Resident, Southern Afghanistan, and
Officiating Agent, Governor-General, Biluchistan, to Sir ALFRED LYALL, K.C.B.,
Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith the *precis* of Kandahar news received on
the 16th instant.

Diary of Kandahar Affairs, Camp Kach, June 16, 1881.

Letters arrived from Mir Hashim, Agent at Kandahar, dated the 6th and 9th
respectively.

In the first he writes that he has not yet been able to get an accurate account of the
Girishk affair from private sources, but sends a copy of the letter received by Sirdar
Shams-ud-din Khan from the officers there. From it will be seen that Sirdar
Muhammad Hashim Khan was not in the fight, but had remained behind with some
horsemen in the Karezat (20 miles off). It is not yet known whether he retreated to
Washir, or has remained in the neighbourhood of Girishk; but he (Mir Hashim) has
sent a man to Washir and those parts to ascertain the actual state of affairs. It is not
true, as reported last week, that Abubekr, the thief, has been captured; and the son of
Majid Khan was wounded, not killed. As regards the affairs of Kandahar, Mir Hashim
remarks that the Amir appointed four persons for its government, namely, Sirdar
Muhammad Hashim Khan, Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan, Kazi Saad-ud-din, and
Sahibzadah Ghulam Haidar. All letters from the Amir are addressed to these four
persons collectively; but Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan acts on his own responsibility without
consulting the others; and gives khilluts to Khans and others as from himself. The
cultivators are much annoyed by the manner in which they are being treated in the way
of robbery of supplies by the soldiers; on this account they are inclined to support
Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan, who has much improved since his arrival and treats
people properly, and shows much intelligence. For instance, he considers that the
Girishk force, consisting of two regiments of cavalry, three of infantry and 10 companies
of Khasadars, with a battery of artillery should be pushed on to Washir at once to
prevent any of Zamindawar people from joining Ayub Khan, &c., but Shams-ud-din
Khan will not agree to it. Both have written their views on the subject to the Amir.
Sirdar Muhammad Hashim asks Mir Hashim to beg me to write to him and enclose the
letter to Mir Hashim.

The following is a translation of the despatch from Girishk alluded to by Mir Hashim —

Last Friday at eight in the morning Muhammad Hasan Khan attacked Girishk bringing his force to within a mile of the fort. We, therefore, found ourselves obliged to sally out and draw up our forces and engage him. The Herat horsemen began the attack in their own fashion. We fought in military order and drove them back fighting for a distance of 16 miles when they fled with a loss of 40 or 50 killed. Their horses and arms were plundered by the villagers. Those of their infantry who were killed had three grooved rifles (Enfields). They had about 1,500 horsemen and 500 infantry, all Zamindawaris; but among the horsemen the majority were Heratis, only a few were Zamindawaris. The day before Sirdar Muhammad Hashim had arrived at Khoja Ahmed-i-Naozad and had received there a letter from Muhammad Hasan Khan asking him if he was tired and unable to come on, to send as many horsemen as possible. Muhammad Hashim accordingly sent the greater part of his men to Muhammad Hasan under command of Muhammad Umar Khan, Nurzai, and they were in the fight; on the Amir's side only one cavalry soldier, one Khasadar, and four horses were wounded. On their side it is said that the son of Majid Khan, Alizai, is very badly wounded, as is Muhammad Mir Khan, son of Musa Khan, and grandson of Sultan Muhammad Khan. Two of their men were killed by cannon shot.

Mir Hashim's letter of the 9th states that his messenger from Girishk has returned, and says that Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan had rallied his men at Kadanak, and had detached Sirdar Muhammad Hasan Khan with 300 horse, who had crossed the Helmand and occupied Sangbur. Sayyid Amir Jan, son of Sayyid Kala, with a few horsemen, some 20 in all, were going from Kandahar to Girishk and halted his men at Miskarez. They were surprised by the 300 horse from Sangbur; Sayyid Amir Jan and one or two others taken prisoners, and one killed. The rest fled to Kandahar. Some kasids, too, were taken prisoners with letters from Kandahar to Girishk. On returning to Sangbur the sowars boasted in the villages that they had defeated the Amir's army. They have established themselves at Sangbur, and are raiding on all sides. Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan was intending to fall back from Kadanak to Khinjak, and collect his forces there. It was currently reported in the Kareat district that troops were on their way from Herat to reinforce him. One regiment of infantry and one of cavalry with two guns, all from the Amir's force at Girishk, were proposing to march to Kalah-i-Gaz and from there make a sudden attack on Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan.

On the 10th a regiment of infantry marched from Kandahar for Girishk. Two hundred regular cavalry, five companies of militia, with as many Kandahari sowars as could be collected, the whole under Sirdar Muhammad Hasan Khan, son of Sirdar Khusdil Khan, have been ordered to march to Sangbur and Miskarez to drive out the Heratis. Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan declares that the latter numbering three squadrons have recrossed the Helmand and rejoined Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan. Mir Hashim says that he is not sure of the accuracy of this statement. Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan also states that 200 regular cavalry, two infantry regiments, and two guns have arrived in Shahr-i-Safr (40 miles from Kandahar on the Kelat-i-Ghilzai road). There is no grain to be bought in the city.

17th June.—Wrote to Mir Hashim acknowledging receipt of letters of 6th and 9th, and informing him of news telegraphed from Teheran on 14th. Wrote also to Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan giving him the same intelligence, also that the Amir had (as telegraphed to-day by Foreign Secretary) announced his intention of leaving for Kandahar on the 16th.

(Signed) O. B. ST. JOHN, Lieutenant-Colonel,
Agent Governor-General, Biluchistan.

Remarks on above.

It is not yet clear to me whether Sirdar Muhammad Hasan Khan's object was merely a feint to ascertain the strength of the garrison of Girishk, or whether unaware of its having been reinforced by regular troops he made a real attack. Anyhow it was repulsed, though his loss, even as stated by the Amir's people, was not serious. That he was not much discouraged is shown by his later daring raid across the Helmand.

The bad feeling between the Amir's officials is evidently increasing, and if he does not appear on the scene himself will alone suffice to ruin his cause.

Enclosure 2 in No. 24.

No. 263, dated Quetta, June 24, 1881.

From Lieut.-Colonel ST. JOHN, R.E., Resident, Southern Afghanistan, and Officiating Agent, Governor-General, Biluchistan to Sir ALFRED LYALL, K.C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith the précis of Kandahar news received on the 20th instant.

Diary of Kandahar Affairs, dated Camp Kuwas, June 20, 1881.

Kandahar post reached me with letters from Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan, dated 10th and 12th June. In his letter of the 10th, Shams-ud-din Khan, after acknowledging receipt of my letter authorising him to draw on me for 50,000 rupees, and stating that he has done so in favour of Hajji Zaman, says that he has, according to the intention expressed in his last letter, sent to Girishk the Tokhi horse, 1,000 militia, a regiment of infantry, and two guns. After them went a regiment of cavalry, 200 militia, and the Kandahar tribal horse. Yesterday (the 9th) 400 infantry, two field guns, one troop of cavalry and 200 militia also started for Pusht-i-Rud.

To-day (the 10th) news arrived from Sirdar Gul Muhammad Khan that Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan with a number of horse and foot had come to Wakhar. Shams-ud-din Khan had also heard that Sartip Nur Muhammad Khan, with two infantry regiments and four guns, had arrived in Washir, and that Muhammad Ayub Khan was following him and had reached Farrah. On this account he (Shams-ud-din Khan) and General Ghulam Haidar Khan, with 800 regular infantry and eight of the guns presented by the British Government with stores and ammunition, also Sirdar Muhammad Hasan Khan and the Kandahar horse, were intending to start for Pusht-i-Rud on the 13th. 400 regular infantry and 300 police were to be left in the city with Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan and Sahibzadah Ghulam Haidar.

Shams-ud-din Khan's second letter runs as follows :—

Yesterday, the 11th of June 1881, Sirdars Muhammad Hashim Khan, Muhammad Hasan Khan, and Abdulla Khan, son of Sultan Ahmed Khan, with their levies of horse and foot, were at Karez-i-Safed. Two regiments of cavalry, one of infantry, and two mountain guns, attacked them. They came on to meet the attack, but were defeated. Sirdar Abdulla Khan was killed, and his body left on the field. Sirdar Muhammad Hasan Khan was wounded, but carried off by his men; but it is said that his wound is so severe that it has probably proved fatal. 103 others of their horsemen were killed or wounded and 53 taken prisoners. Their baggage and tents with three standards and a pair of kettle-drums fell into the hands of the Amir's soldiers. Sirdar Muhammad Hashim did not go into the fight, but kept on one side and fled, hotly pursued by the victorious troops. How far they have gone is not yet known.

It is said also that Abubekr Alizai, Akhtar Khan, Achakzai, Colonel of the Heratis, and Abdul Azim and other leaders of the Heratis have been killed. But whether this is true or not will be written in the next letter.

Two letters from Mir Hashim were also received. The first dated the 10th June 1881 gives information that Sayyid Amir Jan, taken prisoner by Sirdar Muhammad Hasan Khan at Miskarez, had been released, after his arms and horse had been taken from him. When Kazi Saad-ud-din was on his way to Girishk he left at Kushk-i-Nakhud 50 militia to collect supplies. They went after a time to Sangbur, where they were all taken prisoners by the Herati horse, and their arms taken from them. Sirdars Muhammad Hasan, Muhammad Husain Khan, and Shirindil, Kandaharis are ordered to go with one regiment to Kushk-i-Nakhud and to station the Kandahari horse at the fords of Kalah-i-Gaz and Dahana-i-Doab. 700 horse (Kandahari) were appointed to go with Kazi Saad-ud-din Khan, but only 100 horse joined him. There is a report in the bazaar that Sirdar Abdul-Wahab Khan, son of Mir Afzul Khan, is ordered to come through Dehrawud to Khakrez, and so on to the Arghandab districts, but no dependence is to be placed on it. There is no proper system in the management of affairs at Kandahar, and it is impossible to say how they will end. A man arrived from Sirdar Gul Muhammad Khan at 1 p.m. of the day, the letter is dated (the 10th), and brings news that four regiments and two guns from Herat have assuredly arrived in Washir, and it is said in the bazaar that Sirdar Ayub Khan is at Rozabagh.

The second letter is dated the 12th, and says that a messenger from Gul Muhammad Khan with a trooper of the cavalry arrived to-day at noon, and states that, on the 11th about 600 cavalry, two guns, and the Pusht-i-Rud horse

* Shoraki is a district on the Helmand between Girishk and Kalah-i-Gaz. Kadanak is 15 or 20 miles due north.

started from Shoraki* in the direction of the enemy's force, which under Sirdars Muhammad Hashim Khan, Muhammad Hasan Khan, and Abdulla Khan was encamped at Kadanak. Leaving their camp they advanced to Karez-i-Safed. The Amir's cavalry on perceiving them charged sword in hand. The fight lasted three hours, after which the Herati force broke and fled. 104 prisoners were taken, of whom 57 were wounded. Sirdar Abdulla Khan, son of Sultan Ahmed Khan, was killed. Sirdar Muhammad Hasan Khan fled, wounded. Two Kandahari Sirdars who were on that side are prisoners, one of them being wounded. Two leaders of the Herati horse are also wounded and prisoners. Abubekr, Alizai, is said by some to be wounded, by others to be killed. 60 horses and 60 guns were captured. The arms and accoutrements of Sirdar Abdulla Khan have been sent to the General by the Kabul cavalry. 12 letters written by Ayub to the Zamindawaris were taken out of his pouch. With them was a letter from Ayub to Abdulla Khan himself, reproaching him with slow progress towards Kandahar, and ordering him to push on. The letters to the Zamindawaris directed them to join Abdulla Khan and advance on Kandahar; Ayub promising to follow them himself with his whole army.

On the 10th, hearing a number of persons had assembled in the house of Sayyid Muhammad Shah, son of the late Prime Minister, Nur Muhammad Khan, for treasonable purposes, Mir Hashim gave information to the authorities, who arrested and imprisoned Sayyid Muhammad Shah. The others were, Mir Alam Khan, late Kotwal, the son of the Mustaufi, Hajji Gul, Barakzai, Ghulam Muhai-ud-din Khan, Achakzai, and Taj Muhammad Khan, Popalzai. They are still at large. Their plan was to raise a tumult in the city as soon as Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan should leave, and seize it on behalf of Ayub.

A letter has arrived from the Amir to Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan that the son of Abdul Karim Khan, Kohistani, had written to Ayub a letter, which was intercepted. The Amir summoned the Kohistani Chiefs to his presence, and asked them why, having accepted him a ruler, they turned against him. They denied any wish or intention to do so, and declared that, if any one of them should be found to be a traitor, he ought to be punished. The Amir then showed them the letter of the son of Abdul Karim Khan, on which they set on the latter, and killed him.

The following news has arrived from Taiwara:—Anbia Khan had sent a message to Sirdar Abdul Wahab Khan to leave his country, or take the consequences. The Sirdar with 400 infantry, 60 horse, left the fort of Taiwara, moved towards Kalat-i-Nakshi, where Anbia Khan was, and attacked him. About 80 men were killed on both sides. The Sirdar was defeated and retreated to Taiwara, where he is now besieged by Anbia Khan.

A postscript adds that the writer has just heard that, before the fight at Girishk, Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan, with his servants and baggage, and 100 horse, left for Naozad, in which direction the defeated Heratis fled, pursued for eight miles by the Amir's cavalry, which had only four wounded. The Amir writes that he is sending at once from Mushaki two regiments of infantry, two of cavalry, and six guns. The Amir himself was to leave Kabul on the 11th. A standard and a pair of kettle-drums were taken in the fight at Girishk. The corpse of Abdulla Khan and the prisoners are expected in Kandahar in a couple of days. The prisoners are said to declare that there was no force from Herat following them. A report is current that Ayub Khan has put to death Muhammad Umar Khan, Nurzai, on account of his son having come in to Kandahar.

June 21st.—Acknowledgments of the above were written to Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan and Mir Hashim; and the latter was told to inform the authorities that no restriction was placed on Sirdar Muhammad Alam Khan's movements but that Colonel St. John had strongly advised him to go to Kandahar.

(Signed) O. ST. JOHN, Lieut.-Colonel,
Agent, Governor-General, Biluchistan.

No. 25.

No. 107 of 1881.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's
Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, July 15, 1881.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of a letter, No. 268, dated the 30th June 1881, from the Officiating Agent to the Governor-General in Biluchistan, submitting a *précis* of news received from Kandahar.

We have, &c.

(Signed)

RIPON.

D. M. STEWART.

W. STOKES.

RIVERS THOMPSON.

J. GIBBS.

E. BARING.

T. F. WILSON.

Enclosure in No. 25.

No. 268, dated Quetta, June 30, 1881.

From Lieutenant-Colonel ST. JOHN, R.E., Resident, Southern Afghanistan, and Agent, Governor-General, Biluchistan, to Sir ALFRED LYALL, K.C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith *précis* of Kandahar news received up to the 29th instant.

Kandahar News.

June 22nd.—Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan writes on the 16th, acknowledging receipt of my letter about Azad Khan of Kharan, and encloses a letter to that chief. States that, as directed by me, he has drawn a bill on the Quetta treasury for Rupees 50,000, as subsidy for June. The body of Sirdar Abdulla Khan, son of Sultan Ahmad Khan, has been brought into Kandahar and buried. The prisoners taken in the battle are expected in Kandahar immediately, and will be sent on to Kabul. Shams-ud-din had given orders for troops to be sent on to Naozad to drive out Muhammad Hashim in case of his having halted there, but news of their having marched has not reached him. In a former letter, Shams-ud-din Khan says he told me that General Ghulam Haidar Khan and himself were about to start for Girishk, in anticipation of Ayub Khan's advance in person. He does not now consider it necessary to do so, but will wait till the reinforcements arrive from Kabul.

Received letters from Kandahar agent, dated 14th June. He writes that the coffin of Sirdar Abdulla Khan has been brought to the city without any mark of respect. It was carried through the bazaar, and stopped in several places, so that the people might have the opportunity of recognising the body. It is now known for certain that Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan was not present in the fight. Indeed, he tried to prevent Abdulla Khan from fighting, but finding the latter determined to do so, gave him all his horsemen, except 50 or 60, with whom he went to Naozad. It is reported that Sirdar Muhammad Hasan Khan has died of his wound. One regiment of cavalry, one of infantry, and two guns, have marched to Naozad, and will go on to Siah Pushteh. The report of Herati troops having arrived in Washir is false.

The Amir has written to Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan not to leave Kandahar till he knows for certain that Ayub Khan has left Herat. Whilst agent was writing the letter, the prisoners taken at Girishk reached the city. There are fifty-two of them. Others who were Barakzais were kept at Girishk by Kazi Saad-ud-din Khan. The prisoners state that only 500 sowars from Herat and 400 from Farrah were with Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan. The people of Naozad plundered the baggage of Hashim Khan when he was retreating through their country. He himself fled with a few sowars in the direction of Siahband. This was before the arrival of the Amir's troops at Naozad.

A second letter written by Mir Hashim, dated the 16th and received with the last, states that Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan complains that Shams-ud-din Khan conceals from him the news sent from Quetta, and adds that he does not let him (Mir Hashim) know the true state of affairs in Kandahar. Sirdar Muhammad Husain Khan is not properly treated by Shams-ud-din Khan, who is seizing his and other people's bullocks, without payment, for the artillery. Muhammad Husain Khan says that he thinks of asking Colonel St. John's permission to go to Mecca.

A correspondent writes to me from Kandahar that nothing certain is known of the real state of affairs in Herat, but that he expects accurate intelligence to reach him about the 3rd of next month, which he will not fail to communicate. The Amir's officers at Kandahar are not acting on any fixed plan. Orders and counter orders are always being issued, and they are doing their best to spoil their own business.

June 24th.—A person, formerly in our employ at Kandahar, writes to Mirza Yakub Ali Khan that Sirdar Muhammad Hashim's private Mulla has arrived in Kandahar. His alleged object is to obtain possession of the corpse of Sirdar Abdulla Khan, and take it to Herat or to bury it in Ahmad Shah's tomb. His real business is to obtain terms for Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan, who, since his defeat, is turning his eyes towards the Amir. "Inshallah," he will now join him. If he does, Ayub's cause will be ruined in Herat. All the Pusht-i-Rud people who had joined Hashim have either come into Kandahar, or gone to Kazi Saad-ud-din Khan at Girishk, or are on their way. Those chiefs who had joined the Amir's party are now quite confirmed in their allegiance. The Amir's army had advanced to Naozad. Muhammad Hashim Khan and Muhammad Hasan Khan crossed the Khash after the defeat with three or four hundred sowars.

In the evening a second post from Kandahar arrived with letters from Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan, governor of Kandahar, and from the agent. The former contains nothing but compliments and a request that I will write to him occasionally. Mir Hashim writes that Shams-ud-din Khan wishes to send the Farrah and Herat prisoners to Kabul, that they may be seen by the people; but Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan and the General advise that they should be given presents and allowed to return to their homes. The matter has not yet been settled. The Amir has written to the General and Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan to take the troops now on the way from Kabul to Kandahar with them to Girishk immediately on arrival, sending on the force now there to Washir. It is not true that Sirdar Muhammad Hasan Khan was killed or wounded. He fled with two or three sowars to Siabband. A caravan from Herat reports having met Hashim Khan making his way to Farrah, with thirty sowars. The prisoners state that they lost 170 killed, and three hundred horses fell into the hands of the Amir's troops. There are fifty-four prisoners, thirty of whom are Farrah men, the remainder Heratis. A Tokhi horseman, in the service of Sirdar Muhammad Hasan Khan, deserted and came to Girishk. He states that Hashim Khan had no idea of fighting, but had proposed to Hasan Khan and Abdulla Khan to take the sowars with them and go to Kabul by the Dahlah road avoiding Kandahar, and place their services at the Amir's disposal. Twelve camel loads of cannon shot have arrived from Kabul. Four men were killed on the Amir's side in the late action.

Mir Hashim gives the following news brought by his messenger from Herat. Sartip Nur Muhammad Khan, with two regiments of infantry and six guns, has reached Sabzwar. Three Kandahari regiments, two troops of cavalry, and thirteen guns are in camp at Pul-i-Malan, ready to accompany Sirdar Muhammad Ayub Khan, who, however, had not then left the city. Sirdar Mir Afzul Khan had refused Ayub's first summons to Herat. He has now sent a second messenger, and it is reported that Mir Afzul has consented to come. Ayub Khan was publicly announcing his intention of advancing on Kandahar at once, but really intends to wait and see the success of the expedition under Hashim Khan, whether he is joined by the Kandaharis or not. The news of the defeat had not reached Herat when informant left. He was fifteen days on the road.

(Signed) O. B. ST. JOHN, Lieut.-Col.,
Agent, Governor-General, Biluchistan.

Remarks.

THE defeat and dispersal of the force under the three Sirdars seems to have been complete. The failure of this advanced expedition appears to have been mainly due to the small support given it by the Zamindawar and trans-Helmand Duranis. Had Ayub come himself or sent a force of regular troops with guns under one of the Kandahari

Sirdars, the case might have been different; but a thousand Herati irregulars under three Kabuli Sirdars, strangers to the people, could hardly be expected to form a sufficient nucleus for a general rising against the Amir's regulars and artillery. It appears certain that Hashim Khan was averse to fighting, as he is not wanting in personal courage; but I am inclined to doubt the fact of his having proposed to the others to desert Ayub and go to Kabul, or to be thinking of making terms for himself.

It is difficult to say what will be Ayub's next move; but I am inclined to believe that he will not attempt to leave Herat.

(Signed) O. B. ST. JOHN, Lieut.-Col.,
Agent, Governor-General, Biluchistan.

No. 26.

No. 109 of 1881.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's
Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, July 22, 1881.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of a letter, No. 277, dated the 6th July 1881, from the Officiating Agent to the Governor-General in Biluchistan, submitting a *précis* of news received from Kandahar.

We have, &c.
(Signed) RIPON.
D. M. STEWART.
W. STOKES.
RIVERS THOMPSON.
J. GIBBS.
E. BARING.
T. F. WILSON.

Enclosure in No. 26.

No. 277, dated Quetta, July 6, 1881.

From Lieut.-Colonel ST. JOHN, R.E., Resident, Southern Afghanistan, and Agent, Governor-General, Biluchistan, to Sir ALFRED LYALL, K.C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I HAVE the honour to forward, herewith, *précis* of Kandahar news received up to the 6th of July 1881.

Kandahar News.

1st July.—Kandahar regular post arrived with letter from Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan, dated 27th June. He writes that the people of Washir, Fulad, Naozad, Siah Pushteh, and Dusang, who had joined Hashim Khan, have come into Kandahar to ask pardon for their offences. They have been forgiven, and after receiving khilluts, have been dismissed to their homes.

Private letters state that the families of Sirdar Mir Afzul Khan and Sirdar Ghulam Muhai-ed-din Khan have been sent from Herat to Farrah by Ayub Khan. Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan is in Bakwa collecting revenue.

4th July.—Letters arrived from Kandahar Agent, dated 30th of June. A letter had arrived that day in Kandahar from the Amir addressed to Sirdars Muhammad Hashim Khan and Shams-ud-din Khan, Kazi Saad-ud-din Khan and Sahibzada Ghulam Haidar Khan, exhorting them to work in unison, and not to quarrel among themselves. If the Amir writes, one of them should do a piece of notable service without the knowledge or against the wish of the other three, he would be displeased, but no misfortune accruing from the joint act of the four would be considered worthy of censure. The previous day a violent quarrel had taken place between Muhammad Hashim Khan and Shams-ud-din Khan on the subject of unauthorised payments made by the latter, and khilluts given

without Muhammad Hashim's knowledge. Four minor officials send private information regularly to the Amir, and in Mir Hashim's belief he is much misled by them as to the true state of affairs. The following news has arrived from Naozad. The leadership of the Kandahari sowars and khasadars has been entrusted to Kazi Saad-ud-din Khan, but the money and presents in his charge are only given out under the seal of Sirdar Gul Muhammad Khan, who has control over the Pusht-i-Rud and Helmand districts, including the command of the levies from them. The regular troops are under the command of their own officers, but in case of a fight the chief command is to be vested in Gul Muhammad Khan. Kazi Saad-ud-din Khan has been very insubordinate to Gul Muhammad Khan, and in consequence the latter was very angry and threatened to return to his country house east of the Helmand, but was dissuaded by the officers of the army. General Ghulam Haidar Khan has been ordered to the front to take supreme command in both military and civil matters. Three of the Amir's sowars are said to have been murdered by the people of Naozad. The murderers have not discovered. Kazi Saad-ud-din Khan has sent a messenger to Kandahar complaining of the conduct of Sirdar Gul Muhammad Khan. Sultan Muhammad Khan has been sent for by the Amir, and has started for Kabul. The son of Sirdar Muhammad Alum Khan is also going to Kabul. A regiment is expected to arrive at Kandahar from Kabul on the 2nd July. Letters have been intercepted from Ayub's mother to him pointing out that he is not now able to contend successfully with Abdurrahman, and begging him to keep quiet for the present until she has made arrangements for a rising in his favour at Kabul. These letters were sent to the Amir at Kabul, and Ayub's mother has in consequence been placed under strict supervision. Sayyid Muhammad Shah has been released from confinement the Sahibzada of Zakird having stood security for him. Orders have arrived from the Amir concerning the persons alleged to have been implicated with Sayyid Muhammad Shah. He orders the Mustaufi to be degraded to the second place in the account department. The others are to be allowed to go free for the present. Shams-ud-din Khan declares that the reinforcements left Kelat for Kandahar some time ago, but there is no appearance of them.

The following letter has been received in Kandahar from the Amir written after receiving news of Muhammad Hasan's defeat. He orders the troops to be pushed on into the Farrah borders, and directs that arms, horses, and tents be given to the Char

* Ismail Khan, brother of Anbia Khan, and Abdulla Khan, Taimuri.

Aimak Chiefs* in Kandahar, and that they be sent with 500 Kandahari sowars to the assistance of Anbia Khan to combine with him in a raid on the Herat valley. Money and khilluts are also to be sent with them for the Herat chiefs. He notifies the despatch of a regiment armed with breech-loaders from Ghazni for Kandahar and states that another regiment of infantry, one of cavalry, and six guns will leave Kabul as soon as carriage is ready. He gives information of a message from the Char Aimaks and other tribes of Herat begging him to expel Ayub from the country. The governor of Tashkurgan, Kudus Khan, has been accordingly directed to take a lakh of rupees and five hundred sowars and proceed to the Char Aimak country. The Hazaras of Dehzingi, &c., have been into Kabul and received presents. They promised to collect 5,000 men and attack Herat. Thus Herat will be attacked on four directions, and the officers in Kandahar are exhorted to push on without delay.

6th July.—Merchants from Kandahar state that, though the alarm prevalent before the defeat of the Heratis is much diminished, the fact of the Amir's troops having gone on to Naozad leads people to believe that a collision between the main armies is imminent, and that trade is consequently at a stand-still.

(Signed) O. B. ST. JOHN, Lieut.-Col.,
Agent to Governor-General, Biluchistan.

Remarks.

Private letters from Kandahar give information that the son of Sirdar Muhammad Alum Khan has been sent for by the Amir.

Note.—The jealousy and ill-feeling between the Amir's officials is apparently on the increase and is most unfortunate. Nothing else was, however, to be expected from the arrangements the Amir chose to make for the administration of Kandahar. To entrust the government to a committee of four persons, the chief of whom is a mere lad, was to invite dissension and disaster. General Ghulam Haidar Khan has now gone to the front with supreme authority, and this is, no doubt, a step in the right direction. But it remains to be seen whether he is able to control Sirdar Gul Muhammad Khan and Kazi

Saad-ud-din Khan. If these two take umbrage and leave him, they will be followed by all the trans-Helmand Duranis with whom they have great influence. It is to be hoped, however, that their common hatred to Ayub, which is undoubted, may keep them loyal to the Amir for the present.

I do not exactly know the strength of the Amir's force beyond the Helmand, but believe it to consist of 2,500 to 3,000 regular infantry, 1,000 regular cavalry, with 1,000 Kabuli khasadars, and about 2,000 Durani horse, whose fidelity of course is doubtful. Ayub's four regiments are certainly not more than 400 strong, and his cavalry, including that defeated under Hasan Khan, would not exceed 2,000. The quality and armament of his troops are also probably inferior.

6th July 1881.

(Signed) O. B. ST. JOHN, Lieut.-Col.,
Agent to Governor-General, Biluchistan.

No. 27.

No. 111 of 1881.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

Secret.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's
Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, July 29, 1881.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of telegrams relating to affairs in Afghanistan.

We have, &c.

(Signed) RIPON.
D. M. STEWART.
W. STOKES.
RIVERS THOMPSON.
J. GIBBS.
E. BARING.
T. F. WILSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 27.

TELEGRAM, dated July 21, 1881.

From Colonel ST. JOHN, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

Post from Kandahar arrived last night with news, heads of which are telegraphed from Chaman:—On 19th Ayub had reached Seh-ub or Siabb, thirty-three miles west of Khashrud. General Ghulam Haidar had left Kandahar. Agent writes that there are five regiments at Kalah-i-Gaz. Another informant says four only. There is one regiment in Kandahar and vicinity. Shams-ud-din declares reinforcements have left Kabul, and will arrive about 21st; but impression prevails that they are further off and less numerous than he asserts. Nothing is written about Gul Muhammad Khan; but it is stated that Sahib Khan alone among Alizai Chiefs is with Amir's army.

Enclosure 2 in No. 27.

TELEGRAM, dated July 21, 1881.

From Colonel ST. JOHN, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

SIRDAR Muhammad Hasan Khan writes that Amir's officers are in much anxiety, and that Ayub is increasing (*sic.*).

It appears to me that much depends on strength and timely arrival of reinforcements said to be on the road from Kabul. If they are few and cannot be brought to Girishk in time, I am inclined (?) to believe that Ghulam Haidar Khan will not risk a battle, but will fall back on Kandahar.

Enclosure 3 in No. 27.

TELEGRAM, dated July 21, 1881.

From Colonel ST. JOHN, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

SHAMS-UD-DIN writes late on Sunday night that Ayub Khan having arrived in Naozad has sent inviting Kazi Saad-ud-din to meet Hashim Khan half-way between two camps, and settle terms of peace between him and Amir. Shams-ud-din considers this only an artifice to gain time, and has therefore requested Ghulam Haidar to attack Ayub at once after answering that he cannot treat with Ayub except in Herat.

Enclosure 4 in No. 27.

TELEGRAM, dated July 22, 1881.

From AGENT, GOVERNOR-GENERAL, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

No news from Kandahar to-day, but from another source I hear that Sartip was at Farrah with Ayub, and not, as often reported from Kandahar, in advance with a separate force. If Ayub was really in Naozad when message was sent in his name he must have preceded his troops, who could hardly have marched 300 miles from Herat in twenty days. Proposition to treat was probably made to gain time for guns and regulars to come up, and to induce Duranis to join him.

Enclosure 5 in No. 27.

TELEGRAM, dated July 24, 1881.

From AGENT, GOVERNOR-GENERAL, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

KANDAHAR Agent, writing on 20th, reports all well there. No fighting had yet taken place beyond Helmand. Shams-ud-din Khan asserts that Ayub has written regarding terms of peace, and that he has replied that peace cannot be made unless Ayub retires one march. Nothing fresh from Tirin.

Enclosure 6 in No. 27.

TELEGRAM, dated July 25, 1881.

From Colonel ST. JOHN, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

FOLLOWING summary of intelligence, dated Kandahar, 22nd, telegraphed from Chaman:—

Ayub Khan, having arrived with his army at Khawaja Ahmad-i-Naogan, is negotiating for peace through Sirdar Ghulam Muhai-ed-din Khan.

Amir's force on Helmand numbers three Kabuli regiments, one raised at Kelat, and one at Kandahar, one thousand three hundred khasadars, two cavalry regiments, eighteen guns, and two thousand irregular horse. One Kabuli regiment is in the city with eight guns. Three regiments of infantry, one cavalry, eight guns, and eight companies of khasadars are on the way from Kabul: one regiment is said to be either at Khel-i-Akhund, or Jaldak, between Kandahar and Kelat, and the remainder at Mukur.

Habibulla Khan, Muhammadzai, has fled from city to Tirin, spreading false reports of defeat of Amir's army. Ghulam Muhai-ed-din is the only surviving son of Kohndil Khan, and has been at Meshed with Mir Afzul for last year and a half. Habibulla Khan is a nephew of Sartip Nur Muhammad, and a notorious intriguer. He has much influence in Tirin.

Khawaja Ahmad-i-Naogan is two marches north of Girishk.

Enclosure 7 in No. 27.

TELEGRAM, dated July 26, 1881.

From Colonel ST. JOHN, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

SIRDAR Shams-ud-din Khan writes from Kandahar, on 22nd, that Sirdar Ghulam Muhai-ed-din Khan has written to Sirdar Gul Muhammad Khan that, hearing British Government had made over Kandahar to Amir, he was on his way there when he met Ayub and was forced to accompany him. He deplores approaching conflict as contrary to the interests of the family, and asks Shams-ud-din to aid him in bringing about peaceful settlement.

Letter was sent to Shams-ud-din, who answered on the 21st that he could not open negotiations as long as Ayub and his army remained on Kandahar,* but would
* *Sic.* do so if he retired to Khash. If he remained where he was, he would be attacked.

Ayub's army is reported to be very weak and ill-provided. It is so deficient in transport that each sowar is made to carry two cannon shots.

Shams-ud-din, in answer to a question in my letter, gives Amir's army on Helmand at three thousand regular and one thousand two hundred irregular infantry, one thousand regular cavalry, and eighteen guns, with 1,200 Durani horse.

Other letters, though not explicit, give the impression that the Amir's people are wasting valuable time.

It does not appear that any Durani chiefs or any number of people have yet joined Ayub, but his partizans are actively and openly at work in the districts stirring up the Duranis to join him.

Nothing certain seemed known of reinforcements from Kabul. Shams-ud-din says that he is afraid to leave the city till they arrive, though very anxious to go to Pusht-i-Rud.

There is a rumour that Ayub has returned to Herat in consequence of sickness, or an attack on city by Khan Agha's son.

Enclosure 8 in No. 27.

TELEGRAM, dated July 27, 1881.

From Colonel ST. JOHN, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

KANDAHAR Agent, writing 24th, says that General Ghulam Haidar has sent information that Ayub's army marched on evening of 20th from Karez-i-Safed towards Girishk. On hearing news he followed, but has not come up with it. Ayub is believed to have crossed river below Girishk, and to be marching by Balakhana and Band-i-Taimur. His people are reported to give out that they have no wish to fight the Amir, but only the English. He probably hopes to take Kandahar, which is very slenderly garrisoned, by a *coup de main*, assisted by rising of inhabitants.

I have sent camp to Khojak, and intend riding direct there on Friday.

Enclosure 9 in No. 27.

TELEGRAM, dated July 28, 1881.

From AGENT, GOVERNOR-GENERAL, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

FOLLOWING just received from Chaman:—Kandahar Agent just arrived says action was fought yesterday morning at Karez-i-Atta. Amir's forces totally defeated, eighteen guns taken, all baggage, and five lakhs rupees. The Kelat regiment and Kandahar sowars went over to Ayub.

Ghulam Haidar has fled towards Kabul with 80 sowars. Sirdar Shams-ud-din is still in Kandahar with 400 men of Kabuli regiment and 400 police. *Ends.*

I leave for Chaman to-morrow.

Enclosure 10 in No. 27.

TELEGRAM, dated July 28, 1881.

From AGENT, GOVERNOR-GENERAL, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

SIRDARS Muhammad Hasan and Shirindil have arrived at Chaman, having ridden straight from scene of action, which began at 8 a.m. and lasted till 11. Kabuli regiments fought at first, but after action Khanabad regiment went over in a body to Ayub. The other three dispersed and fled. They heard firing in Kandahar direction last night, and again this morning. General Ghulam Haidar went first to city before starting for Kabul. They estimate loss at 300 to 400 on both sides. I believe the Khanabad regiment to be a Turkistan corps.

Enclosure 11 in No. 27.

TELEGRAM, dated July 28, 1881.

FROM AGENT, GOVERNOR-GENERAL, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

FOLLOWING just received from Lieutenant Austin, Chaman :—*Begins.*

Chaman, 28th July.—Details as far as can be gathered as follows: Ayub's force took up a position on rising ground at Karez-i-Atta facing north, guns in front and cavalry on left of position. Amir's force facing south, drawn up in column with guns in front, cavalry on right; baggage, treasure, &c., to right rear of infantry. Ayub sent his cavalry round right flank of Amir's force to attack the baggage. Amir moved his cavalry to his left, faced them about, and engaged Ayub's cavalry, who had got completely round the right flank and were to the right rear of baggage. In meantime Ayub's infantry had come into the plain in line, and his right was attacked and driven back by two of the Amir's regiments; but being reinforced he in his turn drove back these two regiments on to guns. The other two regiments in reserve do not appear to have been engaged; and the repulse ended in a general flight. *Ends.*

No. 28.

No. 113 of 1881.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

TO the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's
Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, July 29, 1881.

WE have the honour to forward for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of a letter from the Amir of Kabul, dated the 7th July 1881, enclosing one from the Officiating Governor-General of Russian Turkistan, regarding the safe arrival at Kabul of His Highness's family.

We have, &c.
(Signed) RIPON.
D. M. STEWART.
W. STOKES.
RIVERS THOMPSON.
J. GIBBS.
E. BARING.
T. F. WILSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 28.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from the AMIR of KABUL to the ADDRESS of the SECRETARY,
dated July 7, 1881.

After compliments.—I have just received and perused a friendly and complimentary letter from Lieutenant Kolpakofsky, who is officiating as Governor-General of Turkistan. I send you the original letter for the perusal of the representatives of the illustrious British Government, keeping a copy of it with myself.

Let it not remain concealed that, in my opinion, it is useless and unnecessary to send a reply to the letter, nor will one be sent, unless you deem it fit and expedient to do so, in which case a complimentary letter in reply will be drafted and transmitted.

Enclosure 2 in No. 28.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from the OFFICIATING GOVERNOR-GENERAL of RUSSIAN
TURKISTAN to the AMIR of KABUL, dated Tashkand, May 30, 1881 Russian,
corresponding to the 16th Rajab 1298 H. (June 14, 1881).

After compliments.—Be it known to your Highness that the letter you addressed to the Adjutant-General Von Kaufmann, the Governor-General of Turkistan, on the

13th Jamadi-ul-Awal (13th April 1881) expressing your Highness' satisfaction and pleasure at the (safe) arrival of your wives and children, reached me at a most auspicious moment. Whereas the Governor-General (Kaufmann) had gone to sleep (had been confined to his bed) on account of a serious illness, I opened your Highness's letter and read it. Having informed your Highness of the above-mentioned event, I beg to express my sincere devotion to your Highness and my constant desire that the Most High God may prosper both your Highness and your Highness' illustrious Government. I have no other wish but that the relations of friendship and amity (between us) may continue to increase.

The Officiating Governor-General put his signature, and affixed the Government seal on the original letter.

No. 29.

No. 114 of 1881.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, July 29, 1881.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of a letter No. 279, dated the 11th July 1881, from the Officiating Agent to the Governor-General for Biluchistan, submitting a *précis* of news received from Kandahar.

We have, &c.

(Signed) RIPON.
D. M. STEWART.
W. STOKES.
RIVERS THOMPSON.
J. GIBBS.
E. BARING.
T. F. WILSON.

Enclosure in No. 29.

No. 279, dated Quetta, July 11, 1881.

From Lieut.-Col. ST. JOHN, Offg. Agent to the Governor-General for Biluchistan, to Sir ALFRED LYALL, K.C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith *précis* of the Kandahar news received up to the 11th instant.

Kandahar News.

6th July.—Shams-ud-din Khan writes to me, dated 2nd, that he hears from his advanced posts beyond the Helmand that there are no signs of movement from the Herat direction. Ayub Khan had pitched his tents at Pal-i-Malan with the intention of moving towards the Helmand, but now after the defeat of Muhammad Hasan, and the death of Abdulla Khan, it is impossible to say what he will do. The people of Dehrawud, Baghran, Siah Pushteh, Naozad, Washir, and Dusang, who had not before come to Kandahar, have now done so. Khilluts have been given them, and they have been dismissed to their homes. Shams-ud-din Khan asks for the subsidy of 50,000 rupees for July.

A private letter of same date gives information that a regiment of infantry, 600 strong, with 200 khasadars, arrived in the city of Kandahar from Ghazni on the 1st. General Ghulam Haidar Khan was expected to arrive in Kandahar from the Helmand. He went to inspect the troops. The Amir's letter appointing him to the government of Pusht-i-Rud arrived after he left Kandahar; when he sees it he will doubtless return at once. A Barakzai traveller from Pusht-i-Rud says that Muhammad Hashim Khan is in Bakwa, and his cavalry in Khash. Two infantry and one cavalry regiment from Herat had reached Farrah. General Taj Muhammad Khan (a Ghilzai who was with

Ayub last summer) has been in 'Tirin, trying to collect a party to raise disturbances. While there he heard of the defeat of Muhammad Hasan Khan and the death of Abdulla Khan, and immediately started for Herat with a few followers. But he could not make his way through the Siahband country, and returned to Tirin. He is at Chimerak. Shah Aghassi Salu and other Popalzais and Ghilzais have joined him. Shams-ud-din Khan is thinking of sending some troops to Tirin to disperse them, but nothing has been yet done.

9th July.—Mir Hashim writes from Kandahar on the 3rd that a firman had arrived giving Ghulam Haidar Khan the rank of Sipah Salar, and ordering a medal to be struck in Kandahar for the officers of the troops engaged at Karez-i-Safed. General Ghulam Haidar Khan, who arrived in Kandahar on the 2nd, has recalled the troops sent on to Naozad, and encamped them at Kalah-i-Gaz. He says that the troops are full of confidence, and declare that they are ready to go on to Herat without reinforcements. He is much pleased with the troops and with the Alizais. As regards the quarrel between Sirdar Gul Muhammad Khan and Kazi Saad-ud-din, the General considers that both are in fault, but believes that he has reconciled them.

Yahya Khan, Akhundzada, writes from 'Tirin that several persons who had taken letters from Herat to Kabul, were now on their way back with answers, but they were in a place where he could not get at them. Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan has sent sowars to seize these persons and bring them to Kandahar. Sirdar Muhammad Hashim wishing to inspect the regiment lately arrived, asked the Colonel to parade it. He did so, when the Sipah Salar coming on the ground, ordered it to be dismissed. Shortly afterwards Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan appeared and ordered the regiment to be paraded again. The colonel refused to do so. This has caused a bad feeling between the civil and military officers. The kotwal of the city having taken offence at some of his people having been punished by Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan, withdrew all the police from the streets. On hearing this Shams-ud-din Khan sent for the kotwal and soothed his wrath. The police were then sent back to their posts. Two stacks of wheat belonging to Farsiwans in the neighbourhood of the city have been burnt. Yahya, Akhundzada, has written to Shams-ud-din Khan from Tirin that General Taj Muhammad Khan, son of Arsala Khan, Ghilzai, has arrived there and gone on to Herat. He, Yahya, was unable to stop him. Sirdar Muhammad Hasan Khan, son of Khushdil Khan, has been appointed muster master of the tribal sowars and to the charge of local affairs. Letters from the Amir have arrived conferring supreme authority in civil matters in Kandahar on Shams-ud-din Khan, and military authority on Ghulam Haidar Khan. Inaiyat-ulla Khan,* Sadozai, has been ordered to Kabul.

* *Note.*—This is the man who probably prompted Hashim Khan to assert his authority, and quarrel with Shams-ud-din.

Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan, if he has not already been formally deprived of the government, will be so shortly. Part of

Ayub's army is said to have arrived at Farrah under command of Sartip Nur Muhammad Khan. Sirdars Muhammad Hashim and Muhammad Hasan are said to be at Bakwa, and Ayub to have left Herat. These are bazaar reports. The return of the Amir's troops to Kalah-i-Gaz has caused much excitement and alarm in the city. It is very unlikely that Shams-ud-din Khan and Muhammad Hasan Khan will get on together.

(Signed) O. B. ST. JOHN, Lieut.-Col.,
Offg. Agent to the Govr.-Genl. for Biluchistan.

Note.

It is not easy to understand Ghulam Haidar's motive for bringing back the troops to the Helmand, except it was to vindicate his authority, the advance having been ordered by his civil colleagues. He had not, however, then received the Amir's order to go on to the Farrah border. Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan was evidently intriguing to get rid of Shams-ud-din Khan, and the latter in consequence appears to have made representation to the Amir, which has ended in all power except over the troops being entrusted to him, thus putting an end to the absurd committee of four in which the administration has hitherto been vested. An insurrection seems likely to take place in Tirin, where Taj Muhammad Khan, one of Ayub's generals, who after the 1st September fled to Kabul, is collecting a gathering.

(Signed) O. B. ST. JOHN, Lieut.-Col.,
Offg. Agent to the Govr.-Genl. for Biluchistan.

Quetta, July 11, 1881.

No. 30.

No. 115 of 1881.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's
Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, July 29, 1881.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of a communication from the Commissioner of Peshawur, No. 199, of the 15th July 1881, enclosing the translation of a statement made by a messenger sent from India regarding the aspect of affairs at Kabul.

We have, &c.
(Signed)

RIPON.
D. M. STEWART.
W. STOKES.
RIVERS THOMPSON.
J. GIBBS.
E. BARING.
T. F. WILSON.

Enclosure in No. 30.

No. 199 (Camp), dated July 15, 1881.

From J. G. CORDERY, Esq., Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur Division, to
SIR ALFRED LYALL, K.C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign
Department.

HAS the honour to forward the translation of a statement made by a trustworthy messenger regarding affairs at Kabul.

STATEMENT of a MESSENGER sent from PESHAWUR on the 12th June, reached KABUL on the 21st, and having left KABUL on the 4th of July returned to PESHAWUR on the 12th July 1881. (Extract.)

I REACHED Kabul on the 21st June, and on the 26th June His Highness the Amir called a whole regiment before him and asked them to swear loyalty to him, and to bind themselves by an oath to fight against his enemies, otherwise, he said, if they were inclined to join his enemies, they might depart, provided that they left their arms behind them. They all took the oaths required of them. The Amir called up the other two regiments on the second and third day respectively, and exacted similar promises from them. Each regiment, as it was dismissed, received three months' pay, an extra month's wages being given as a present, and left at once for Kandahar. Some 400 horsemen have also lately started in the same direction, armed with the carbines lately sent from Peshawur.

At present there are 1,000 horsemen, three regiments, and seven guns in Kabul; recruiting goes on daily.

The dâk which arrived in Kabul on July 1st had been robbed somewhere between Kabul and Kandahar.

Five days before my arrival a kafila of merchants was robbed in the neighbourhood of Mukr.

A large quantity of copper has been received from India for the gun manufactory.

All transport animals are most expensive in Kabul. A pony was sold in Peshawur for 45 rupees, though in Kabul the owner had a short time before refused 150 rupees.

Though all are afraid to speak openly in Kabul, yet the strength of Ayub Khan is much discussed, and the general impression is that the Amir's troops were defeated in both the two recent engagements.

People also say that Ayub intends to march for Ghazni through Hazara.

A man named Sultan, who came to Kabul from Kurrachee, was arrested on the suspicion that he was a servant of Sirdar Sher Ali Khan, governor of Kandahar. He was confined for three days, and then released.

The Amir holds a public Durbar up to 10 o'clock, when he often distributes presents to the chiefs of the neighbouring districts. After this hour he receives people privately.

A man was brought before the Amir on the charge of having insulted the Mahomedan religion. The Amir made him over to the Kazis, who sentenced him to death by stoning; the Amir, however, released him after fining him 3,000 rupees. On this the Kazis said that the Amir had rendered himself liable to be stoned to death, and soon after the man was again arrested and imprisoned.

While I was in Kabul a convoy arrived from Turkistan under a guard of Jezailchis. The road is threatened by the relations of Muhammad Afzal Khan.

The dâk is despatched twice from Kabul; no stamps are sold to the public; every letter is delivered into the hands of the postmaster with five Kabuli pices. All letters are examined by the Kotwal, and no one is permitted to receive or to send any letter, except through the dâk.

The dâk is examined at four different places; first at Butkhak, then at Kotal Lattaband, next at Gandamak, and lastly at Jellalabad.

(Signed) G. C. WALKER,
For Commissioner and Superintendent,
Peshawur Division.

Peshawur, 15th July 1881.

No. 31.

No. 116 of 1881.

Government of India.—Foreign Department—Secret.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's
Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, July 29, 1881.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copies of letters, Nos. 286 and 287 of the 16th and 19th July 1881, from the Officiating Agent to the Governor-General in Biluchistan, submitting *précis* of Kandahar news.

We have, &c.
(Signed) RIPON.
D. M. STEWART.
W. STOKES.
RIVERS THOMPSON.
J. GIBBS.
E. BARING.
T. F. WILSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 31.

No. 286, dated Quetta, July 16, 1881.

From Colonel O. ST. JOHN, Officiating Agent to the Governor-General for Biluchistan,
to SIR ALFRED LYALL, K.C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign
Department.

I HAVE the honour to forward, herewith, *précis* of the Kandahar news received up to date.

Kandahar News.

11th July.—Mir Hashim writes from Kandahar on the 7th that Shams-ud-din Khan informs him that he has heard that Sahibzada Udran, Sahibzada Umr Jan, and other Sayyids have stopped Ayub's army at Farrah and are on their way to Kabul with a copy of the Koran and the young Sirdar Musa Jan to make submission to the Amir. Mir Hashim himself hears that two regiments have arrived in Farrah from Herat, two more are in Sabzwar, and two at Pul-i-Malan with 13 guns. The sowars beaten at Karez-i-Safed are at Kalah-i-Saki beyond the Khash with an outpost of 100 men on the river. Sirdars Muhammad Hasan and Hashim are at Farrah. The Kotwal tells Mir Hashim

that negotiations which were in progress between Hashim and Shams-ud-din have come to nothing. Sirdar Muhammad Hasan Khan, reported in the last letter to have been placed in charge of local affairs, was not so placed in accordance with instructions from the Amir, but by Shams-ud-din Khan on his own responsibility. Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan had received a letter from the Amir telling him that all the business of the country was in Shams-ud-din's hands, and that he should not attempt to interfere with it, but that petitions and quarrels might still be referred to him. "From the first," the Amir says, "I exhorted you four persons to work in unison. If you cannot do this, at least refrain from meddling with each other's business." In another letter the Amir writes to Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan reminding him that he is his eldest son and of the same blood, and pointing out that this is no time for quarrelling, that he, Muhammad Hashim, is an inexperienced lad, and that Shams-ud-din Khan has on this account been placed with him to direct affairs; and that as it was necessary that Shams-ud-din's authority should be recognised by the people of Kandahar and Pusht-i-Rud, he was right to give them khilluts in his own name. The Amir goes on to exhort him not to be angry, for what is for the good of the State is his own good, but to remain quiet till the Amir's arrival in Kandahar, the present, with the enemy in front, being no time for disputes.

A thief caught breaking into a shop has had one hand cut off.

General Ghulam Haidar Khan is preparing to start for Girishk, taking the lately arrived regiment with him. The merchants with a caravan just arrived from Farrah declare the story of the Sahibzadas and Musa Jan to be a fabrication.

12th July.—Letter arrived from the Khan of Kelat, dated the 6th July, acknowledging receipt of my letter informing him of the defeat of Muhammad Hasan Khan and the death of Abdulla Khan. He expresses his pleasure at the news.

* * * * *

A third letter from the Khan, dated 7th July, informs me that he sent a spy to Kharan some time ago. This spy has returned, and reports that Muhammad Yakub Khan having escaped from India, has passed through Kolwah to the house of Baluch Khan, Naushirwani. The latter sent his brother with him to Azad Khan at Kharan, whence Azad Khan sent him escorted by a force under his son to Herat. The Khan regrets that he was not informed of Muhammad Yakub Khan's escape that he might have taken measures to seize him. He also points out that if he had been permitted to

attack Kharan as he wished, he would not only have punished Azad Khan, whose villany is patent to all, but also have seized the fugitive Sirdar.*

*Whether this story is a deliberate fabrication or not is difficult to say. Probably the spy heard or saw something of Taj Muhammad Khan, Seistani, or some Afghan Sirdar may have passed through Biluchistan from the coast to Kharan *en route* to Herat. The Khan's object is sufficiently clear. He wants leave to attack Kharan.

Letters arrived from Mir Hashim, dated last Friday, the 8th. He writes that General Taj Muhammad Khan, who has been trying to collect a gathering in Tirin, has been seized by the people with 16 others, and is being sent to the city.

A trustworthy merchant had just told Mir Hashim that Muhammad Ayub Khan with six regiments, 1,500 cavalry, and 13 guns was at Farrah. This news has caused great excitement in the city. Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan says that on the third day hence he will leave for Pusht-i-Rud. It is not yet known who will accompany him, and the Sipah Salar. There is much talk about the falling back of the Amir's troops from Naozad to Kalah-i-Gaz. The news of Ayub having himself left Herat has produced a great impression on the people, and the Duranis in and about the city are much excited. Kazi Saad-ud-din has written to Shams-ud-din Khan that Ayub has moved from Herat. Abdul Wahab Khan is said to be besieged in the fort of Taiwara by Anbia Khan. The regiment lately arrived has marched to Girishk.

Instructions sent to Mir Hashim to send a summary of intelligence to Lieutenant Austin at Chaman for translation and transmission by telegraph.

16th July.—Kandahar post arrived with letters from Sirdar Shams-ud-din Khan, dated 10th and 11th. In the first he acknowledges receipt of my letters informing him of Ayub's march. On the same day he heard of his arrival in Farrah. On the 7th July he sent a regiment of infantry with six guns to Pusht-i-Rud, and on the 10th a second also with six guns was going. The Sipah Salar Ghulam Haidar Khan would leave on the 11th. Three regiments of infantry and six troops of cavalry have been sent from Kabul. One regiment is in Kelat, the others between Ghazni and Kelat. They should arrive in a few days, and when they do, Shams-ud-din will take one regiment and the cavalry with him to Pusht-i-Rud, leaving the other two and the khasadars to garrison the city. He feels no apprehension at the approach of Ayub Khan. General Taj Muhammad Khan, Ghilzai, had fled from Kabul and come to Tirin. Yahia Khan,

Akhundzada, and Zainulabidin Khan, Muhammadzai, thereupon took him prisoner. They have been ordered to send him into Kandahar.

The second letter sent by a different hand to Chaman repeats the same news. The second regiment of infantry marched on the 10th as intended, but Ghulam Haidar has put off his departure for a few days. The letter ends with expressions of complete confidence in the ability of the Amir's forces to beat Ayub Khan.

A private letter states that it is now currently reported in the city that Ayub Khan is in Farrah with six regiments, each 400 strong, twelve guns, three troops of regular cavalry, and 1,500 irregular horse. Sirdars Muhammad Hashim Khan and Muhammad Hasan Khan, with Kazi Abd-es-salam were at Dilaram collecting supplies, and declare that Ayub will soon follow them. Kazi Abd-es-salam has been writing letters to the Pusht-i-Rud people, who have brought them to Shams-ud-din Khan. The opinion in Kandahar is that if Ayub reaches Pusht-i-Rud, the majority of the Chiefs will join him. The son of the late Majid Khan, Alizai, the only Alizai Chief of importance who joined Hashim Khan, has sent in to Shams-ud-din asking pardon.

(Signed) O. ST. JOHN, Col.,
Offg. Agent to the Govr.-Genl. for Biluchistan.

Note.

I cannot exactly make out what force of the Amir's troops is now on the Helmand. Six regiments were said to have left Kabul for Kandahar in March. Of these three were halted about Ghazni, and three reached Kandahar the day after we left. The three first were ordered on at once, but I believe only two arrived in Kandahar until the beginning of this month, when the sixth made its appearance. But this was said to be a regiment fresh from Kabul armed with breech-loaders, and may be in addition to the six first. Each is 600 strong, in reality, not on paper only, and the regular infantry thus numbers 3,600 to 4,200 men. All seemed to be on the Helmand. In addition there are 1,000 or 1,200 Ghilzai khasadars, good irregular troops, about 1,000 regular cavalry, some Ghilzai tribal horse, besides the Kandahar levies. Ghulam Haidar Khan brought six guns with him and appears to have equipped 12 more in Kandahar. Ayub Khan has, according to the Herat correspondent, only four regiments, but two others may possibly have been sent on before to Farrah. Each is 400 strong, and his infantry force is thus 1,600 to 2,400. He has nine guns only, 200 regular cavalry, and 2,000 to 2,500 irregulars. His force is thus decidedly inferior to the Amir's, and the disproportion may suffice to keep the Duranis loyal to the Amir or at least neutral. The seizure of General Taj Muhammad Khan by Yahia, Akhundzada, and Zainulabidin Khan (a nephew of the Sartip) is a good sign, both being among the least trustworthy of the Duranis. But it must not be forgotten that Taj Muhammad is a Ghilzai, and therefore an enemy of all Duranis.

The sentiment in favour of Ayub Khan throughout this part of the country is universal among Brahuis as well as Pathans, and confidence in his ultimate success as yet quite unshaken. Part of this may be due to the prestige of his father, and part to the antagonism of south against north; but I suspect that the greater part is due to the fact that he is looked on as the enemy, and the Amir as the creature of the British Government. This seems to me quite natural, any opponents of constituted authority being, in a state of society such as this, looked on as a popular champion, and is quite compatible with a sincere wish to remain under British rule. It is not therefore, I believe, likely to cause serious trouble even in case of Ayub's success, which would, however, occasion much excitement till the character of the future relations between him and the British Government became known.

(Signed) O. ST. JOHN, Colonel,
Offg. Agent to the Govr.-General for Biluchistan.

Enclosure 2 in No. 31.

No. 287, dated Quetta, July 19, 1881.

From Colonel ST. JOHN, Officiating Agent to the Governor-General for Biluchistan,
to Sir ALFRED LYALL, K.C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign
Department.

I HAVE the honour to forward, herewith, *précis* of Kandahar news received up to date.

Kandahar News.

16th July.—Wrote to Shams-ud-din Khan asking for a detail of the strength of the Amir's forces at Girishk, Kandahar, and on the road.

17th July.—Letters from Kandahar Agent, dated 10th and 13th, arrived. In the first he writes that a regiment of infantry with six guns had left for Girishk three days before, and a second regiment with four guns that day. The Sipah Salar states his intention of starting in two or three days. Shams-ud-din-Khan says that he is only waiting for the arrival from Kabul of seven companies of khasadars and six troops of cavalry, and will then join the army at Girishk. The approach of Ayub Khan is now generally known, and it is said that he has arrived at Farrah and his troops in Naozad. The son of Mir Alam Khan, Hotaki, has arrived in 18 days from Kabul, and says that he saw no sign of reinforcements on the road, and that the Amir is still at Kabul. There was, however, a small body at Deh Bori (a short distance outside Kabul). It would appear from this man's statement that there is little probability of the Amir coming to Kandahar. The Sirdars (of Kandahar) are still quarrelling among themselves. A man whom the Agent sent to Pusht-i-Rud reports that Sirdar Gul Muhammad Khan had gone to his house at Nahr-i-Sarkar, and up to the 7th had not returned to the army. Some people said that he was angry and would not return; others declared that he would. It is certain that Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan has come to Washir. The Barakzais and Alizais of Pusht-i-Rud have been subjected to much annoyance at the hands of the Amir's troops, and are looking forward to the approach of the enemy.

Nur Muhammad, a man whom the Agent had sent to Herat, has returned, and reports that when he left Ayub's army was at Shahbed, one march on this side of the city. It numbered 13 guns, four regiments, 1,400 irregular horse, and one squadron of cavalry. Sartip Nur Muhammad Khan was at Saki (near Khash) with six guns and two regiments. Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan, who had retreated to Farrah, has returned to Khash with the Farrah horse and some Herat cavalry, and is said to have come on to Naozad. Taj Muhammad Khan, who was taken prisoner by the Tirin people, has not yet been brought in to the city, and is not likely to be brought in now that Ayub is approaching.

The letter of the 13th gives the strength of the Amir's force as follows:—Four Kabul regiments (one lately arrived armed with breech-loaders) and one regiment raised in Kandahar, five in all, each 630 strong; two cavalry regiments of 400 sabres each; a thousand khasadars, 400 Tokhi and 600 Kandahari horse, 16 guns. All these have gone to Girishk. Shams-ud-din Khan has collected 700 sowars more whom he says he will take with him to Girishk. Gul Muhammad Khan had 600 Barakzai and Alizai sowars from Pusht-i-Rud under his command, but it is said they have dispersed to their homes. Ghulam Haidar Khan is still at Kandahar. Shams-ud-din Khan declares that two regiments of infantry, six guns, and six troops of cavalry have passed Kelat, and that he will take them on to Girishk directly they arrive. There is great excitement in the city in consequence of the approach of Ayub Khan. It is reported that large numbers of British troops are assembling in Pishin, and some say that their advanced guard is already at Gatai. A hundred Kandahari sowars stationed at Naozad have been forced by the people to return to Girishk.

A correspondent writes to me that he has heard nothing fresh from Herat, but that it would appear that Ayub's prospects are brighter than they were. Matters are going on very badly in Kandahar; plans being changed daily, and contradictory orders given. He gives the strength of the Amir's force in Pusht-i-Rud as follows:—Three regiments of infantry and 200 men of a fourth; 15 guns; two cavalry regiments; 1,000 khasadars; 500 Kandahari sowars; 800 Pusht-i-Rud sowars under Gul Muhammad Khan. Two regiments, 15 guns, and 800 Kandahari sowars are at Kandahar or on the way to Girishk. All the Kandaharis, except the few people of consequence who were prominently connected with the English, are eager for the arrival of Ayub Khan. The Amir's army unless compromised by the incompetency of its Generals will fight well, so it is impossible to say what will happen.

(Signed) O. ST. JOHN, Colonel,
 Officiating Agent to the Governor-General
 for Biluchistan.

Note.

The last remark in my opinion sums up the situation accurately. The Amir's main hope, as it has been from the first, lies in the superiority of his troops, which, if sufficiently manifest, may be expected to keep the Durani Chiefs to their allegiance, or at least cause them to stand aloof till the battle is over. It will be noticed that I overestimated the strength of the infantry in Kandahar in the last *précis*. It would appear that only three regiments and a detachment of another were sent from Kabul before the beginning of this month, when a fourth, armed with breech-loaders, arrived in Kandahar. Another seems to have been raised in Kandahar, but not, I believe, from Duranis. If it had, more would have been heard of it. Shams-ud-din Khan declares that three regiments of infantry with artillery and cavalry are on the way from Kabul. Unfortunately there seems reason to doubt the correctness of this assertion. If it is true, General Ghulam Haidar Khan will have a great superiority in numbers as well as in quality of troops, and ought to be able to defeat Ayub without much difficulty. If no reinforcements are on their way, the respective forces will stand approximately as follows:—

Each regiment numbers 630 beside officers—30 being drummers and buglers and 600 in the ranks.

Amir's army—

Five regiments of 600 bayonets	-	-	3,000
Khasadars	-	-	1,000
Regular cavalry	-	-	800
Irregular „	-	-	400
Guns, uncertain, but at least	-	-	16

Ayub's army—

Six regiments of 400 nominal, real strength 360 bayonets	-	-	2,160
Regular cavalry (maximum)	-	-	300
Irregular cavalry with Ayub	-	-	1,400
„ with Hashim about	-	-	600
Guns 19, according to Kandahar, 9 according to Herat correspondent, say	-	-	19

I have put the Amir's force at its minimum, and Ayub's at its maximum, and have omitted the Pusht-i-Rud and Kandahari horse from the calculation, as they will probably hold aloof. I have also omitted any irregular infantry that Ayub may gather about him, as they will not in a quarrel like the present take any active part in a fight, unlike the Kabuli and Ghilzai khasadars, who, though irregulars, are real soldiers. The superiority in number of cavalry is on Ayub's side, in quality on the Amir's. If it comes to a fair stand-up fight, Ghulam Haidar Khan's superior strength in infantry should enable him to hold his own without difficulty. An indecisive action would probably do less harm to him than to Ayub. He is nearer his base, has more abundant munitions and plenty of money, and may expect early reinforcements, while a single battle would well nigh exhaust Ayub's resources, and he has no reserves of men or material to draw on. A *bonâ fide* victory, on the other hand, would, I should anticipate, settle the campaign. With Afghans it means loss of guns and baggage and dispersion for the time. Ayub would, if defeated, lose all hope of support from the Duranis, and would have to retire to Farrah at least, if not Herat. If the Amir's troops are defeated, the Duranis of Pusht-i-Rud and Tirin would of course join Ayub at once. Whether Kandahar could be held would depend on whether there were any regular troops there or not. If so, they might hold the city till the defeated army arrived, and might even attempt to stand a siege, but the united force would more probably fall back on Kabul.

Another and very likely contingency is that Ayub finding Ghulam Haidar so much stronger than himself may avoid risking a battle and halt at Naozad or thereabouts, collecting volunteers and exciting the tribes to rise. If Ghulam Haidar has the courage to attack him, this would be of little consequence, but it is to be feared he also would stand on the defensive. This would probably be disastrous, as in the face of Ayub's superiority in irregular horse which would continually increase, he would find it very difficult to feed himself. A few days waiting would force him to fall back on Kandahar and stand a siege, of which the result would depend on the Amir's ability to send a force to raise it.

The last contingency is that, the probability of which was discussed last year, *viz.*, that Ayub abandoning his base might move round to the north into the Arghandab valley. This course he is no more likely to adopt than he was last year. It would

involve the abandonment of his wheeled artillery, and would place a Kabul army between the Heratis, of whom his force is mainly composed, and their homes.

Last year Ayub left Herat on the 18th June, reached Khash on the 9th, and the Helmand on the 19th July. This year he is exactly a week later, and as Ghulam Haidar Khan seems to have no intention of meeting him, collision is not likely to take place much before the 27th.

The news of Sirdar Gul Muhammad Khan's defection, if true, is serious. I do not think he is likely to go over to Ayub, but the mere fact of his holding aloof would influence the Duranis of Zamindawar against the Amir.

(Signed) O. ST. JOHN, Colonel,
Officiating Agent to the Governor-General
for Biluchistan.

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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE.

No. 1.

No. 79 of 1878.*

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Simla, 9th September 1878.

IN our letter of the 19th August, we reported to your Lordship our preparations for the deputation of General Sir Neville Bowles Chamberlain, G.C.B., G.C.S.I., early in September, upon a special mission to the Amir of Kabul. His departure has been adjourned, as was explained in our subsequent letter of the 26th August, in consequence of the death of the Heir-Apparent to the Kabul throne, but the Mission will now leave Peshawar about the 16th instant.

2. We inclose copy of our Resolution formally appointing Sir Neville Chamberlain; and detailing the officers and gentlemen who will accompany him, on political duty and upon his personal staff. It will be seen that two gentlemen belonging respectively to Hindu and Muhammadan families of the first rank in India, have joined the Mission. We considered that it would be politically advantageous to attach them to it; and our offer to do so was accepted by them at once and very willingly.

3. We also inclose, for your Lordship's information, copy of a Minute recorded by the Viceroy upon the relative positions of England and Russia in Central Asia, upon the course of events in those regions which has brought about the present important conjuncture of affairs, and upon the various possible solutions of the problem which is now before the British Government. In general accordance with that part of the Viceroy's Minute which has special reference to the despatch of a British Mission to Kabul, the instructions to our Envoy have been framed, after careful deliberation over the actual situation, and after examining the measures and lines of policy best calculated to secure a durable and satisfactory settlement of our relations with Afghanistan. It is to be understood that the remainder of the Minute expresses only the personal views of the Viceroy.

4. These instructions [which are contained in a letter to Sir Neville Chamberlain, of which a copy is inclosed] may be summarized as follows:—We have directed our Envoy to ascertain what misunderstandings exist between the British Government and the Amir, and to endeavour to clear them up. If these misunderstandings cannot be removed, or if the Amir is unmistakeably and of set purpose unfriendly, the Envoy will return. If the Amir is found to be not ill-disposed, the Envoy will intimate that the British Government are prepared to place their political connexions with Kabul upon an improved footing; and that there are two essential conditions of an alliance. The first is the withdrawal of any Russian Agency that may be still in Afghanistan, and the complete exclusion, henceforward, of Russian Agents from His Highness' dominions: and the second condition is the establishment within the Amir's territories of English officers accredited to him by our Government. Upon this basis, if it is accepted, the Envoy may concede to the Amir a subsidy; a promise to recognize the successor whom His Highness may formally name in his lifetime; and also an engagement on the part of the British Government to defend the Amir's present territories, if Russia, or any State under Russian influence, attempts to take possession of any part of them.

5. It will be understood by your Lordship that these terms represent the extreme limit up to which we have authorised our Envoy to grant concessions to the Amir; and that he is not instructed to offer or agree to make them in their entirety, unless he judges this to be necessary. Upon such points, and in the whole conduct of the negotiations, we have intrusted a very wide discretion to Sir Neville Chamberlain, who possesses our full confidence, and who is peculiarly qualified for this important Mission by his long

* NOTE.—Extract of this despatch, with the enclosures referred to in paras. 2 and 6, was published in the papers relating to the affairs of Afghanistan which were presented to Parliament in November 1878.

experience of the Afghan border, by his personal acquaintance, in former days, with the Amir Sher Ali, and by his distinguished reputation upon our North-West Frontier.

6. A copy of the letter from the Viceroy, which Sir Neville Chamberlain will deliver to the Amir, is also inclosed.

We have, &c.
(Signed) LYTTON.
F. P. HAINES.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON.
R. STRACHEY.
S. J. BROWNE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 1.

MINUTE BY THE VICEROY (LORD LYTTON).

A mission, under the charge of General Sir Neville Chamberlain, is about to proceed to Cabul to confer with the Ameer; thus affording us our first, and possibly last, opportunity of entering into personal explanations with the Ruler of Afghanistan, in his own capital, regarding the relations between his country and the British Empire.

Resulting, as this mission does, from Russia's recent action in Central Asia, it cannot but raise the whole question of the relative positions of Russia and England in those regions, and may not improbably lead to a final settlement of that long vexed question. It is, therefore, desirable that we should very carefully examine, in the light of recent events and disclosures, the problem of our future in Asia; with a view to arriving at such broad and definite lines of policy as may serve to guide our Envoys in their difficult task, and to direct our efforts for the consolidation of our dominion and due influence in the East.

In the present Minute I shall endeavour first, to define clearly the nature of the problem before us, and show how it has arisen; and then, to examine the various possible solutions which present themselves:—

Progress of England and Russia in the East.

1. At the beginning of last century Russia's most advanced posts, at Orenburg and Petropaulovsk, were nearly 2,500 miles distant from the insignificant British settlements in India. Our only rivals there were the French. The advance of Russia southwards seemed practically bounded by the vast and almost impassable deserts of the Kirghiz Steppes. For a century past her progress and conquests had been entirely in an easterly direction; and no one could at that time foresee that England and Russia would ever come into collision in Asia.

2. About 1730, Russia commenced the absorption of the hordes of the Kirghiz Steppes, and the gradual occupation of those arid deserts,—a task which occupied her for more than a hundred years; and her outposts began to draw nearer to India. England, meanwhile, had not been idle. Bengal had been conquered, or ceded to us, the Madras Presidency established, and Bombay become an important settlement; and at the close of last century less than 2,000 miles intervened between English and Russian possessions.

3. In the beginning of this century the more rapid progress was made on our side. While Russia was laboriously crossing the great Desert, and slowly consolidating her power in the Kirghiz Steppes, England was advancing with great strides over India. The North-Western Provinces, the Carnatic, the territories of the Peishwa, Sind, and the Punjab, successively came under our rule; and by 1850 we had extended our dominion to the foot of the mountains beyond the Indus. Thus, during the first half of this century, the distance between the outposts of England and Russia had been reduced, almost entirely by advances on our side, from 2,000 to less than 1,000 miles.

4. In 1854–56, the Crimean War temporarily checked the designs of Russia in Europe; but this seems rather to have stimulated her progress in Asia. The great Desert once crossed, Russia found herself in presence of fertile and settled countries, whose provinces fell under her control as rapidly as those of India had fallen under ours. Twenty-five years have not yet elapsed since that war; and, during this period, the

distance between England and Russia in the East has been reduced, this time entirely by advances on Russia's side, from 1,000 to less than 400 miles.

5. It might seem unnecessary to recall such well-known facts, were it not that there are those who argue, even now, that there is no imminent risk of contact with Russia in Asia; that we have no reason to anticipate further advance on her part; and that the dread of such advance is groundless, since we are still separated from her by vast distances and almost impassable obstacles. It is, therefore, well to show how little vast distances and impassable obstacles have hitherto stayed the advance of the British and Russian Empires towards each other in the East; and, by measuring the past, to attempt to estimate the probable future, rate of progress.

6. It appears, then, that the approach of the two Powers has, for nearly two centuries, been a steady continuous movement; undiverted by any obstacles, whether purely physical or of human origin,—most rapid on our side during the first half of this century, and recently on the side of Russia—never ceasing, however, but, on the contrary, constantly increasing in rapidity. The progress towards contact made in the first half of this century was greater than during the whole preceding one; and during the last quarter of the century it has been proportionately greater than during the first half century.

7. We have also been told, however, that the further advance of Russia cannot prove formidable, because further advance and conquest means greater weakness. But conquest and extension of dominion do not necessarily weaken a great Power. Is the British Empire less powerful, now that England has extended her rule to Peshawur, 1,500 miles from Bombay and Calcutta, than when she was painfully struggling for a foothold round her factories? Doubtless there is a measure of extension which cannot be passed without danger; but what proof have we that Russia has reached that limit? *Has* Russia been weakened by the extension of her power over 1,000 miles, from Orenburg to the Oxus? On the contrary, all that we know as a fact is that she has put more forces in the field, and shown more energy, in her latest and most distant expeditions in Asia than in any former ones. And I shall, I think, be able to show hereafter that Russia will actually gain in strength by further progress.*

8. We know, then, that the approach of the two great rival Powers in Central Asia has continued uninterruptedly for two centuries, and has made progress at an ever accelerating rate, as if governed by the laws of attraction that rule material bodies. We know that the conditions which govern the relations between civilization and barbarism are unchangeable, and that every cause which has acted in past times to compel the advance of ourselves and of Russia continues to act with undiminished force; and we know that neither Power has yet shown signs of failing strength or vitality. Therefore we can calculate, as certainly as we calculate on the succession of the seasons, that the same causes will continue to act, and to produce the same results; and that within a time which can almost with certainty be computed as less than a generation, and which may prove much shorter, England and Russia will be conterminous in the East. Accepting this as certain and unavoidable, it remains for us now to determine where that contact shall take place.

Present position of Russia and England.

9. Assuming, as we may with certainty, that neither Russia nor England will recede from any position they now occupy, it follows that the line of ultimate contact must be either the present frontier of one of the two countries, or some intermediate line; and these possible lines I will now proceed to examine.

British Frontier.

10. The present north-west frontier of India has been the subject of much discussion, and high authorities have recorded opinions in favour of it. Many of these opinions, however, were given when Russia was 600 miles further distant than she now is, when Afghanistan was looked upon as a certain ally, and when, consequently, the whole

* NOTE.—I am aware that there are those who say that Russia, threatened with bankruptcy and socialism, is now formidable only to herself. I would remind these prophets that precisely the same language was held, with equal plausibility, at the time of the Crimean War; since which time Russia has largely developed her railways and increased her military strength, has carried her armies to the walls of Constantinople, has permanently acquired the most important harbour and fortress in Asia Minor, and has added the Khanates to her conquests in Central Asia—instructive commentaries on the predictions of 20 years ago. I would further remind them that it was not France the prosperous monarchy, but France of the Revolution, bankrupt and socially convulsed, which overran Europe, and crushed every well-established monarchy in turn. It is strange to what little practical purpose history is studied by some of our political prophets.

conditions were different. Had these high authorities lived to this day they would probably have seen reason to modify their opinions, as Lord Napier, the most distinguished living Indian military authority, has done. No one who has studied the question can doubt that a rapid change is taking place in public opinion on the subject,—a change especially remarkable during the time I have been in India. Two years ago the opponents to an occupation of Quetta, or to any extension of our military frontier, were numerous and powerful; now they have dwindled to a comparatively small minority.

11. Our present frontier dates from the annexation of the Punjab. It was not a chosen line, accepted after careful study and with far-seeing prevision; but was adopted because it represented, approximately, the points to which the Sikhs had at that time pushed their power. Had the annexation of the Punjab taken place a little earlier or a little later we should have had a different frontier. It would be strange if a line thus taken by chance should combine more advantages than can be found in any line selected by human ingenuity; and yet that is the contention of some of its advocates.

12. Undoubtedly, at the time, this frontier had much to recommend it. It is natural for a Government, looking to the interests of the moment, to carry its conquests to the foot of a mountain tract, and stop at the point where military operations become more difficult and results less satisfactory. Rich plains are easily overrun and held, and they respond to the benefits conferred by improved administration. Wild mountain tracts are difficult to traverse and subdue; and, when subdued, their administration presents a still more ungrateful task. The foot of the hills also offers a well-defined line; whereas once the hills are entered it is difficult to know where to stop. So long, therefore, as we had only the rude hill tribes to consider there was much to be said in favour of the line we found drawn. It was not a strong line, except in the sense that a prison wall is strong to the prisoner; and it was not a favourable line, as it left our boundary peculiarly exposed to inroads and insult, while limiting our power of external influence or chastisement. But, on the whole, it might fairly be argued that the inconveniences of advancing beyond it exceeded those of remaining there; and, in that sense, and that sense alone, it was a good line.

13. Regarded, however, as a great strategical line, it is dangerously and fatally defective. The theory of awaiting attack behind a mountain range belongs to the pre-Napoleonic period of military science, and to the time of wars of position, when armies manœuvred opposite each other for months, and the capture of one town was considered a sufficient result of a year's campaign. Napoleon shattered this theory, with many others; and in every instance where such defective strategy has since been adopted it has resulted in utter defeat and ruin. Modern military authorities are agreed that the value of an obstacle, such as a great river, or a mountain range, depends upon the command, on both sides, of the points of passage, and on the power of operating at will on either side of the obstacle. To the combatant who securely holds the passes it is of incalculable value, enabling him to mask his movements, to concentrate his force in safety, and to strike at will; or to hold his adversary in check while maturing his defence or preparing his counterstroke. To him who does not command the passes, it is, on the other hand, a barrier which hampers his movements, and a screen which masks and protects his enemy. Hence the value of the great German fortresses on the Rhine and of the former Austrian fortresses in the Italian Quadrilateral; and hence the value to France of Nice and Savoy, which give her the command of the passes of the Alps.

14. But along our existing frontier every pass is in the hands of tribes independent, if not hostile; and who, if we elect to remain permanently within our present border, must ultimately become allies and subjects of our great rival. And whenever the time of actual collision arrives we should have to choose between forcing passes, defended against us as they have never yet been defended, to seek our adversary in a hostile country, far from our base and from all friendly support; or awaiting him along a frontier line of 1,000 miles, pierced at all points by passes which are open to him, and with a river at our back.

15. It is true that the recent occupation of Quetta has materially improved our position. The command of the southern passes is now in our hands; and from Multan to the sea, a distance of 500 miles, our frontier is well guarded. While we, securely established at Quetta, can at any moment descend on the plains of Candahar, or advance to meet our adversary in the open field, no enemy can debouch on our plains without first besieging and taking Quetta—a task of no slight difficulty, and involving much loss of precious time—and then forcing a long and difficult pass held by us. But on the northern, and more directly exposed, portions of our frontier our line is as fatally defective as ever.

16. I conceive, then, that it would be simply suicidal to allow Russia to establish herself peaceably and securely at Cabul, and extend her authority to our present borders and over the passes leading into India. She would gain fresh and almost inexhaustible sources of military strength in the wild warriors who inhabit the countries round Cabul and Herat; and who, in her ranks, would rival the best native troops we have in India. She would add enormously to her prestige, a factor never to be lightly thought of in war, and of almost magic power in Eastern warfare. Her dream of a railway from the Caspian to Herat, and of a new and shorter line of communication with her Central Asian possessions, would soon become a reality; and all her present difficulties of distances and communications would disappear. We cannot rely on her friendship; and the rich plains of India might prove a too alluring bait to the occupiers of the barren and profitless mountains of Afghanistan. To attack Russia, securely established in such a position, would be a task that might prove beyond even our military resources; to await her in the plains below would be to court defeat. Russia could offer the plunder of the plains, and the conquest of regions once their own, to the Afghans and hill tribes who join her ranks; we have nothing to offer them in return. Even Lord Lawrence, the great advocate of our present frontier, says, "I feel no shadow of a doubt that if a formidable invasion of India from the west were imminent, the Afghans, *en masse*, from the Ameer of the day to the domestic slave of the household, would readily join it." And though he believes that such hordes would make no impression on the troops we could oppose to them, the conditions would be different were these hordes armed, drilled, and led by European officers, and supported by European troops.

Russian Frontier.

17. The Russian frontier, from the Caspian to the Pamir Steppe, is about 1,200 miles long; 200 miles longer than our north-west frontier. Of this, however, less than half is open to attack, as from the Caspian to Samarcand it is covered by the great Khivan desert. But the fatal defect in this line is its want of inter-communication, and its distance from support. While every part of our frontier is within 200 miles of railway communication, and most of it much nearer, Tashkend, the centre of Russian power in Turkistan, is more than 1,000 miles from the nearest railway; and many of the frontier posts are 1,500 miles distant from such support.

18. The difficulties attending a military occupation under such conditions are necessarily great: and the entire force that Russia, with her vast military resources, can maintain in Turkistan does not exceed that which we maintain in the Punjab alone. It would be easier for us to collect 100,000 men at any point in our frontier than for Russia to collect 25,000 on hers. This heavy drawback has been long felt, and has led to various schemes for connecting the distant provinces of Turkistan with the centres of Russian power—among which may be mentioned Romanoffsky's Oxus-Caspian Canal, and Aral-Caspian Railway; and a proposed railway from Orenburg to Tashkend, 1,350 miles long.

19. Russian Statesmen and Generals have long perceived that the true base for their Central Asian possessions is on the Caspian. From Samarcand by Tashkend to Orenburg is about 1,500 miles. From Samarcand to the Caspian by Merv is about half that distance; and the disproportion is greater in the case of the Russian stations on the Oxus. It was with a view to opening a new and shorter line of communication with the Khanates that the military settlement of Krasnovodsk was established. Owing to the difficulties of the desert between Krasnovodsk and Khiva this scheme has failed; and, though projects for a railway are still discussed, Russian attention is now mainly directed to a more southern and fertile route along the Persian frontier.

20. In an able paper by Colonel Veniukoff on the Russian position in Central Asia, he indicates a railway from the Caspian to Herat, and thence northwards to Kunduz and southwards to Shikarpur, as the great natural line of communication between Western Europe and the British and Russian possessions in the East. That Russia accepts this view as regards her possessions we have abundant evidence. The maintenance and increase of her establishments at Krasnovodsk and Chikislar, and her recent advance to Kizil Arvat, can have no object but that of opening communication with Turkistan; and we have already explained the almost overpowering necessity which forces Russia towards Merv, in furtherance of this object.

21. Colonel Veniukoff, in the paper above quoted, further draws attention to the importance to Russia of Badakhshan, and of the minor Usbeg States of And Khui, Sir-i-pul, and Maimena; and to the fatal error which he conceives Russia to have committed in acknowledging the rights of Afghanistan over them. "These small Usbeg

"States," he says, "form the last oases in the southern borders of the Turan Steppe, at the very foot of the Paropamisus. To replace them by any other localities favourable to sedentary life in our future frontier on the south is impossible." "Russia cannot halt in her progressive movement till she encloses on the south the steppes extending to Khorassan and the Hindu-Kush." And of Badakhshan he says, "Without possessing it and colonising it we can never guarantee peace in Turkistan, or even the solidity of our rule there. It occupies the most flourishing district in the basin of the Oxus, and feeds a numerous population," and "without Badakhshan the Russians must consider themselves in Central Asia as guests without any settled habitation, and unable to form one."

22. Nor is this an exaggerated picture of the necessity she is under. Were England securely established at Cabul, with the passes of the Hindu-Kush in her possession, and outposts at Faizabad, Kunduz, Balkh, and Herat; while Russia still occupied her weak and extended line, severed by the Khivan desert from her military establishments on the Caspian, her position would be indeed insecure. Peshawur and Tashkend are about equally distant from the passages of the Oxus; but, while Peshawur is only 150 miles from a railway, and can be rapidly re-inforced by the whole military resources of India, and of England, Tashkend is practically isolated, and can only slowly, and with infinite trouble, receive small re-inforcements from Russia. The result of a contest on the Oxus, under such conditions, cannot be doubted; and the loss of a battle there might entail on Russia the loss of most of her Central Asian possessions.

23. Thus it appears that both Russia and England have, now, weak frontiers, at which they cannot willingly accept contact with a great rival Power; and are both equally urged forward by considerations of military and political expediency, and by the instinct of self-preservation, towards the Hindu-Kush, the great natural boundary between India and Central Asia. Long continued inaction under such conditions is impossible; and I will now examine the intermediate regions into which both are thus impelled, and where the ultimate boundary line may possibly be found.

Country between British and Russian Frontiers.

24. The wild country intervening between the present Indian and Russian frontiers contains the key to both India and Turkistan. It comprises that great range of mountains which, under various names, extends from Herat in the west, past Cabul, to the extreme northern boundary of Cashmere; and forms the watershed dividing the waters running south towards the Persian Gulf and Indian Seas from those running north into the great inland seas and deserts. Such a vast natural barrier has always a high influence and significance in the ultimate demarcation of empires and of races, beyond its mere strategical value; and I believe it destined to become a great line of national demarcation in the present case.

25. The routes crossing or turning this barrier, and connecting the Asiatic possessions of Russia and England, may be roughly classed in three groups. The first or eastern one comprises those leading from Kashgaria, over the Karakorum and other passes, through Ladak and Cashmere. The second or centre group comprises the roads from Kashgar, Khokand, and the Pamir Steppe by Chitral; from Bokhara and Samarcand by the Bamian and other passes; and from Herat and Merv, by Maimena and the Bamian Pass; all meeting about Cabul and Jellalabad. The third or western group comprises the roads leading from Persia and the Caspian, by Herat or Birjand, on Candahar and the lower Indus.

26. Of these groups, the eastern is the least important, owing to the length and difficulties of the roads, the rugged and inhospitable country they traverse, and their distance from the centre of Russia's power. The centre group comprises the shortest and most direct routes connecting the two countries. The distance between Peshawur and Tashkend, the most important garrisons of India and Turkistan respectively, is little more than half that from the Caspian to the lower Indus; but the roads connecting them cross a double chain of mountains, with difficult passes, before emerging on India. The western group presents the easiest roads and those best adapted for military operations. But they are the longest, and debouch at one end on a desert line backed by a broad river, the Indus, at the other on the Caspian, where Russia has a secure base, and insignificant military settlements only to strike at.

27. We shall not willingly be the aggressors in any contest with Russia. We have no desire to extend our conquests further; and our object being confined to the defence of India, ours will naturally be essentially a defensive policy. But theory and experience alike prove that a strategy purely defensive almost certainly ends in disaster; and if

this principle holds good where an army is defending its own soil, surrounded by a friendly and sympathising people, it applies with tenfold force in India, where we have no such advantages, and where retreat or inaction would probably raise us even more dangerous enemies in rear. When the occasion arises India must be defended by a vigorous offensive; and in choosing our line of contact with Russia, we have to consider what facilities it offers for striking quick and hard, even more than what protection it affords.

28. Bearing this in mind, a study of the map will show the immense importance to us of the triangle formed by Cabul, Ghuznee, and Jellalabad, with the possession of the passes over the Hindu-Kush. Defensively, this position, entrenched behind a rampart of mountains, and with its communications unassailable, directly commands the central group of roads, while indirectly threatening both the eastern and western group. Offensively, it gives the power of debouching at will on the plains of the Oxus, and threatens every point of Russia's extended frontier. It is difficult to imagine a more commanding strategical position; and whenever the moment of collision with Russia arrives it must find us in possession of it, as friends and allies of the Afghans if possible, but firmly established there in any case.

Eastern Group of Roads.

29. With this as our great central bastion and line of defence, it remains to determine the flanks and outposts of our position. To the east our line may be easily defined. I cannot anticipate much danger to India from operations undertaken by Russia on this side; and I can hardly conceive any circumstances in which we should wish to engage a force in the long and difficult passes of Cashmere, for the sake of debouching on Kashgar, and striking at Russia in that direction. Except for this purpose there would be little use in holding the northern debouches of the passes; and it would be difficult to cross the ridge and establish ourselves in Sarikol and the valleys leading to Kashgaria without being gradually drawn further into regions where we have no interests to defend. Beyond these mountains we should meet Russia at a disadvantage; while the passes leading into India are so few, so long, and so difficult, that they could easily be stopped if occasion required. From the Karakorum to the Baroghil Passes, therefore, our ultimate boundary should be the great mountain range or watershed; and our officers in Cashmere have accordingly been instructed, whilst endeavouring to extend our influence over the petty chiefdoms along the southern slopes of this ridge, to avoid interference with the tribes beyond it.

Western Group.

30. On the left or western group of roads our position is eminently satisfactory. Our flank is covered by the Arabian Sea and the sandy deserts of Western Beloochistan; while the roads and passes leading into India are commanded by Quetta. From a military point of view, our position here leaves little to be desired, beyond the improvement of our communications between Quetta and the Indus: and though we can never allow Candahar to fall into the hands of a rival Power, and political or special military considerations may make it necessary for us to occupy that town, I do not consider that such occupation would actually strengthen our western frontier.

Central Group.

31. But the central group, between the Chitral Valley and Quetta, presents a much more difficult problem. Two lines here naturally suggest themselves—an inner and an outer one; the inner following the Hindu-Kush to the head of the Helmund, and thence down that river to Girishk and Candahar; the outer one following the recognised frontier of Afghanistan along the Oxus from Wakhan to Kojah Saleh, and thence across to Herat and the Persian frontier.

32. Of these, the inner line would probably, from a military point of view, most recommend itself. From the Pamir to the Caspian by this line is 1,200 miles. But the assailable points on this frontier are practically confined to three,—Chitral, Cabul, and Candahar,—of which the two last only are important. The Chitral passes might, perhaps, be best defended by closing the debouches at Chitral or Jellalabad. But the Bamian and Khawak or Panjsher passes are the great high roads between India and Turkistan, and of these it would be necessary to hold the northern debouches to secure the full advantages of the position. Between Cabul and Candahar our information is very imperfect, but the line is not, so far as we know, pierced by any important passes, while on our side

there is good inter-communication, except in the depth of winter, by the Ghuznee and Khelat-i-Ghizai Valley. Finally, the communications with all parts of the line are good and well covered.

33. The outer line is 1,700 miles long, and includes Wakhan, Badakhshan, Balkh, and other provinces subject to Afghanistan lying in the basin of the Oxus. It may be necessary on grounds of policy—such as to secure an alliance with Afghanistan—to include these in our sphere; but, militarily and financially, we should suffer by advancing into the valley of the Oxus. We should gain no accession of strength, for the Oxus offers no good military line, and we should be withdrawing further from our base, and increasing the strain on our military and financial resources. These provinces, also belonging to the great basin of the Oxus, are by race and interests more closely allied to Bokhara than to Cabul, and we should there become involved in interests which might make it difficult to stop even at the Oxus.

34. I am aware that great stress has been laid on our retention of Wakhan, through which lies the only high road of commerce between Eastern and Western Central Asia. If we are prepared boldly to cross the great mountain range, occupy the valleys of the Oxus on one side, and of Kashgaria on the other, and contest Central and Northern Asia with Russia, then, undoubtedly, we should never allow Wakhan to pass out of our hands. But if, as I hold, we should in the main confine ourselves to the south of the great mountain range, only occupying such points beyond it as are absolutely necessary for the protection of India, then I think Wakhan should naturally pass into the hands of the Power that spreads over the country north of the mountains. To oppose an obstacle to a trade which we cannot ourselves develop or control, would neither be generous nor wise, and on the other hand, the more we stop Russia's southern advance, the more desirable it seems to be to give her every facility for expanding eastwards.

Herat.

35. The real point of difficulty in the choice of our line—the point where military, political, and financial considerations have to be most carefully weighed—is Herat. The objections to a military occupation of Herat are obvious. It lengthens our communications by 360 miles, and our frontier by 500 miles. To garrison it properly, and hold its long line of communications, would require a considerable increase to our army and to our already heavy military expenditure. It draws us away from a naturally strong and compact line, and creates a weak and exposed salient, with bad communications, one road exposed to Persia, the other to the Turkomans and Russians on the Oxus, and it entails on us the ultimate subjugation and pacification of a wild and unremunerative tract of mountain land, occupied by hitherto unsubdued tribes. But the political and strategical importance of Herat is so commanding, and its probable influence on Russian progress in Central Asia so great, that Imperial considerations may well outweigh all such objections.

36. The importance of Herat, both as a fortress and as the capital of Western Afghanistan, long an independent State, is well known. It is also in a peculiar degree associated with our name and reputation in the East. We have made an attack on it a *casus belli* with Persia, and have successfully fought for it; on one occasion it was defended by a British officer. To yield it now to Russia would be to falsify all past policy, to declare wasted the lives and money expended in the Persian war, and to proclaim to the eastern world that, while prepared to fight Persia, we are not prepared to fight Russia, for this point.

37. But Herat has also a special importance from its geographical position. Without acknowledging its right to the title of "key" of India, of which empire it is only a distant and rather inconveniently situated outpost, it is undoubtedly the key to Eastern Persia and Western Afghanistan, and to the roads from the Russian possessions in Central Asia to the Persian Gulf. It is also the centre of the most fertile region, and of some of the most powerful tribes of Afghanistan, and we may well hesitate before surrendering to a rival power such a source of strength.

38. In the natural progress of civilised and civilising powers, which I have already dwelt upon, wherever we leave a vacuum, Russia will assuredly fill it up, and if we leave Herat outside our sphere Russia will sooner or later occupy it, and extend her power southwards through Western Afghanistan and Seistan, and probably to the Persian Gulf. Thus ultimately we should be conterminous with, and enveloped by, Russia along the whole of our frontier from the Pamir Steppe to the Arabian Sea, and the increased military expenditure entailed on us by such contact would fall little short of that entailed by an occupation of Herat.

39. But if we securely hold Herat, I believe its command of position to be so great that it will definitely and finally stop the southern progress of Russia, not only in Afghanistan but in Eastern Persia, and probably divert her expansion permanently eastwards. Our contact with Russia on this side would then be restricted to the space between Herat and the Pamir; an influence equal to or greater than that of Russia might be regained in Persia, and we might watch without anxiety Russia's efforts to open a new line of communication from the Caspian through Merv to Turkistan. The scheme of a railway from the Caspian to Herat, and thence southwards to India, and northwards to Central Asia, would no longer be a mere visionary dream, but an idea which might become an accomplished fact within the next generation, and, instead of a source of danger, might prove an element of stability and of development and commercial prosperity alike to Persia, England, and Russia, in the East. Lastly, our frontier, though in appearance lengthened, would really be shortened, for so long as we hold Herat, our western frontier between that and the sea will never be seriously menaced.

40. To sum up then. As a purely military line, the strongest frontier we could take up would be along the Hindu-Kush from the Pamir to Bamian, holding the northern debouches of the principal passes; and thence southwards by the Helmund, Girishk, and Candahar to the Arabian Sea. Though political considerations of the moment may compel and justify an extension of our line to the northern frontier of Afghanistan, this would weaken rather than strengthen our general position. But the political and strategical importance of Herat is so great that, though it lies beyond our natural frontier, it cannot be excluded from our line of defence. This line, therefore, should ultimately run from the Hindu-Kush along the Paropamisus to Herat, and thence down the western frontier of Afghanistan and Beloochistan to the Arabian Sea.

Present Situation.

41. It will be seen, then, that the Frontier problem which has ever pressed for solution is this:—Granted that Russia and England are steadily drawing nearer to one another in the East; and that there are certain points necessary to the safety of India, which we must secure against absorption by Russia; how can these be secured with least danger, disturbance, responsibilities, and expense?

42. I do not here discuss whether the contact which is ultimately inevitable between Russia and England will be beneficial to us, or the reverse. While, on the one hand, such contact will doubtless tend towards the civilization of Central Asia and the development of commerce, it is equally certain that it will gravely increase our anxieties in India, expose our Empire in the East to the influence of every political disturbance in Europe, and render necessary the maintenance of armaments on a very different footing to that which has hitherto sufficed, and on a scale more proportionate to those of the great European military Powers. But this question seems to me to be outside the actual problem before us; for no one, so far as I know, has ever maintained that we should let Russia touch us at a line of *her* choosing.

43. The solution hitherto sought has been to maintain Afghanistan as a friendly, but independent, State, between Russia and ourselves; guarding those points which we deem necessary to India's security. No one will question the wisdom of the policy, though we may disapprove the system of absolute non-intervention which was thought necessary to give effect to it. The error which vitiated this policy was an assumption that Russia would appear in Afghanistan in the character of an enemy, as an invading and conquering Power; and that if we only held aloof and gave no cause for offence, Afghanistan, when the time came, would certainly throw herself into our arms. Even before landing in India I drew attention to this most dangerous fallacy. I pointed out that Russia was too far-seeing and wary to shipwreck her cause by a wild premature invasion; that she would first appear at Cabul in friendly guise; and that what we had really to fear was the gradual establishment there, by friendly means and by a policy more active than our own, of an influence hostile to us. This is precisely what has happened. While British officers have been rigorously excluded from all parts of Afghanistan, Russian officers have been permitted to visit Maimena and other points on her northern frontier; a Russian mission has been received, and hospitably entertained at Cabul, where it still remains; and proposals have been openly made to the Ameer to receive Russian workmen to aid in the improvement of his manufactures, among which arms and soldiers would doubtless be included. This is the situation with which we have now to deal, and which has forced on us the somewhat undignified course of hurriedly despatching a rival mission, without even waiting to learn how it will be received.

44. So long as the ruler of Afghanistan was, in appearance at least, on good terms with us, and Russia abstained from interference, the system of maintaining an indepen-

dent State as a barrier could be adhered to. But this policy necessarily requires that the intermediate State should be friendly to us, and not subject to the influence of our rival. These conditions being reversed, such a State becomes a source of very real danger, and one of two alternatives is forced on us; an immediate and definite understanding with that State, adverse to a rival, or an immediate and definite understanding with our rival, adverse to that State. Either we must re-establish a preponderating influence in Afghanistan and exclude Russia, or, disregarding Afghanistan, we must endeavour to effect with Russia some mutually satisfactory arrangement by which we shall be secured from the dangers to which our present weak frontier exposes us.

45. There is, indeed, a third course, but it is one which is surrounded with difficulties and dangers, while leading to no practical final solution, and could only be justified were our position here too weak to be defended in any other way. It is to attempt to stay Russia's progress in Asia by making any further advance on her part a *casus belli*. To do so, a definite line must be drawn somewhere—at Kizil Arvat, or Merv, or Herat, or Candahar. But in reality such line would be variable, and dependent on the views and temperament of the Ministry in power; and Russia would thus be ever tempted to trespass. She will doubtless give any required assurances, and a distinct declaration on our part would probably delay her advance for a time. Its immediate effect, therefore, would be to allay alarm, and so defer the measures necessary to our permanent security. But, unless we undertake the control of the countries which we forbid her to meddle with, the position would soon become impossible, and we could hardly avoid ultimately accepting all the responsibilities of a guarantee without securing the advantages we might originally have gained from it. It is also certain that Russia would disregard all her assurances when an opportunity seemed to offer the means of doing so with impunity. One of two results must then follow—either we should have to withdraw from our declarations, and allow Russia to continue an advance, against which her assurances have prevented our properly securing ourselves; or else go to war with her at the time selected by her as most disadvantageous to us.

46. War with Russia is not a thing to be lightly undertaken. The obligation to undertake it for an object which might have been attained by other means would be most discreditable to our statesmanship. A British statesman, remembering the American war, and the lasting effect which a few hostile cruisers have had on America's commercial prosperity, may well hesitate before exposing British commerce to the same risks. The contemplation of war with Russia in Central Asia has been forced on my mind in the study of the anxious question now under consideration. But the more closely I contemplate such a catastrophe, the greater is the repugnance with which I regard it—a repugnance amounting almost to horror. In such a war we should doubtless be successful, for we can meet Russia with far superior forces on the Oxus. But it is the consequences of success that we have to consider. We should probably stir up a Mahomedan rising throughout the Khanates, and we can realize the horrors of such a rising if we picture to ourselves another Indian mutiny, in which the mutineers would be supported by a victorious European army. As we advance, and drive the Russians out of Central Asia, and perhaps back to Orenburg, our difficulties and responsibilities would increase. We cannot undertake the whole administration of Central Asia, nor prevent Russia stepping in again to restore order in the countries which, by our withdrawal, we have abandoned to the wildest anarchy. And, when she does this, she will assuredly take signal vengeance on all who sided with us during the war.

47. Nor has such a war ever finally stopped the progress of a great advancing Power. We spent thousands of lives, and 80 millions of money, on the Crimean War; and within 20 years the results of that war have been lost, and the interests for which we then fought have been still more seriously endangered. While, therefore, to secure a peaceful solution, war must always be kept in view as a possible ultimate measure, it is one to be resorted to only when all others have failed; and threats of war held over Russia will only be effective if accompanied by, and subordinate to, not substituted for, such direct action in Afghanistan as I now propose to consider.

48. Of the two courses indicated in para. 44, that of a direct understanding with Afghanistan presents the greatest advantages. It would be in accord with our old policy, and would involve no undignified withdrawal from long asserted positions. It has the advantage of avoiding the delay and complication of European references and diplomacy, and of requiring action in India alone; and it could in all probability be more promptly and effectively carried out than any arrangements requiring negotiation with Russia.

49. If this course be selected, we should, in the first place, endeavour to establish our influence in Afghanistan through the present Ameer. There is no man in Afghanistan

his equal in character and ability. He has firmly established his rule, and secured it by disposing of all who might be dangerous rivals; and no successor could, for many years to come, wield the power that he now wields. Whether we can win him to our side is questionable. He has become estranged; he has learnt thoroughly to mistrust us; and all recent information confirms the belief that, of his two great neighbours, he hates the Russians the least. On the other hand, he knows that we are nearer, and more powerful for good or harm, than is Russia; and that no assistance from her could preserve his country or his throne against us.

50. But, if we wish to bind the Ameer to us, we must appeal to something besides his fears; we must hold out hope of advantage to him as well. He will probably demand a subsidy; though he seems latterly to have extracted from his subjects a revenue sufficient for his wants, and to be comparatively indifferent to money. In the next place, he will require some territorial guarantee. To expect him, for our convenience, to agree to any arrangement by which he might lose part of his territories, would be absurd; nor would it be less manifestly unjust to interfere with his making his own terms with the Russians, and yet not protect him from them. Lastly, he will probably seek some sort of dynastic guarantee. What guarantees to require from the Ameer, and what to grant him, are the points requiring the most careful consideration in framing the instructions for the present mission.

51. In the first place, then, it is evident that we cannot simply return to the *status quo ante*. Neither the withdrawal of the Russian mission, nor any assurances on the part of Russia, will cancel the fact that a Russian mission has been well received at Cabul, after one from us had been refused; and the Russian officers have had full opportunities of instilling into the minds of the Ameer and his councillors distrust and dislike towards England, belief in Russia's power and destiny, and hopes of assistance against us from that country. And, as Russian promises have not kept Russian missions out of Cabul in the past, to accept them as guarantees for the future would be blind folly. Some visible proof of England's supremacy in Afghanistan is, therefore, essential; and the terms which it seems necessary to demand on our part, as the conditions of a friendly alliance with the Ameer, are; 1st, the dismissal of the Russian mission if still at Cabul, and the exclusion of Russian agents from Afghanistan for the future; 2nd, an engagement on the part of the Ameer to enter into no diplomatic relations with foreign Powers without first consulting us; 3rd, the establishment of a British representative at the Ameer's Court, or free access for British missions to Cabul and to the Ameer when considered necessary; 4th, failing the establishment of a permanent mission at Cabul, the location of agents at Balkh and Herat, or at any frontier towns where the presence of such agents may seem necessary to anticipate and frustrate foreign intrigue.

52. The question that then presents itself is, What inducements can we hold out to the Ameer that shall be sufficient, when coupled with his fears, to induce him to accept these terms, and identify his interest with ours? A reasonable subsidy may be granted; but the question of guarantees is more difficult. The objections that exist to giving territorial guarantees have been often and fully urged. By any such guarantee we shall in a manner become conterminous with Russia along the northern border of Afghanistan, and hasten that contact which it is our avowed policy to delay. It will further bind us to the distant and inconvenient line of the Oxus. Many and weighty objections can also be raised to rendering ourselves responsible for the protection of a country over whose administration we have no control; and incurring responsibilities which may ultimately entail interference in, and control over, the interior administration of Afghanistan. But we must keep clearly in view the problem before us; *viz.*, to secure certain points necessary for the safety of India, and to do this with least possible danger, disturbance, or expense? Would a war with Russia, or an internal revolution brought about by us, or an invasion with a view to a forcible occupation of the points we require, attain our end with more certainty and with less danger, disturbance, or expense? Could we, indeed, confidently depend on any of these alternative courses to secure for us all the points we require—Herat for instance?

53. It is true that such territorial guarantee practically hastens contact between England and Russia. But it brings it about under conditions the most favorable to us, and at a line the least favourable to Russia. It is true that it compels us permanently to adopt a line exposed to disadvantages already pointed out; but that line is far more disadvantageous to Russia. It is true that such a guarantee exposes the guarantor to risks and demands which it is difficult fully to measure or foresee; and to guarantee a weak State against a near and overwhelmingly powerful neighbour, as we have done in the case of Belgium and of Asia Minor, is indeed to accept grave responsibilities. But the risks of the guarantee depend on the relative power of the guaranteeing State, and of that against which the

guarantee is directed ; and when the guaranteeing State is relatively powerful, as we should be against Russia on the Oxus, the risks are comparatively slight, because the guarantee is not likely to be defied. Moreover, in the case of Afghanistan, it may well be questioned whether such a guarantee *does* increase our responsibilities. I have already pointed out that to declare a *casus belli* against Russia would involve us in responsibilities still wider, and more dangerous because more vague ; and it is difficult to imagine the circumstances in which, if we have made any sort of friendly arrangement with Afghanistan, we could allow Russia to invade its territory. Lastly, it is true that a territorial guarantee will probably entail some ultimate control over the administration of Afghanistan. But it has been already shown that such control *must* be ultimately exercised either by Russia or by England. Unless we are prepared to yield it to Russia, we must be prepared to assume it ourselves ; and there is no way in which it can be more gradually and advantageously introduced.

54. We ought, therefore, to be prepared to give a territorial guarantee to the Ameer if it is pressed for, and if other circumstances, such as the prospects of securing the Ameer's alliance, and of the stability of his throne, make it desirable to enter into close relations with him. Such guarantee will not materially add to our necessary responsibilities regarding Afghanistan ; while it affords the easiest, and only reasonably certain means of securing the positions we require there. The conditions likely to be asked by the Ameer may be inferred from the negotiations of 1873, and seem to be such as we can in the main reasonably assent to, and as would be covered by a guarantee against *annexation*. This, therefore, is the form I conceive our guarantee should take ; being made dependent, of course, on the location of British agents at exposed points of the frontier, and free access to the Ameer.

55. The question of dynastic guarantee is less difficult. We should be prepared to recognize any heir whom the Ameer, with the concurrence of his principal nobles, nominates and proclaims. Further, we should be prepared to acknowledge his succession on the death of the Ameer ; and to continue to him whatever subsidy the Ameer has received so long as he proves himself generally acceptable to the Afghan people, and able to maintain his throne. But we should distinctly decline to enter into any engagement to support him by force of arms. It is probable that the Ameer will seek a promise that we will not interfere in the internal administration of Afghanistan : and this promise would be a sufficient reply to any such proposal on the part of His Highness.

56. But, in thus determining the basis of an acceptable agreement with the Ameer, much must necessarily be left to the discretion of the Envoy. He must be careful to make it clear that we do not seek to ally ourselves with the Ameer alone, but with the people of Afghanistan ; and that we will not sacrifice either our interests or those of Afghanistan to the personal interests of the Ameer. He must also assure himself, as far as possible, that the Ameer is in a position to carry out any promises he makes, and that his throne shows such reasonable promises of stability as to make it desirable to enter into close relations with him.

57. If the Ameer proves hopelessly estranged, and we fail in all efforts to win him ; or if the Envoy considers that, from any cause, it is not desirable to involve ourselves in engagements with him, we must take immediate steps to neutralize his hostility, and to secure our interests. The best course then open to us would probably be to aim at dethroning him, and replacing him by a candidate more favourable to ourselves. There seems little doubt that we could easily dethrone him, but the results of such action must be well considered. The candidate whose prospects were fairest, and whose interests seemed most allied with ours—the only candidate who could reasonably hope to succeed to all his father's possessions—has just died. Were Yakub Khan abroad, and could we secure him to our interests, he might prove even a better candidate. But this we have no right to anticipate ; though the Envoy, if opportunity offers, might endeavour to open relations with him. What the result of a free contest for the throne, in present circumstances, would be, may perhaps be guessed. Abdul Rahman, supported by Russian influence, would establish himself in the trans-Hindu-Kush provinces as a feudatory of Russia. Herat would probably fall to Persia ; Candahar and Southern Afghanistan to us ; while Cabul would remain a centre of disturbances, struggles for power, and bigoted fanaticism, hostile and dangerous to all neighbours alike, and ultimately we should be obliged to forcibly pacify and hold it. We should, doubtless, after fighting and much trouble, gain our necessary mountain frontier ; but it is not so certain that we should secure the passes and their debouches, and Herat might be lost to us for ever.

58. Meanwhile, the measures which should be immediately adopted on the failure of our mission are, 1st, an armed occupation of the Koorum valley ; 2nd, the concentra-

tion of a force at Quetta sufficient to threaten Candahar; 3rd, the opening of direct negotiations with the various semi-independent tribes along the border, with a view to detaching them from the Ameer's cause. The occupation of the Koorum would be an easy task. It is a comparatively open and fertile valley, with a peaceful and agricultural population, who have been much oppressed by the Ameer, and have long sought to come under our rule. By this route the Khyber Pass and Jellalabad are turned; and a force located at the head of the valley would equally threaten Cabul, Ghuznee, and Jellalabad.

59. As the results of our Khelat policy, the concentration of a force at Quetta can now be effected with the same ease and certainty as at any point in the interior of India, while we should find useful auxiliaries in the Brahuīs, who have already offered to join our standards in the event of a rupture with the Ameer. The Ghilzais, the most important Afghan tribe between Ghuznee and Quetta, have recently sent in a deputation to Quetta, offering their services against the Ameer, and requesting the presence of a British officer; and there can be little doubt that the Khyber tribes, the Kakars, and others would gladly separate themselves from the Ameer, and ally themselves with us. With the high road to Cabul thus open, with the principal cities of Eastern and Southern Afghanistan directly threatened, and the communication between Cabul and Candahar closed by the Ghilzais, the Ameer's power could not stand long. So long as we maintain our threatening position in the Koorum, no candidate hostile to us could establish himself in Cabul; and it is probable that our mere presence there, without further action on our part, would secure the throne for the candidate whom we favour. If we could thereby secure an overwhelming influence at Cabul, giving us at the same time the command of Herat, and of the passes of the Hindu-Kush, while not involving us in responsibilities regarding the Oxus provinces, this would probably be the best solution of all for us. But it may be doubted whether a candidate thus enthroned at Cabul would be able to establish his authority at Herat; where Persia would appear on the scene with decisive effect long before we could approach it. And to recover Herat from Persia, abetted, and perhaps actively aided, by Russia, would be no light task.

60. There still remains the course indicated, of coming to an amicable arrangement with Russia. Russia has before this suggested a partition of Afghanistan; and, whatever views Russian enthusiasts may have on India, there can be little doubt but that she would consent to our occupation of Cabul and Southern Afghanistan, if thereby she could secure the Oxus provinces. That we must offer her some such terms, if the arrangement is to be a pacific and amicable one, is evident; for it is not to be expected that Russia will willingly accept any arrangement so prejudicial to her interests, and incompatible with the realisation of her long cherished hopes, as final and absolute exclusion from the northern provinces of Afghanistan.

61. An arrangement with Russia might be a not undesirable final solution of the Central Asian question, if concluded on the terms already indicated as necessary to our security on this side, viz., the possession by us of the debouches of the Cabul passes, and of Herat. As regards the former, it is probable that Russia, in return for the cession of the Oxus valley, and having regard to the difficulties attending any advance beyond the Hindu-Kush, would accept these conditions; but it is more doubtful whether she would willingly abandon Herat to England, and so finally renounce all hopes of seeing it either in her own hands, or in those of a vassal ally.

62. A most important point to be considered in any such understanding with Russia is, that we must be prepared to act on it immediately. For if, while Russia is left free to advance to the Hindu-Kush, England remains quiet, and content with assurances that the rest of Afghanistan is beyond her sphere of action, we should soon see renewed, and under conditions much more unfavourable to us, the difficulties we are now contending with. Any such treaty with Russia, therefore, must be promptly followed up by the actual and visible occupation of the tract necessary to us. The nature of such occupation would depend on the circumstances under which the agreement with Russia was made, and may be considered later.

63. I conceive, therefore, that our first object should be to use every endeavour to re-establish such relations with the Ameer as will give us due influence in Afghanistan, and for ever exclude Russia therefrom; and that, to effect this, we must appeal both to his fears and to his hopes. Failing in all efforts for this purpose, we shall have to take such steps as may be necessary to protect our own interests, irrespective of his, either by action in Afghanistan, or by direct arrangements with Russia, or both. It remains now to determine the nature of the instructions to be given to the Envoy, and the further measures to be taken, should the mission fail.

Instructions to Envoy.

64. The general character of the instructions to be given to our Envoy may be deduced from what has been said in paras. 51–56. He should, in the first place, condole with the Ameer on his recent heavy loss, and declare the friendly character of the mission, having for its object to clear up the mutual misunderstandings which have arisen since the Ameer last conferred personally with the Viceroy. In proof of the friendly character of the mission, he will point to the selection made of an officer personally known to the Ameer, and whose deputation might be supposed to be specially agreeable to him.

65. If the Russian mission is still at Cabul he will insist on its withdrawal, or, at least, on the Ameer requesting it to withdraw, and renouncing all further communication with it, before entering on the immediate subjects of negotiation. To this condition I attach the highest importance. I think it alike inconsistent with the dignity of our Government, with the line hitherto pursued towards Afghanistan, and with the respect due to the high officer selected as our Envoy, that he should appear in the character of a rival suing for the Ameer's favour; nor could I anticipate any satisfactory results from negotiations conducted under such conditions. It is essential that the Ameer should, from the outset, understand that he must make a definite choice in his alliance; and that he will not be again permitted to play off one Power against another, or prolong a chronic state of uneasiness and uncertainty. The Envoy will, therefore, explain to the Ameer the circumstances of the negotiations entered into by us with Russia, on behalf of Afghanistan, in 1869; and the assurances given, and repeatedly renewed, by Russia regarding non-intervention in Afghanistan; and he will demand the dismissal of the Russian mission.

66. If the Ameer hesitates, the Envoy will place very distinctly before His Highness, and before the principal chiefs and councillors of the kingdom, the probable consequences of a refusal. It would, perhaps, be desirable to communicate this representation to the Russian mission also. But he will discuss no other subject with the Ameer: and if, after reasonable time allowed, the Russian mission still remains in communication with the Ameer, and entertained by the Court of Cabul, our mission will withdraw.

67. If the Russian mission has left before the arrival of our Envoy, or withdraws on his representations, he will then proceed to set forth, but in conciliatory tone, the various unfriendly acts of the Ameer, culminating in the reception of a Russian mission after the rejection of ours; and will ask explanations of this last open affront. The refusal to admit Sir D. Forsyth, and the terms in which that refusal was couched, should be especially emphasized.

68. The Ameer's reply to this will probably be a long indictment against England, and a recapitulation of alleged acts of unfriendliness on our part; to which the Envoy can reply that those misunderstandings are entirely due to the policy of seclusion adopted by the Ameer, and might have been avoided by freer intercourse between his Government and ours. If the Ameer endeavours to fix the discussion on those points the Envoy will say that he has not been informed on them, and that his deputation has for its object the *future* relations between the two Powers, and the prevention of such misunderstandings hereafter.

69. In opening the actual negotiations it should be assumed that all past promises or engagements on our part were abrogated by the Peshawur Conference, and the discovery then made of the different and irreconcilable interpretations put on these verbal engagements by the parties to them; as well as by the Ameer's subsequent unfriendly conduct.

70. The conditions which the Ameer will be required to accept as the basis of future amicable relations are broadly—

- 1st.—An engagement not to receive Russian agents, nor to enter into relations with any Powers under the political influence of Russia, without first consulting us.
- 2nd.—Free access for British missions on special and suitable occasions to Cabul, and to the presence of the Ameer.
- 3rd.—The reception of permanent British agents at Herat and Balkh, or at any points which may be exposed to danger from without. Or else the reception of a permanent British agent at Cabul, with free access for British officers, on special and suitable occasions, to Herat, Balkh, or any other exposed points of the Afghan frontier.

The precise terms of all such engagements must, however, be left to the discretion of the Envoy; provided that no arrangement can be accepted as satisfactory which does not exclude the agents of Russia, and give to us a real and visible preponderance, and recognised position of authority, in Afghanistan. The reception of a permanent British

representative at Cabul has not been put prominently forward, because of the repugnance which the Ameer has, on several occasions, shown to such a proposal. But, if the Envoy finds His Highness not unwilling to accede to it, such an arrangement, coupled with the above-mentioned condition of occasional access to the frontier localities, would be preferable to any other, and might be advantageously substituted for Nos. 2 and 3.

In addition to the above, some satisfactory and effective arrangements should be entered into for keeping open the Khyber Pass; either through the agency of the Ameer, or by our personally dealing with the Khyberees, and relieving the Ameer of all responsibility on their behalf.

71. In return the Envoy may promise as follows:—

1st.—An annual subsidy, not, for the present, exceeding in amount twelve lakhs of rupees.

2nd.—The recognition, by the Indian Government, of the heir formally named by the Ameer with the concurrence of his Sirdars; and the continuance to such heir, on succession, of the subsidy granted to the Ameer.

3rd.—A territorial guarantee against *annexation*.

Much must be left to the discretion of the Envoy in regard to these terms also; but the following indication of the views of Government on the subject may serve to guide him in the negotiations.

72. The Government is prepared to recognize the heir of the Ameer's choice, provided such choice is not distinctly opposed to the national will, and is accepted by the chief nobles of Afghanistan. The Government will formally recognize such heir as successor on the death of the Ameer, and will pay him at once one year's subsidy, to assist him in establishing himself on the throne. But if he proves incapable, and, with these advantages in his favour, cannot maintain his throne, the Indian Government will not interfere by force of arms to reinstate him. It is our earnest desire to abstain from all direct intervention in Afghan affairs, and to maintain the friendly independence of the Afghan State; and it will be pointed out to the Ameer that an armed intervention in favour of any candidate would be inconsistent with these views.

73. The arguments in favour of a territorial guarantee have already been explained. Such guarantee should not be unnecessarily offered by the Envoy; and, if asked for by the Ameer, the Envoy should, in the first place, make him understand that it may entail our exercising a certain control over his foreign policy. But if the Ameer distinctly desires it, it should be frankly and unhesitatingly given; for it is better that it should be refused by the Ameer, on the grounds of the future pretext for interference which it may offer, than that he should be rendered suspicious and distrustful by the provisos under which we endeavour to guard ourselves. The guarantee desired by the Ameer in 1873 was that we should aid him, by arms, money, or troops, to *repel* any invasion of his territory; and this guarantee we may give.

74. It will be evident, however, that this guarantee must directly depend on the admission of officers to the exposed points of the Afghan frontier; and that whatever modifications of the conditions may, in the discretion of the Envoy, be made, these two must stand or fall together. It would perhaps, be to our interest not to ask for an agent at Balkh if the Ameer does not ask for a territorial guarantee; but an agent at Herat is of the highest importance; and some arrangement giving adequate expression to our undisputed influence at Herat must, in any case, be insisted on, whether the territorial guarantee be given or withheld.

75. If the Ameer refers to Quetta, and our action in Beloochistan, he must be distinctly informed that we can recognize no right on his part to question our dealings in that country. He may be told that the troops at Quetta were stationed there in accordance with a treaty of more than 20 years' standing with the Ruler of Khelat, renewed two years' ago; and in pursuance of the policy determined on, in accord with the Khan and his Sirdars, for the pacification of the country and the protection of the trade of the Bolan Pass. Assurances may further be given him against any hostile intentions in that direction; and the Envoy, if he thinks fit, may inform the Ameer that the mission to Cabul, proposed two years ago and rejected by His Highness, was to explain to the Ameer, beforehand and unreservedly, the nature and objects of our policy in Beloochistan, and its thoroughly friendly and unaggressive character. In fact, the presence of British troops at Quetta, so far from being *intended* as a menace to the Ameer's *real* interests, practically increased our means of assisting His Highness in the defence of those interests against designs on the part of Russia, which, though probably unknown to the Ameer, were not unknown to the Viceroy before that measure was adopted. If, therefore, the presence of British troops at Quetta has been to His Highness a cause of apprehension, this is entirely due to his own conduct in refusing us

the opportunity we sought of removing every cause of apprehension ; and not to any unfriendly or inconsiderate disregard of it on the part of the British Government. Our Envoy, however, must at once disallow, and decline to discuss, any claim advanced by the Ameer to a voice in the affairs of Beloochistan.

76. If the Ameer asks for arms he must be informed that such assistance will be considered in connexion with the arrangements for the defence of his frontiers.

77. On minor questions of opening the country to the English, and removing trade restrictions, it will not be desirable to press the Ameer ; though it will be extremely advantageous to secure such concessions if the Ameer seems not unwilling to grant them.

78. Lastly, the Envoy may most emphatically assure the Ameer, and impress on His Highness by every means in his power, that, so long as he proves himself friendly and loyal to us, it is our desire to see him prosperous and independent ; and to promote and confirm his power alike against internal troubles and external dangers.

79. But if it appears that we cannot find, in a friendly alliance with the Ameer, the necessary security for our north-western frontier, we must then be prepared to take immediate steps for making the security of that frontier independent of him. The military measures proposed for this purpose have already been indicated ; viz., the advance of a column to the head of the Koorum Valley, and the assembling at Quetta of a force sufficient to threaten, and, if necessary, occupy, Candahar. For the first purpose 4,000 men might suffice, and for the second about 10,000, exclusive of the present garrison of Quetta. Orders have already been issued to detail these forces. But, as it is indispensable, both for the security of the mission, and for the full trial of the pacific policy which is its object, that nothing should now be done which could in any way be interpreted to indicate hostile intentions on our part, I have withheld my sanction from any active preparations.

80. It will be seen, from what has been already said, as well as from the smallness of the proposed military preparations, that no invasion and subjugation of Afghanistan is contemplated. Such a measure would at once rekindle the animosities of that fanatical people, and probably destroy any party we may now have there, uniting the whole nation against us. It would require military operations on a very different scale from that now contemplated, with a proportionately heavy expenditure ; and it would probably entail a permanent military occupation of the country ;—a step which, however feasible from a military point of view, would involve financial burdens we could hardly bear.

81. Moreover, remembering always the object in view, which is to secure certain points necessary to our safety in India, we must consider whether these points, and Herat especially, *would* be certainly secured by such a measure. If we invade Afghanistan she will immediately throw herself into the arms of Russia ; and even if Russia, unwilling to involve herself at this moment in a great European war, does not assist her, she will certainly assist her with money, arms, officers, and advice. At the Court of Persia, according to the reports of our Minister, Russian influence is paramount, and British influence *nil*. Persia has always coveted Herat, and asserted a claim to it ; and it is more than probable that, if instigated and supported by Russia, she would be prepared to resist our occupation of it by force of arms. It may be doubted whether any force we can put in the field would be strong enough to march from the Indus to Herat, a distance of 750 miles, carrying with it heavy artillery, and all the necessary appurtenances for a difficult siege ; to cover its flanks along the whole of this long and exposed line against the Afghans on one side, and the Persians on the other ; and, finally to undertake, in the presence of an equal or superior Persian force, the siege of an important fortress defended by European arms, officers, and skill.

82. For these reasons I view an invasion of Afghanistan, like a war with Russia, as a measure which may become unavoidable, and must, therefore, be taken into consideration in our forecast ; but which is only to be resorted to in case of absolute necessity, when all others have failed. Our immediate object should be to apply such pressure only as may be necessary, either to bring the Ameer to a truer sense of his interest, or to dethrone him and give an opportunity to the party which still remains favourable to us at Cabul. And such pressure should be applied in the directions, and in the manner, which seem least likely to bring us into collision with the Afghans, or arouse their fanatical spirit of independence.

83. It is possible that the evidence, which the action proposed in paras. 58-9 would afford the Ameer, of our own earnestness, and of his powerlessness to oppose us, might lead him to re-consider his position and make overtures to us. In that case we should be most favourably placed to dictate our terms. As a preliminary, we should require

the Ameer to come personally to our head-quarters, or into British territory, to negotiate; and we should insist on the retention of a British force in the Koorum Valley. Thus firmly established, in close proximity to his capital, we should be in a position to renew or modify our previous proposals, under conditions far more favourable to us.

84. If the Ameer still remains hostile, we should take no further action against him, beyond entering into negotiations with all the tribes and parties in Afghanistan who are unfriendly to him; and there is little doubt that his kingdom would fall to pieces of itself. Nor could any candidate, hostile to us, maintain himself on the throne of Cabul; which would thus necessarily fall to a successor friendly to us. To such successor we should endeavour, by every means in our power, to secure the whole of Southern and Western Afghanistan; but we should decline to incur any responsibilities for the northern provinces; and we should insist on maintaining our position in the Koorum, and on having representatives at Cabul, Candahar, and Herat.

85. If, in the course of the convulsions which may be expected to precede and follow the fall of the Ameer, Herat should fall into the hands of Persia,—a contingency already indicated as probable, we should then, as the ally of the Ruler of Cabul, insist on its immediate restoration. This, however, is to be attained, not by an expedition marched across the whole breadth of Afghanistan, but by pressure applied to the exposed southern provinces of Persia, as in 1857. Russia cannot there help her; and Persia must either submit to the loss of some of her most important provinces, or resign Herat. Nor could we establish ourselves in Herat under more favourable conditions than those created by a treaty, in which we appear as the friends of Afghanistan, and the recognized liberators and guardians of Herat against Persia.

86. Thus far, I have practically left Russia out of consideration, and considered Afghanistan alone. We must now consider what will probably be Russia's action, and what should be our relations with her. In the first contingency, *viz.*, that our mission succeeds in displacing the Russian mission and securing the cordial alliance of the Ameer, it is not likely that Russia will venture on any direct hostile action. England and Afghanistan united would be far too powerful for Russia on the Oxus, as the latter well knows; and any hostile action on her part would risk the loss of the Khanates and her expulsion from Central Asia. When the treaty has been completed, it might be desirable to communicate it to Russia, and obtain her concurrence in the guarantee undertaken; but rather as a matter of diplomatic courtesy, than for any strength or security we should gain by her concurrence.

87. If the mission fails, and our troops advance to the Koorum, it is probable that Russia's reply will be to advance her columns to the Oxus, and, perhaps, across into Balkh and Badakhshan. It would undoubtedly be advantageous to interpose at once between Cabul and Russia, by seizing the Bamian Pass, but considering the distance of Bamian from Peshawur and Tashkend respectively, I cannot think this point likely to be gravely threatened. On the other hand, I consider it above all things desirable that we should not engage in an open invasion of Afghanistan, and thus give Russia the chance of appearing as her ally and guardian. I conceive, therefore, that we should not attempt any hostile advance on Cabul, but should still confine our action to strengthening our position in the Koorum, and detaching the neighbouring tribes from the cause of the Ameer.

88. The Russian column assembled at Djam can hardly exceed, and probably falls short of, 5,000 men. Such a force could hardly, in any circumstances, dare to push on to Bamian, 500 miles from all possible support, with the probability of there meeting a superior British force. But, even if it does, before it reaches the pass, one of the two contingencies discussed in paras. 83 and 84 will probably have occurred—either the Ameer will have changed his tone, and accepted our alliance; or he will have lost his throne, and been succeeded by a ruler friendly to us. In either case, we shall then be in a position to repel a Russian advance, without involving ourselves in a hostile invasion of Afghanistan.

89. But, in any case, the time will have come for opening negotiations with Russia and determining the future line of demarcation in Central Asia. Russia is not now in a position to contest supremacy with us on the Oxus, unless we commit the fatal mistake of driving Afghanistan bodily into her arms by an invasion. Russia knows this, and knows also that, if once our troops come into collision with hers, our advance is not likely to stop at the Oxus. It will, therefore, in effect remain with us to determine our ultimate boundary; and I would practically draw it at the Hindu-Kush, while requiring, however, the withdrawal of Russian troops behind the Oxus. The terms I would, in this case, offer Russia are the acknowledgment by us of her protectorate over

Bokhara, and all the country north of the Oxus, on the understanding that she acknowledges a similar protectorate on our part over Afghanistan proper; and that the limit of advance for the troops on the two sides should be the Oxus and the Hindu-Kush (including Bamian) respectively—either Power reserving to itself full liberty of action, should the other pass these bounds.

90. There remains the all-important question of Herat—the turning point of all negotiation and all action in Central Asia. It may be doubted whether Russia, weak as she now is in Central Asia, would go to war for Herat, unless with the assured support of Afghanistan, as well as Persia. The arrangement above proposed would still hold out hopes to her of ultimately gaining the line of communication between the Caspian and Turkistan, and the frontier of the Hindu-Kush Mountains—the avowed objects of her Central Asian policy; and it is, therefore, probable that she would not break off negotiations on this point.

91. Lastly, it remains for us to consider the military and financial bearings of the policy now discussed. If the mission succeeds, our frontier will be stronger, and safer, than it has been at any previous time. Russia will have received an open check, and the relations between the Ameer and ourselves will be closer than they have yet been; and this, coupled with our most satisfactory position in Khelat, cannot but re-act favourably throughout the frontier. An agent, with a small escort, will be located at Cabul or Herat, and possibly others at Balkh and Fyzabad, but the cost of such agencies will be small; and no increase of military expenditure need be contemplated in this case.

92. If the mission fails a force will be moved to the head of the Koorum Valley, and that valley occupied: and, whether the Ameer subsequently accepts our alliance, or whether another ruler, under our auspices, succeeds him at Cabul, this force should never be withdrawn. It is probable that 6,000 men will suffice, both to form the necessary cantonment at the head of the valley, and to protect its communications with our present frontier. But, as a force so placed will relieve the pressure on Peshawur, and in other ways strengthen our frontier line, a large part of it might be drawn from Peshawur, and from its support Rawul Pindi; and such occupation need add little, if at all, to the permanent establishment maintained in India.

93. The force to be collected at Quetta, and possibly to move on Candahar, is intended as a demonstration only, and its functions will have ceased when either contingency above discussed has been brought about. The force might consequently be then withdrawn. But the opportunity thus offered should be taken to permanently strengthen our garrison there. This also might be done at little, if any, additional cost, by drawing troops from stations further inland, where their presence is no longer specially required.

94. To advance our garrisons further, and occupy Candahar and Herat, would doubtless entail a large increase of force, and consequently of military expenditure. But I anticipate no necessity for such permanent occupation, even of Candahar, unless we should unfortunately find ourselves embarked in a great war with Afghanistan. This contingency we may reasonably hope to avoid. If, as the result of amicable arrangements with Afghanistan, or with Russia, or with both, we find it necessary to establish ourselves visibly at Herat and the Hindu-Kush passes, we should do so by the location of agencies, with small escorts only, at those points, supported, under certain contingencies, by locally raised corps, paid from British funds. But such local forces should in no case exceed two or three thousand men in all, and being less costly than regular troops, the additional charge would not be great.

95. It is not by a military occupation of Afghanistan that our position there is best won and secured; nor do I conceive that it would be desirable, even if possible, to undertake to garrison Herat for many years to come. Against Persia it is best secured by our known power to invade her southern coasts; against Russia, by the risks which a war would entail on her exposed frontier in Turkistan.

96. I have thus endeavoured to carry out the task I originally set before myself, *viz.*, “to define clearly the nature of the problem before us, showing how it has arisen, and “to examine the various possible solutions which present themselves.” In doing so, I have necessarily looked a long way ahead, and speculated, perhaps rashly, on the future, for many contingencies, not foreseen in this Minute, may and probably will arise. But I conceive that such forecasts, however defective, have their use in guiding our general lines of policy. Above all, I have endeavoured to show that war, whether with Russia or with Afghanistan, would be the most expensive, as it would probably be the least satisfactory and least statesmanlike solution. I recognise fully the necessity that may arise for referring to the arbitration of the sword; but I earnestly hope and trust that

we shall be able to attain by peaceable means a settlement of the questions considered in this Minute, which shall be alike becoming to the dignity of the great British Empire, conducive to the security of that part of it specially committed to our charge, and beneficial to the neighbouring States concerned.

LYTTON.

4-9-78.

Enclosure 2 in No. 1.

No. 1912P.

From the SECRETARY to the GOVERNMENT of INDIA to His Excellency SIR NEVILLE
BOWLES CHAMBERLAIN, G.C.B., G.C.S.I.

SIR,

Simla, the 7th September 1878.

I AM directed to inclose to your Excellency a copy of a Resolution of the Government of India, appointing you to proceed upon a Special Mission to the Amir of Kabul and its dependencies, as Envoy-Extraordinary on the part of the Viceroy and Governor-General of India. The officers who have been attached to your Embassy, and to your personal staff, are named in the Resolution.

2. I am to request that your Excellency will have the goodness to arrange for your departure for Kabul from Peshawar, where the requisite preparations for your equipment and escort will have been made, so soon after the 16th September as may be practicable; and that you will travel to Kabul by the route of the Khaibar Pass and Jelalabad. The Government of India have no information leading to the belief that your journey through Afghanistan may be interrupted or opposed; but it is now many years since English officers have traversed that part of the country; while political exigencies may make it necessary that you should cross the frontier before any formal reply can be received from the Amir to the Viceroy's letter which notified that an Envoy would be sent. And the same exigencies, with the general importance of your Mission, require that your Excellency should reach Kabul speedily. If, therefore, any attempt is made by the local officers or authorities upon the road to delay or dispute your passage, you will be justified in disregarding dilatory excuses, expostulations, or refusals to authorise your advance, made on the pretext that orders are wanting, or are adverse. You will assume the responsibility of overstepping such opposition, and you will continue your march, with your escort, unless you are met by serious resistance. In such a contingency his Excellency the Viceroy leaves everything to your discretion; though if arms are used or any hostile demonstration is made in earnest by persons responsible to the Kabul Government, your Excellency is instructed to return.

3. His Excellency the Viceroy has directed me to communicate to your Excellency the following instructions for your guidance in the exercise, upon your arrival at Kabul, of the full powers with which you have been invested. It is only necessary to trace in outline the general policy of the British Government in regard to the present state of affairs in Afghanistan; and to fix the essential points toward which negotiations, if you enter into any, should be directed. All details, and all questions as to the ways and means toward the accomplishment of the general objects of your Mission, are left entirely to your Excellency's judgment and decision. Very much will obviously depend upon the actual condition of parties and internal politics at Kabul, and upon the position and behaviour of the Amir himself. Upon all these matters the information now before the Government of India is still very imperfect, and it will be part of your Excellency's commission to ascertain fully and precisely how these matters stand.

4. Your Excellency's reception in full durbar by His Highness will afford an opportunity for declaring publicly the friendly character of your Mission, and of announcing that its object is to clear up the mutual misunderstandings which have arisen since the Amir conferred personally with the Earl of Mayo at Umballa. In the less formal interviews which may be expected to follow, your Excellency will be able to impress upon the Amir and his Ministers the necessity of bringing to an end these misunderstandings, which are leading to serious political complications, by a frank and outspoken exchange of views. The immediate cause of your Excellency's deputation to Kabul may be stated plainly to be the arrival at the Amir's capital of a Russian Mission, and its reception by His Highness soon after his persistent refusal to receive British officers. According to international usages throughout the world, this must be regarded by the Government of India as an affront, which requires explanation and remedy. The fact

(which must be known to the Amir) that the Russians have entered Afghanistan in open contravention of promises made by their Government to England, gives to their presence at Kabul a specially ambiguous import. In short, your Excellency will show that these proceedings, and the whole course of recent events in Central Asia, in the vicinity of the Afghan frontiers, have materially affected the political situation; insomuch that the British Government is now very closely interested in ascertaining without delay what interpretation is to be placed upon the new aspect of affairs, and what are to be henceforward its relations with the Amir. On recent occasions the conduct and demeanour of the Amir toward this Government have been far from satisfactory; and this latest incident has brought the proceedings of His Highness to a point at which they can be no longer treated by His Excellency the Viceroy with indifference. The highest interests of both countries demand that the question of their future reciprocal relations shall be brought to a definite understanding: and this, it may be said, is the object of your Excellency's Mission.

5. It is possible that the Amir may be found disinclined to explain or to make any conciliatory reply; and that he and his Ministers may assume a tone decisively significant of unfriendly resolutions. Your Excellency may thus be given to understand, or may gather from other quarters, that the Kabul Government is already pledged to a policy adverse to British interests. The Amir, his advisers, and sirdars, should in that case be desired to consider very earnestly the grave consequences which must flow out of a complete and open estrangement and separation of interests between India and Afghanistan. If nevertheless it becomes clear that the Amir has views or engagements incompatible with the revival of satisfactory relations with the British Government, then your Excellency's Mission is terminated, and you will return to India. The test of the Amir's real disposition and intentions will be his agreement or refusal to require any Russian Agency that may at the time be in Afghanistan, to leave his territory.

6. If your Excellency finds that the Amir is disposed to realize the value of a reconciliation with this Government, and the risks of a rupture, and to negotiate for the restoration of political connections; His Highness may then be moved to examine the actual situation in all its bearings, and to appreciate the urgent necessity of some definite and comprehensive arrangement. No arrangement, it may be observed, can be satisfactory, which does not accord to the British Government a recognized position of diplomatic authority in regard to the external relations of Afghanistan, to the exclusion of the political action or influence of Russia in the country. The primary basis, therefore, of an alliance is that the Amir shall engage not to admit within his dominions any Russian envoy or emissary. It will accordingly be an essential preliminary to any negotiations that the Amir shall agree to take such steps as may be necessary for the withdrawal from his capital of any Russian officers or agents actually at Kabul, having due regard to their personal safety and dignity; that he shall desire them to leave his territory, and that, in case of their demur or refusal to comply, he shall break off all communications with them, direct or indirect. And your Excellency is authorised to assure the Amir that in taking this step he may rely upon the support of the British Government, and upon their complete protection of him from any injurious consequences which he may apprehend.

7. The second essential condition is that the Amir shall agree to permit the residence within his dominions of English officers accredited to him by the British Government. Experience has proved that for the prevention of misunderstandings in future, and in order that the British alliance may be recognized and made manifest in an indisputable manner, it is absolutely necessary that the British Government shall be adequately represented within Afghanistan. It would be in accordance with the general diplomatic usage among States, and it would be for several reasons advantageous, if the British representative were stationed at the Amir's capital or head-quarters, where he might have ready access to His Highness as occasion might require. But previous discussions of this point have elicited from the Amir expressions of particular disinclination to an English Resident at Kabul: and if these objections are repeated and adhered to, the alternative of placing agents at Herat and Balkh may be accepted. Under this latter arrangement, however, your Excellency will stipulate for free access to Kabul, and to the Amir's presence, of special Envoys from India, whenever this may be thought necessary by the British Government. If, on the other hand, a Resident is placed at the capital only, he must be at liberty to detach officers to visit any points upon the Afghan frontier at which their temporary presence may be rendered necessary by the condition, at the time, of external affairs. Thus the establishment of a single Resident at the capital will necessitate free access, for specific reasons, to the frontier; while the location of officers upon the frontier will necessitate free access, upon special occasions

to the capital. The precise terms of these arrangements are left to Your Excellency's discretion, upon the understanding that they will provide for the complete exclusion of the Agents of Russia, and for securing to the British Government a real and visible preponderance in Afghanistan, by the establishment of British representatives in the country.

8. If the Amir accepts the foregoing essential conditions of an alliance with the British Government, the principal concessions which Your Excellency is empowered to make in return are as follow :—

- (1) An annual subsidy—not exceeding, for the present, twelve lakhs—may be promised.
- (2) The British Government will undertake to recognize the heir-presumptive to the rulership of Kabul and its dependencies, who shall be formally named, as such, by the Amir Sher Ali during his lifetime. And the subsidy will be continued to the Amir's successor thus recognized, so long as he shall continue to fulfil the conditions of the Treaty of Alliance in its entirety.
- (3) If any attempt be made at any future time, by Russia or by any State under Russian influence, to take possession of any part of the territories now under the acknowledged jurisdiction of the Amir of Kabul, the British Government engages to join the Amir in defending his territories by force of arms.

9. Here, again, much must be left to the discretion of Your Excellency in regard to the terms and form of these concessions ; but the following indication of the views of the Government of India on the subject may serve to guide you in the negotiations :—

The Government are prepared to recognize the heir of the Amir's choice, provided such choice is not distinctly opposed to the national will, or to the known rules and principles which have always governed successions in the Amir's dynasty. But if the heir chosen prove, with the advantages of our recognition in his favour, unable to maintain his throne, the Indian Government will not interfere by force of arms to reinstate him. It is our earnest desire to abstain from all direct intervention in Afghan affairs, and to maintain the friendly independence of the Afghan State ; and Your Excellency will point out to the Amir that armed intervention in the event of a contest for the rulership, would be inconsistent with these views.

The engagement to defend the Amir's territory should not be unnecessarily offered to him, since a preferable arrangement would be the conclusion of an alliance upon more general terms, so long as the essential conditions already specified are included. If, however, the guarantee is asked for by the Amir, or if Your Excellency judges that to offer it is necessary, Your Excellency will in the first place explain to the Amir that it may unavoidably entail our exercising a certain additional degree of control over his foreign policy. If the Amir still distinctly desires the guarantee, it should be frankly and unreservedly given. But the guarantee must directly depend on, and be linked with, the admission of British officers to reside, as political representatives, either at Kabul or at certain important points upon the Afghan frontier. Of these points Herat is the most important.

10. If the Amir alludes to Quetta, and to our action in Biluchistan, he should be distinctly informed that we can recognize no right on his part to question our dealings in that country. He may be told that the troops at Quetta have been stationed there in accordance with a treaty of more than twenty years' standing, renewed two years ago, with the Khan of Khelat, and in pursuance of the policy adopted, in concert with the Khan and his Sirdars, for the pacification of the country and the protection of trade. And Your Excellency may see fit to add that one of the objects of the British mission to Kabul which was proposed to, and declined by, the Amir in 1876, was to explain our intentions regarding Biluchistan, and to give the Amir satisfactory assurances on these points, before taking the action of which His Highness is now understood to complain. But it should be intimated that the time for discussion of these affairs is now past.

11. If the Amir asks to be supplied with arms, Your Excellency will reply that the British Government does not consider necessary any separate or immediate stipulation upon this head ; and that the point is reserved as falling within the general question of the military dispositions to be taken for the defence of Afghan territory in case of war.

12. On minor questions of opening the country to the English, and of allowing free transit of commerce through the Khaibar Pass, it may not be desirable to press the Amir ; though some agreement for improving the existing state of things would be advantageous, and may be proposed to the Amir if the opportunity appears favourable. The subject may be brought forward in connection with any discussion that may be raised regarding the amount of the annual subsidy.

13. I am directed to send herewith a letter from His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General to the Amir, which I am to request your Excellency to deliver personally. A copy is also inclosed, for your Excellency's information.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. C. LYALL,
Secretary to the Government of India.

No. 2.

MEMORANDUM ON THE RECTIFICATION OF THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER OF INDIA.

IN giving an opinion on the question of the rectification of the North-west frontier of India, it is necessary to suppose the existence of some cause demanding such a rectification; it is likewise difficult to make such a subject intelligible without entering into political as well as strategical reasons. In what follows I have, therefore, ventured to deal with the matter from both points of view.

If, for instance, we were in friendly relationship with Afghanistan, and we had merely to guard our frontier from the occasional raids of the independent mountain tribes located in the mountains running parallel to it, then a very limited rectification would, in my opinion, be required either for political or strategical reasons, but recent events which have occurred in Afghanistan have shown beyond the possibility of a doubt that we must be prepared to protect our North-west frontier against a powerful European nation, which unless prevented could place a formidable army, complete in all the scientific warlike appliances of the present day, in a position from which she could make an attack upon our Indian empire.

This position is the valley of Herat; and I think it is now generally admitted that from such a base only could Russia collect an army of sufficient strength to seriously menace our Eastern empire. Such being granted, I consider that any rectification of our North-west frontier must allow of our occupying a position in advance of our present one which would, in case of war, permit of our obtaining possession of Herat before a Russian force could do so.

I do not think, however, that that Power could attempt such an enterprise until she had gained possession of Merv, which, however, may, I think, be anticipated at no distant date both from the direction of the valley of the Attrek and from the Oxus.

I will, therefore, suppose Russia in possession of the Turkoman country, including Merv, and that the rectification of our present North-west frontier is to be based upon that hypothesis. Under such conditions, Russia would be about 220 miles from Herat, which must of course be assumed to be garrisoned by a friendly Afghan force, advised by British officers. We must, therefore, find some good strategical position beyond our present border that would enable us to arrive before that city in time to prevent it from falling into the hands of the above Power in case of sudden war.

Such a position, in my opinion, can only be found at Kandahar, from which we should command strategically and politically the whole of Afghanistan, and the causes which have led to the late complications with that country certainly render such a command essentially necessary to us.

Kandahar possesses all the requirements for forming a strong military position; its situation is easily defensible, it has a plentiful supply of water, the climate is salubrious, and what is of the greatest importance, the inhabitants are less fanatical and hostile to us than are any others to be found in Afghanistan. It further commands all the principal roads leading towards India; it is 350 miles from Herat (by a road along which a carriage has been driven), 230 from Kabul, and about 150 from Quetta. It is also generally understood that there exists no road by which an army could reach Kabul from Merv, except through Herat and Kandahar, or viâ the Oxus and Balkh; the Oxus viâ the latter city is 220 miles distant from Kabul, and the road leads over the Bamian Pass, one of the worst in Afghanistan. A force from Kandahar could, therefore, arrive at Kabul as soon as one from the banks of the Oxus, having a far easier road to march.

Again, a force stationed at Candahar would command the north-west entrance of all the passes leading into British India and situated between the Bolan and the Khyber.

If, therefore, it is admitted for the above principally strategical reasons, that the occupation of Kandahar by a British force is necessary for the future defence of our Indian Empire, the first considerations will be its communication with that country.

Starting from our frontier town of Jacobabad, and passing through the province of Cutch Gundava, we reach at a distance of 90 miles, the town of Dadur, at the southern entrance of the Bolan Pass; the above town it is to be hoped will soon be connected

with Jacobabad by rail. A further distance of about 60 miles brings us to the summit of the Bolan Pass, from whence to Quetta is a distance of about 25 miles, over a level plain. A tramway should at once be constructed across this.

As, in the event of Kandahar being occupied, the position of Quetta would become most important, a strongly entrenched camp should there be formed, containing an arsenal, storehouses, and barracks. Fortunately the configuration of the surrounding country is such that a very little engineering skill would render such a position impregnable. The force stationed here would form the main support of the garrison of Kandahar.

The great deficiency at Quetta is fuel and forage during the winter, but as coal has been found near the Bolan it is to be hoped that it may soon be utilized; as for forage, the only means of meeting the want is to store chopped straw and dried lucerne, and to keep as small a force of cavalry as is possible during the winter months.

From Quetta to Kandahar a good bridged road should be constructed, the distance being about 150 miles, and on it fortified stations for its protection. The Kojuk Pass, over which the road would be carried, is the only physical difficulty to be met with, but is not of a serious nature.

On the whole of this line from Jacobabad to Kandahar, of about 325 miles, it would be necessary to liberally subsidize the tribes for police purposes. From our own border to Quetta there would, I conceive, be no difficulty in doing so, owing to the great foresight of the late General Jacob, and to the admirable system of frontier administration which he established, and which is now showing such favourable results. From Quetta to Kandahar I am less acquainted with the character of the people. I should, however, imagine that a policy of liberality, firmness, and justice would have the same effect upon them as it has had upon the Balooch.

In the above I have sketched briefly the communications between our frontier post of Jacobabad and Kandahar, and which are situated beyond Indian limits. Those within our territory are under as favourable conditions as could be wished. I take for granted that the railway between Sukkur on the Indus, one of the termini of the Indus Valley Railway, and Jacobabad is completed; this will place the latter frontier station in direct railway communication with the seaport of Kurrachee, and as the improvements made in the harbour of that port allow of vessels of a draught of 28 feet crossing the bar, the Indian troop ships would find no difficulty in entering it. Supposing, therefore, that each of these five vessels could convey 1,500 men (infantry), these 7,500 men would be landed at Kurrachee, via the Suez Canal, in about 18 days, from Malta.

From Kurrachee to Dadur, a distance of about 500 miles, ought not to exceed 48 hours in transit; from thence to Quetta would be a march of six days; and on to Kandahar, at an average rate of 10 miles per diem, would take 15 days more; in fact, a regiment leaving Malta ought to arrive in six weeks at Kandahar. Such a rapid means of reinforcement would be of essential service should political circumstances at any time render it unadvisable to weaken the garrison of British troops in India. It must also be borne in mind that the River Indus has a powerful steam flotilla at the disposal of the State, the steamers of which run between Kotree, Sukkur, and Mooltan.

Having thus shown that no very great difficulties are to be encountered in maintaining the communications between Kandahar and British territory, I am most strongly of opinion that no further rectification of the North-west frontier would be required so far as placing any other military posts in advance of that frontier.

Several passes between the Bolan and Khyber are known to debouch into the valley of the Indus, but with the exception of the latter, the exact value of each as a practicable route for an invading army is unknown, but whatever their advantages for such a purpose may be, their north-west entrances are to be found in Afghanistan, and a force stationed at Kandahar, and able to be reinforced to any strength, would command them all. At Peshawur we know that the Khyber is practicable, although an invading army of any strength would find extreme difficulty in debouching; nevertheless, a strongly entrenched camp might here be formed to meet every emergency.

The same precaution might be adopted with reference to the other passes I have mentioned, and the nature of the defences would depend upon the practicability of the passes whose debouchures they would have to guard.

Any attempt to push forward military posts into those passes with a view either to defence, or to overawing the independent mountain tribes, would only, I believe, lead to constant irritation, and to frequent punitive expeditions.

It might be asked, if such is my opinion, why I have advocated the occupation of such a distant post as Kandahar. My reply is that, in addition to political reasons demanding it, the Belooch tribes through which the greater part of our communication

would be are essentially different in character from those on the Punjab frontier. The Belooch, although a Mahomedan, is not a religious fanatic, and he bears no hostile feeling towards Europeans. Further, in dealing with these tribes, we have in the Khan of Khelat a central authority to whom we can look, and to whom all Belooch tribes acknowledge an allegiance. British officers composing the Sind Frontier Force have for years been in the habit of traversing all parts of Beloochistan, either on patrolling duty or in search of sport, and they have never met with anything but kindness at the hands of the inhabitants. An experience of 20 years has, indeed, proved to me that under good management the Belooch can be trusted under any circumstances, their loyalty and devotion having on many occasions been remarkable towards those by whom they have been well treated and in whom they have confidence.

But can such be said of the Patan tribes? They have no acknowledged head; even their tribal chiefs receive only a nominal obedience; they are, as a rule, fanatics in religion, treacherous, revengeful, and totally untrustworthy; they hate all Europeans, and the life of a British officer entering their mountains is as insecure now as it was 30 years ago. Their only virtue is personal courage. Such races are, I consider, one of the best defences that we could have in the rear and flanks of an invading army, while the best plan that we can adopt towards them is to keep them at a distance.

In dealing with the defences of our frontier under any condition, I would urge the absolute necessity of good lateral communications; I look to these as most essential, and I consider it beyond dispute that much of the success of the guarding of the Sind frontier was due to General Jacob's foresight in at once connecting his outposts by good bridged roads, so that the patrols from each post could meet each other at all seasons, as well as allowing of one post supporting the other in cases of emergency.

These frontier roads also exert a considerable moral effect over the robber tribes. Many a party of marauding horsemen has been stopped on coming across a made road; they know that if they cross this well marked line they are committing themselves, and once across they never know when they may not meet with British troops, or whether their retreat may not be cut off. I would therefore consider it an essential condition in the defence of the frontier that a good bridged road of not less than 40 feet in breadth should be constructed the whole length of the border from Jacobabad to Peshawur, and that this road should, if possible, mark the limits of our boundary, and on which our outposts should be built.

I would add it as my opinion that this line of outposts should be entrusted to the charge of the regular army only, and that the Native police should act within this line solely for civil purposes; that what is now called the Native militia should be disbanded; and that all the inhabitants, instead of being permitted to bear arms, should be disarmed and encouraged to turn their energies to agricultural pursuits.

I would likewise do away with all local forces, excepting the Guide Corps, placing the entire frontier under the Commander-in-Chief, and making the whole Native army take its turn of frontier duty; no better school for soldiers could be found, and I see no reason why the whole army should not partake of the advantage of such teaching.

The mountain tribes beyond our outposts should be informed that we had no wish to injure them so long as they left us alone, and that we would allow no armed man to cross our frontier, and that anyone who attempted to do so would be treated as an enemy; unarmed they should be allowed to pass for all purposes, in fact, encouraged to do so.

Such a system would, no doubt, at first be expensive on account of the number of troops it would require to maintain it, but if carried out systematically and with firmness, the cost would in the end, by securing peace, be amply repaid.

In the above remarks, I have not ventured upon any suggestion as to what number of troops would be required to hold Kandahar and its communication with India, because such a question could only be decided by political considerations, and the terms on which we occupied a position in Afghanistan.

Before concluding, I should wish to glance at the political conditions of the occupation I have advocated.

I have hitherto in every way deprecated any interference in the affairs of, or any advance into, Afghanistan, and I should have continued to do so, had not the undisguised hostile action of Russia in that country forced upon me the conviction that the time had come when we must take precautionary measures in some form; but I am still of opinion that the most limited occupation that will meet the circumstances of the case will be the best for all parties.

I have, however, no doubt in my mind that, for the future, we must hold such a position in Afghanistan as will render our influence supreme, and any other power impossible,

and I believe that by such means only can we secure ourselves against Russian intrigue, and prevent the two nations from drifting into war at some future time.

The very fact of taking up such a position as will ensure that supremacy beyond discussion will tend more to prevent the chance of war than anything else.

But to accomplish this, I think all our experience of Asiatics teaches us that we must be amongst the people whom we wish to influence, and that such influence in Afghanistan can no longer be exerted from Calcutta or from Simla.

As an example of this, we may take Beloochistan, conterminous since 1843 with our Sind frontier. Forty years ago, nowhere could a country more unfriendly disposed towards us have been found, as was proved in the conduct of its ruler towards our troops during the last Afghan war.

Yet, at the present moment, it would be difficult to show a country more loyally inclined towards us; and this change has been accomplished gradually and without any show of violence on our part, but, on the contrary, by a policy which, viewed as a whole, has been firm and generous both towards the ruler and the people. There has been no necessity for annexation, although we occupy a military position within the country by right of treaty, but also with the full concurrence of both its ruler and its people.

I see no reason why the application of similar principles should not prove equally successful in Afghanistan.

I consider the annexation of Afghanistan to be quite uncalled for under existing circumstances, and that it should be avoided by every means, both for financial as well as political reasons.

At the same time, it is an essential condition to our holding a position in the country that the ruler and people of the country should be in the most friendly relations with us.

I assume that the time is fast approaching when a ruler of some sort must be found to occupy the throne of Kabul, in which case a treaty, such as that we now possess with Khelat, might form the basis of our new relations with the Afghans.

By a clause in this treaty, we might hold Kandahar as we now do Quetta in Beloochistan, and it is to be hoped that from such a position we may gradually but surely exert such an influence over the whole country as will make the inhabitants our friends.

That considerable difficulties would have to be encountered at first there can be no doubt, but as we have won our position in India by overcoming such difficulties, I see no reason to despair in this case.

I would add, in addition to the political reasons I have already given for advocating the presence of a British force at Kandahar, that the influence exerted by it would not be confined to Afghanistan, but would extend throughout Persia, and materially strengthen our position in that country. All who are acquainted with the subject are well aware that our influence at Teheran has long been waning, not from any dislike to England, but from a feeling that we were unable, or perhaps unwilling, to assist her in case she resisted the demands of Russia.

I have not touched on commercial topics, yet there can be no doubt of their vast importance in the consideration of such a question; the very fact of maintaining a safe line of road direct from Kandahar to the seaport of Kurrachee, free from all vexatious transit duties, will give a great impetus to trade between Europe and Central Asia, and as this trade increases year by year, so will the civilisation of the people amongst whom it spreads.

(Signed) HENRY GREEN, Major-General
(retired).

30th December 1878.

No. 3.

MEMORANDUM ON THE STRATEGICAL AND POLITICAL VALUE OF KANDAHAR AS A POSITION.

COVERING as it does the roads from Eastern Persia and Herat, as well as that from Kabul and Ghazni, Kandahar is no doubt a position of much importance. The features of the country in the immediate vicinity of the city are favourable for defence; but its occupation by us would entail the establishment of strong posts on the Helmand and at Khelat-i-Ghilzai *at least*, bringing the intervening districts under our control. Assuming,

however, the retention of the country embraced within the limits here indicated, we do not thereby obtain a satisfactory frontier, because it would be impossible to guard such a long and exposed line without a series of military or police posts as connecting links. While recognising the strategical importance of Kandahar, its occupation now would, in my opinion, be a mistake even from a military point of view, seeing we could at any moment lay our hands on it from our base in Pishin; I am aware that military critics of high authority consider the retention of Kandahar to be essential to the security of our frontier, on the ground apparently that the Afghans might some day construct works at that place, which would neutralise the advantages which our proximity to it would give us; this is, no doubt, a possible contingency, but it does not counterbalance the immediate and very patent disadvantage of a premature occupation, and our engagements with the Afghan State will be on a very unsatisfactory footing, if they do not make due provision to meet contingencies of this character. As a purely military question, therefore, the possession of Kandahar would, in my opinion, place us in a false position, and in point of fact be a source of great weakness to us. The political objections to the retention of Kandahar in opposition to the wishes of the Afghans seem to me to be very strong. For many years our policy in India has ceased to be an aggressive one, and this policy has been avowed in the utterances of Government during the present war; it follows, therefore, that on principle we ought not to annex a rood of land that is not really essential to the security of our frontier; to do otherwise would be to discredit us in the estimation of the world. It has been suggested that we might hold Kandahar by an amicable agreement with the Afghan Government, and if this could be arranged it would be unobjectionable; but I am inclined to think that this is the last thing the Afghans would be disposed to accede to. Though the people of this province profess to be tired of the Barakzai rule it must not be assumed that they are prepared to receive us with favour; so far as I am in a position to judge they detest us cordially, and I am under the impression that our immunity from anything like organised opposition is largely due to the fact that our dealings with the people are taken as an indication that our occupation is a temporary one only. As regards the unpopularity of the Barakzai regime, it should be recollected that the military force employed in the province for many years has been of insignificant strength, a fact that discredits the idea of an oppressive or very obnoxious system of government. It has been further alleged, by high authority, that the occupation of Kandahar would be a final settlement of the frontier question; but if there is one point more than another on which it would be safe to venture a prophesy, it is that circumstances would necessitate further movements at no distant date, until some natural boundary has been reached; indeed, the most fatal of the objections to Kandahar as a frontier is its want of defined and defensible boundaries. By restricting our advance to Pishin we have a strong and, in most respects, a satisfactory frontier, and in that position we can lay our hands on Kandahar at any moment, and this being so, I fail to see why we should anticipate events by undertaking a costly, onerous, and troublesome charge, involving, as it must do, the government of a large province inhabited by a warlike, fanatical, and turbulent population, whose independence it is our interest to support and foster, and whose friendship we should do our utmost to secure.

D. M. STEWART.

Kandahar, 18th April 1879.

No. 4.

MEMORANDUM ON THE POLICY TO BE ADOPTED TOWARDS AFGHANISTAN.

THE late successes of General Roberts, and the season of the year precluding for some time any more military operations,—the opinion also (which Lord Lytton seems to share) that sufficient retribution has been obtained for the massacre of our Envoy,—all these circumstances seem to show that the time has come when Government should lay down peremptorily to the authorities in India their views as to the sound policy to be adopted towards Afghanistan.

Sir Donald Stewart, writing from the head of his army in Kandahar, puts the question very pithily,—“Now that we have got Afghanistan, what are we to do with it?”

If I were asked for an opinion as to the instructions to be issued to the Indian authorities by the Secretary of State, I should, after having consulted those of my colleagues whom I consider the best authorities on Indian policy, and after refreshing my memory by reperusing all the political records of the last few years, reply as follows :—

Adhere to the main policy announced by Lord Salisbury in February 1876, and abandon all notions of conquest or annexation in Afghanistan; proclaim to the people of Afghanistan at once that the British have no desire or intention to annex any portion of Afghan territory; secure sufficient order in the country to enable the Afghans to replace the present anarchy by order under one ruler or several, as best suits themselves; and promise them all assistance in arms, money, and counsel, on the sole condition that they acknowledge our suzerainty and conduct all their relations with foreign powers through us. These conditions being secured, return to your ancient boundaries in India.

Unfortunately for the interests of India, the Afghan question has become a party one. Without knowing much about the matter, the people of England are divided into two hostile camps, and neither side will listen to any argument, however temperate and however much unbiassed by party views, which at all clashes with those adopted by Government or by the Liberal party.

But there is a more serious difficulty arising out of our Government by party as respects India. In an ordinary Indian case, if Government desires to retrace or remodel its policy, or to check the Indian authorities in any course adopted by them, nothing is so easy. Like despotic Governments elsewhere, it can displace or remove imprudent agents at will, and if the matter should chance to come before Parliament, any Government such as exists now-a-days in England would be able to furnish well reasoned well written justification of their proceedings in a form certain to disarm all criticism. But when once party is seized of an Indian question, it is most difficult for the Government of the day to abandon any iota of the policy they have enunciated, or to surrender any position (however much they may disapprove of it) which their agents in India have taken up.

Nevertheless, it is incumbent on Government and on parties of both sides, when any great crisis occurs, to lay aside all minor questions on which struggles for power usually occur, to accept the past as irrevocable, whether good or bad, and, as wise statesmen, to deal with the present state of things in such manner as shall best secure the welfare of the future.

I think I speak the sense of all Indian politicians when I say that the pending question as to the treatment of Afghanistan does form such a crisis in the history of our Eastern Empire.

When I have said above that Lord Salisbury's main policy of February 1876* ought to be maintained, the expression will, no doubt be cavilled at, for the controversy whether Lord Lawrence's "masterly inactivity," or Sir Bartle Frere's bland but decided intervention† (which latter view seems to have been adopted by Lord Salisbury) is the sound policy has been raging for years, and has called forth volumes, and additional volumes might still be produced in favour of either view.

This policy as to the choice of means is eminently a question for party debate, but it does not affect the more important question of what is to be done now; I, therefore, pass it by without notice. And I contend that an impartial critic now, and history hereafter, will recognise that the main policy of Lord Salisbury, as announced in the Despatch above mentioned, is exactly the same as that of all previous Governments, namely, to maintain an independent and friendly Afghanistan.

If that Despatch is looked through as well as Sir B. Frere's long letter, not a trace will be found of any desire to annex or occupy any part of Afghanistan; no indication of an opinion that the existing frontier of India was a weak one, and ought to be extended; on the contrary, as I shall show presently, Lord Salisbury lays down most distinctly in subsequent Despatches,‡ when the fears of his Council had been raised, that the policy of conquest was quite at variance with the instructions to Lord Lytton of Her Majesty's Government.

The fact is, and it cannot be too distinctly noted, that the idea of an extended frontier emanated not from Government, but from the authorities in India, and this idea, it may be clearly established, has led us into all our present troubles, and, if not dis-

* Parliamentary Papers, Afghanistan, 1878.

† No. 18, Political Despatch, 29th November 1877, para. 4.

‡ Subsequent Despatches, when the fears of his Council had been raised, that the policy of conquest was quite at variance with the instructions to Lord Lytton of Her Majesty's Government.

† The private letter of Sir B. Frere of 3rd March 1876, subsequently published, setting forth a full scheme of frontier administration, had been (as it states) preceded by others.

tinctly repudiated by the Home Government, may lead us into still greater troubles and perhaps involve our Indian possessions in financial and political ruin.

It is necessary to maintain this view by proofs, and for this purpose it is essential to attend carefully to dates.

Lord Salisbury delivered his celebrated Despatch of February 1876 to Lord Lytton in London, and his Lordship took his seat in Council as Viceroy on 17th April following.

* Notification to Envoy, 5th May 1876.

Command Papers, Afghanistan, 1878.

† 7th October 1876. Simla Conferences, *ib.*

A few days after his arrival, he notified* to the Amir his intention to send to him his friend Sir Lewis Pelly as Envoy; the Amir demurred to receiving an Envoy on the well known Afghan objections, which clearly are that the residence of an English functionary would lead, as in India, to the destruction of his power as an independent Prince. But he consented to send an agent to meet the Viceroy's Envoy in India. The Agent accordingly appeared at Simla,† where the Viceroy himself took part in the conference. It was here that Lord Lytton used the famous illustration of the earthen pipkin (which, by the by, he borrowed from Sir B. Frere's private letter, whose expressions as well as whose views appear to have deeply impressed themselves on his Lordship), and the conference ended by the Agent being commissioned to intimate to the Amir the terms of a new treaty, a *sine quâ non* of which was to be the establishment of English Agents in Afghanistan.

The Agent proceeded from Simla to Kabul,‡ and intimated to the Amir the proposals of the Viceroy. The Sirdars at first unanimously rejected the proposal of British Residents. Many *durbars* (which are quasi privy councils) were held, one of them lasting 16 hours, but ultimately Lord Lytton's Native Agent seems to have talked over the Amir, and he gave his consent to the proposal.§

‡ 26th November 1876. Kabul Discussions, *ib.*

§ 21st December, *ib.*

Assent of Amir to treaty, *ib.*

|| Peshawur Conferences, 8th February 1877.

¶ Despatch of Government of India, para. 36, *ib.* p. 170.

** 30th March 1877, *ib.*, page 222.

The conference and discussion on Lord Lytton's proposed treaty accordingly took place at Peshawur,|| but was broken off by the Viceroy, although it had been reported to his Lordship that the Amir was prepared to accept eventually all the conditions of the British Government,¶ and Lord Lytton's native Agent was recalled from Cabul.**

But during the period when all these discussions between the Indian Government and the Amir were proceeding, at Simla, at Cabul, and at Peshawur, Lord Lytton was maturing another scheme, the principle of which had been already sanctioned by the Home Government, for the better administration of the North-western frontier, a line extending for 1,100 miles from Peshawur to Karachi.†† In the course of the Viceroy's inquiries, his Military Secretary, Colonel Colley (an able Officer recently from the Staff College at Sandhurst) laid a paper before him, denouncing the existing mountain frontier as an extremely bad one, and maintaining that, according to modern notions of military science, India could only be safely defended against an enemy advancing from the west by the British occupation of the whole mountain mass of Afghanistan, that is, by securing the western passes leading into the valley of the Oxus, as well as those debouching on India. Similar views to these had been propounded in India 50 years ago by a frontier officer, General Jacob, and have been reiterated by other soldiers and eminent men, such as Sir H. Green, Sir Henry Rawlinson, and Sir B. Frere. But, after repeated investigations into the whole question by the highest military authorities in India, these proposals had been unanimously rejected by successive Governments. The Blue Books giving the proceedings of Lord Canning's

†† Parliamentary Paper, 72 of 1879.

Parliamentary Paper, 73 of 1879.

Government in 1857, and especially of Lord Lawrence's Government in 1867†† afford the fullest information on the subject, and the papers of Lord Lawrence, Major-General Durand, Sir Henry Norman, and the late Lord Sandhurst exhaust the subject on the side of the impolicy of extending our frontier. Lord Lytton, however, adopted the views of Colonel Colley.

Now of these two grave subjects, which were maturing simultaneously in India, only one came to the notice of the Council of India. The discussions which were taking place between the Viceroy and the Amir in 1876 and the early part of

†† This scheme had also been shadowed forth in Sir B. Frere's letter.

1877 were not reported home till the 10th May 1877, and then only in the Secret Department. But the views of Lord Lytton as to the reorganization of the North-west frontier were necessarily laid before Council,* and the Despatch from India, 17th May 1877, and other Despatches of Lord Lytton, disclosed to the Council of India the views of Lord Lytton as to Afghanistan.

Contemporaneously with the above-mentioned Despatch, another arrived in England from the Viceroy, dated 23rd March 1877,† announcing a new treaty with the Khan of Khelat, by which the occupation of Quetta by British troops was secured. These Despatches and the other referred to caused great alarm amongst members of Council,‡ who, with the exception of one or two voices, unanimously deprecated any extension of the frontier. They pointed out that the occupation of Quetta was the first step which had been perseveringly urged for forty years, as the indispensable preliminary to a successful aggressive policy, and they dwelt mainly on the consideration that, if once the frontier line is extended into the mass of mountains west of the Indus, it will be impossible to avoid the necessity sooner or later of annexing the whole of Afghanistan.

Lord Salisbury deemed these fears groundless, though he entirely concurred in the deprecation of an extended frontier line, and he justly remarked that whatever the views of the Government of India might be, they were only a subordinate Government, and that the Home Government was quite strong enough to restrain any inclinations of a too bellicose character, even if they existed.

The two Despatches, however, underwent great discussion, and were not replied to for many months after their arrival.

In deference to the views expressed by members of Council, Lord Salisbury, in approving of the occupation of Quetta,‡ expressly enjoined on the Government of India to carefully abstain from any measures which can be held to indicate on the part of Her Majesty's Government, a resolution permanently to maintain British troops in that town.

§ Parliamentary Paper, No. 3, In his Despatch on the proposed North-western Beloochistan, 1878. frontier he expressed himself as follows:—§

“Fears have been expressed that administrative modifications of this kind might carry with them a change in the pacific policy which has for many years guided the Indian Government in its dealings with neighbouring tribes and States. It is almost superfluous for me to draw your Excellency's attention to these apprehensions, for they are as much at variance with your own views as they are with the instructions which the Indian Government has uniformly received from the Government of Her Majesty. Your Excellency as plainly perceives as Her Majesty's Government that a policy of conquest on your North-west frontier would lead to no advantage which would in any degree counteract the certain financial and political embarrassment it would cause. The changes now under consideration have no such object. They are measures of defence and security, not of aggression. *They will operate as a guarantee for the maintenance of existing territorial limits.*”

The Council was entirely satisfied with this emphatic declaration of policy, but it is submitted that the above references and these quotations completely make out my point, that the idea of an improved military frontier emanated not from Her Majesty's Government but from the authorities in India.

I have now to show—and it is another important consideration which has been hitherto overlooked, or has not been sufficiently adverted to—the effect which this notion of an improved frontier extending into Afghanistan produced on the mind of the Amir in resisting the British proposals for more intimate relations between the two Courts.

Up to the period of the conference with the Amir instituted by Lord Lytton, the Afghans entertained no fears that we had any desire to annex their country. Dost Mahomed significantly told Lord Lawrence that his country contained nothing but rocks and men, but plenty of both. Shir Ali, in the same sense, remarked that he had no fears on the score of annexation by the British, for his country produced barely a million sterling of revenue, and it would cost India ten millions to occupy it.

But when the Amir's Agent appeared at Simla in 1876, the views and intentions of the Viceroy as to an improved frontier had apparently oozed out, as things do in India. Lord Salisbury, in one of his Despatches, had cautioned the Viceroy that all publications and political statements relating to Afghanistan were at once translated and made known to the Amir; and, in point of fact, when the Kabul Agent, in October

1876, was describing to the Viceroy the Amir's state of mind, he used some remarkable words, to the effect that "the Amir is just now in great fear of Russia on the one side, and of India on the other. He sees the continued acquisitions of Russia year by year, and he has Sir Henry Rawlinson's book in his hands." In fact, he already felt himself in the position of the earthen pipkin, without being told so.

His apprehensions of annexation were thus aroused in October 1876, but, when his Agent met the English Envoy at Peshawur in March 1877,* the first step of probable annexation, the occupation of Quetta, had been already taken, and the Amir's repugnance to accept Lord Lytton's proposals is completely accounted for.

Further evidence as to the deeply ingrained repugnance of the Afghans to Europeans (Russians or English) obtaining any political footing in their country might be accumulated en masse, but the two following extracts deserve careful attention at the present moment.

On 7th February 1877, when Dr. Bellew assured the Kabul Envoy that the British Agents were to be posted in Afghanistan for the Amir's advantage, he shook his head negatively, and said, "We mistrust you, and fear you will write all sorts of reports about us, which will some day be brought forward against us, and lead to your taking the control of our affairs out of our hands."—*Command Papers, Afghanistan*, p. 202.

The Envoy also stated on the day following, "The people of Afghanistan have it deeply rooted in their hearts that if Englishmen or other Europeans once set foot in their country, it will sooner or later pass out of their hands."—*Ib.*, p. 208.

The above retrospect has shown that the deliberate policy of our Government against annexations or conquest is to be found in Lord Salisbury's Despatches, and, therefore, even in a party sense, the casual expression of Lord Beaconsfield in an after-dinner speech as to a scientific frontier cannot be tortured into any binding obligation on our Government.

The question is still open, not only as to what is the most scientific frontier, but, more important still, what is the best political frontier for India. On the first question it would be presumptuous for any civilian to offer a remark if there existed a *consensus* of military opinion upon the subject. But they are all at loggerheads respecting it. Some advocate the western face of the Hindu Kush; others the abandonment of Kabul, and the occupation of Kandahar and possibly Herat.

† The "Times," 5th January. Lord Lytton, in his recent speech† at Calcutta on New Year's day, strongly recommends the retention of "the established military line of defence which the present year has given us," whatever that may be, but Sir Henry Norman, who has both fought on the frontier, and for 20 years, both as War Secretary and as Member of the Governor General's Council, has had more to do with the military policy of the Government than any man in India, now, with all the additional information that the campaigns of the last two years has supplied, is decidedly of opinion that, both on military and political grounds, it is far wiser to retire altogether from the mountains so soon as military exigencies and political considerations will allow.

What is apparent to every eye, whether civil or military, is this, that wherever we draw the scientific line in the mountain range we cannot stop there, but must advance.

‡ The "Times," 4th January. Already we hear from the well informed correspondent of the "Times" (General Vaughan?)‡ what the prevailing policy in high places in India is, viz., to break up Afghanistan into a number of quasi-independent principalities, to extend the frontier to Kandahar, and to make over Herat to the Persians.

It is to be feared that the Cabinet will be inundated with numerous proposals of this kind from Indian theorists, and that Government has but little opportunity of ascertaining what the calm views are of men who have been studying this class of questions all their lives, and who adhere with conservative tenacity to opposite doctrines which in their opinion have been tested by time and good results.

I have no hesitation in recording, after what I may call a complete judicial investigation of the subject, my entire adhesion to Lord Salisbury's views, that conquest and annexation in Afghanistan will lead to political and financial embarrassment in India, which no possible advantage can countervail, and that speedy retirement from Afghanistan should be insisted on.

Ready objections to any proposal of withdrawal can, of course, be made, and loss of prestige will figure in the argument. The all-sufficient answer to this objection is that

we did retire under very similar circumstances more than 30 years ago, without the slightest injury to that very untranslatable word *prestige*, and that, during the whole of that period, both Afghanistan and British India have flourished as they never did before, and, on the whole, there has been very little to complain of in our mutual relations.

The campaigns of 1878 and 1879 have demonstrated to the Eastern world what Sir Henry Durand foretold in 1867, that the Afghans are not able to offer the least effective resistance to a British force whenever it thinks fit to enter their country. They also show that the Russian interference so much bruited abroad as the real danger to India when an Indian difficulty occurs is an entire delusion. These facts having been so clearly proved, the English army will return to India with a greatly increased sense of their power diffused through Asia.

A much more serious objection occurs, arising out of the anarchy in which we should leave the country were we to retire now. This constitutes the great difficulty of our position; but it is much more an Afghan question than an English one. If the Afghans were left to themselves, they would undoubtedly constitute some form or other of government, probably not without fighting, and the survival of the fittest would occur. It would be repugnant to British feeling to leave the country a prey to civil war, with the self-reproach that it was ourselves who had produced it; on the other hand, the alternative of administering the country, with the certainty that, however temporary we might intend our rule to be, it would undoubtedly become permanent, presents such a formidable prospect for British interests in the East that the most strenuous efforts of statesmanship should be directed to avert it. The position requires all the wisdom of Government and all the tact of our best administrators, but I am sanguine enough to believe that if, by the promulgation of large and liberal views such as statesmen on both sides entertain, the Afghans can be brought to see that the independence of their country is as much desired by England as by themselves, and that the British Government will render them all the assistance in their power to accomplish it, a happy solution of our present difficulties might be effected.

E. PERRY.

10th January 1880.

No. 5.

OCCUPATION OF KANDAHAR.

LORD HARTINGTON,

YOUR remark of yesterday as to the possible necessity of occupying Kandahar induces me to lay before you the rough copy of a note (the only one I have) which I submitted to Lord Cranbrook in January last.*

Its value, if any, consists in this, that it sums up the deliberate opinions of my colleagues Sir H. Norman, Sir R. Montgomery, and Sir F. Halliday, whom I consulted before committing myself to paper.

I was disposed to think Lord Cranbrook did not much dissent from these views, and he seemed to concur in the opinion that it was not desirable to maintain the permanent occupation of Afghanistan.

But the notions which emanated from India, or possibly from England, about the same period, that it was good policy to break up Afghanistan, found favour with Lord Beaconsfield's Government, and Shir Ali was hailed as Wali of Kandahar with promises of assistance.

I have not seen anywhere the exact terms by which Her Majesty's name has been pledged to this arrangement, but I observe that Lord Lytton states we are pledged; and we have Mr. Lepel Griffin's speech to the Afghans, in which he announces Her Majesty's decision.

The extent to which Her Majesty is committed remains, of course, a considerable factor in the question under discussion.

But the consequences likely to result from this arrangement are so serious that it appears to me all the efforts of statesmanship should be directed to avert it.

Whether Afghanistan shall remain under one ruler, or be broken up into two or three petty principalities time alone can decide. But if it is sound policy to resist the permanent occupation of Afghanistan, and to revert to the notion of an independent

* No. 4.

Afghanistan, many times asserted by the late Government, is it possible to do so if we fetter ourselves with any pledge to support the ruler of Kandahar?

We may take for granted that if we leave, as we ought, to the Afghans themselves to determine whether they will live under one ruler or several, the issue will be determined in Afghan fashion, not without a struggle. So it was with Dost Mahomed, so with the late Shir Ali, and so also will it probably be with Abdul Rahman, whom Lord Lytton contemplates and desires to see ruler of Kabul.

But if *our* ruler is established at Kandahar, we shall have another Shah Soojah on our hands, and success will lead to the permanent occupation of the whole country.

I would throw out for Lord Hartington's consideration whether it would not be expedient to address to the new Viceroy a Despatch to be made public by him on his arrival in India.

Opportunity might be taken to express Her Majesty's strong determination to make no annexations of territory beyond the frontiers of India, and of her desire to see established an independent and flourishing Afghanistan. All that England requires is that that country shall not be made the seat of any intrigues or disturbances which may affect our Indian empire, and to this end ample guarantees may be obtained without affecting the real independence of Afghanistan.

Various passages from the Despatches of the late Government may be cited to show that the above policy is quite in accordance with what they frequently announced, and in particular the Despatch of Lord Salisbury may be cited with respect to the occupation of Quetta, which was the first step in the aggressive policy of the last four years, and in which he distinctly held that the occupation was to be only temporary.

May 10, 1880.

E. PERRY.

No. 6.

NOTE ON THE LINE TO BE OCCUPIED ON THE NORTH-WESTERN FRONTIER OF INDIA.

ON the assumption that the question of the best line of frontier to be occupied by us on the north-western border of India will shortly be reconsidered, in anticipation of the withdrawal of our forces from Kabul and its neighbourhood, I venture to submit a few observations for the consideration of the Secretary of State for India. In making these observations I assume that the provisions of the treaty of Gundamuk are entirely at an end, and that we are at perfect liberty to arrange our frontier solely with reference to what may be considered our own interests.

I will also assume that we shall not continue to occupy Kandahar. If we retain a force at Kandahar any arguments I may use adverse to the tenure of positions in the direction of Pisheen or the Bolan fall to the ground, for if we hold Kandahar we must doubtless hold in ample strength our line of communication with that city. I have no knowledge as to the reasons which may have led to the alleged agreement with Shere Ali that he should have the province of Kandahar, or as to any stipulation that we should support him in his government, either by having a garrison at his capital or its neighbourhood, or at Pisheen, nor have I any knowledge as to there being any binding agreement of the kind. If there is such a binding agreement of course it will be adhered to, but I must say that the creation of such an engagement is to be lamented, and I am quite unaware of any necessity that has arisen for making such an engagement, while I am sure that it would be well, even at a very great sacrifice, to induce Shere Ali to consent to its modification.

To occupy Kandahar at all will be very expensive, and no one, I suppose, really believes that the province will be for any long time left undisturbed if through our action it is separated from Kabul. To occupy it means to continue to occupy Khelat-i-Ghilzai, to be involved from time to time in the directions of Girishk and of Ghuznee, and eventually probably to be led on towards Furrah and Herat in the one direction and Kabul in the other, without really adding one iota to the security of our possession of India. Bad as it would be to occupy Kandahar ourselves, even this would be better than to remain there to support a Chief, the justice of whose rule could not be depended upon, whose very existence as a ruler would provoke trouble, and whose presence would be rather a weakness than a strength to our occupying force.

Our occupation of Kandahar, or its being held by a ruler under our guarantee, would infallibly land us, and speedily land us, in renewed difficulties such as our recent experience should lead us to avoid. It seems to me, indeed, pretty certain that if we remain at Kandahar we shall be again embarked on the troubled sea of Afghan politics, and may

anticipate that before long we shall again have a large army in the field for no object that can benefit us.

As I trust that Kandahar will not be occupied, and that it will turn out that we are not obliged to maintain Shere Ali in the government of that province, and as I am writing rather about the frontier intended to be occupied under the Treaty of Gundamuk than about Kandahar, I will refrain from saying more on this point, and I will only add that the arguments I shall hereafter use against advancing our old frontier in view to being strong against Russia are, in my opinion, applicable to the occupation of Kandahar, but that if we feel ourselves compelled for any reason to hold Kandahar we must, as I have before said, hold Pisheen and other points between it and India.

In considering the best line for our North-western frontier, I desire first to point out that no rectification of the old frontier has ever been advocated, as far as I know, in view to resisting the Afghans. Any contention to such an effect would, I submit, be absurd. The greatest alarmist can hardly apprehend danger to India from a mere Afghan invasion unless our military power was so broken or so feeble as to render our whole position in that country insecure, and in such a contingency any extension of our old border would be a source of much additional weakness. The Afghans very wisely and naturally have never shown any desire to molest us since we took up the line of frontier occupied in 1849, and the conviction often expressed by myself and by others of far greater authority that the very largest force of Afghans which could possibly be brought against us would, in the plains on our border, be speedily shattered by a moderate number of our troops of all arms, has been well borne out by the experiences of the late war in the territory of the Afghans themselves.

The old frontier, too, has this advantage with respect to Afghanistan, that it is for the most part separated from the territory heretofore under the direct rule of the Ameer of Kabul, and we have thus during a long series of years been spared many causes of irritation and disagreement likely to arise if our subjects and our officers had been constantly in direct contact with the subjects of Afghanistan.

I would therefore urge that, as respects the Afghans, no advantage is to be gained by us from extending our frontier, even if the extension did not bring with it very serious disadvantages, which I shall hereafter state.

Apart from the Afghans proper, however, it has been sometimes alleged that an advance of frontier will place us in a stronger position with respect to the border tribes who either own a very slack allegiance to Kabul or own no allegiance at all. I can understand that this might be asserted with some show of plausibility, and might even find acceptance with impartial persons ignorant of the physical peculiarities of the frontier hills, if we were really proposing to take up a new line of frontier beyond the hills which these tribes occupy, but no one who speaks with any sort of authority has ever ventured to recommend such a measure. It would be one of the most difficult extensions of territory that could be conceived, involving the employment of an army even larger than that maintained at present in Afghanistan with so much strain on our resources. The results would certainly be very inadequate, but this is not what has been proposed or what was adopted in the Gundamuk Treaty, putting Kandahar aside, and it is not now, I presume, to be thought that we should desire to go beyond the arrangements of that treaty. By it we were to occupy Pisheen, Kurrum, and the Khyber Pass, three isolated forward positions having no military communication with each other, and the first separated from the second and third by some hundreds of miles of difficult country inhabited by more or less warlike tribes. Can any adequate benefit, as respects the tribes along our frontier, result from the occupation of these three separate forward positions?

In the Sind direction anything deserving the name of an inroad in force into our territory has not taken place for many years, and in this direction any advance to secure our subjects from molestation in future seems unnecessary.

The occupation of Kurrum has rather created than lessened difficulties with the tribes beyond our old border in that direction, and notwithstanding the very strong force in that district, raids have taken place in its rear and outrages been committed entailing, I believe, a greater loss on our own people than ever took place in a much longer period formerly, when the Kohat and Bunnoo frontier was held without a European soldier, and by a force certainly not a third as strong as that which now holds those places and Kurrum.

The placing troops in the Khyber, too, can be of little use as a protection to our territory. Half a dozen regiments may hold the pass in the way it has been held during the past 18 months, with the aid of money payments to the tribes and local levies, though not without outrages in the pass and destruction of telegraph wires from time to

time, but these very Pass Afreedies have never by their conduct during the last 30 years rendered it necessary to organise an expedition to punish them. Their offences have been robberies or murders by individuals or small gangs, the prevention of which is a matter of police, and even these offences have sensibly diminished of late years, and have never been so numerous as to warrant such a costly measure, both in life and money, as the occupation of the line from Jumrood to Lundi Kotul. It is doubtful, indeed, whether placing garrisons in the Khyber would have any sensible effect in checking such offences as I have referred to, while, for the exercise of any influence on border tribes a few miles away from the Khyber, such occupation would be absolutely useless.

In truth, none of the three forward positions arranged to be occupied after the Treaty of Gundamuk can possibly exercise any real influence over the border tribes with whom we have had serious trouble, namely, the Mahsood Wuzurees, and the tribes on the Yusufzai border. It is only with these people that, since 1849, we have had any real fighting on a large scale, and it is only on the two expeditions in these respective directions, in 1860 and 1863, that we have sustained a loss of over a hundred men killed and wounded. A reference to a map which shows the nature of the country as well as the distances will convince any one how little use troops placed in the Khyber would be to exert any influence on the border tribes of Yusufzai, and nothing but an overpowering force in Kurrum could afford to detach troops for the coercion of the Mahsood Wuzurees, while a much smaller body of troops than that now in Kurrum, if within our old territory, could not only check inroads by these people, but, if necessary, chastise them, as was done on a previous occasion.

In reality there is little call for any re-arrangement of our frontier line as respects the border tribes. The only point at which it occurs to me we might perhaps advantageously now obtain control is over the line of pass between Kohat and Peshawur. Undoubtedly it is a disadvantage to have a piece of independent territory on the direct and shortest road between two important frontier garrisons, and if the Punjab Government thought it expedient and were assured that it was practicable to assume direct control without entailing on us extensive or prolonged military operations, I think the measure should be allowed; but any actual advance seems to me injudicious, and certain to entail upon us inconveniences out of all proportion to the advantages which any one has assumed could be gained with respect to the tribes by such advances.

There remains to consider how far our occupation of Pisheen, Kurrum, and the Khyber would strengthen us against that European Power of which, as I think, such unreasonable alarm has been expressed.

Is it possible for anyone to say that we now really dread a Russian invasion of India? Has not our experience during recent operations in Afghanistan, comparatively close to the magnificent resources of India, and the accounts we read of Russian difficulties when operating against undisciplined tribes in Central Asia, dissipated the apprehensions of the most inveterate of Russophobists? A policy started to place an English Agent in Afghan territory has step by step involved us in operations which have lasted for two years, and which we shall be fortunate if we conclude without an expenditure, present and prospective, of 20 millions sterling, and then we shall probably not have achieved the object with which we began. With this experience is it possible to apprehend that Russia is likely to subjugate or to influence Afghanistan so as to make it a base for operations against India? At all events, it is more than ever evident that any Russian advance, if indeed it is possible, would be made at great risk, and that it must be effected with so much slowness and deliberation as to give us leisure, 20 times over, to occupy any or all the posts on the scientific frontier, and also Kabul and Kandahar, before a Russian advance could have made itself felt.

The question is sometimes put as to whether the advocates for adhering to the old frontier line would defend India from Russian attack on or beyond that frontier. To that I would reply, that a good General acting on the defensive usually strikes blows in advance, but how far counter advances should be made in the case in question, I think, would have to be determined by the responsible authorities of the day, when the time came. Much would depend upon the condition of India at the time, upon the popularity of our rule, and upon our military strength. Any great forward movement would necessitate large European reinforcements, which England might not be able to send, while, if the defence was, in the main, confined to our old frontier, large reinforcements might not be necessary. It seems to me useless now to discuss how we would act under a contingency which will probably never arise, or which, if it arises, must be attended by circumstances which we cannot foresee. The most eminent scientific authority who has spoken on the subject of our Indian frontier, General Hamley, has

admitted that we can readily defend our old frontier and give a good account of any enemy in the valley of the Indus, and he deprecated advance beyond our Peshawur border.

The sum of the whole is, that we should be content with the old frontier and gradually strengthen it, and not commit the folly of prematurely thrusting forward troops in anticipation of invasions which may never come. To do so is to waste troops and resources, and perhaps, after much money has been spent in a particular direction, we may find that invasion may be more readily accomplished in a different direction. Let us not forget, either, our position in India, and that dangers worse than a Russian invasion are possible. We might have bitterly to repent some day the absence of several thousand troops in positions beyond the frontier, whence at the moment of need elsewhere it might be impossible to withdraw them, and where they themselves might be in great need of support.

Taking in succession the three forward positions named in the Gundamuk Treaty, how would they affect Russian invasion.

Beyond Peshawur the extreme point to be held by us was distant four marches from that garrison. It is obvious that if desired the Khyber can be traversed and the forward positions occupied in the course of a few days. When the railway is completed to the Indus or Peshawur, with a permanent bridge at Attock, it may be possible, if we have no troops in advance requiring support, to have even a smaller garrison than heretofore, and certainly there can be no need to increase that garrison. What is needed is to maintain at Peshawur and its neighbourhood transport for a strong division of all arms, and as troops could be brought in a day by railway from Rawul Pindee and Jhelum, and from several other stations within two days, we should have the means of at once pushing into the Khyber, if we needed to do so, a body of troops fresh from healthy stations, and provided with efficient and untired transport.

The next point retained by us under the treaty was the valley of Kurrum. Leaving the general disadvantages of this as of the other positions for future remark, I would observe that its occupation cannot be needed as a defence against Russia. The force in Kurrum has, since October last, been of no use whatever to General Roberts at Kabul, and has itself suffered much trouble at the hands of the surrounding tribes. For six months communication from Kurrum into Afghanistan is, for military purposes, quite closed, and of all these forward positions this seems the most absolutely useless. If circumstances render any advance by the Khyber necessary, an advance might be usefully made by Kurrum as a diversion, but this can be done when the time comes. It is unjustifiable to lock up a large force in Kurrum on the remote contingency of a Russian invasion, especially as, if that invasion came, it might be in quite a different direction, and yet those troops could not be withdrawn from their useless position.

It is hardly possible to conceive a European force attempting to invade India by the Shuturguridan, even if the attacking power could at the same time force us to use bodies of troops to repel invasion in other quarters, but if such a hazardous enterprise was to be attempted there would, as in the case of the Khyber, be ample time to bring up troops from garrisons in our old territory.

The occupation of Pisheen and Quetta seems as unnecessary as that of the Khyber and Kurrum. An advance of Russia on Herat would be a serious undertaking on the part of that power, and despite what has been lately written about the resources of the Herat district, I have most excellent authority for saying that it could not support the most moderate European army. How then could Russia hold it if she ever reached there, still less how could she cover the 400 miles of difficult country between Herat and Kandahar? If she could do this, still what influence could be exercised against such an advance by a division divided between Pisheen and Quetta? And if we proposed to fight Russia at Herat or Kandahar, the occupation of Pisheen would not very materially lessen the time it would take us to place at either of these towns the large army necessary to cope with the considerable force with which Russia alone would dare to advance troops, and transport animals would have to be brought in large numbers from the rear before any move counter to Russian advance could be attempted, while according to the best information obtainable by me there are no resources at Pisheen or Quetta which are of sufficient importance to an army to justify our holding those places in order to secure their resources.

I do not forget that a railway is in progress towards Pisheen, and it may be said that if we maintained transport at Pisheen for troops to be brought up from the rear when wanted, as I have proposed for Peshawur, it would greatly strengthen us against a Russian advance to do so, and this, of course, would be impossible, unless we kept troops there also. I would reply that Peshawur has been ours for 30 years, that it is a large

city with great resources, in a fertile district, and that no question can now be raised of our not holding it. None of these reasons apply to holding Pisheen. Again, cattle can easily be maintained in large numbers at and about Peshawur, and with a bridge over the Indus those kept at Rawul Pindee can be at Peshawur in a week. No similar advantage is to be found at Pisheen, and to bring transport sufficient for an army to Pisheen by a railway like that under construction, with a break of gauge in the middle of it, would be so tedious as to render the railway next to useless for the purpose. The railway would have quite enough to do to take up the troops needed for active operations with their provisions and stores, and, until their transport came, no advance could be made. Such an advance, I suppose, is contemplated by those who advocate the occupation of this and other forward positions, for I presume it is not desired to lock up troops at any of them or at any places beyond them to stand a siege in garrisons liable to be cut off by an invading foe.

As to the railway, no argument whatever should be based upon it. Constructed as it has been, there seems every probability that large parts of it will be destroyed when floods come, and when this occurs, it may possibly be thought not worth while to renew it. It will prove a very ruinous work from a financial point of view, any predictions of its paying being to my mind fallacious. When we consider the cost of keeping up a railway in such a country, it is difficult to conceive that the requirements of a few thousand troops and the trade that can ever be expected from Kandahar can afford any set-off equal to the expenses of working and maintenance. Having gone so far with the railway, if we keep troops at Pisheen it may be well to maintain it, at all events as far as it has gone, but it will involve heavy cost, and in the end it would save much pecuniary loss if, by withdrawal from Pisheen and Quetta, we could dismantle the railway and use the rails, sleepers, and rolling stock elsewhere.

Quetta offers no more advantage than Pisheen for opposing Russian advance, and in addition it has proved, as was predicted, very unhealthy for our troops. By treaty with the Khan of Khelat, no doubt we may keep troops there, apart from any provisions of the treaty of Gundamuk, but I am not aware that there is any use in doing this. We went there originally to restore order in the territories of the Khan of Khelat. Having done this let us honourably come away, or at all events propose to leave whenever the Khan thinks he can hold his own against his Chiefs without us, and when we are satisfied that disorder will not follow our withdrawal. We might, however, reasonably revert to an arrangement formerly in force by which a political officer remained with the Khan, and had with him an escort of suitable strength. The Khan's territories so match with ours that this arrangement may be desirable after our withdrawal.

Having sufficiently adverted to the negative advantages of occupying Pisheen, Kurrum, and the Khyber, I would turn to a consideration of the positive disadvantages attending such a measure.

Politically the disadvantage would be that we should be extending, so to speak, our sphere of irritation, and placing ourselves in positions where it would be difficult to keep still. Either from the front of these advanced positions, on their flanks, or in their rear, constant trouble may be expected, entailing operations which will almost certainly end in further advances and occupations. We also irritate the people, who would as a rule like us better at a distance than at hand, and very probably we destroy any hope of a friendship which would be valuable if the improbable event of a Russian advance really took place. I have seen it stated in more than one letter from Kabul that the people dislike us and the Russians alike, but that our occupation of Kabul has led them to desire nothing more than a Russian advance which should rid them of us. This feeling will no doubt disappear when we leave, for the Afghans certainly do not desire to be interfered with by Russia, but the statements I have quoted illustrate what has often before been said, namely, that our best plan to ensure having the Afghans on our side as against Russia is to leave them alone. Our occupying forward positions has an exactly contrary tendency.

One great military disadvantage of the provisions of the Treaty of Gundamuk arises from the unpopularity of the service beyond our frontier. The Native soldier likes a campaign, but he objects strongly to a prolonged absence from his country, especially when, as in the Khyber and at Quetta, he is placed in most unhealthy and disagreeable positions. He cannot obtain leave of absence, a privilege which, if constantly withheld, as it has been of late, would end in the loss of our Native army, and this and the frequent deaths and invaliding of soldiers beyond our frontier are serious obstacles to recruiting. We know, indeed, that recruiting is now so difficult that most extraordinary and expensive measures have been resorted to to complete the ranks, and, as far as we know, these measures have not been successful. No doubt with a withdrawal from

Kabul and Kandahar the number of troops beyond our frontier will sensibly diminish, but as long as we maintain a certain force beyond the frontier there will be a disinclination to enlist. This will not seem strange to those who know the Native soldier, especially if they read the lamentable accounts of the state to which some regiments were reduced by sickness last year.

The cost of holding forward positions is the third objection, and here there is scope for discussion, not as to the fact that there must be considerable expense, but as to the amount. It is impossible that any estimate can be exact, for certain elements for calculation are wanting. These must be assumed, and I will give my reasons, of course, for such assumption. I would, however, remark that in 1867 and 1873 I prepared the estimates of the probable cost of moving troops into Afghanistan under certain assumed conditions. I endeavoured to be moderate, but I believe was charged with exaggerating the probable cost. In point of fact, we have not done nearly as much as I assumed would be done in the way of occupation, and my supposition that all the troops sent into Afghanistan would be replaced in India has only been carried out to an extent, perhaps, of one third. Yet the actual expenditure has far exceeded any estimate I then made. I mention this to show that my predictions were not formed in an exaggerated spirit, and I shall observe the same desire to be moderate now.

The first point to settle is the amount and description of force needed to hold the advanced positions, and, as respects the Khyber and Kurrum, I think it is reasonable to accept as appropriate a force similar to that left last year after the conclusion of the Treaty of Gundamak.

After the troops had been withdrawn, there remained in the Khyber and in Kurrum respectively the following troops, on the 1st August 1879 :—

In the Khyber.

One field battery of Royal Artillery,
One Native mountain battery,
Two companies of Sappers and Miners,
Two regiments of British Infantry,
One regiment of Native Cavalry,
Five regiments of Native Infantry,

and there were present, excluding all absentees, 111 British officers, 1,600 British and 3,660 Native soldiers. In August, when there was much sickness, one regiment of British Infantry was withdrawn, reducing the European troops to 872 men.

In Kurrum.

One battery, Royal Horse Artillery,
One and a half field batteries, Royal Artillery,
Two mountain batteries, Native Artillery,
One company of Sappers and Miners,
One squadron of British Cavalry,
Three regiments of Native Cavalry,
Four regiments of British Infantry (less two companies),
Six regiments of Native Infantry,

and the numbers present were 223 British officers, 3,555 British and 6,265 Native soldiers. This number of men continued there, subject to the ordinary fluctuations, until the war broke out again in September. The numbers here given do not include more than 1,200 Native soldiers, a half field battery of Royal Artillery, and two companies of British Infantry at Kohat.

There is no reason to suppose that the force allotted to the Khyber and Kurrum was excessive, and we know that it was supplemented in the former by a local levy, and that subsidies were given to the tribes. Whether this was the case in Kurrum I do not know, but here from October to the present time a force of about 8,000 men has been locked up, though, as far as aid to our troops at Kabul was concerned, they have been useless.

The Indian Army Commission have allotted to the Khyber and to Kurrum, in their scheme for the garrisons of India, the following troops :—

Khyber.

1 Native Mountain Battery.
1 Company Sappers and Miners.
1 Troop Native Cavalry.
3 Regiments Native Infantry.

Kurrum, including Thull.

- 1 Field Battery, Royal Artillery.
- 1 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery.
- 2 Guns, Native Mountain Artillery.
- 1 Company Sappers and Miners.
- 2 Regiments British Infantry.
- 2 Regiments Native Cavalry.
- 4 Regiments Native Infantry.

Making allowance for the fact that the Indian Army Commission contemplate an addition to the strength of regiments, their estimate is considerably below the force actually employed in the Khyber and Kurrum after the conclusion of peace in 1879. Under favourable circumstances, the force they have proposed for Kurrum might suffice, but I believe that a prudent commander would consider that the least force that could properly hold the Khyber would be that actually serving there on the 1st September 1879, namely,—

- 1 Field Battery, Royal Artillery.
- 1 Native Mountain Battery.
- 1 Company of Sappers and Miners.
- 1 Regiment Native Cavalry.
- 1 Regiment British Infantry.
- 5 Regiments Native Infantry.

For Pisheen and the country in its rear we cannot refer to actual experience, for instead of being our most advanced position, Pisheen has hitherto simply been a post on the line of communication with a strong division at Kandahar, but the Indian Army Commission, on the assumption that Kandahar would be given up, have allotted to Pisheen and the posts between it and Dadur inclusive,—

- 1 Field Battery, Royal Artillery.
- 2½ Mountain Batteries, Artillery.*
- 1 Garrison Battery, Royal Artillery.
- 1½ Regiments Native Cavalry.
- 2 Companies of Sappers and Miners.
- 1 Regiment British Infantry.
- 4 Regiments Native Infantry.

This force seems to me too small, considering that it has to hold a most important forward position, and to guard Quetta and a long line of communications, flanked by independent tribes who might give infinite trouble. I doubt a prudent Commander being satisfied without at least another British Infantry regiment and one and a half regiments of Native Cavalry, so as to bring up his force to a brigade of Cavalry and two brigades of Infantry. Recent experience has shown how unexpectedly our communications are assailed, and how suddenly large forces appear against us in the field. Forgotten lessons have indeed sharply repeated themselves to us since the Indian Army Commission closed its proceedings, and we should benefit by them. I therefore assume that the addition just stated is accepted. This would bring up the troops in positions beyond our old frontier to—

- 3 Field Batteries, Royal Artillery.
- 2 Mountain Batteries, Royal Artillery.
- 2½ Native Mountain Batteries.
- 1 Garrison Battery.
- 4 Companies of Sappers and Miners.
- 6 Regiments Native Cavalry.
- 5 Regiments British Infantry.
- 13 Regiments Native Infantry.

On the present establishment of Corps in India, which is, as respects British Corps, the ordinary peace complement of men, but which has given an increase of 96 and 200 men respectively to every Native regiment of Cavalry and Infantry beyond the frontier, the force I have detailed would comprise about 5,000 British and 15,000 Native soldiers.

The effective charge for these corps in time of peace, and on the peace establishment, as calculated from data of the cost of each unit of the Indian Army, made by Sir G. Kellner in 1879, would be somewhat over 750,000*l.* per annum. If to this we add a hundred per

* I am not certain what proportion of this is intended to be Native, but in my calculations I provide for two mountain batteries here, one European and one Native.

cent., I am sure we shall not do more than provide for the additional charge on account of the increased establishments of Native regiments, the extra charges for staff for a complete transport, for provisions, for extra allowances and for rations to Natives, for the greatly increased cost of Native Cavalry, for depots in India, for increased non-effective charges owing to pensions being given to the heirs of all Native soldiers who die beyond our frontier, for works and roads, for civil and political charges, and for subsidies to Native Chiefs and others.

Against this it is impossible to assume that any material set-off can be looked for from revenue. The whole revenue of the Khyber, Kurrum, and Pisheen could not, under the most favourable circumstances, appreciably reduce the foregoing large military charge, while the revenue of the Quetta territory will, of course, go to its own ruler.

I have assumed that these troops are in excess of the old establishment of the army, or that if reductions could be effected the reductions would be *pro tanto* so much less than they otherwise might be. I cannot think that we had too large an army in India before the Afghan war, and our occupying forward positions, which are much more likely to need support than any frontier garrisons previously occupied, seems to me a strong reason for not diminishing the force in India. If this view was accepted, and it may be forced on us, the extra cost of the forward positions would be something like a million and a half a year. If only half the troops beyond our frontier were in excess of the old peace garrison of India, then the extra charge of the whole and the normal charge of half would be due to the advanced positions, or 1,125,000*l.* per annum, and in the very improbable contingency of no addition being made to the old establishment to replace the force beyond the frontier the extra charge would still amount to 750,000*l.* per annum. Even if my estimate of the extra cost of the troops is unduly large, and may be reduced by a fourth or a third, it will still be seen that a heavy pecuniary burden will be thrown on India, but I believe my estimate of the troops costing double as much as they would in peace in India is not excessive. I would add that, of the 750,000*l.* stated now to be spent monthly on the Afghan war, exclusive of home charges and cost of frontier railways, a very considerable proportion must be due to the troops in the Khyber, in Kurrum, and between our frontier and Pisheen, or that would be placed at Pisheen if Kandahar was given up.

In conclusion, I urge, for all the reasons I have set forth, an entire withdrawal within our own frontier. On the line of the Khyber or in Kurrum no time will be so appropriate for this withdrawal as when our troops return from Kabul. There is no object to be gained in remaining longer, and in fact it will be easier to come away then than later on. But I advocate no precipitation. Leisurely marches and frequent halts of a day or two should be made, not only in view of allowing the impedimenta to get well away, but also to show the Afghans that our withdrawal is in no respect like a retirement before an enemy. Some may think it undesirable to relinquish control of the Khyber Pass. If this control can be maintained, so as to secure a safe transit for trade and travellers, by the subsidizing of the Chiefs or by any arrangement not very expensive, and which will not involve the employment of our troops or any obligation to send those troops from time to time to restore order in the pass, possibly there is no objection to our, to this extent, controlling the Khyber, but I do not think we should go beyond this. Kurrum should be made over to whoever is left as the ruler of Kabul, as before, a measure which will greatly strengthen his hands with his subjects.

On the Kandahar side the retirement might be more deliberate, and be made first to Pisheen and then to Quetta. The withdrawal from Pisheen, however, should not be much delayed, or trouble may arise which would be urged as a reason for again advancing to Kandahar. It should be understood that once we came away, our officers and troops had no concern with what took place at the points given up, and the halt at Pisheen should not be understood as being made to enable us to see whether matters were going to be well managed or not at Kandahar. I think, therefore, a halt at Pisheen of a fortnight or three weeks would be ample, and all troops, except those for Quetta, should then return to India in a leisurely manner.

We went to Quetta for a purpose quite different from that which took us to Kandahar, and the former place should be held until the conditions are fulfilled, as I have before suggested, but the Political Officer should be told that he is to encourage the Khan to exert himself to do without our aid, so as to allow of our troops leaving. If necessary, however, they might remain until the season following that in which Pisheen was given up.

Having urged strongly that these retirements should take place, I must avow my belief that they would produce no injurious political effect in India. That we have

made a great mistake in going into Afghanistan no doubt is felt by Natives of intelligence, but this mischief is done, and is not to be repaired by stopping there. The Natives know that on every occasion we have defeated the Afghans, and they will also certainly know that we shall be stronger in India when we come away than it is possible for us to be when we have the strain of an Afghan war on our hands. Further, I am fain to believe that they will feel it is on the whole more just on our part to leave the Afghans to themselves than to occupy certain positions in their country on the plea that we must do so to protect ourselves against the improbable contingency of Russian invasion.

(Signed) H. W. NORMAN.

26th June 1880.

No. 7.

MEMORANDUM on our future POLICY in AFGHANISTAN.

THE present war in Afghanistan has, in many respects, closely followed the various phases of our first operations in that country.

We have easily beaten the enemy in the open field; we have overrun the country without serious difficulty; we have met with reverses in Southern Afghanistan and had to take refuge within the fortifications of Kandahar, and the only ruler we have as yet set up and helped to provide with an efficient native army has been deserted by his troops at the first opportunity. The disaster of the retreat from Kabul in 1842 has been imitated, although fortunately on a much smaller scale, in the defeat at and flight from Khusk-i-Nakhud.

The point, however, where the parallel ceases is in the utter collapse of the native army.* This had certainly not been generally foreseen, and must have been most unexpected by those who had looked forward to the early encounter of the Sepoy and the Cossack on the banks of the Oxus. A little consideration will, however, show that there is nothing extraordinary in this collapse. Perhaps the most prosperous provinces in India at the present time, or at all events those whose prosperity has progressed most rapidly, are those from which we have hitherto drawn our best recruits. The natives of Oude and the Punjab, as their riches and civilization increase, lose their taste and aptitude for a military life, and are disinclined to exchange the ease and plenty of their homes for prolonged garrison duty in a severe climate and amongst a treacherous and hostile population. Another cause has also been at work in lessening our recruiting field in India. Many duties which before the mutiny used to be entrusted to the native army are now carried out by the police, and although the police and army together may employ as many men as were formerly required for the army alone, still the number of native troops has, for the last 20 years, been considerably below the number maintained in the days of the East India Company. The demand for soldiers having been less, many men who would formerly have served in the army have turned their attention to other pursuits.

The present state of affairs shows conclusively that the native army is not capable, as at present recruited and organised, of undertaking operations on a large scale for an extended period beyond the frontiers of India.

If one result of the present war is to cause judicious improvements in our Indian army and the formation of an efficient reserve, it will not have been altogether unprofitable to this country.

Another matter which has become painfully evident is the complete failure of our means of transport. Our expenditure of baggage animals has been so ruinous that some years must elapse before we shall be able to provide transport for a large body of troops for prolonged operations on the north-west of India. During that time, it is true, our railway communication will be carried to our frontier and probably beyond it, and in our next advance into Afghanistan our camel and cattle transport will not be required until points very much further in advance are reached than has been the case during the present war. It must, however, be borne in mind that as our system of railways becomes extended in India, the supply of camels for transport purposes will gradually diminish. This fact became apparent some few years ago in carrying out the yearly reliefs of troops, when it was discovered that in those districts well provided with railways the natives no longer found it profitable to breed camels for transport purposes.

* The absolute failure in the supply of recruits is not confined to the Bengal Presidency, but extends to the whole of India.

In discussing our future policy with reference to Afghanistan, it is necessary to bear clearly in mind these two well established facts ; first, that the native army is no longer to be reckoned on for extended operations in that country ; and second, that our means of transport have been exhausted.

The points for consideration as regards our immediate policy in Afghanistan appear to be the following :—

1. How far the attitude and power of Russia in Central Asia should influence our proceedings.
2. Should Afghanistan be united under one ruler, or divided into separate provinces.
3. The line of frontier we should take up and the positions, if any, that we should occupy in the country.

With regard to the first question we may consider it a certainty that Russia will subdue the Tekke Turkomans, and, if necessary to effect this thoroughly, her troops will occupy Merv. But we may confidentially anticipate that she will not be able to advance beyond Merv, or even to hold that place permanently. From Merv to Herat is 230 miles, through a more or less desert country the whole way.

We may safely judge of the difficulties Russia must encounter in her progress in Central Asia from the experience we have gained in Afghanistan during the last three years. We have advanced from Sukkur to Kandahar, some 400 miles, and from Peshawur to a short distance beyond Kabul, some 200 miles, and, having done so much, we are exhausted and incapable of moving further. The march of detached brigades beyond these points were on a small scale, and are not here taken into consideration. We have had the resources of the whole of India at our disposal for transport animals, and we have used them up. Russia has to move all her troops and stores by sea, and to land them on the difficult shores of the Caspian, and has then to collect from the scattered and generally unfriendly Turkoman tribes the camels necessary for transport purposes. So difficult is it found to collect a sufficient number of these, that the main advance probably will not be undertaken until a line of rails has been laid down for part of the distance. The distance of Merv from the Caspian is considerably greater than the distance of Kandahar from the Indus. In the country to be traversed, Russia can obtain no supplies whatever for the men, and but scanty forage for the horses and cattle. So that she has not only to contend against enormous difficulties in providing transport, but also against very great difficulties in obtaining sufficient forage. She may be better off for men than we are at the present moment, but this will be no great advantage if she has not the means to move their baggage and supplies. A march on Merv will severely tax the powers of Russia, and it may be seriously doubted if she will attempt to undertake it.

Russia has always been content in her advances in Central Asia to take one step at a time, and to secure her advanced position before attempting a further movement. She will be content now to re-establish her reputation in Central Asia by a successful expedition against the Tekke Turkomans, and will then be prepared to wait patiently before making any further advance. Russia knows she need take no step to checkmate any movement of ours, as she is well aware of our intention to evacuate Afghanistan, and of the strain in men and money the present war is to us. She is besides now busied with arrangements for a war with China, and on this account alone will be glad to forego any operations against the Turkomans beyond what may be absolutely necessary.

We may therefore conclude that Russia will not now undertake any operation in Central Asia beyond those necessary to chastise the Tekke Turkomans.

We can then leave Russia altogether out of our calculations in any arrangements we may make in Afghanistan, and whilst firmly maintaining the principle that Afghanistan is beyond the sphere of Russian influence, we may feel assured that for *the present* Russia has no wish to exert her influence in that country. We must not, however, expect that this will always be the case.

Although we may have no cause to feel uneasy at present regarding the advance of Russia in Central Asia, that is no reason we should not at all times keep ourselves acquainted with her movements and designs in that part of the world. It is extremely unfortunate that, owing to the Consulship at Asterabad having been so long vacant, we have now no means of learning the progress of the Russian expedition against the Tekke Turkomans. Not only does it appear advisable to fill up the vacancy at Asterabad without further delay, but it might also be judicious, until affairs at Herat and in Western Afghanistan are settled, to detach an officer as Consul to Meshed.

If we were kept accurately informed of the state of affairs in those regions the Government would be at once able to dispel the discreditable state of alarm into which

this country is periodically thrown by rumours of Russian expeditions against Herat or Northern Afghanistan. If knowledge is power, ignorance is weakness, and this weakness we constantly show by the undignified fear displayed at every report or threat of Russian movements. It is frequently said, and occasionally truly so, that our military disasters are attributable to the defective information obtained by our Generals. It is probably safe to say that in the conduct of foreign affairs the same cause is at work, and that when we are outwitted by foreign powers, it is owing to our being deficient in the necessary information.

As regards the question of Afghanistan remaining one united kingdom, or being divided into separate provinces, it may be urged that, by having a united Afghanistan, our influence would be exerted over the whole country through one ruler, who would be responsible to us for the behaviour of all minor chiefs, instead of our having to control them separately. The difficulty of establishing a Resident, with a sufficient escort, could, if necessary, be confined to Kabul or its neighbourhood, instead of being multiplied by the number of separate chiefships that might be formed; the field of Russian intrigue, which will, sooner or later, make itself felt again, would be narrowed, and we should be continuing the policy of maintaining an independent and united Afghanistan closely allied to England, which policy we have hitherto proclaimed it our intention to follow. Russia has not openly disputed the principle we have laid down, that Afghanistan is beyond her influence, and if she has tacitly accepted it, we may presume she has done so on the understanding that the country remains united and independent. If Afghanistan is to be dismembered, she will claim her share of the spoil. With the revenue of the whole of Afghanistan at his disposal, and able to draw recruits from the entire kingdom, the ruler of the country will be in a position to hold the outlying provinces of Herat and Turkestan in subjection, and to consolidate his power as successfully as was done by Shere Ali. Deprived of the revenues and resources of the province of Kandahar, his hold on the outlying provinces would be feeble, and they would soon offer a favourable field for native intriguers supported by Russian influence.

Two principal reasons have been put forward by various authorities for the maintenance of Kandahar as an independent province, and for the retention of a British garrison at that town. The first is, that Kandahar is a place of great strategical importance as regards any further operations we may have to undertake against Afghanistan, and the second is, that it will be an important stage gained on the road to Herat, and will enable us, when the struggle takes place with Russia, for the possession of that town, to forestall her there. To maintain our influence at Kandahar without interference with the ruler at Kabul, it is contended by many eminent authorities, that the province should be separated from the rest of Afghanistan, and governed by a Chief, who would be advised by a British Resident. The limits of the province of Kandahar have not been officially defined; it is probably intended that they should extend to and include Farrah.

Kandahar is undoubtedly a point of great strategical importance, but it possesses this importance only in time of war. If we occupy such a position as will enable us to seize Kandahar on the first symptom of war, we obtain practically all the strategical advantages of the place itself, and at the same time avoid all the inconveniences which its permanent occupation would entail. If instead of Kandahar, we hold the Pishin Valley, we shall shorten our line of communication with India by over 100 miles, and at the same time be near enough to Kandahar to seize it when the necessity arises, and near enough to avail ourselves of the resources of the valley of the Arghandab.

There is no reason if we give up Kandahar, why the railway already in progress should not be continued to that place from Pishin. One of the conditions of making over the province to Abdul Rahman might be that he should furnish labour and funds towards the construction of the line within his territory, and that when our troops are finally withdrawn, he should be responsible for the protection of the line within his dominions.

As regards the value of Kandahar as a *point d'appui* against a Russian advance from Herat, or as an advanced base for a British advance on that town, it is contended that Russia is not now in a position, and will not be so for years to come, to undertake any offensive operations in Afghanistan, and we ourselves are incapable of advancing on and occupying Herat in the face of Russian opposition, and many years will probably elapse before we are in a position to do so.

The formation of the province of Kandahar into an independent Chiefship will practically cut off the district of Herat from Kabul, for the line of communication between those two places will then be restricted to the road over the Bamian Pass and through Afghan Turkestan, the mountain portion of which is closed by snow for at least two

months in the year. The advocates of the formation of an independent province of Kandahar do not appear to have put forward any proposal for the future of Herat, beyond the suggestion, which has happily been found impracticable, of handing it over to Persia. Herat is not strong enough, with reference to its powerful and aggressive neighbours, to be independent, and if weakly held by the ruler at Kabul it will become a source of constant trouble to Russia, Persia, and ourselves.

The establishment of an independent province of Kandahar under our protection, means, in fact, the dismemberment of Afghanistan, for the ruler at Kabul would then no longer be able to retain an efficient hold over Afghan Turkestan and Herat. The former would eventually fall to Russia and the latter to Persia, and would remain in the hands of that power so long only as it might suit Russian policy that it should do so.

We should then find ourselves at Kandahar, ready, it is true, to oppose an advance of Russia from Herat, but Russia meantime will be at the Hindu Kush, a few marches only from Kabul, and we should in no way have increased our power or means of opposing a Russian advance from that direction. When the Russian Agent went to Kabul in 1878, he did not proceed *viâ* Herat but *viâ* Bamian; when a body of Russian troops was moved to Djam in 1878, there was no intention of sending it to Herat to help the Afghans against us, but it was to have proceeded to Kabul. Kabul has for years been the seat of political and military power in Afghanistan, and the ruler at that place has been master of the country.

In our dealings with Native Princes in India we have maintained our supremacy over them by making our power felt at their capital, as is now done at Morar in Gwalior, at Hyderabad in the Deccan, &c. The same principle should apply in Afghanistan. Our occupation of Kandahar, as regards any influence it will exercise over the ruler at Kabul, is futile; he will remain as open to Russian intrigue as he has ever been, and we shall continue as heretofore, ignorant of what may be taking place at his capital until the mischief has been done. In fact, we shall in no way improve our means of counteracting a danger which has already been experienced, although we may be better able to guard against a Russian advance from Herat, which is a danger which has not yet occurred and cannot be experienced for many years to come. We shall provide against an improbable and remote contingency, but shall gain no advantage against one of daily and immediate occurrence.

To make our influence and power felt in the country, it must be exerted at or near the capital, and for the reasons put forward on a previous occasion, the formation of a fortified cantonment at Kushi, with a British Resident, who could thence proceed to Kabul when necessary, is again strongly urged. If this proposal cannot be carried out, then it is suggested that a strong brigade of all arms, with carriage complete, should be cantoned in the highest part of the Kuram valley, which is suitable for occupation all the year round, and that the road thence across the Shutur-Gurdam Pass should be improved by our troops before they completely evacuate Northern Afghanistan. The knowledge that this force is ready for an advance at any moment on Kabul would have a very powerful influence on the conduct of affairs in that town.

The Government have decided that a British Resident is not in future to be stationed at Kabul, but it will probably be necessary to appoint an agent especially entrusted with Afghan affairs to reside on the frontier. This officer should be at the cantonment in the Kuram valley in the summer, and at Peshawur during the cold weather, and it should be his duty to pay periodical visits to Kabul.

The serious difficulty undoubtedly exists of our having bound ourselves to support the independence of the Wali of Kandahar, but this support, it is supposed, has not been promised unconditionally. His inability to maintain his position and rule has already been proved by the wholesale desertion of his troops, and this alone would appear sufficient reason for releasing us from our engagements.

Kandahar under a Native Prince but with a British garrison, would be independent in name only; in a very short time the administration would of necessity pass into our hands. It is impossible to disguise the fact that the independence of Kandahar, under the conditions proposed, means the annexation of the province to the British dominions.

What then becomes of our declaration that we had no intention of annexing any portion of Afghanistan beyond what might be absolutely necessary for the safety of our own frontiers? What faith will the Afghan nation in future place in British promises? They will say that in our first expedition against Afghanistan we suffered a serious disaster and were driven out of the country. In our second war, that we found it impossible to conquer the country, but, nevertheless annexed that part where the inhabitants are the least warlike, and where alone we could hope to retain our hold, and that we did this in spite of promises that the integrity of the country should be maintained.

In any future war between this country and Russia, Afghanistan will play a very important part, and it is as well we should consider what effect any arrangements we may now make may then have. The Afghans will not then look with favour upon those who have destroyed their independence and broken up their empire; they will rather side with the power that has shown them unvarying friendship, and which has not attempted to rob them of territory. A few Russian officers and a supply of arms would render the northern Afghans such a formidable enemy that they would seriously cripple any offensive operations we might undertake at the same time in Europe.

It is not recommended that Kandahar should be at once evacuated. This should not be done until Abdul Rahman has shown that he is firmly established in power, and is faithful to the promises he has made to the British Government; and Kandahar must also necessarily remain in our hands until the defeat inflicted by Ayoub Khan has been thoroughly avenged.

Lastly, as regards the frontier line we should occupy, there appears to be no reason why any alterations should be made from that contemplated in the treaty of Gandamak. By occupying Kushi, or the Upper Kuram Valley, we are in a position to enter Kabul, either as a friend or an enemy, whenever we may wish to do so, and from Pishin we can advance in a few days on Kandahar whenever the necessity arises.

Whether under any circumstances it will, at some future time, be advisable for us to advance beyond Kandahar, or Kabul, it is impossible at present to say; but, from a military point of view, it appears rather judicious to allow an enemy the difficulty and the risk of a long march, through a poorly supplied country, with the chance of having his army completely destroyed in case of a defeat, when he reaches his first objective point, than to undertake this march and risk ourselves, and relinquish to him the advantage of fighting a decisive battle near his base of operations.

(Signed) C. J. EAST,
A.Q.M.G.

Intelligence Branch,
Quartermaster-General's Department,
War Office, 16th August 1880.

Endorsements on the above.

Quartermaster-General,

I submit the within paper on "Our future Policy in Afghanistan," by Colonel East, A.Q.M.G.

I consider the views therein so ably put forward, of the greatest interest and importance at the present time.

I concur generally in the conclusions at which Colonel East has arrived.

(Signed) A. ALISON,
D.Q.M.G.

18th August 1880.

I think this a very good minute upon the present condition of affairs in Afghanistan, and I fully concur in the views expressed regarding the desirability of our leaving Kandahar, and retiring upon Pishin, as soon as political events will allow us to do so.

(Signed) G. J. WOLSELEY.

23rd August 1880.

No. 8.

MÉMOIRANDUM by Field Marshal His Royal Highness the DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE on
Colonel EAST'S PAPER on our future POLICY in AFGHANISTAN.

WHILST admitting to the fullest extent the value of this paper, I confess I am not in the least convinced by it of the advisability of giving up Kandahar as the result of the great struggle we have been and are still engaged upon in Afghanistan. On the contrary, I feel more and more satisfied from all that is now going on, that upon the retention of Kandahar largely depends our general position and influence in the East, and more particularly in Central Asia; and even our hold on India will be shaken should we not have the boldness to maintain what we have so dearly purchased.

I firmly believe, that with a good line of communication by railroad, which is now in progress and considerably advanced to Kandahar, that city might and would in time become a great emporium for commercial purposes, and that the trade of Persia and Central Asia might in this way be very considerably diverted from passing, as it now

does, through the provinces of Russia, and that then our power would be largely increased in those parts, besides securing to us those commercial advantages which now fall to the share of our rivals. The railroad, in connecting Kandahar with India, would bring the trade down to Kurrachee, whence it would be shipped in perfect security to any portion of the world. Again, as a military position, I am strongly in favour of Kandahar. We know, by recent experience, that the march thence to Herat is not by any means difficult of accomplishment, and as Herat must ever be looked upon as the key to any advance on the part of Russia to India, the facility of reaching it before the Russians could attain it from Merv would, in itself, be of immense importance. That Russia is bent upon reaching Merv is palpable from all their movements, and is hardly denied by them. We cannot, if we would, prevent their attaining it, and I do not think we shall make any effort to do so, consequently I feel satisfied their object will ere long be accomplished. To us this would be a heavy blow, but for our occupation of Kandahar. But with Kandahar in our possession—and we are actually there now—I think we might look on with perfect calmness to Russia's occupying and holding Merv.

Such being my views, I ask myself what are the chief arguments against it as contained in Colonel East's paper. The first is the collapse of our native armies, the second the breakdown of our transport. I think too much importance is attached by him to both these incidents. I do not believe in the utter collapse of the native armies. No doubt native troops cannot be too long kept in the field or away from their native habits, as must be the case when the troops are in the field. It must be remembered that the army in Afghanistan has been for *two years* consecutively in the field. This would be a severe strain upon the best European troops, how much more so with natives deprived of all their usual habits and comforts. The native armies have fought faithfully and admirably and have never flinched. Give them rest and time to recover themselves, and there is no reason to doubt that they would be found as ready and willing again to go wherever ordered. Very probably recruiting has been checked and suspended by what has been required of the troops in so protracted a campaign. But there are many other causes which have added to the difficulty of obtaining recruits, and which are referred to in Colonel East's paper, and in other communications I have received from India. The severity of military duties in India has been very great, the facility of employment is far greater than what it was, and the labour market has now to be watched in India, as it has to be even at home. In fact, the price of the military article, in the shape of men, has greatly increased in value, and there has not been any sufficient rise in the remuneration offered to induce men to enlist as freely as in former times. So that I think we must not ascribe to the unpopularity of the war alone the difficulties with which we are contending.

Then as regards transport, there is no doubt that at the present moment this has seriously broken down, and hampered our movements. But this has been chiefly caused by the want of preparedness at the outset of the contest, and the consequent overworking of such animals as could hastily be collected, bad or inferior in themselves, and rendered totally inefficient by the vast amount of work they were called upon to perform from the deficiency in their numbers. But as regards the retention of Kandahar, I do not think this ought to cause any uneasiness, for with the railroad once completed to Kandahar, the traffic will be conducted mainly on this line, and transport animals will only be required in reduced numbers, and as auxiliaries to the great line of communication by rail.

I hold, therefore, that the objections chiefly raised by Colonel East to the retention of Kandahar ought to be, and would be, met by judicious measures, and as I feel satisfied that our prestige would receive a vital blow by retrograde movement in that direction, I adhere strongly to my conviction, that Kandahar ought, on no account, ever again to pass out of our hands.

As regards the question of expenditure, I firmly believe that, in the long run, it will be found much less costly to retain our hold of the advantageous position we have acquired, both in a commercial and in a military point of view, than to have to fight for our very existence in India should our interests and prestige suffer, as I am persuaded they would were we now to withdraw to Pishin as suggested.

GEORGE.

Kissingen,
August 31st, 1880.

No. 9.

NOTE *on* the RETENTION OF KANDAHAR.

MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON,

ON the 26th June last I submitted to your Lordship a note on the subject of our line of frontier on the north-western border of India; but in that note I confined my observations in the main to the questions connected with the line of frontier to be occupied under the Treaty of Gundamak, that is, the Khyber Pass up to Lundi Kotul, the Kuram Valley, and the country beyond the old frontier of Sind up to Pisheen. I did not touch on the question of occupying Kandahar, for, as far as I knew, there was then no proposal that we should occupy it. Under the provisions of the Treaty of Gundamak we were entirely to withdraw from it, and under a more recent arrangement made by Lord Lytton, with the details of which I was imperfectly informed, Kandahar was to be made over to the Wali Shere Ali, who was to be supported by us, but to what extent I did not know.

Recent events, however, have made it important that some other arrangement should be made, and any sort of notion that may have been entertained of the power of Shere Ali to hold Kandahar must be discarded. Few believed in his power to do so at any time, but it is now conclusively proved that, except under the immediate support of our troops, he is quite incapable of retaining the position of ruler of Kandahar.

In my note of the 26th June, on the North-western frontier, I made the following allusion to Kandahar:—

“I will also assume that we shall not continue to occupy Kandahar. If we retain a force at Kandahar, any arguments I may use adverse to the tenure of positions in the direction of Pisheen or the Bolan fall to the ground; for if we hold Kandahar we must doubtless hold in ample strength our line of communication with that city. I have no knowledge as to the reasons which may have led to the alleged agreement with Shere Ali that he should have the province of Kandahar, or as to any stipulation that we should support him in his government, either by having a garrison at his capital or its neighbourhood, or at Pisheen, nor have I any knowledge as to there being any binding agreement of the kind. If there is such a binding agreement of course it will be adhered to, but I must say that the creation of such an engagement is to be lamented, and I am quite unaware of any necessity that has arisen for making such an engagement, while I am sure that it would be well, even at a very great sacrifice, to induce Shere Ali to consent to its modification.

“To occupy Kandahar at all will be very expensive, and no one, I suppose, really believes that the province will be for any long time left undisturbed if through our action it is separated from Kabul. To occupy it means to continue to occupy Khelat-i-Ghilzai, to be involved from time to time in the directions of Girishk and of Ghuznee, and eventually probably to be led on towards Furreh and Herat in the one direction and Kabul in the other, without really adding one iota to the security of our possession of India. Bad as it would be to occupy Kandahar ourselves, even this would be better than to remain there to support a Chief the justice of whose rule could not be depended upon, whose very existence as a ruler would provoke trouble, and whose presence would be rather a weakness than a strength to our occupying force.

“Our occupation of Kandahar, or its being held by a ruler under our guarantee, would infallibly land us, and speedily land us, in renewed difficulties such as our recent experience should lead us to avoid. It seems to me indeed pretty certain that if we remain at Kandahar we shall be again embarked on the troubled sea of Afghan politics, and may anticipate that before long we shall again have a large army in the field for no object that can benefit us.

“As I trust that Kandahar will not be occupied, and that it will turn out that we are not obliged to maintain Shere Ali in the government of that province, and as I am writing rather about the frontier intended to be occupied under the Treaty of Gundamak than about Kandahar, I will refrain from saying more on this point, and I will only add that the arguments I shall hereafter use against advancing our old frontier in view to being strong against Russia are, in my opinion, applicable to the occupation of Kandahar, but that if we feel ourselves compelled for any reason to hold Kandahar we must, as I have before said, hold Pisheen and other points between it and India.

“In considering the best line for our north-western frontier, I desire first to point out that no rectification of the old frontier has ever been advocated, as far as know, in view to resisting the Afghans.”

Very important events have occurred since I wrote the above, but I think it will be admitted that these events have not weakened the force of what I urged. Ayoub Khan

came from Herat to the Helmund, very much incited to do so, it would seem probable, by our having set up Shere Ali as ruler of Kandahar. The troops of the latter either wholly deserted his cause or became unreliable, and we had the mortification of suffering a disastrous defeat, and of seeing a considerable body of our troops shut up in Kandahar. It is difficult indeed to speak with respect of an arrangement which forced us to support at Kandahar a ruler who was evidently quite incapable of holding so important a province. We may, hope, however, that the arrangement which we entered into of our own accord with Shere Ali is at an end, and that we shall not attempt a similar experiment at Kandahar with any other chieftain. If this is admitted it remains to consider whether we shall permanently occupy the place as a British possession, a course which is being strenuously urged by those who have incited and applauded the policy which took us into Afghanistan two years ago, and some of whom at least would gladly see us remain at Kandahar as a sure step towards the eventual annexation of all Afghanistan.

At the outset of the discussion, the question of what is meant by the occupation of Kandahar must be raised, and the reply at first sight, I presume, would be that we should take over the province of Kandahar as recently allotted, or intended to have been allotted to Shere Ali. Few of those who write so readily about annexing Kandahar really know what such an annexation means, while others who are better informed and who desire the entire annexation of the Afghan kingdom must smile at the innocence with which taking Kandahar to ourselves is described as a small matter, when they know that it means a most gigantic step towards achieving the annexation they wish for.

The territory to be given to Shere Ali was described by Sir Donald Stewart, in a Despatch to the Government of India, dated 16th February 1880, as the province of Kandahar proper, excluding the assigned districts of Pisheen and Sibi, with possibly that part of Seistan watered by the Helmund; the district of Khelat-i-Ghilzai, separated from Kandahar in 1855; the districts of Pusht-i-rud and Zemindawar, separated about nine years ago, and the district of Furrah originally belonging to Herat, but which was formed into a separate province since the capture of that city by the Ameer of Kabul in 1863. This is stated by General Stewart to be the minimum already practically fixed, and he enclosed a cutting from a map showing the extent and approximate limits of the territory. It is there shown by "an irregular figure not far removed from an equilateral triangle, with sides nearly 400 miles in length and covering about 70,000 square miles. A very small portion of this is cultivated, or indeed cultivable." Sir D. Stewart estimated the number of inhabitants at between half a million and a million, three-fourths being Dooranees, according to their own account, the only true Afghans, and Colonel St. John estimated the revenue at 20½ lacs, which sum he assumed, might "be largely increased by a settled government and by the construction of a railway from India to Kandahar."

Judging by the map, the province thus comprised would extend forty or fifty miles beyond Khelat-i-Ghilzai, or say 130 from Kandahar in all, in the direction of Ghuznee and Kabul. It would reach a point about 30 miles beyond Furrah, or 260 miles from Kandahar in the direction of Herat, and within 130 miles of the last-named place. Due west it would extend to the Persian frontier beyond Lash Jawain, a distance of 300 miles from Kandahar, and it would extend 120 miles to the eastward, and about 300 miles to the southward of Kandahar. This is a tract of country one fifth larger than England and Wales combined, and about the same size as the Punjab territory annexed by Lord Dalhousie after the war of 1848-9, while it is so placed as to hold forth a sure prospect of discord with the rulers of Persia, Herat, and Kabul. The people too, General Stewart says, comprise a large majority of Dooranees, the class which we are told has chieftains most inclined to be hostile to us, and whose expulsion from the city of Kandahar was deemed essential after the defeat of General Burrows and advance of Ayoub Khan.

To take upon ourselves the responsibility of this large and unprofitable territory cannot, I think, be contemplated. If it is contemplated, then we had better prepare to maintain at least 20,000 troops in Southern Afghanistan, with the prospect of having to send a good many more. If we take Kandahar with only a moderate territory round, including the tract between it and Pisheen, so as to guard our communications and command sufficient supplies, still difficulties will arise as to who is to have the territory of the province of Kandahar, and many troubles may be caused by various claimants for different portions of territory, and we ourselves from time to time be involved in these troubles.

Putting this aside, and supposing the smaller tract only is taken, that is the country between Pisheen and Kandahar, and a tract of 50 to 70 miles in other directions, I will ask what advantage accrues to us?

Taking the military arguments first, we see it broadly stated by anonymous newspaper correspondents that military men quartered at Kandahar were unanimously of opinion that we ought to retain the place. I have good grounds for doubting that this assertion is correct, and though I am unaware of General Stewart's opinions at present, I certainly understood that he at one time considered Kandahar useless as a military position. But after all what does the military opinion amount to? We do not know what attention these military officers may have given to the various considerations which must be borne in mind by a responsible Government. They could not say that service there was popular, for such a statement would be directly opposed to facts; they could not say that by holding Kandahar we would require fewer troops in the army of India than if we did not take Kandahar, for not only would a large force be required for Kandahar and the communications, but the presence of this force beyond our frontier could in no way enable us to weaken Sind by having less than the very small garrison which has sufficed for it for many years prior to 1878.

In short it comes to this, that some authorities consider Kandahar to be a good military position while others disagree with this opinion, but if the former view is correct, we have to ask for what purpose is it a good military position and necessary for us to hold. We have had no trouble in India from the Afghans, and assuredly need anticipate no trouble from them to warrant our undertaking the occupation as against them, nor can it be believed that we are in danger from Persia, and must therefore take this forward position permanently. It must be the old story of Russia invading India, and to oppose her it is deemed by the advocates of this policy necessary to keep a force at Kandahar, which, of course, necessitates other troops on the line of communication and in reserve. But are we to undertake serious and immediate responsibilities and difficulties merely in the prospect of a contingency, such as the advance of Russia to Herat? Our being at Kandahar would not prevent Russia from advancing to Herat if she desired to do so. An occupation of Herat could only be prevented by our sending a considerable army there, and not by remaining at Kandahar. The contingency is remote, and if Russia really intends to injure us in India, which, of course, would involve war in Europe, my impression is that she is at least as likely to make an advance from the direction of Tashkend towards Afghan-Turkistan and Kabul, as to move forward by Herat.

Our real danger of Russia taking possession of Herat, without giving us a cause of war, would arise if Persia had the place, as, I understand, was at one time contemplated as a good arrangement for England. Then, indeed, Russia might, under some plausible pretext of a quarrel with Persia, find reasons, with which we could hardly quarrel, for taking Herat. I trust we shall entirely discourage any occupation of Herat by Persia, and without such occupation it does not seem likely that Russia could find grounds to take Herat, even if she desired to do so. My contention is that the probability of our having to struggle for Herat, or to defend India from Kandahar, is so remote that its possibility is hardly worth considering as an argument for an inconvenient and costly occupation. I think such an occupation would involve too large a charge for the small extra facility it might afford us in bringing up at some future day the 30,000 or 40,000 men it might be requisite to use if we had to fight Russia at Herat or at Kandahar, or between those two places.

The military reasons, therefore, seem to me to be of little force, while financial reasons must assuredly be *nil*. Holding Kandahar with a moderate *entourage*, it is hardly to be supposed that we could realize 10 lacs of rupees a year, even under the favourable circumstances anticipated by Colonel St. John, and this sum would leave us heavy losers. A railway, which would be almost a necessity of our occupation, would never recoup us for the outlay of construction and maintenance. Its first cost would be very heavy, and establishments would require handsome pay to induce them to serve. Is it possible to believe, after our experience of railways in fertile, thickly populated parts of British India, that a railway across the desert of Sind, and passing over mountain ranges in a sparsely populated country like Beloochistan and Southern Afghanistan, is likely to pay its heavy working expenses, maintenance, and interest on money laid out? It would be the wildest assumption to suppose that any occupation of Kandahar could ever result pecuniarily in anything but a heavy loss.

The political reasons urged in favour of occupation or annexation, as far as I understand them, are as follows:—

I. That we shall influence Afghanistan and Central Asia generally from Kandahar in a way favourable to our views.

II. That we shall introduce good government where otherwise there would be bad government.

III. That annexation is desired by the people or by a majority of them.

IV. That our prestige will suffer by retirement, especially in the eyes of the people of India.

V. That it is advisable to remain at Kandahar in order that we may have something to show in return for our heavy loss in lives and treasure in Afghanistan during the last two years.

As to the first reason it appears to me that our presence at Kandahar, so far as it exerts any influence, will be unfavourable to us. Every one engaged in the recent war whose opinion I have read, and I have read many opinions, from those of the two most distinguished Generals the war has produced down to that of an intelligent Native Officer has expressed himself to the effect that the less we have to say to the Afghans the better for our influence over them. For many reasons they dislike our presence, and though we lavish money on them and treat them with justice and kindness they are in no degree reconciled to our being in their country. They are an independent people and do not like us in the position of conquerors, the only position in which we can remain among them, and apart from this our ways and our religion are so different from that of the Afghans that we can never expect them to tolerate us in their country unless it may be to aid them to repel or to expel some other invader.

It is to be hoped that we may so far flatter ourselves as to believe that the second reason urged is, in a sense, true. No doubt, so far as our means extended, our Government would be far better than that of any Afghan, but it is a Government not desired by the Afghans, and we have no right to take territory without the consent of those to whom it belongs, merely to enable us to bring into play our system of good government.

The third reason, namely, that our rule is desired, is absolutely opposed to all our experience. There may be a certain number of Hindoo traders and others who think we would protect or favour them, but can anyone suppose that the Afghans themselves wish for our rule? Who of them has lost an opportunity, when such opportunity offered, of injuring us? No place ought to appreciate us more than Kandahar, where our money had been lavished, most strict discipline maintained, as was indeed the case everywhere with our troops in Afghanistan, and where we had very scrupulously abstained from everything calculated to annoy the natives, and yet, how did they behave? A full inquiry into recent events at and near Kandahar will, I think, show that the behaviour of the Afghans of the city and neighbourhood was the reverse of friendly directly we fell into trouble, and we are told that the villagers not far from Kandahar murdered our fugitive soldiers after the defeat of Khosk-i-Nakhud. These people cannot desire our rule; on the contrary, they detest it, and have availed themselves of every good opportunity to show this feeling.

Fourthly, it is alleged that our prestige in India will suffer by retirement. I do not see why this should be alleged of Kandahar more than of Kabul, the retirement from which place seems to have been followed by no such result. On the contrary India seems to have accepted the retirement as a wise and just measure. I feel sure the same sentiment would follow a retirement from Kandahar, and we should further know that, prestige or no prestige, we should be far stronger in India after the retirement, and would be so in long years to come when any recollection of a temporary or partial loss of prestige would be forgotten.

The last argument, though it appeals to national feelings, seems to me one that can hardly be pressed. It amounts to this,—that we have made a very bad bargain of this Afghan war, but it is so painful to admit this that we must cling to a part of our bad bargain. If the portion we retained would cost us nothing hereafter, there might be a show of sense in the argument, but if it can be shown that our remaining at Kandahar simply means a perpetuation of a bad bargain, surely we had better, like sensible people, admit we have made a mistake, and let our first loss be a final one. Let us not condemn others to die in Afghanistan, because we have already lost many valuable lives, or lavish millions in addition to those millions that have already gone past recall, merely because we are unwilling to admit that we have been led into grievous error.

I have thus noted a few observations on the reasons assigned for holding Kandahar. It hardly seems worth while to allude to the argument that we should create and improve trade. I am sceptical as to trade receiving any considerable development because we establish our guns and bayonets at Kandahar, but if this result was certain, and if every one of the other reasons assigned for holding the place was true, I would say they were immeasurably outbalanced by the evils of any such occupation, and I will now detail those evils, though I shall be far indeed from exhausting the catalogue.

First, as to political evils. One of these, of most importance in my mind, is that we should be guilty of injustice. No doubt we may have taken territory in India under circumstances now considered not creditable according to strict rules of justice and right. It might be hoped that our sense of justice had improved in these latter years, but, if we annex a portion of Afghanistan we shall, I think, commit a great wrong, and a great wrong is a political error in any country, but most of all so in India, where our supreme position gives us so heavy a responsibility, and where, as Christian rulers, we should set an example of Christian justice to our subjects. Necessity cannot fairly be alleged, as it was alleged, rightly or wrongly, in some of the cases of annexation, that are now condemned. Our greatest annexation during the last fifty years was that of the Punjab, but this annexation only took place after an actual invasion of our territory by the formidable army of the Punjab, and after the failure of our attempt, subsequent to the defeat of the Sikh army, to maintain the lawful sovereign of the country peaceably on his throne. We annexed Oudh in 1856, and though individually I think the measure was wrong, our title to do so was, under the circumstances, incomparably greater than anything that can be alleged in favour of annexing Kandahar. I feel certain that the real political effect of such annexation will be injurious to us in India, as it will impress upon the Chiefs and people the notion that a mere cry that we should be the better for possessing certain territory is sufficient to justify us in seizing it.

If it is stated that the wishes of the population justify our annexation, I would say that the evidence seems to me to tend in the opposite direction. On what occasion have the people given practical proofs of friendship for us? I have already shown what they did when we were in trouble last July and August, and it is notorious that then everywhere our communications were stopped or threatened. It is not likely that a province, three fourths of the population of which are Dooranee Afghans, the people who, it is said, General Primrose had to expel from the city directly after the defeat of Burrows, is much in favour of annexation by the British. Our well-wishers are probably confined to a few of those who make money out of us, and the friendship even of these is not to be relied on whenever circumstances stop their gaining profit out of us. It seems to me that we have no grounds for evading the charge of injustice in annexing, by the plea that we are acting in accord with the wishes of the bulk of the people.

Then, assuredly, the political effect of burdening India with the inevitable cost of the annexation would be bad. It is not likely that the English taxpayer will approve of an annual charge to meet that cost, wholly or in part, and it is evident that if we hold Kandahar taxes must be added in India, or imposts maintained that otherwise might be abolished to the great contentment of our subjects. If we stop all charges for Afghanistan, we may enter on a settled course to improve our financial position; but if we remain in that country, not only are extra charges inevitable, but these charges must be so uncertain, and, I fear, with a constant tendency to increase, that a state of things will continue which is highly undesirable from a political point of view.

Remaining in Afghanistan means a continual simmering of trouble with real troubles from time to time. Hence there will be a constant excitement in India. We can never be quit of Afghan difficulties while we remain in the country. Disputes of one kind or another are certain to arise, in which we shall be involved, and when any reverse or check takes place we see how readily panics arise in India, and such panics may at any time be taken advantage of by those classes of our subjects or feudatories who do not wish us well. Nothing can have a better effect politically in India than for the people to know that we are very strong within our borders, and that we have ceased to have the constant anxieties which arise from our troops being thrust forward into advanced positions in an inhospitable country, full of unfriendly and warlike people.

Our object is always said to be to have a friendly and strong Afghanistan. Breaking up the country, as we must do by holding Kandahar, ensures us enemies, and certainly cannot make Afghanistan strong. It is difficult to conceive that the ruler of Kabul could conquer and hold the Herat province if we held Kandahar, and it is difficult also to conceive, looking to past history, as recently quoted in a memorandum submitted to your Lordship by Sir Erskine Perry, and also judging by common sense, that a ruler at Kabul can feel himself powerful and contented if he does not hold Kandahar. I have already alluded to the difficulties which beset us as to territorial jurisdiction if we hold Kandahar. They seem to me almost insuperable, but it is quite certain that whether we take the whole Kandahar province or only a limited part of it, a series of struggles must take place among the chieftains, of which it would be difficult for us to keep clear,

and which certainly would place in the far distance any hope of a united or friendly Afghanistan.

Turning to the military financial aspect of the question, it must be observed what a great misfortune it will be if we have to maintain troops in excess of the real requirements of India. Apart from what I look upon as a weak and unfounded fear of Russia, I suppose few now assert that we have a better frontier by advancing than we had previously. At all events on the Sind frontier, which alone can be affected by our advance on Kandahar, we have had no military trouble for many years, and a most moderate garrison, not 5,000 men for all Sind, has amply sufficed. A force placed at Kandahar may be considered entirely in excess of Indian requirements, and so far from enabling us to do with fewer troops in Sind it would necessitate, I think, an addition so as to have a reserve at hand ready to come up.

The amount of force required at Kandahar depends, first, upon the territory we take, and secondly, upon the supposed object of holding Kandahar. If we occupy the whole province and hold Kelat-i-Ghilzai, Girishk, Furrab, and other necessary places, besides Quetta and our lines of communication, I do not see that less than 20,000 or 22,000 men would be sufficient, and this force would have to be very thoroughly equipped for movement, and require a strong reserve to be brought from Sind and India if ever operations were to be extended towards Herat, for I need hardly remark that our being at Kandahar would not hinder Russia, if so minded, from occupying Herat, unless we are prepared to bring up a large force to that place. No doubt many of the advocates of annexation look upon a move to Herat as a necessary sequence to the occupation of Kandahar, though I have very high military authority for saying that if we are to oppose Russia we ought not to advance to Herat to do so.

Assuming, however, that we only hold Kandahar, the country between it and India, and a territory extending to that unsatisfactory line of frontier, the Helmund, and for 40 or 50 miles in other directions, and also assuming that the present army in India generally is looked upon as sufficient to afford a body of troops to move up speedily if extended operations become necessary, I cannot think that, judging by past experience, we could prudently keep less than 15,000 men beyond the old frontier. When Ayub Khan advanced from Herat last July, General Primrose had rather more than 12,000 men under his orders, or deducting the garrison of Kelat-i-Ghilzai, he had about 11,000 men, all of them beyond the old frontier. We have seen how inadequate this force proved, and I should hope that we should in future have at least 15,000 men to compose the Kandahar division thus distributed.

Kandahar, including the adjacent territory to the west, north, and east :—

- 4 Batteries of Artillery.
- 1 Regiment of British Cavalry.
- 3 Regiments Native Cavalry.
- 2 Companies Sappers and Miners.
- 2 Regiments British Infantry.
- 5 Regiments Native Infantry.

On the communications, extending 250 miles, and excluding the garrison of Quetta and reserve at that place :—

- 1 Battery Native Artillery.
- 1½ Regiments Native Cavalry.
- 3 Regiments Native Infantry.

Reserve Brigade at Quetta and garrison for that place :—

- 2 Batteries Artillery.
- 1½ Regiments Native Cavalry.
- 1 Regiment British Infantry.
- 3 Regiments Native Infantry.

This force is in reality only in excess of that which General Primrose had to the following extent, viz. :—

- 1 Field Battery retained at Quetta in 1879, but returned to India without relief when General Stewart left Kandahar.
- 1 Mountain Battery taken on by General Stewart from Kandahar, and not replaced last July, though intended to be so.
- 1 Regiment British Cavalry.
- 1 Regiment British Infantry.
- 1½ Regiments Native Cavalry.
- 1 Regiment Native Infantry.

This seems a moderate addition, and assuming that the additional corps were about the same strength as those serving in Afghanistan last year, would bring that force up to about the 15,000 men I have put down as necessary.

In Artillery it will be seen that I have only brought up the strength to the scale of 1879. A British Cavalry regiment has been added for Kandahar, and this I look on as important. A regiment of this arm accompanied General Stewart to Kandahar, and was most useful, but was withdrawn in April 1879, to be hurried up again, from a distance of more than a thousand miles, directly General Burrows was defeated. No doubt Native Cavalry are excellent, and for general purposes are more useful than British Cavalry, but the latter are, in my humble opinion, an essential component part of a well constituted force in India. It was accepted as an established rule in India, after experience of the Mutiny and Sikh wars, that British Cavalry were, in all practicable cases, to be a part of any considerable force of all arms, especially if there was Horse Artillery. That was a wholesome rule, and had it not been departed from at Kandahar we might have had a different result to General Burrows' action. No doubt the presence of British Cavalry, inaccessible to those influences which may be brought to bear on our Native Cavalry, and possessing superb discipline, adds enormously to the moral strength of a force, and I am quite sure that Sir F. Roberts would readily acknowledge the advantage he has experienced during the last twelve months from the presence of the 9th Lancers.

The only other addition I have made is that of a regiment of British Infantry, a regiment and a half of Native Cavalry and a regiment of Native Infantry, just sufficient to enable the General Commanding to bring up a reserve brigade of 3,000 men of all arms to Kandahar whenever wanted, without unduly weakening Quetta or his posts of communication. That such a reserve should be maintained at or near Quetta, completely equipped with transport, however expensive it may be to keep transport at Quetta, seems to me essential. Had any proper moveable reserve been maintained, such as I propose, and General Phayre, instead of only being able to send forward to Kandahar dribblets of Native Infantry prior to Burrows' defeat, been able to move forward with a strong brigade when first reinforcements were called for, that brigade would have reached Kandahar a fortnight before Burrows' reverse, and might have entirely prevented it.

Let us not suppose that trouble is ended because Sir F. Roberts has defeated Ayub and captured his guns. That distinguished Officer captured all the Kabul artillery in October 1879, and yet his splendid force was compelled to retire behind the walls of Sherpur in December. In fact, the Afghans are stronger when the uncongenial discipline to which their forces have been subjected of late years is destroyed, and they are at liberty to fight in their own fashion. If, therefore, we are capable of learning by experience, we shall not leave Kandahar in future without a strong reserve above the passes.

It may be urged that if we make a railway a more moderate force will answer. I doubt this. The railway, for about 250 miles, will have to be strongly guarded, and it is not only liable to attacks but also to interruptions from floods, of which instances occurred this year, although the rainfall was not excessive. No doubt a railway is useful in bringing reinforcements and stores, but it must not be implicitly relied on, and at all events the force I have specified is the least that I think should be maintained above the passes, completely equipped for movement and quite independent of the railway.

The entire cost of the occupation of Kandahar, according to the foregoing view, and by calculations based on the plan adopted in my note of the 26th June 1880, would be about 1,400,000*l.* per annum.* I think this is fairly and entirely chargeable to the cost of occupation, for I am not aware that the occupation of Kandahar would strengthen us in India or on any other part of our northern frontiers, while certainly some reserves would have to be held in constant readiness to support Kandahar and Quetta.

Besides this large charge, no doubt much would have to be done in the way of constructing permanent shelter for the troops and in improving or constructing fortified posts, and these, together with the completion of the railway from Sibi to Kandahar

* That is taking the ordinary cost of the troops in India and adding 100 per cent. to cover the increased cost of supplies for European troops, larger establishment, of Native regiments (96 men in the Cavalry and 200 in the Infantry), staff, transport, rations, and extra payments to Natives, increased cost of Native Cavalry: depôts in India, heavy non-effective charges owing to pensions being given to heirs of all Native soldiers who die beyond the frontier, rations to families of British soldiers allowed during absence of troops in Afghanistan, for works and roads, and for civil and political charges and payments.

(250 miles), and the probable improvement that will be necessary to the railway up to Sibi, could hardly take less than 2,000,000*l.* sterling.

For all this what return can be expected? It can hardly be supposed that the territory I have assumed round Kandahar would give a net revenue of 100,000*l.* a year, while the prospect of the railway covering its working expenses and cost of maintenance in a difficult country, and necessarily high cost of establishments, and probably, in parts, of fuel, is doubtful. That it could also cover the interest on capital seems impossible, when we recollect the sparse population and sterile nature generally of the country through which it passes and to which it leads.

On the other hand, if we frankly put aside our Russian bugbear and give up Kandahar, we may discontinue the railway, and save a great outlay, and by bringing back our troops to India, even if we do not reduce regiments or batteries, we might save all the additional expenditure consequent on foreign service and increased establishments.

Entire withdrawal from Afghanistan would be hailed with joy by our Native Army. Nothing short of this will restore the old popularity of our service. We know that recruiting, even though a bounty is given, has been practically stopped, and this to those who know the Native Army is not surprising. Good and loyal soldiers as they are, and always anxious for a campaign, prolonged service out of India, and especially in Afghanistan, is hateful to them. No device of a reserve will remedy this defect, for neither army nor reserve can exist without recruiting, and I can conceive nothing more disastrous to the popularity of the service than a continuance of the liability to be sent to Afghanistan, combined with the formation of a reserve which should give the State a claim to re-enrol a man when he had left active service and settled down at his home. We cannot do without our Native Army, so let us not tamper with it. It serves our purpose for all really necessary objects connected with the defence of India, but it will not serve us if we condemn a large part of it to duty in Afghanistan. We cannot replace this army in Afghanistan by Afghan levies, for they would eventually turn against us, and to replace them by Europeans would be too heavy a burden.

The mere fact of our making Kandahar British territory would in no way reconcile our sepoys to service there, nor would the extra advantages given them on the ground that service at Kandahar is foreign service be prudently withdrawn. In Burmah, which has been ours since 1852, the sepoys still receive all the advantages of foreign service, and the heirs of those who die there receive pension, and this undoubtedly would still have to be allowed at Kandahar if we annexed it.

Doubts, too, have been expressed as to the suitability of all portions of our Native Army for service in Afghanistan. Loyal, well-disciplined, and brave as those troops are, many of our soldiers are physically inferior to the Afghans. A determined attack by fanatical Afghans tries the best troops, and there is an opinion among officers who have recently served that the result of such attacks if really carried home may be doubtful, unless our forces were in the main British, Sikhs, Pathans, and Goorkhahs, elements of the Army which, for many reasons, it is impossible to largely increase. We are only likely to see such attacks when we meet the Afghans on their own ground, for it is not the disciplined soldier, but the fanatical Ghazee, who makes such attacks, and these people usually have neither the inclination nor the means to enable them to proceed to distances in a body.

I trust I have made clear some objections to holding Kandahar. I have already urged that we should not permanently hold Pisheen and Quetta. I think I can add little to what I said on that subject in my note of the 26th June. It is to me doubtful whether holding Pisheen would be much of an improvement over the occupation of Kandahar. We might require less troops and have fewer sources of trouble around us, but in all probability being near to Kandahar something would soon draw us back there. Further, by all accounts, Pisheen possesses few resources. It is also distinctly Afghan territory. As to Quetta, it is impossible to see any justification for our permanent occupation of the place. A treaty empowering us to send troops into the territory does not warrant our permanently taking Quetta, and our doing so is opposed to Lord Salisbury's Despatch of 1877. Quetta is hateful to our troops, and very sickly. It is folly to suppose that it is necessary to hold Quetta in order to secure ourselves against Russia, and the wise and just course is to give it back to the Khan, and, with it, to give the district of Sibi, taken by us from Kabul in 1879. My urgent contention is that we should come back altogether,—not hurriedly, but deliberately, and with a determination henceforth to leave the Afghans to settle their own affairs, and with

a resolve not to interfere with them unless they are actually allying themselves with Russia for unfriendly purposes towards ourselves.

If we retain Kandahar, or if we retain Pisheen, I venture to predict that we shall have an army in the field before a year is over engaged in opposing those with whom we ought to have no cause of quarrel.

I feel deeply the momentous issues that hang upon the decision as to the retention or abandonment of Kandahar. To my apprehension a judicious withdrawal will be for the great and lasting benefit of India, while a continuance there will be productive of endless evil, and be a measure which, once formally decided on by Her Majesty's Government, can hardly be revoked save under circumstances of dishonour and disaster.

As a humble contribution to the facts and arguments already before your Lordship on the subject, I venture to submit the foregoing remarks.

H. W. NORMAN.

20th September 1880.

No. 10.

MEMORANDUM ON KANDAHAR.

THE importance of Kandahar strategically is generally allowed by military authorities as to the following:—

It covers *all* the lines of communication between Southern Afghanistan and the Indus.

It commands the easiest westerly approach from Herat, which will infallibly be used by any hostile body coming from that direction. This route presents no physical difficulties; the absence of such has been well proved lately by Ayooob Khan bringing with him a large force of artillery, 30 guns, not particularly well mounted.

It commands the roads to Northern Afghanistan and powerfully flanks the Kabul line. No force designing to reach India from the Oxus would dare venture on advance through Kabul and the Khyber, Kandahar being held in force by the troops of India.

From Herat to Kabul there is no direct road practicable for wheeled artillery. The only other such route than by Kandahar is the roundabout one viâ Maimena, Balkh, and Bamian.

For supplies for an army Kandahar is the next best situation to Herat. It is a real emporium to which the products of the surrounding valleys, some of them very rich, readily flow in, and where everything required for soldiers, except European necessities, can be obtained in ample sufficiency.

Being a trade centre the inhabitants generally are very peacefully disposed, and in the first part of this war, as well as in 1839–42, showed themselves very ready to keep on good terms with us. The adverse display after the disaster of Maiwand was mainly from surrounding tribes led away by the temptation of expected easy plunder.

Politically, the advantages resulting from retention of Kandahar are very great. The establishment of good order and fixed system of government promoting peace and prosperity in Southern Afghanistan would have a wide-spreading effect, helping to civilise the tribes, and to gradually induce them to forego their clan animosities, while by our influence steadily gaining ground, we should easily become acquainted with all that went on in Afghanistan and adjacent countries.

If the present arrangement with Abdool Rahman is to bear real fruit, his being relieved of the trammels attendant on the administration of Kandahar from Kabul will be a great help to him rather than an injury.* He has quite as much as he can manage to consolidate his power in Northern Afghanistan, and aid in money given him there will be far more useful to him than being saddled with a distant charge. In the arrangements lately entered into, Kandahar was excluded from what he was to receive, and there is not the slightest necessity for altering that rôle. It should be borne in mind that an united Afghanistan under one ruler was only revived by Dost Mahomed towards the end of his reign. In the settlement of the country amongst the Barukzye family, Kabul and Ghazni were Dost Mahomed's portion. Kandahar was allotted to his five half brothers, Pardil Khan, Sheredil Khan, Kohundil Khan, Rehimdil Khan, and Mehrdil Khan, while a Suddoozye Prince still ruled at Herat. Separation now is therefore but a return to the "status quo ante." Dost Mahomed only took possession of Kandahar in 1854, and of Herat just before his death. His youngest son, Shere Ali, succeeded to these possessions, but throughout his reign there were constant disturbances in all

* Recent papers show he has expressed himself to this effect.

parts, no stable rule or improving government, and of all places the one that suffered most was Kandahar. It was regarded as a sort of milch cow, and whenever the Ameer was pressed hard for money, a demand was made on Kandahar, to be squeezed out of the people as the Governor thereof best could, and as he well knew the tenure of his office depended on prompt obedience he used the screw freely. Then he had to meet his own wants besides, and it is only natural that government from Kabul and by its officials finds no favour with the Kandaharis. They are weary of oppression and disorder, and would most gladly welcome a firm regular rule.

In a commercial point of view the security given to trade by a strong government at Kandahar cannot be otherwise than most advantageous to the Afghans as well as to ourselves, and should have full consideration. It will insure that trade safe and speedy transit to and from our sea ports, causing a very largely increased demand for our home fabrics, especially cotton goods, which are greatly desired in Afghanistan and Central Asia, while the exports from those parts will proportionally increase. There has always been a certain amount of trade from Kandahar down the Bolan Pass into Sind, bringing the products of Kandahar, Ghuzni, Kabul, Herat, and even from countries beyond, such as wool, excellent woollen stuffs, silks, carpets, dyes, fruits, &c. for the Indian markets. Before disturbances were stirred up in Beluchistan the flow of this trade was very regular. For the ten years, 1863-73, the records show that the average value of the wool alone brought down annually by the Kafilahs amounted to 60,000/. The journey then took up the whole of one cold season, so that the merchants could only make one trip a year. With railway communication the trips may be repeated more than once and the trade expand accordingly.

The extension of influence gained by means of such a trade would be quiet, certain, and steady. No government understands the value of such action better than Russia. Her most effective pioneer has ever been, and still is, commercial intercourse, and large sacrifices are unhesitatingly made to promote it. Her most strenuous efforts have been devoted to keeping the trade in Central Asia in her own hands. British goods from India are completely barred from the Khanates, owing to the heavy duties imposed on them by the Russian authorities. Assistance, and with no sparing hand, is given to merchants by the Russian Government to enable the former to push their goods to most distant markets, and, sending the best, to sell them there at greater advantage than like goods conveyed by a nearer and cheaper route. That this has been done for a long time past in the direction of India may be proved by the following fact:—Thirty years ago the collector of Shikarpore reported that Russian fabrics brought down by Kafilahs through Afghanistan were being sold at fair prices in the bazaars of that city, and much approved of by the people. Specimens were ordered to be sent to England to ascertain the nature of the superiority. They were forwarded to a firm at Manchester, who readily testified to the excellence of the articles, for they found their own trade mark on them; they were of their own making. These goods imported into Russia had been transmitted from there over the long land journey, and were made to compete successfully with articles from the same manufactory that had reached the same place mainly by water carriage. This was not simple commercial enterprise of merchants, but the powerful lever of trade influence promoted and largely aided by a government that knew its value.

Why should we not extend our influence and commerce, but in a fair and legitimate way, when the opportunity is presented to us? Why should not our merchants be able to compete rightfully with those of Russia in the various markets of Afghanistan, Khorassan, and Persia, if not in the Khanates, and what more favourable position for such competition could there be than Kandahar.

Russia is using every effort to draw the trade through Armenia and by the Caspian on to the routes under her own special guidance and command. Why should we not avail ourselves of alternative routes yet left open to us.

The above remarks refer to the advantages following the retention of Kandahar. It should now be considered whether retention would be costly and draw unduly on the revenues of India. It has been hastily assumed by some that the cost must be very heavy, and that occupation of Kandahar must entail a large increase in the Indian army. More careful consideration will, however, show this assumption to be entirely wrong; that no increase to our army is required, and that any extra expenditure incurred in the administration and management of the occupied country will be more than covered by the returns on the spot.

The disciplined force necessary to hold Kandahar would be two strong brigades of infantry, each consisting of one full British and three native regiments, with artillery and cavalry in proportion, in all about 8,000 men, supported in Pishin and on the line of com-

munication by a third brigade with cavalry and artillery, 4,000 more, making a total of 12,000 men in advance of the old Sind frontier. Up to Sibi might be held from Sind.

Now, it has always been decided that there should be in India a body of at least 30,000 men over and above ordinary garrison requirements to be used and moved in any direction from which danger threatened, and especially with an eye to necessary operations in or towards Afghanistan. The commission which lately sat at Simla went much further than this. They state that under their proposed distribution of the troops, it would be possible with comparative ease, and without any demand from England, to put into the field 12,674 cavalry and 55,272 infantry, with 240 guns, besides siege artillery and sappers, leaving at the same time for the preservation of internal order in India a force of British and native troops numbering over 96,000 men and 160 guns.

Garrisoning Kandahar then, and maintaining proper communications with our old frontier line, would only employ 12,000 men, who would otherwise have to be kept ready for service in India, mobile in a strict sense, that is with the same means of transport as they would have in Afghanistan, and this would be taking only a small portion of the old recognised available body, leaving enough for regular relief and a margin besides.

With the railway completed the reliefs could be carried out as often and as systematically as in any other part of our possessions, and the present objections raised to long service in Afghanistan would entirely disappear.

The brigade on the line between Kandahar and Sibi should not be frittered away in small detachments, but divided into strong bodies, located in central positions, from which suitable parties could be sent when required to put down with promptness any disturbances that might arise. The intermediate portions would be watched and protected by local levies taken from the neighbouring tribes, properly enrolled, regularly paid, and held strictly responsible for faithful and efficient performance of the duties assigned to them. There would be no difficulty in getting the services of any number of men well fitted for the purpose, and at a rate of pay much below that of regular troops.

The extra military expenditure then on account of occupation of Kandahar would only be certain field allowances to the troops, the transmission of stores not procurable in the country (ordinary supplies, such as grain, meat, and forage, can be obtained in plenty and at cheap rates), and providing shelter for the force. This latter could be easily managed at Kandahar for no great outlay; indeed, it already exists to a considerable extent. The cost of the levies on the line would also be debitable to the same head.

The civil management of the district would be placed in the hands of a well chosen British Agency, supervising and controlling the establishments already existing, with the least possible alteration in the arrangements for collection of revenue, tenures of land and general administration.

For police purposes and ordinary maintenance of order a sufficient body of local levies should be entertained on the old irregular system under select British officers, similar to the mounted and armed foot police in Sind.

The cost of the above (also that of the small body of local levies required for military purposes) should be fully met from the revenue derived from the Kandahar District, from Pishin, and the so called assigned districts down to Sibi, all of which would be most justly applicable to the expenditure which brought good government, and established peace and order in the country.

Under the rule of the late Ameer the revenues of the Kandahar district only were reckoned at 7 lakhs of rupees (Indian) per annum. During the year of our occupation, though some duties were abolished as obnoxious, a return has been received showing that the above amount had been more than doubled, reaching 15 lakhs, and this, with continuance of regular government ensuring safety of person and security of property, will certainly be still further increased without pressure on the people.

It has been suggested to hold Pishin, that is the line of the Khoja Amran range, some 80 miles south of Kandahar, with Chaman on the northern face as the most advanced post. This would be a very far inferior position to Kandahar. It would be equally in Afghanistan, among Afghan tribes, but no real beneficial influence could be exercised from it over the city of Kandahar where everything in this part of Afghanistan is concentrated. Indeed, standing aloof from it, as it were, would have a most injurious effect for us on all around, by making it appear we were afraid to undertake the responsibilities which as a great power we ought to assume for the protection of our own possessions, and for the well-being of those we had been brought amongst. The force required for this position would be quite as large as that for Kandahar, without having as a set-off the advantages the latter plainly affords. Supplies in Pishin and its immediate neighbourhood are very limited, especially forage for cavalry and transport animals, and would

only suffice for a small portion of the troops. The deficiency would have to be sent up from below the passes, to assure its being forthcoming. Accommodation for the troops would call for a large outlay, having to be entirely freshly constructed on some new site to be fixed upon as suitable.

If it was ever necessary to re-advance to Kandahar, it would take at least a week for the force to reach, with the not unlikely probability of finding it in possession of opponents.

To briefly summarise what it has been endeavoured to show in the above remarks—

That Kandahar has particular advantages in a strategical point of view.

That ordinary necessary supplies for a force garrisoning it can be obtained on the spot in ample sufficiency.

That the inhabitants generally are peacefully disposed, and occupation would thus be easy, and free from the friction likely to be found in other places.

That politically our being established at Kandahar would be most advantageous.

It would be no help—indeed a weakness to him—handing it over to the new Ameer of Kabul.*

That commercially Afghanistan and India would benefit by our establishing a settled form of Government and security at Kandahar, in the rapid increase and expansion of trade, which again would benefit merchants generally.

That we have a just right to endeavour to compete on fair grounds in Afghanistan, Khorassan, &c. with the trade which for many years past Russia has been vigorously and cleverly pushing in that direction.

That no addition to the present army of India would be called for in consequence of the occupation of Kandahar.

That the extra military expense of such occupation would be comparatively trifling.

That the cost of administering the district of Kandahar, including Pishin and the assigned territory down to Sibi, would be more than covered by the revenues received and realised, without pressing at all on the people.

That Pishin as a position is in every respect far inferior to Kandahar—wanting in the advantages of the latter—and having disadvantages which the other has not.

(Signed) W. MEREWETHER.

24th September 1880.

No. 11.

MEMORANDUM ON KANDAHAR.

LORD HARTINGTON,

YOUR Lordship will probably by this time have in your hands the Memorandum relating to Kandahar of Sir Henry Norman, than whom as (virtually) Minister of War in India for so many years, and as having served on the Afghan frontier, there is no higher military authority. I will endeavour to consider the question solely as a politician, premising that as military authorities differ among themselves as to the best frontier for India in case of a Russian invasion, the whole question has to be decided by statesmen, and on large political grounds.

After our first invasion of Afghanistan in 1840, General Jacob sounded in 1856 the note of alarm against Russia, and contended that with her hold over Persia she could whenever she pleased take possession of Herat and Kandahar, and thus find an easy entrance to the plains of India. His remedy was first of all to occupy Quetta with a strong force and then to place a garrison of 20,000 troops in Herat. Lord Canning's Government maturely considered this scheme and rejected it. The outlines of Jacob's policy have been persistently maintained ever since by Bombay officers, Sir B. Frere, Sir H. Rawlinson, Sir W. Merewether, Sir H. Green, not one of whom has ever been in Afghanistan proper, with the exception of Sir H. Green and Sir H. Rawlinson, whose experience of the country was founded on political service there 40 years ago.

Eleven years later Sir B. Frere (then Governor of Bombay) brought to the notice of the Supreme Government the same policy in a somewhat different form. Sir H. Rawlinson at about the same time in two articles in the "Quarterly Review" and in a confidential Memorandum (which he afterwards published) to the Government of India reiterated Jacob's arguments. But the Government of India (then exceedingly strong, Lord Lawrence, Lord Sandhurst, Sir H. Maine, Sir H. Durand, Mr. Massey) peremp-

* He has said he would rather not have it.

torily rejected the scheme, and the military Minutes of Lord Sandhurst and Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Durand, and the political one of Lord Lawrence in 1868, are eminently worthy of reperusal at the present moment.

When Lord Salisbury subsequently sanctioned the occupation of Quetta, which was much opposed in Council as the first step of Jacob's policy towards annexation, he inserted a paragraph (to satisfy the fears of the Council, see paragraph 25, *Biluchistan Blue Book*, 1878, p. 10) ordering Lord Lytton "to abstain from any measures which " could be held to indicate the resolution of Government permanently to maintain " British troops in that town." The advocates of annexation were entirely satisfied with this clause, being satisfied that once at Quetta the British would never come away.

Thus then the first step of Jacob's policy was adopted; now comes on the second, the occupation of Kandahar.

The military force required for holding this province, its cost, and its effect on the native army of India will no doubt be fully discussed by Sir H. Norman. But it is well to point out that Sir H. Rawlinson maintained that 10,000 men would be sufficient to hold Quetta, Kandahar, and Herat.

But if Kandahar is occupied and annexed (for no one now advocates the setting up of another Wali) what reasonable ground can there be for supposing that we shall stop there. Herat and Kandahar are most intimately connected, and within easy marching distance, and inhabited by the same warlike Durani race (I speak not of the commercial and trading Hindus, and Parsiovars of the towns, a most insignificant lot), and Herat till lately has been held by the annexationists to be the key of India. Now they go much further afield, and after the Treaty of Gundamak it has been deliberately recommended that we must occupy Maimana, and from thence it is but a step to the whole valley of the Oxus. When I see how successful the arguments and advocacy of the annexationists have been, in spite of the declared counter policy of the home Government, I feel little doubt that, unless such a strong Government as we have at present seizes the golden opportunity which the collapse of the puppet Wali affords to return to our ancient frontier, the annexation of all Afghanistan is inevitable, and with it a shock to the Indian empire which sooner or later may prove fatal.

Then what do all these arguments which we see in many public organs amount to? They are the same that might have been used for annexing Naboth's vineyard. But that vineyard was at all events a desirable possession. Afghanistan, on the other hand, consists of rocks and men. The English public is always prone to applaud vigorous blows and occupations of new lands, but no one who studies the temper of the times can fail to see that the sentiment of public morality is strengthening from day to day. Assuming for the moment that Kandahar is a useful strategic point, and likely to be, on the authority of men calling themselves patriots, but with no local knowledge of Afghanistan, a "great emporium of trade," could not Louis Napoleon say the same for the annexation of Belgium and Bismarck for that of Holland? But Europe unanimously condemned such filibustering proposals.

But lastly, whilst we are urged in the name of civilisation to advance the British standards, are we quite sure that when we destroy the independence of a nation we are not sapping the very elements on which true progress depends? It is a moot question to the present time whether there is not more happiness under a native state in India than under our own rule. And I am quite satisfied that the difficult problems arising for us as to the mode of governing well 200,000,000 of Indians are sufficiently numerous without attempting to draw within our sway many millions of other races, especially when they are so warlike and intractable as the inhabitants of the Afghan mountains.

Public opinion is probably now on the balance between giving up and holding Kandahar, but after many years' study of the subject, and with no prepossession in favour of Afghans, I am satisfied that both justice and the interests of India require that we should leave that turbulent race to govern themselves in their own rude independent method.

(Signed) E. PERRY.

24th September 1880.

MEMORANDUM ON KANDAHAR.

THE time has now come for deciding on the future policy to be adopted in regard to Kandahar. It has been generally assumed that there are but four courses among which to make our election, which have been thus formulated :—

1. We may continue to support the Wali Shir Ali as an independent ruler.
2. We may remove him, as utterly inefficient and unpopular, and appoint some stronger Sirdar, in whom we have confidence, in his place.
3. We may reunite Kandahar and Kabul, leaving both provinces in absolute possession of Abdur Rahman, undisturbed by our presence ; or
4. We may annex Kandahar to our Indian Empire.

But I venture to add two other alternatives :—

5. We may retire from Kandahar to Pishin, or further south (as we did in 1842), without making any local arrangement, and let the Kandaharis elect their own ruler ; or
6. We may continue our military occupation, but leave the civil administration in the hands of any Government whom Abdur Rahman may appoint.

I will now briefly consider each of these proposals.

1. There can be no doubt that in equity any pledges we may have given to the Wali Shir Ali are as binding now as at any former period. There has been no imputation on his loyalty, nor indeed on his sincerity, for he never professed to be able to govern without our strong armed support. He has merely shown himself to be thoroughly incapable, thus convicting us of a gross blunder in placing him in power, and promising him protection against his enemies. If he should now seek to hold us to our promises which, however, under the circumstances, he will probably not attempt, we should find ourselves very awkwardly placed. We could not fulfil our engagements, and should be obliged, therefore, to pay forfeit, however highly he might assess his damages.

2. With regard to finding another Chief to replace Shir Ali, and carry out the policy entrusted to the former Wali, I do not think the prospect would be hopeless, in so far as character and position were concerned. If it had so happened, indeed, that Mir Afzal Khan, the former governor of Kandahar, had accepted our friendly overtures, instead of flying into Persia at the approach of our troops, we should have had an instrument ready to our hand, fully as well qualified personally to govern Kandahar as is Abdur Rahman to govern Kabul, for Mir Afzal is the senior representative of the old Kandahar Sirdars, and has the highest reputation for ability, firmness, and local knowledge. His fanaticism, however, renders almost impossible any friendly arrangement between himself and the British authorities, and even if it were not so, if he were still uncommitted, and were now disposed to coalesce with us, it is hardly likely that, having just escaped the perils of pledging our protection to one Afghan Chief, we should commit a similar imprudence with another. The establishment, therefore, of a "puppet" King at Kandahar, be it Shir Ali, or Mir Afzal Khan, or any one else, under our auspices, may be considered at present beyond the field of debate.

3. The third proposal, to make over Kandahar to Abdur Rahman, and to withdraw our troops from Western, as we have already from Eastern, Afghanistan, presents perhaps the readiest solution of the pending difficulty, and is the course, moreover, to which it may be inferred from their language the Government is most inclined ; but there are grave impediments in the way, to which I proceed briefly to refer. In the first place, Abdur Rahman has no wish to possess Kandahar, nor, if he coveted its possession ever so much, has he the power, unaided, to conquer the province or to retain it. A great deal has been written about the sin of disintegrating Afghanistan, or interfering with the hereditary claims of the Amir of Kabul, but the fact is, that Abdur Rahman has personally no more to do with Kandahar and Herat than he has with Peshawur or Lahore. He has no hold upon these provinces whatever, either in virtue of his birth or conquests, or family connexions. He stated distinctly to Mr. Lepel Griffin, at their last interview, that "he had no hankering for Herat or Kandahar," that "If he was not interfered with from those provinces, he certainly should not interfere with them," that "he declined to be responsible for tracts where he had no power," &c., &c. And when we consider that Dost Mahomed Khan ruled for 25 years at Kabul before he ventured on the conquest of Kandahar, while the feeling at the latter place against the Kabulis has been deepening year by year ever since, we may well understand the reluctance with which, at the very outset of

his career, and while still struggling for power at Kabul, Abdur Rahman would see himself committed, at our dictation, but without our aid, to the forcible occupation of Western Afghanistan. It is my firm belief that Abdur Rahman would decline the responsibility of governing Kandahar unless promised a large British support, either in men or money, in excess of his Kabul requirements, and I am further sure that, to thrust him on this enterprise with inadequate means would raise against him a host of enemies and endanger his position as Amir. But these are mere local considerations, interesting because practical, but not of any large political significance. The really important questions involved in the proposal to abandon Kandahar to Abdur Rahman and to retire precipitately to Pishin or Sinde, refer to the effects which such a proceeding would have upon our general position in Europe and in Asia. To say that we should be stultified would very imperfectly represent the situation. In real truth, we should abdicate our position as a first-class Asiatic power, and must be content hereafter to play a very subordinate part in the history of the world. Already the first result of our vacillating Afghan policy has shown itself at Teheran, where our staunch supporter, the late Prime Minister, has been driven from office to be replaced by a notorious Russian partizan, and where accordingly we may expect to see Russian influence completely dominant in the future. The natural results, indeed of our retirement from Afghanistan under present circumstances, which are, in truth, not favourable to our military reputation, and which will assuredly be magnified by report to our disadvantage, would be to leave the field completely open to Russian ambition and intrigue. Assisted actively by Persia, she would have no difficulty in occupying Merv in the course of one or, at most, two more campaigns. Bokhara, at the same time, would be absorbed and the Russian would march with the Afghan frontier along the line of the Oxus. At the same time, Persian nominees would be established at Herat and Kandahar, Ayub probably, or one of the Meshed refugees, at the former, and Mir Afzal at the latter; and Abdur Rahman, whether he wished it or not, would be obliged, in order to maintain his position, to enter into friendly relations with his old friends at Tashkend and Samarcand. Whether all this would constitute any real danger to India must be a matter of opinion. According to my present lights, without anticipating any attempt at immediate invasion, or even any serious offensive demonstration, I think that the evidence of our recoil before the advancing power of Russia, such as our withdrawal from Kandahar would be considered to be, would have a most disquieting effect on the Native mind in India, and would predispose many of our large feudatories to listen to intrigues against the stability of our rule; and it is further important to remember that difficulties in India, any popular discontent or show of weakness upon our part, would react on the position at home, and seriously diminish our influence in the Councils of Europe.

4. *Annexation*.—It may be inferred from the arguments made use of in the preceding section that I am in favour of annexation, but such is not the case. I have never advocated annexation *pur et simple*, nor would I give my adhesion to such a doctrine at the present crisis, except as a last resort. I have no superstitious abhorrence of the principle of annexation, as some writers appear to have, nor do I question the validity of our title to annex, a title acquired by the blood shed at Maiwand and Kandahar; but I do very much question the expediency of such a course. I look with extreme apprehension at the prospect of introducing among the wild tribes of Kandahar, without previous training, our tax gatherers and police, our law courts, our vagaries of over-education and over-civilization, and above all our missionaries. We have no experience in India, or at any rate a very limited experience, of the difficulty of administering the affairs of a province inhabited exclusively by Mahomedans. The Duranis of Kandahar, though a good deal under the influence of the priesthood, are not, as a rule fanatical; yet they would, I feel satisfied, offer the most determined opposition to the interference of Europeans in their domestic affairs; and it would require the nicest care to reconcile them even with the limited control of our non-regulation system of government. If we are driven by force of circumstances to annex, we must, I submit,—at any rate at first,—employ a full Native machinery for all details of administration, keeping our European official supervision entirely in the background. Otherwise the friction will be insupportable.

But why should we gratuitously face the difficulties when we can obtain all the advantages derivable from annexation by other means? All that we require at present at Kandahar is a strong military position, giving us a complete control over the resources and communications of Western Afghanistan, presenting a bold front to the north-west and enabling us to devote our undivided attention to the railway, this last-named undertaking being in truth the germ of the whole matter, the only factor in the Afghan

question which is worthy of very serious consideration. Our best course then, as it seems to me, would be simply to hold on, as at present, leaving the civil government of the province to be provided for as I shall presently suggest, and waiting on events. It is not likely that the public mind, either in Europe or in Asia, would appreciate the distinction between annexation and a continued armed occupation. The palpable result, that is the impression produced on the public, would be that we were holding our ground in a most admirable strategical position, covering the whole Indian frontier, for the Kabul line equally with the Bolan is controlled from Kandahar, and so improving our communications with our base as to promise shortly to render our advanced *place d'armes* unassailable. When the railway to Kandahar might be completed and the Central Asian trade had fairly taken possession of the line, working, as it certainly would, an entire revolution in the feelings and habits of the population of the province; then, and not till then, might we begin to think of incorporating Western Afghanistan in our Indian Empire.

5. *Retirement without arrangement.*—I have ventured to supplement the list with this proposal, not because I in any way approve of it, but because, if Abdur Rahman decline the responsibility of attempting without our aid to coerce the Kandaharis, and if the Indian Government still adhere to its resolve to withdraw its forces before the winter, there will positively be no alternative but to repeat the unsatisfactory procedure of 1842. On that occasion we simply marched out of Kandahar in two columns, one bound for Kabul, the other for Sinde, neither asking for further aid, nor granting protection, but rather proclaiming our indifference as to consequences. The result was that although Prince Sudder Jung, as a Suddozye and the titular head of the Duranis, was able to hold the town for a brief period after our departure, he was compelled to fly to India on the re-appearance of the old Sirdars from their refuge in Persia, the former Baruckzye rule being at once restored, and our partizans in the place, those who had provisioned Kandahar throughout the troubles of the preceding year and had supplied carriage for our march to Kabul, being plundered and maltreated, and in some cases murdered. In the present instance, if Abdur Rahman held aloof, we should probably have no resource but to leave the town in charge of the municipal authorities, who would remain at their posts until it suited Mir Afzul Khan to return from Persia, when he would naturally resume his government and avenge himself on those who had supported the British occupation. We have made an effort at Kabul in friendly communication with Abdur Rahman to shield our adherents against the presumed hostility of the party now in power, and it is to be hoped that our effort may be successful, but it is not easy to see how such a course could be followed at Kandahar if we retired behind the Khojak range without providing any regular government for the upper country, or entering into any definite understanding with the local ruler. Perhaps the difficulty of finding a “strong, friendly, and independent” governor for Kandahar, coupled with the impossibility of leaving the province a prey to complete anarchy and sacrificing our friends to the vengeance of the anti-English party, who are, no doubt, as far as rank and influence are concerned, in the majority, may compel us after all to adopt the extreme measure of annexation, but I should hope that this very hazardous step might for the present be avoided, and would suggest in the meantime a middle course, which, if it could be carried out, might relieve us from our embarrassment.

6. I would propose then to offer the sovereignty of Kandahar to Abdur Rahman on very much the same terms that we offered it to Wali Shir Ali, that is coupled with the condition of our retaining a strong British garrison in the province for military purposes, but entirely unconnected with the civil government, and also providing for our completion of the railway to Kandahar, in two years, say from the date of agreement; Abdur Rahman might thus delegate any officer in whose loyalty and ability he had sufficient confidence to administer the province. The governor appointed from Kabul would receive the full moral support of the British garrison, whose presence again would testify to the cordial relations existing between Abdur Rahman and the British Government. He would realise annually the full surplus revenue, estimated by Colonel St. John to amount at present to about six lakhs of company's rupees, contributing perhaps a moiety of this sum, in grain, for the use of the British troops. These troops, again, would not be employed in collecting revenue, nor even in quelling local disturbances, but would be reserved for the higher duty of protection against external foes, and would serve the main purpose of giving weight and consistency to the government.

Sir Donald Stewart has already well observed that if a permanent British garrison were maintained at Kandahar the troops should be located, not in the city or in the immediate neighbourhood, but at the distance of 10 or 15 miles, adding that “the position of the troops should be, *mutatis mutandis*, that of the garrison of Secunderabad

"in the Deccan." I entirely agree with this recommendation, and have no doubt that a suitable locality might be found for the camp on the Arghandab at a distance of about 10 miles from the city.

And now let us consider practically the various interests concerned in this proposed arrangement:—

(a.) Would Abdur Rahman agree to it? Would he so far identify himself with the British as to be a party to a sort of joint government at Kandahar? His late anxiety to obtain from us a treaty guaranteeing to him our support, renders it probable that he would not object to the principle of association, but the partnership might compromise him with the anti-English party at Ghazni and Kabul, and thence arises a certain element of uncertainty as to the practicability of the arrangement. In so far as Kandahar is concerned I should anticipate no serious difficulty, for though Abdur Rahman may be personally unpopular in the south, and would thus probably be unable to coerce the Duranis if he merely trusted to his position as Amir of Kabul, yet backed up by an efficient British force, and represented by a governor, whom, if wise, he would select from a popular local family, the case would be widely different. Abdur Rahman's Baruckzye Lieutenant would be at least as competent as Wali Shir Ali to govern the Kandaharis on all ordinary occasions, and on extraordinary occasions, such as possible invasion from Herat or Ghazni, the British garrison might be relied on, notwithstanding recent experience, to clear the way. It is possible, of course, that jealousies might arise between the British authorities in camp and the Afghan governor in the city. It is possible that this officer might abuse his power and burthen us with the odium of his tyranny, but these are minor evils which might easily be borne and remedied, provided only that Abdur Rahman, the responsible head of the government, were strong and loyal at Kabul.

(b.) What would be the real effect upon British interests of this compromise between annexation and withdrawal? It may be conceded that it would be an object of much value to obtain the full moral effects of annexation, in regard to prestige, military strength, security of frontier, extension of trade, &c., without encountering the evils of friction, national irritation, and risk attendant on the larger measure, but the question still remains for consideration whether, in the present state of the finances of India, those moral effects would be worth the expenditure of money and strain on our resources which would be necessary to secure them? I do not pretend to be able to estimate the difference of cost between a continued military occupation of Kandahar and the alternative of partial or complete withdrawal. Of course, if we decided on retiring within our ancient line of frontier, not only abandoning the Kurram Valley, but evacuating all Western Afghanistan as far as the mouth of the Bolan, the immediate relief to our military expenditure would be enormous, but if alarmed at the almost certain political consequences of such a wholesale surrender, we merely proposed to withdraw behind the Khojak range, I doubt if the pecuniary relief would be perceptible. It has not, I think, been sufficiently considered that to create a large station in Pishin which shall in any way compensate for Kandahar, either as a military barrier or as a focus of political influence, is almost impossible. At any rate such an undertaking would be prodigiously costly, both in its inception and its maintenance, for the country south of the Khojak is a wilderness, without inhabitants, without cultivation, almost without water, and, moreover, the position is strategically of quite second rate importance, for it can be turned on either flank, both from Kabul and Herat. I have discussed this question repeatedly with Sir R. Temple, Sir M. Biddulph, and others well acquainted with the localities, and I have found the universal impression to be that it would be more costly to hold Pishin in strength than to hold Kandahar, the saving in distance from our Indian base not compensating for the dearth of carriage and supplies. The alternative, therefore, may be considered to be practically reduced to remaining at Kandahar or withdrawing to Sinde.

(c.) Among the drawbacks to our maintaining a force above the passes has been often quoted the unpopularity of the service with our Native soldiery. To such an extent, indeed, has this feeling, it is said, prevailed recently at Kabul that it has seriously interfered with our recruiting powers in India. I cannot, however, look upon this as a permanent difficulty in so far as Kandahar is concerned, for the climate is there of the Indian type, the bazaars are well supplied, the troops, European as well as Native, could be economically and comfortably housed in the new cantonments, and the communication with India would be rapid and constant. As soon, indeed, as the railway were completed the regular relief of regiments would be accomplished with the same ease and celerity as in India, and if all service above the passes were regarded as foreign service, entitling to batta or free rations and extra warm clothing, we should probably

soon see a revulsion of feeling on the subject in the Native Army. What the strength of the Kandahar garrison should be the military experts must decide. I would suggest a regular force of about 5,000 men of all arms, together with local levies of the same strength, Hazarehs for choice, if their enlistment would not too violently excite the animosity of the Afghans.

Other objections have been raised to this scheme, which may be briefly noticed. It has been said on one side that the presence of our troops at Kandahar would keep open a festering sore; on the other, that it would not be fair to Abdur Rahman, as it would show our distrust of him and would discredit him with his own people. These are delicate topics on which the less is said the better. There is an Eastern proverb that "a wise man treats his best friend as if he would one day become his enemy." I have no wish to endorse this cynical maxim to its full extent, but undoubtedly we are bound, after our past experience, to exercise due caution in all our dealings with the Afghans, and to consult our own interests in the first place rather than their wayward feelings of pride. The presence of a British garrison at Kandahar, over and above the support it might yield to our foreign policy, would be our best guarantee for the permanence of the Kabul arrangement, and cannot, therefore, be too strongly insisted on as a measure of proper, and only proper, precaution.

I have only now to say a few words in conclusion on the subject of the Kandahar railway.

Of all possible political short comings connected with Afghanistan, the most fatal, as it seems to me, would be the abandonment of this most promising undertaking. The railway was the most efficient arm of defence hitherto devised against Russian aggression, far more efficient than the conquest of Kabul, or the establishment in power of a friendly Amir, for its effect when completed would have been to transfer our military base from the Indus to within 350 miles of the threatened point of attack, namely, Herat. If we now abandon the work as a sequel to the withdrawal of our troops from the upper country, it must be remembered that we virtually deprive ourselves of the power of protecting the Afghan frontier from Russian aggression, and that the promises accordingly of assistance against external attack, which we recently volunteered to Abdur Rahman at Kabul, are rendered impossible of performance, for we could not and should not, whatever the emergency, march troops again from the Indus to the Oxus.

But the political were among the least of the advantages to be expected from the railway. Commercially it would have revolutionized Central Asia, changing the trade routes, and superseding by direct train from the seaboard at Karachi the present supply through Russia and Persia of European goods to the various countries watered by the Oxus and its tributaries.

That it would have stimulated in a like degree the productive and manufacturing industries of the Afghans, and all the populations in their neighbourhood, can hardly be doubted, and the gain thus accruing to peace and order, and social prosperity would have been immense. Hitherto the British occupation has impeded trade, the whole available carriage of the country being required for military purposes; and if the occupation be maintained, as above suggested, this dislocation of the normal course of supply and demand will no doubt be continued, and will even increase in intensity as the means of transport become exhausted, unless the iron horse steps in to relieve the pressure. Should the Government, however, decide to resume the railway works, and continue the line to Kandahar, as a subsidiary measure appertaining to the prolonged occupation, I feel satisfied that the result would be most beneficial. This is not the place perhaps to dissect statistical tables and calculate financial results, but I have seen reliable data which seem to show that the railway, merely as a commercial concern, would yield a fair return on the capital outlay; while I make bold to say that its general effects would be of a far greater and more extended value. The opening of the railway, indeed,—the true pioneer of civilization—would inaugurate a new era for Kandahar. The Western Afghans, who are essentially a trading race, meeting the British in the caravanserai and bazar, instead of on the battle field, would soon lose their national antipathy, and would fraternize with us in the paths of peace and commerce. Common interests would produce common sympathies, and a way would thus be gradually paved for the amalgamation of the tribes of Kandahar with the other subjects of our Indian Empire.

H. C. RAWLINSON.

25th September 1880.

P.S.—It may be only proper to notice that as I am closing this Memorandum, intelligence arrives from Persia of the Russian Government having despatched Colonel Grodekoff with three officers to the Khorassan-Afghan frontier, laden with presents, but

charged with what is called an "exclusively commercial mission." As Colonel Grodekoff knows nothing whatever of commerce, but knows a good deal of Afghan politics, being the officer who very recently published a very interesting account of his journey from Samarcand by Sir-i-pul and Mymeneh to Herat, there can be no reasonable doubt that his present mission is connected with the pending settlement of Western Afghanistan. Can it be prudent, then, to obliterate all traces of our Kandahar occupation, and even cancel our means of acquiring information as to current events upon the frontier, just as Russia is showing signs of renewed activity in that direction, and the opportunity seems to be now offering for the realization of her long-cherished scheme of exerting a direct influence at Herat?

H. C. R.

No. 13.

NOTE ON KANDAHAR.

LORD HARTINGTON,

I AM very strongly impressed with the danger of a prolonged occupation of Kandahar by our troops. This will plead my apology for a brief statement of my views on the subject, in the hope it may aid you in your decision.

Should our troops remain at Kandahar for any time, entanglements are likely to arise; and it may be afterwards difficult to withdraw. There will be hostile gatherings, and threats from tribes. Assassinations will be continued as before, and a bitter spirit will be stirred up.

There are many parties in Afghanistan, and beyond its limits, who, from various motives, will encourage and foment disturbances with the view of embarrassing us.

I assume of course that it is the intention of Her Majesty's Government to retire from Kandahar; and that we no longer consider ourselves bound to support the Wali, who has proved himself to be so incapable. He can retire to India with a suitable provision.

Kandahar formed a portion of the territory of the late Ameer of Kabul, and therefore should form a portion of the territory of the present ruler.

Now that we have acknowledged Abdool Rahman, the natural and common sense view is to place him in possession.

Were a communication at once made to him, he would depute a governor to take charge of it, as he did successfully at Ghazni, when he was not so strong as he is now. Our troops could then retire to India.

The occupation of Kandahar by Abdool Rahman would greatly strengthen his position at Kabul, and give him a greater hope of his being able to establish his authority over the whole kingdom.

And when an opportune time came he would settle matters with Herat.

I feel convinced that no ruler of Kabul, shorn of Kandahar, could hold his position long there. This is an additional reason for strengthening him.

Supposing the line I have suggested carried out, our troops could return in November. We should be relieved from an enormous expenditure, and from the probability of great future embarrassments.

I have heard it rumoured that Lord Ripon contemplates holding Pisheen. In my opinion no greater error could be committed. Pisheen is a portion of Afghanistan which we have no right to occupy. And further, the influential families residing there are Syuds as well as Afghans, and are held in great esteem by the leading families of Kandahar and Kabul.

The retention of Pisheen by us, or our bestowal of it on any one but the Ameer of Kabul, will lead to great future difficulties, and would be most impolitic.

The Princes and Chiefs of India watch closely all we do. It will be a relief to them when they find we are not resuming the policy of annexation. It is what they dread, naturally feeling that their turn may come next.

And the Mahomedan subjects of our Indian Empire, numbering over 50 millions, and whose sympathy has been entirely with their Afghan co-religionists, will rejoice when they learn that, though conquerors, we have not curtailed the possession of the only great Mahomedan power bordering on India. We shall gain credit for moderation at a time when they have seen that there is no army to oppose us.

With a British agent as heretofore with the Khan of Khelat, our influence will be paramount through the whole of that territory. There is no need for any garrison of our troops at Quetta. It will only keep up a sore on the Afghan frontier and launch us into troubled waters. Besides being costly, the place is unhealthy and disliked by our native troops.

In conclusion, I would only again repeat, withdraw as soon as possible. There should be little resting to see what may turn up. Time is precious. All is quiet at present. This may not last.

Abdool Rahman, as the ruler of Kabul, has a right to Kandahar, and he will gladly take it off our hands.

R. MONTGOMERY.

September 28, 1880.

No. 14.

MEMORANDUM on the RETENTION of KANDAHAR and PISHEEN.

I AM loth to add to the volume of the documents which have been already written on this vexed question. Almost all that can be said in support of their views by the rival schools of Indian politicians has been already stated with far greater ability and authority than any to which I can aspire. Yet I feel so strongly the gravity of the issues which are involved, and the formidable nature of the forces marshalled in support of what I consider a mistaken policy, that I am glad of the opportunity which has been afforded to me of expressing to Lord Hartington those views which, had I already taken my seat on the Viceroy's Council, I should have submitted to Lord Ripon.

My opinions on this subject have not been hastily formed. I had ample opportunities of becoming acquainted with the circumstances which attended the inception of Lord Salisbury's Afghan policy. I have carefully watched the development of that policy since the day when Lord Lytton assumed the office of Viceroy. Its history has been told with admirable force and accuracy by the Duke of Argyll, to whose stringent criticisms no attempt has as yet been made to return an adequate answer. I compare the results of the policy with the previous utterances of the rival schools of Indian politicians. I find that, on the one side, not one of the advantages, which, according to the advocates of a "forward" policy, were to have been reaped by a departure from the time-honoured traditions of India's greatest statesmen have as yet been obtained. It appears, Lord Hartington said in a Despatch to the Government of India of 21st May 1880, "that, as the result of two successful campaigns, of the employment of an enormous force, and of the expenditure of large sums of money, all that has yet been accomplished has been the disintegration of the State which it was desired to see strong, friendly, and independent, the assumption of fresh and unwelcome liabilities in regard to one of its provinces, and a condition of anarchy throughout the remainder of the country." On the other hand, I find that the gloomy predictions of the opposite school have been realised to a very remarkable extent. History, I conceive, scarcely furnishes another so striking example of the speedy and complete fulfilment of political prophecy. With these facts before me, I ask myself which of the two rival schools is likely to prove the safer guide for the future? Are we still to follow those who, like Sir Henry Rawlinson, are the advocates of a policy discredited by the logic of accomplished facts, or should we not turn for guidance to those who, like Sir Henry Norman, have shown a statesmanlike foresight justified by subsequent events?

It would, indeed, be too much to expect that the advocates of a "forward" policy should confess their errors. There may to this day be living protectionists who steadily adhere to the views they expressed prior to the repeal of the Corn Laws. Each supporter of the late Government may have his own explanation to account for the ill success of its Afghan policy. As must always happen in such matters, a number of minor incidents cluster round the broad lines of the policy in respect to which it is conceivable that this or that accident, different conduct on the part of this or that individual actor in the scene, or other adventitious circumstances, might have given a different turn to the current of events. But it is difficult to believe that to those who are unfettered by preconceived opinions, and who look more to the leading features of the policy than to its details, the inference as to the relative value and authority of the two schools can be doubtful.

Nothing would be easier than to quote numerous passages from the abundant literature on this subject in support of these views. I content myself with one example from the writings of each school.

Shortly after the signing of the Treaty of Gundamak, Sir Henry Rawlinson commenced an article in the "Nineteenth Century" in the following words:—"The curtain has

“ fallen on the second Afghan war almost as suddenly as it rose, and the public, in so far as it is represented by the London press and the London world, seems almost ashamed at having been deluded into taking an interest in so small and ephemeral a matter. A reaction of this nature is perhaps the natural consequence of the exaggerated tone which was taken at the outset by the opponents of the war, in regard to its character and the risks that it involved. The late Lord Sandhurst, it is well known, affirmed a few years back that it would not be safe to advance on Kandahar with a less force than 30,000 men, and the expense of such an enterprise was popularly estimated at twenty millions of money. We were told, indeed, that our so-called ‘Jingoism in the East’ would inevitably lead either to national disaster or national bankruptcy, and now, because these sinister predictions have not been realized, but, on the contrary, a short, inexpensive, and not inglorious campaign, skilfully conducted and bravely supported, has been crowned with a peace promising substantial political results, we are taunted with having made a mountain of a molehill, with having raised a hobgoblin for the mere purpose of laying it, and, in fact, with having betrayed the nation into a needless and unseemly exhibition of alarm.”

Compare this jubilant statement with subsequent events. When the “curtain had fallen on the second Afghan war,” no long interlude was allowed to elapse before it rose again on the third, and again, a little later on an episode which may almost be dignified by the name of a fourth war. For a considerable time we had a force across the frontier largely in excess of the 30,000 men of which Lord Sandhurst spoke. The popular estimate of the cost of the war is, I fear, not far wrong. Two incidents,—the murder of the British Envoy and the defeat of General Burrows,—have occurred, which come nearly within the category of “national disasters.” We are, I believe, free from any danger of “national bankruptcy,” but Sir Henry Rawlinson’s policy has taken us as far along the road to the bankruptcy of India as it was well possible to travel in two years. The most “sinister predictions” of the adverse school have been too truly realized. A war which has lasted for two years can scarcely be called “short.” It has certainly not been “inexpensive.” It has had its inglorious as well as its glorious incidents. It has not always been “skilfully conducted.” The “peace,” with which we were “crowned” when Sir Henry Rawlinson wrote, was of the most ephemeral description. Its “political results” can certainly not be termed “substantial.” The Afghan difficulty bears, I fear, in allegorical language, a far greater resemblance to “a mountain” than to “a molehill.” The “hobgoblin” has indeed been raised, but has not yet been laid. The nation, or at all events a large section of it, so far from exhibiting a “needless and unseemly alarm,” is, I fear, far too prone to forget the true history of this Afghan business, and still to turn for guidance to those frontier politicians who have in the past led it astray.

Compare, by the light of our present knowledge, these utterances of Sir Henry Rawlinson with the opinion expressed by the Government of India on January 28th, 1876. After reviewing the probable results of forcing a British Resident on the Amir,—results which were all subsequently brought about,—the Government of India went on to say, “A condition of things like this could not exist for any length of time without leading to altered relations, and possibly even in the long run to a rupture with Afghanistan, and thereby defeating the object which Her Majesty’s Government have in view, We are convinced that a patient adherence to the policy adopted towards Afghanistan by Lord Canning, Lord Lawrence, and Lord Mayo, which it has been our earnest endeavour to maintain, presents the greatest promise of the eventual establishment of our relations with the Amir on a satisfactory footing, and we deprecate, as involving serious danger to the peace of Afghanistan, and to the interests of the British Empire in India, the execution, under present circumstances, of the instructions conveyed in your Lordship’s Despatch.”

If I dwell on the previous utterances of the two schools, it is because Indian questions are often,—in my opinion too often,—decided by an appeal to the authority of experts, and I submit that, if any such appeal is to be made, it is essential to bear in mind, in deciding on the policy of the future, the relative claims to inspire confidence which each of the two schools can adduce by an appeal to the past.

I turn now to the arguments in support of keeping Kandahar and Pisheen, considered on their own merits. I wish, however, in the first instance, to observe that I deprecate any compromise between annexation and withdrawal. Sir Henry Rawlinson’s proposal that we should “continue our military occupation, but leave the civil administration in the hands of any Governor whom Abdur Rahman may appoint,” can only be considered as a half-way house towards annexation. Indeed, Sir Henry Rawlinson recognizes as much himself. In his article in the “Nineteenth Century” of August

1879, he makes use of the following phrase:—"Practically, no doubt, we shall do pretty much as we please throughout the entire region, and, indeed, I can only look on the present nominal reservation of rights as the transition stage between independence and annexation." He was then speaking of the state of affairs as they existed subsequent to the signing of the Treaty of Gundamuk, but there can be no doubt that the opinion he then expressed applies equally well to the actual condition of things, for in his note of 25th September he says, "When the railway to Kandahar might be completed, and the Central Asian trade had fairly taken possession of the line, working, as it certainly would, an entire revolution in the feelings and habits of the population of the province, then, and not till then, might we begin to think of incorporating Western Afghanistan in our Indian Empire." It is as well to call things by their real names. The question we have to consider is whether we shall withdraw from Kandahar, or whether we shall annex the province, either at once or after a transition period of "military occupation."

I would also dispose of one further preliminary point. Almost every argument which may be advanced against remaining at Kandahar appears to me to hold equally good against remaining at Pisheen. I can add nothing to the excellent remarks made by Sir Henry Norman on this subject. Moreover, on this point the authority of Sir Henry Rawlinson himself may be evoked. "I have discussed this question," he says, "repeatedly with Sir R. Temple, Sir M. Biddulph, and others well acquainted with the localities, and I have found the universal impression to be that it would be more costly to hold Pisheen in strength than to hold Kandahar, the saving in distance from our Indian base not compensating for the dearth of carriage and supplies. The alternative, therefore, may be considered to be practically reduced to remaining at Kandahar or withdrawing to Sindh." That is the real question. Are we to remain at Kandahar, or are we to go back to our old natural and common-sense frontier?

Some of the arguments urged in favour of annexation may, I think, be speedily disposed of

The first is that the people themselves desire our rule. The same argument was used in respect to Oudh before the mutiny. There may be a few traders who have expressed opinions favourable to annexation. Under the rule of the late Khedive there would have been no difficulty in finding a few individuals at Cairo or Alexandria who would have expressed views favourable to the annexation of Egypt by England; but if anyone had hastily inferred that their ideas represented the general feeling of the people, he would have fallen into a great error. *Primâ facie* there is every reason to suppose that Sir Henry Norman is right when he says, "These people (the inhabitants about Kandahar) cannot desire our rule; on the contrary, they detest it, and have availed themselves of every good opportunity to show this feeling." It would take much stronger evidence than I have as yet seen adduced to make me believe that this does not represent the true state of the case.

Another argument is based on the commercial advantages of annexation. Even if the commerce to be opened up were much more considerable than I conceive it will be, it could afford no sufficient justification for so sweeping a measure.

Next there is the argument based on "prestige." I am not one of those who attach no importance to prestige; but I object to its becoming a bugbear, which is to hurry us against our will along a road which we do not wish to travel. Sir Henry Rawlinson says that if we were to retire to Pisheen or Sindh it would "very imperfectly represent the situation to say that we should be stultified." In real truth we should abdicate our position as a first class Asiatic power, and must be content hereafter to play a very subordinate part in the history of the world." Surely this is exaggerated language. Our retirement from Afghanistan under present circumstances would, he goes on to say, "be magnified by report to our disadvantage," and would "leave the field completely open to Russian ambition and intrigue. It would have a most disquieting effect on the Native mind in India, and would predispose many of our large feudatories to listen to intrigues against the stability of our rule, and it is further important to remember that difficulties in India, any popular discontent or show of weakness on our part, would react on the position at home, and seriously diminish our influence in the Councils of Europe."

Now to what does all this amount? It amounts simply to this, that we are to be debarred from pursuing a line of conduct which is dictated by sound policy for fear of what ill-informed and ignorant people will say; everything is to be sacrificed in order to preserve a semblance of continuity between the policy of the late and the present Government. It is perfectly true that withdrawal to our original frontier will stultify those who were primarily responsible for our advance beyond it. And it is equally true

that in the eyes of a considerable section of the British public, whose opinions also have to be considered as well as those of Afghans or Persians, the present Government would be stultified by a decision not to withdraw. But these are not the points at issue. The real point at issue is which course is most conducive to the public interests. Even supposing that it were brought home to the minds of some Asiatics that it is difficult to ensure a continuity of foreign policy under the English form of Government, can any one suppose seriously that the expression of this very trite sentiment would oblige us to "abdicate our position as a first-class Asiatic power" and "hereafter play a very subordinate part in the history of the world?" We surely need not be so very much alarmed at every false report circulated to our disadvantage, or at the movements of every Russian colonel in Central Asia, or at every article in the Native or Continental press which proclaims that the power of England is on the wane. We have shown our strength in the field, and we can now afford to pursue whatever policy may, on its own merits, commend itself to us.*

As to the effect which withdrawal would exert on the Native mind in India, this, as Sir Henry Rawlinson observes, must be a matter of opinion. My own view is that, so far from "predisposing many of our large feudatories to listen to intrigues against the stability of our rule," it would inspire them with additional confidence in our intentions; they would regard it as a sign that a policy of territorial annexation found no favour with us. As regards the effect on natives of British India, I maintain that those of them who are in a position to form any opinion on the subject will not be slow to perceive that the retention of Kandahar is synonymous with a high rate of military expenditure, and, therefore, with burdensome taxes. In fact, those who, like Sir Henry Rawlinson, have for years studied this great question from one point of view only, are too prone to forget that the first and cardinal point of our policy in India is to administer such territory as we already possess in a manner conducive to the welfare of its population. "We are too apt to fall back on the abstract and theoretical splendour of the Indian Empire," Mr. Gladstone said, with perfect truth, in the House of Commons, on 12th June 1879, "and we do not sufficiently recollect that the administration of that Empire, in the final judgment of history, will bring no advantage or glory to us, except in the exact and precise proportion that that administration confers benefit upon that Empire, and renders India prosperous and happy." I maintain that the retention of Kandahar necessarily involves discontent in India by reason of the high taxes which will have to be maintained. And, moreover, that it not improbably involves an indefinite adjournment of many of the fiscal and other reforms of which India stands so much in need.

As to the influence which our withdrawal may exert on our position in "the Councils of Europe," I will only say that it appears to me that our position would be considerably strengthened by the knowledge that we were no longer embarrassed by complications beyond our Indian frontier.

I turn to another argument of greater importance than those to which I have so far alluded. It is alleged that the strategical advantages of the Kandahar position render it imperative on us to retain it in our own hands.

In dealing with this question I would, in the first instance, observe that it is the business of politicians and not of soldiers to arrange the terms of peace when the fighting is over. I am far from saying that strategical considerations should not be allowed their due weight, but the opinions of strategists should be corrected and checked by the light of broader and more general views. It is the special business of the strategist to ensure the retention of such a position at the close of a war that in the event of another war he may enter the field with a decided advantage. In securing this position he not unfrequently lays the seeds of a future quarrel;—witness the Franco-German peace of 1871, based to a great extent on strategical grounds, with the result that for the last ten years there has been a constant expectation of war in Europe. On the other hand, it is the business of a politician to ensure, so far as is possible, a lasting peace, even at the expense of some apparent military advantage. I deprecate, therefore, too unreserved an acceptance of the views of the strategists.

* Lord Wellesley, who was not likely to under-estimate the value of prestige, wrote thus to Lord Ellenborough on July 4th, 1842, under circumstances which bear a striking analogy to the present condition of affairs:—"Your Lordships, I am satisfied, would reject Afghanistan and Kabul with their rocks, sands, deserts, ice, and snow, even if Shah Soojah had bequeathed them as a peace offering to England."—("The Indian Administration of Lord Ellenborough," p. 175.) The Duke of Wellington, also, on September 3rd, 1842, said that the press were beginning to "discuss national disgrace, unburied bones, vengeance, &c." But, he adds, "I recommend to you to leave out of the question all this stuff."—(*Ibid.*, p. 290.)

Another preliminary point on which it would be well to have some clear idea is this, is it against Russian invasion or Russian intrigue that we are now exhorted to advance our frontier? It used to be a favourite argument of the advocates of the forward policy, when the difficulties which a Russian invading force would have to encounter were pointed out to them, to reply, that they did not fear actual invasion, but that what they feared was Russian intrigue, which would disquiet the minds of the natives of India. It is clear that if intrigue is all that is to be feared, the question to be argued is not one of pure strategy, but I think I shall be correctly stating the views of the forward school if I assume that although, in Sir Henry Rawlinson's words, "no attempt at immediate invasion, or even any serious offensive demonstration" on the part of the Russians, is to be anticipated, and although, in the words of Major East (Memorandum of August 16th, 1880), "Russia is not now in a position, and will not be so for years to come, to undertake offensive operations in Afghanistan," at the same time that invasion is a contingency which, although remote, is of sufficient present practical importance as to necessitate some measures being taken to guard against it, that Russia may attempt to establish a "dominant position at the Court of Kabul," from whence "a preliminary skirmishing array of intrigue and agitation might be directed against the Indian frontier" (Sir H. Rawlinson. "Nineteenth Century," August 1879), and that she may then gradually advance, and so occupy outworks which shall eventually serve as a base for future invasion. It is, therefore, on this assumption that I proceed to discuss the question, merely observing that other means besides those involving territorial annexation may be employed to prevent Russia establishing "a dominant position at the Court of Kabul," and that, in my own opinion, the invasion of India by Russia, although just within the bounds of practicability as a military operation, is not a question of sufficient present practical importance as to necessitate any precautionary measures beyond such as are involved in consolidating our position in such territory as we already hold.

I have had the advantage of reading the opinions of those high military authorities who, although sometimes differing as to the precise nature of the frontier line which it is desirable to hold, agree in advocating some advance beyond the base of the mountains. I do not discuss the proposal of the Intelligence Branch of the Quartermaster-General's Department to occupy Kushi, for I conceive that there is no intention to adopt it. Neither do I discuss the desirability of occupying permanently the Khyber and the Kuram lines, for there appears to be a tolerable agreement of opinion that they should be abandoned. I confine my remarks to the Kandahar line, and I take, as the text of what I have to say, Sir Frederick Roberts' Memorandum of May 12th, 1880, and Sir Edward Hamley's lecture delivered at the United Service Institution. Both are authorities entitled to be heard with the utmost respect. Sir F. Roberts speaks with a special knowledge of the topography of Afghanistan, and with all the well-deserved prestige acquired from his recent brilliant feat of arms. Sir E. Hamley has studied strategy as a science perhaps more profoundly than any other officer of the British Army.

I infer from what Sir F. Roberts says that he was formerly an advocate of the frontier which was dubbed "scientific" by Lord Beaconsfield, but which is now universally recognised as being very faulty. I must confess to some surprise in reading the reasons which have induced him to alter his opinions. "No one," he says, "has more strongly advocated an unsparing reduction of the military power of Afghanistan than I have," and he adds that "nearly a year's residence at Kabul has . . . manifested how completely Afghanistan has ceased to be a cause of danger to our Indian Empire. . . . So long as Afghanistan continued to be a formidable and ill-disposed neighbour, it was all important that we should be within striking distance of the capital (Kabul)," but now "Afghanistan is but a wreck of her former self, and though, no doubt, still capable of strong combinations and powerful for mischief, she no longer exists as a military power, and has practically ceased to be a menace to India." It is, I confess something quite new to me to hear Afghanistan spoken of as a "military power" capable of offensive operations against India. I had always understood that the Russians, and not the Afghans, might be the possible invaders of India, and that the whole object of the war was to prevent Russian influence, and still more Russian soldiers, from establishing themselves in Afghanistan. Had any doubts existed as to the slight capacity of the latter country unaided to adopt an offensive attitude, they must, I should imagine, have been thoroughly dispelled by the events of the late war.

Turning to Sir F. Roberts' arguments in favour of the retention of Kandahar, I find that they are entirely based on the desirability of our assuming the offensive, and fighting the Russians somewhere in Western Afghanistan. "It is, of course, impossible," he says, "to predict what may be Russia's future objective, but looking to the altered con-

"ditions of Kabul, I think it probable that Herat and Kandahar would be the points to
 "which her efforts would be directed, whether an invasion of India were seriously con-
 "templated, or merely a demonstration to contain our troops and prevent their despatch
 "from India to Persia and Asia Minor. Under any circumstances, I am of opinion that
 "it is by this line (the Kandahar-Herat line) that all offensive operations on our part
 "would most advantageously be carried out. . . . We should decide to remain
 "merely on the defensive in our north-west frontier, and devote all our energies to
 "striking vigorously on the Kandahar side. . . . To what extent these offensive
 "measures might be pressed in southern and western Afghanistan scarcely comes within
 "the scope of this paper, depending, as they assuredly would, on numerous and com-
 "plicated eventualities, such as the attitude of Persia, the object and strength of Russia,
 "and the state of Afghanistan generally. It might be found necessary to make a rapid
 "advance on Herat and mass a considerable army there, or it might, on the other hand,
 "be deemed desirable to confine operations to Kandahar itself, or to Sistan and the
 "valley of the Helmund. It will be sufficient for our present purpose if we can come
 "to the conclusion that the Kandahar line will be the one by which all offensive move-
 "ments against Russia would be carried on." I postpone answering these arguments
 until I come to deal with Sir E. Hamley's opinions, but before leaving Sir F. Roberts' Memorandum. I would point out that there is some apparent inconsistency in his views.
 "The longer and more difficult the line of communication is," he says, "the more
 "numerous and greater the obstacles which Russia would have to overcome, and, so far
 "from shortening one mile of road, I would let the web of difficulties extend to the very
 "mouth of the Khyber." Why, I would ask, does this argument apply only in the
 case of the Khyber? Why does it not equally apply to a Russian advance by the Bolan? * And this inconsistency becomes still more apparent when Sir F. Roberts, leaving purely strategical grounds, touches on the political aspects of the question. Whatever others may think, Sir F. Roberts has been far too intelligent an observer of the events passing round him to be under any delusion as to the sentiments which the Afghans entertain towards us. "It may not," he says, "be very flattering to our *amour propre*, but I feel sure I am right when I say that the less the Afghans see of us the
 "less they will dislike us. Should Russia in future years attempt to conquer Afghanistan,
 "or invade India through it, we should have a better chance of attaching the Afghans
 "to our interests if we avoid all interference with them in the meantime." Quite so. That has always been one of the main arguments of those who advocate a non-interference policy. But then, Sir F. Roberts adds, "the military occupation of Kandahar is, as I
 "have before stated, of vital importance. Even then we should make our presence but
 "little felt, merely controlling the foreign policy of the ruler of that province." This is virtually the same policy as that advocated by Sir Henry Rawlinson. I submit that it is one which is wholly impossible of execution. We cannot occupy Kandahar, and at the same time "make our presence but little felt," any more than the Prussians could occupy Paris or the French Berlin without their presence being felt. We cannot obtain the political advantages of non-interference, and at the same time the alleged military advantages of occupation. We must choose between one and the other.

I turn to Sir E. Hamley's lecture. Although I cannot agree in his conclusions, I fully recognize that his paper is the most forcible which has been written on the strategical view of this question. Sir E. Hamley has far too profound a knowledge of the principles of strategy to be under any delusion as to the true value of the so-called scientific frontier. He advocates giving up the Kuram and the Khyber. He dwells on the fact that "an English army corps, say 24,000 strong, with artillery, extends with its
 "combatant forces only, on a European road about 16 miles in length, and with its
 "trains 27 miles. Allowing only a slight increase in the nature of the road, the com-
 "batants of a similar force in the pass would stretch 18 miles, the total, with trains, 30.
 "Thus, when the head of the combatant column issued from the pass, its rear would be
 "nearly two days' march behind; and, considering the host of animals required for the
 "necessary supplies on such an expedition, the rear of the trains could then scarcely be
 "less than six days behind the head of the column, that is to say, only about two

* The same inconsistency appears, I may observe, in Major East's proposals. "Whether under any circum-
 stances," he says, "it will, at some future time, be advisable for us to advance beyond Kandahar or Kabul, it is
 "impossible at present to say, but from a military point of view, it appears rather judicious to allow an enemy
 "the difficulty and the risk of a long march through a poorly supplied country, with the chance of having his
 "army completely destroyed in case of a defeat, when he reaches his first objective point, than to undertake
 "this march and risk ourselves, and relinquish to him the advantage of fighting a decisive battle near his base
 "of operations." Nevertheless, Major East advocates an advance to Kushi.

“ marches beyond Jellalabad.” He then points out the great difference which exists between the narrow mountain chains of Europe, which have been successfully passed by great armies, and the deep ranges which border India. “In a couple of marches,” he says, “the Prussian armies were through the Bohemian mountains, and presently combined in the attack at Sadowa. But here, the shortest pass through the barrier, that between Kabul and the Indus Valley, is 190 miles long, the Gomal nearly 300 miles, and not days, but weeks, are occupied in the isolated march.” Sir E. Hamley, however, advocates the retention of Kandahar, but what are the conditions under which he discusses the question? They are as follows:—“Let me pause,” he says, “to say what I understand by an invading army. Not all the assembled forces of the Afghans,—not such a Russian force as we saw lately assembling on the frontier of Bokhara,—not such an army as Persia can at present send forth,—any or all of these would fall far short of the requirements of such an enterprise. But I will suppose that Russia has completed those improvements in her communications which we know she persistently contemplates; that she has united the Caspian with the Aral by a railway; or that, combining with Persia, she has made a convenient way from the southern shore of the Caspian to Herat; that the ruler of Afghanistan has thrown in his lot with them; and that within the fortified triangle Herat Kandahar Kabul, the dispositions for this great undertaking have been brought deliberately, with all the aids of military science, to completion. We may be assured that an invading army of India, such as we cannot afford to despise, will be no improvised force, no barbarous horde, but truly formidable in numbers, organization, and leadership.” Now, it is conceivable that if the actual condition of affairs were such as is assumed by Sir E. Hamley, it might give us a strategical advantage to be at Kandahar. That is a matter of opinion which I will discuss presently; but in the meanwhile I would observe that the case he puts is purely hypothetical. Not only does it not represent the actual condition of affairs, but it represents a state of things which could not possibly be brought about except after a long lapse of time, during which we should have ample opportunity of deciding on our course of action, for it is scarcely to be supposed that, whilst the Russian dispositions for invasion were being “brought deliberately, with all the aids of military science, to completion,” we should remain perfectly quiescent, and not take such steps as the circumstances of the time required to repel the attack. Russia cannot certainly be said to have “completed those improvements in her communications” which she without doubt contemplates. The Caspian and the Aral are not united by a railway. She has not as yet succeeded in “combining with Persia” to make “a convenient way from the southern shore of the Caspian to Herat.” The ruler of Afghanistan shows no special predilection to “throw in his lot” with the Russians, and, after what we know of the promises given to Sher Ali and the manner in which he was subsequently thrown over, it is hardly too much to assume that the Court of Kabul will not be very favourably disposed to trust to Russian support in the immediate future at all events. The Russians are not established “within the fortified triangle of Herat, Kandahar, Kabul,” nor is it at all probable that they will be established there for a long time to come. In fact, the actual condition of affairs is so wholly different to that which Sir E. Hamley supposes, that it might fairly be deemed a sufficient answer to his argument to say that he does not touch the immediate point at issue. That point is whether at present, when Russia has not taken any one of the preliminary steps which, it is admitted, must be the forerunners of invasion, and when invasion is regarded as a remote, although possible, contingency, it is desirable to take up a position which will almost necessarily oblige us to assume the offensive, and to fight a decisive battle under circumstances in which defeat would, in all probability, involve irreparable disaster. For it is to be remembered that, if we occupy Kandahar, we shall stand pledged to an offensive attitude, and we shall fight at a great distance from our ultimate base, to which we shall be connected by only a single line of communications.

Now, what do the text-books on strategy say as to the best way of defending a mountain frontier? I quote from Sir E. Hamley’s own able work “The Operations of War.” What he says is quite in harmony with the views of other writers on strategy. After pointing out the grave objections to attempting to defend many passes—objections which appear to have been lost sight of by those who formerly advocated the so-called “scientific” frontier—he goes on to say (p. 221),—“If, then, the defensive army, seeing the danger and futility of occupying all the passes, concentrates in the chief of them, the enemy would the more easily break through the front at unguarded points and descend upon the rear; and the fate of a body of troops attacked in front, and dependent on a single intercepted issue in rear, would generally be the same as that of

" the Austrians at the Monte Legino.* It is more usual therefore, and more consonant with prudence, to hold the principal passes,—that is to say, those which lie most directly in the line of operation, and have the best communications with the rear,—with advanced guards, keeping the mass of the army disposable at points in rear where many valleys and passes unite; thus securing the retreat of the advanced posts, supporting them if necessary, and opposing with a formidable force the first hostile troops that cross." The advanced guards are not meant to offer serious opposition to the invaders; they are merely meant to give timely warning to the main defensive body of the direction in which the invader is advancing, and retard his advance. They may be sent when we are on the eve of war. They do not require any special preparation now. This is a very different military operation from that involved in deciding at once to hold the outposts of one road to India in strength. Applying, therefore, these general principles to the case of our Indian frontier it might appear, at first sight, advisable to maintain a strictly defensive attitude. Sir E. Hamley discusses this view of the question, and finds much to be said in its favour. "There is," he says, "no spot in the world where we could make such a military display of strength at short notice as on the Lower Indus. Thus, with the passes suitably guarded, the army of the Lower Indus assembled beyond the river, the reserves at Lahore and Mooltan ready to reinforce either of our two armies (*i.e.*, the army opposite the Kyber and that opposite the Bolan), we should be in a situation full of promise, and it was the consideration of it which caused me to express elsewhere the opinion that we ought, with good management, to give an excellent account of any foe who should attack us in the valley of the Indus." Our position would, indeed, as it appears to me, be even more promising than Sir E. Hamley supposes, for I venture to think that he under-estimates the difficulties which an invading army would have to encounter when once it had crossed the Bolan. It would have to traverse a country described by Sir A. Alison as "a waste land extending for 96 miles, including 28 of howling desert, and abutting on a wide and bridgeless river." (Memorandum of December 16th, 1878.) However this may be, Sir E. Hamley discards the idea of assuming a strictly defensive attitude. "It is not," he says, "always judicious to await invasion. . . . It is sometimes a judicious course, sometimes not." In this particular instance he thinks we would be injudicious, because there is "a concurrent testimony of all Indians that there is no territory on which it could be more perilous to give an enemy the chance of winning a battle than our Indian Empire."

Now, I am far from denying that there is a great deal of force in this argument. When the time comes, or even at some time before war has been declared and the march of the invading columns commenced, it may be desirable to put ourselves in a position whence we may more conveniently assume an offensive attitude than we could from our present frontier. What I object to is pledging ourselves at present to such a course of action. In answer both to Sir F. Roberts and Sir E. Hamley, I maintain that, on strategic as well as on political grounds, it is wiser to preserve complete liberty of action. Sir Henry Norman's argument on this head appears to me to be quite unanswerable. In his Memorandum of June 26th, he says:—"A good General, acting on the defensive, usually strikes blows in advance, but how far counter-advances should be made in the case in question, I think, would have to be determined by the responsible authorities of the day, when the time comes. Much would depend upon the condition of India at the time, upon the popularity of our rule, and upon our military strength. Any great forward movement would necessitate large European reinforcements, which England might not be able to send,† while, if the defence was, in the main, confined to our old frontier, large reinforcements might not be necessary. It seems to me useless now to discuss how we would act under a contingency which will probably never arise, or which, if it arises, must be attended by circumstances which we cannot foresee."‡

* This refers to Napoleon's campaign in 1796 against General Beaulieu. It is described in Adam's "Great Campaigns of Europe, 1796-1870," pp. 1-12.

† I would observe on this point that the advocates of the forward policy always appear to me to forget how necessary it is, with our limited supply of European soldiers, to husband our resources. We have to deal with a Power which, whatever other difficulties it may have to encounter, has at its command an almost unlimited supply of recruits.

‡ The argument against going too far in the direction of a policy of natural insurance against all possible risks was well stated by Sir George Cornwall Lewis in writing to Lord Palmerston on November 23rd, 1860, in connection with the expenditure on fortifications to guard against a French invasion. "If," he said, "the evil is remote and uncertain, I think it is better not to resort to preventive measures, which insure a proximate and certain mischief."—Ashley's "Palmerston," vol. ii., p. 333.

For these reasons, therefore, I maintain that on strategical grounds it is undesirable to keep possession of Kandahar or Pisheen.

Another argument in favour of annexation is based on our moral obligation not to leave anarchy behind us. I admit this obligation. We are bound before we retire to make the best arrangement of which the circumstances admit for securing to the people of Kandahar whatever Government gives the best chances of stability. I do not, however, admit that having once established such a Government we are bound to secure its permanency. I think we should retire with the distinct understanding that, in so far as internal dissension is concerned, the new ruler of Kandahar must look to his own resources and expect no aid from us. This is a point of very great importance, as to which it is most desirable to have some definite opinions. After all that has occurred it would be almost hopeless to expect that internal disturbances in Afghanistan will not be even more rife in the future than they have been in the past; and when they occur there will very probably be an outcry both in England and from the Europeans in India against the Government. Opinions may be expressed that we should repair our mistake, as it will be considered, in retiring by undertaking fresh military operations. It will be said that our prestige will suffer severely if we remain inactive, that we are leaving the field open to Russian intrigue, &c. Nothing would, of course, be worse than to retire, and then to be obliged to advance again after no great interval of time. Unless, therefore, the Government is fully determined to withstand any such outcry, and to resist the powerful influences which may very probably be brought to its support, it will be better at once to adopt the views of the "forward" politicians, and to remain at Kandahar or Pisheen.

Assuming, however, that the Government has quite made up its mind on this point, the alternative courses which present themselves in view of carrying out the policy of withdrawal may be considered. I assume that we shall not again commit what Sir H. Rawlinson terms the "gross blunder" of setting up the Wali Shir Ali. There remains the question of incorporating Kandahar into Abdur Rahman's dominions. This would be the best solution, if it be practicable. Sir Henry Rawlinson says that Abdur Rahman "has no wish to possess Kandahar," and that he "would decline the" responsibility of governing Kandahar unless promised a large British support." I cannot say how far these statements may be correct, but a reference to Abdur Rahman himself would speedily solve the question. If, as Sir Henry Rawlinson supposes, Abdur Rahman does not want to govern the people of Kandahar, and the people of Kandahar do not want Abdur Rahman to govern them, the only other solution is for the Government of India to take steps, through its officers on the spot, to find out on whom the choice of the people falls, and, having installed him in power, to retire.

Another argument in favour of retaining Kandahar is based upon the condition of public opinion in England. Although there may now be a sufficiently strong party in this country opposed to the policy of annexation, who can say that, in the future, when the Russians advance to Merv, or some other obscure town in Central Asia, a new wave of Russophobia will not pass over the country and drive the Government into the adoption of a forward policy?

After the instructive experience of the last two years who can rely on the sagacity and self-command of the British people in resisting plausible appeals to their pride or their prejudices on questions so little understood, and so remote from their political experiences? I admit the force of this argument, but the conclusion I draw from it is, not that we should occupy Kandahar, but that we should come to terms with the Russians, and discover some *modus vivendi* with them in Central Asia. I will only add that, if any treaty be made with the Russians, it should, in my opinion, be published to the world, and that care should be taken in framing it that no conditions are imposed on either side which, so far as can be foreseen, there would be any strong temptation to evade.

To sum up, therefore, I think that no attempt at a compromise between the two rival schools of policy should be made. We should simply return to the policy of Lord Canning, Lord Lawrence, Lord Mayo, and Lord Northbrook, at the same time coming, if possible, to a general arrangement with Russia on Central Asian affairs. That policy was well stated by Lord Lawrence, on 4th January 1879, in the following terms:—

"We foresee no limits to the expenditure which such a move (*i.e.*, a permanent advance of the frontier) might require, and we protest against the necessity of having

to impose additional taxation on the people of India, who are unwilling as it is to bear such pressure for measures which they can both understand and appreciate. And we think that the objects which we have at heart, in common with all interested in India, may be attained by an attitude of readiness and firmness on our frontier, and by giving all our care and expending all our resources for the attainment of practical and sound ends over which we can exercise an effective and immediate control."

"Should a foreign power, such as Russia, ever seriously think of invading India from without, or what is more probable, of stirring up the elements of disaffection or anarchy within it, our true policy, our strongest security, would then, we conceive, be found to lie in previous abstinence from entanglements at either Kabul, Kandahar, or any similar outpost, in full reliance on a compact, highly-equipped, and disciplined army stationed within our own territories, or on our own border, in the contentment, if not in the attachment, of the masses, in the sense of security of title and possession with which our whole policy is gradually imbuing the minds of the principal chiefs and the native aristocracy, in the construction of material works within British India, which enhance the comfort of the people, while they add to our political and military strength, in husbanding our finances and consolidating and multiplying our resources, in quiet preparation for all contingencies, which no Indian statesman should disregard, and in a trust in the rectitude and honesty of our intentions, coupled with the avoidance of all sources of complaint which either invite foreign aggression or stir up restless spirits to domestic revolt."

This, therefore, is the general policy which I should like to see adopted and publicly avowed by Her Majesty's Government. The time and method of carrying it into effect must necessarily be to a great extent left to the Government of India. I would only on this point observe that, as it appears to me, the longer the delay, the greater will be the difficulty of carrying it into execution. Already the effect of Sir F. Roberts' victory over Ayub is beginning to wear off, and it is not impossible that before we can retire, fresh military operations will have to be undertaken, for I agree with those who think that our withdrawal should on no account have the appearance of a forced retreat. The longer, however, we remain within what Sir Henry Norman calls the "sphere of irritation," the more shall we increase the power of whatever party there may be in Afghanistan favourable to Russian influence rather than to British, the more hated shall we become, the heavier will be the charges which the Indian taxpayers will have to pay, and the greater will be the danger that we shall be driven forward against our will to extend our frontier to Herat or even further. Sir A. Hobhouse ("Fortnightly Review," September 1880) has, not without reason, drawn attention to the fact that, in the eyes of the extreme Russophobists, not even the possession of Kandahar affords sufficient security to our Indian possessions, but that further extension northward and westward is contemplated as a very possible contingency.

I have said that, in my opinion, the Government of India must judge how and when the withdrawal from Kandahar is to be effected. The withdrawal from Quettah calls for some special remarks. It should, I think, be the aim of our policy to hand over Quettah eventually to the Khan of Khelat, but I doubt whether it would be expedient to do so yet awhile. The reasons, or at all events the ostensible reasons, which took us to Quettah are different from those which have led to the occupation of Kandahar. They were explained by Lord Salisbury (Despatch to the Government of India of December 13th, 1877), in the following words:—"The existing force has been placed there for the purpose of preserving the peace of the Khan's dominions, the security of commerce in the Bolan Pass and the plain which lies below it, and the safety of your Agent."

The annexation of Kandahar would necessarily involve the permanent occupation of Quettah, although Lord Salisbury was careful to explain in the Despatch, quoted above, that its occupation was intended to be a purely temporary measure. I submit that to annex Quettah without the consent of the Khan of Khelat would be an arbitrary and impolitic act, even if it did not constitute an absolute breach of faith. We have a certain right to annex Kandahar; we have the same right—that of conquest—by which we hold the whole of India, although the original injustice of the war affords a strong moral plea for not exacting the right in this case. But we have not even this right in the case of Quettah. The Khan has done us no harm; he has, I believe, on the contrary, shown a friendly disposition to us throughout the recent troubles. I have not

the text of the Treaty of 1854 by me to which to refer, but I believe that under that treaty we have the right to locate British troops in the Khan's territory. On the other hand, we are bound by Art. 3 of the Supplementary Treaty of December 8th, 1876, to "respect the independence of Khelat," and Art. 6 of the same Treaty expressly declares that the location of British troops at Quettah was in consequence of the desire expressed by the Khan and his Sirdars for their presence there. Moreover, in his conversation with Lord Lytton on December 8th, 1876, the Khan expressed some anxiety lest troops should be stationed in his dominions without his permission, and was formally reassured by the Viceroy on this point. Under these circumstances I do not think it would be justifiable to give permanency to our occupation of Quettah without consulting the Khan. It may be that he would not object, but the tone of his recorded conversation with Lord Lytton, and facts reported in respect to alleged intrigues between the Khan and the late Amir Shere Ali, lead me to suppose that the location of British troops at Quettah, even as a temporary measure, was not altogether so pleasing to him as might be inferred from the terms of the Supplementary Treaty.

I will only add that, when we withdraw altogether from Afghanistan, I trust we shall do so without making any treaty either with Abdur Rahman or the ruler of Kandahar, whoever he may be. If any treaty is to be made it should be with Russia.

E. BARING.

London, 7th October 1880.

No. 15.

NOTE ON KANDAHAR by GENERAL LORD NAPIER OF MAGDALA.

What are the several courses open to us regarding Kandahar?

1. We may abandon it to any chance ruler.
2. We may remain in occupation in support of some native ruler.
3. We may deliver it to Abdul Rahman.
4. We may annex the district, or such portion of it, together with the town and fortress, as considerations of military and political necessity may lead us to determine on.

The *first course* would throw the district open to competition and leave it liable to become the scene of sanguinary struggles between rival candidates, and abandon the peaceful inhabitants to the mercy of any of the turbulent chiefs who could command a following out of the wrecks of the Kabul army and other disorganised bodies.

In case of the return of Ayub Khan, or the establishment of any of the cleverer or more powerful leaders of the party of the late Ameer Shere Ali or his sons, the nucleus of an opposition to Abdul Rahman would be formed and the settlement of the Kabul Government very possibly overturned.

The return and successful re-establishment of Ayub Khan at Kandahar would be the greatest possible discredit to us. He would claim to have driven us away by his victory over General Burrows, and would be believed. It would be partly true.

Second course.—The occupation of Kandahar by a British garrison in support of or in alliance with a native ruler would be of all measures the worst. It has often been tried; hardly ever with success; and our recent experience of it should put it out of the question.

Third course.—We might deliver Kandahar to Abdul Rahman, but its people and its interests are separate and distinct from those of North-Eastern Afghanistan. Kandahar has constantly tried to be independent of the domination of Kabul and has only been retained by superior force.

There would certainly be a struggle for its possession, which might probably end in unseating our recently elected Ameer, and entailing an additional disgrace to those which our retreating policy would inflict on us.

According to the best authorities our first announcement of our intention to retire was received by the inhabitants of the town with great regret.

Whatever assurances may be given of immunity for those who have been friendly to us, or have assisted us, it is certain that they will never be ultimately fulfilled by Afghans.

We may try and justify our abandonment of our obligations to those who have befriended us, by declaring our belief in their future good treatment, but we shall do so in the face of our fullest experience to the contrary.

Fourth course.—For the security of British India and the welfare of the district of Kandahar, the permanent annexation to India of the fortress and its surrounding territory appears to me to be the best course we could adopt.

The extent of territory to be so annexed must depend on considerations of military and political expediency, and can be referred for the opinions of the experienced officers who know thoroughly the country and the race affinities of its populations.

It is urged against the retention of Kandahar that it will require a large force for its defence and the maintenance of its communications, and that the expense will bear heavily on the resources of India.

The expense of repeated expeditions, with their contingencies of transport, which will be the certain consequences of our retreating within our old frontier, will undoubtedly be as heavy without the compensation of the revenue of the annexed province and the profits of extended commerce.

The question of expense is an Imperial one. Let us consider what England would lose with the loss of her power and influence in India.

The whole of her mercantile affairs connected with the trade of the East hang on our possession of India. There is hardly a mercantile house in Great Britain that is not deeply interested in commerce with India. Hardly a family that has not a vital interest through some of its members in the security of our Indian possessions.

Certainly, at least half the expense of the occupation of Kandahar should fall upon England.

If the Russians in Central Asia are a reality, if they have possessed themselves of Bokhara, Samarcand, and Tashkent, if they are about to occupy Merv, of which they make no secret, if they have an easy road to Herat, which is a fact well known, and a fortress there before them in a fertile country, held by a people without unity and without leaders,—who that regards the course of Russian progress can doubt that, if we are timid, apathetic, or consenting, a few years will see them in possession of a fortress which, in their hands, will be rendered impregnable, and will command the road to India with a facility for aggression which may be measured by Ayub Khan's rapid march to Kandahar?

It is difficult to believe that any one can be really blind to the danger to India which a little extension of the alliance which actually existed between the Russians and the Ameer Shere Ali would have matured.

The difficulties of the march of an army through a rugged and mountainous or desert country are relied on by some people as a protection; they may afford protection against sudden predatory invasion, though India has too often succumbed to such visitations, but to those who know what skill and science can do to remove difficulties, when there is a base to work from, and when there are men, means, and time, backed by a steady will and unflinching purpose, the protection of a difficult country vanishes.

For more than 800 years the Afghans have looked on Hindustan as a fair ground for conquest and plunder. Whenever they were at all powerful, even within the time of the British possession of India, they were always contemplating an invasion of Hindustan, and the recovery of the dominion which they once held, of which the decline of the Mogul dynasty, and the warlike prowess of the Mahrattas and Sikhs, gradually dispossessed them.

No sooner had the Ameer Shere Ali become strong, through our assistance, than, on his failing to obtain the concession of all his demands, he at once closed with Russia, and proclaimed to his people the prospect of a religious war against us.

Let the tone of his later communications with us, his great military preparations at Kabul, his alliance with Russia when war between that country and England was so imminent that Russia was moving a force to be ready to co-operate with Afghan allies,—let his public and honourable reception of a Russian ambassador, combined with his public and insulting rejection of Sir N. Chamberlain's mission,—speak for the necessity of our proceeding against him as an act of self-defence.

To those who know the whole of the circumstances that occurred before, and have been discovered since, our capture of Kabul, it seems impossible that any one approaching the subject in a fair and unbiassed spirit, free from party and political feeling, could deny that our war with Afghanistan was an act of self-defence.

It is true that we at first announced that we made war on the Ameer and not on the Afghan people. We had driven away Shere Ali, and were leaving the country peaceably under the Treaty of Gundamuk, when the treacherous massacre of our Embassy and the defence of that act by the mass of the Afghan people placed the war on a new footing and gave us the right of conquest to dispose of Kandahar in satisfaction for the injury done to us.

After our proclamation of the permanent annexation of Koorum, our declaration to the Khyber chiefs that they should never again fall under the dominion of Kabul, and our establishment of Kandahar as a separate State, the abandonment of Kandahar or the retreat from the frontier of the Treaty of Gundamuk will be misunderstood and attributed in the East to the prowess of the Afghans.

The misfortunes of the first Kabul war have made a greater impression than the subsequent victories of the British commanders. Even the English press, in times of anxiety, refer more to the destruction of Elphinstone's force than to the victims of Pollock, Nott, and Sale. If we now retire, the memory of the defeat of Burrows will outlive the splendid victory of Roberts and his army. One of the difficulties arrayed against remaining in Afghanistan is the alleged dislike of the Native army to serve in that country, and the consequent difficulties of recruiting. The same comparatively liberal payment that has filled the colonies of Great Britain and France with coolies, and has provided bodies of Sikh police for Shanghai and Singapore will fill a Kandahar *corps d'armée*. Let the soldiers be sufficiently paid for the hardships and dangers of exile in Afghanistan and there will be no difficulty in filling the ranks.

If the Kandahar corps is composed of troops of Southern India, who have not had war training for a long time, half the force should consist of Europeans, until the Native regiments have become familiar with the Afghan style of warfare, and as able to beat them as they were on former occasions.

If the annexation of Kandahar is determined on, it should be carried out as an Imperial measure in the most complete manner; nothing should be left to chance.

The most important points are the selection of proved officers for the military command and for the political administration. The best science and skill should be devoted to fortifying the positions taken up.

The city must be made secure against attack, otherwise it will never have confidence or rise to the prosperity which it should attain. The citadel for the command of the city and the security of our magazines should be made as perfect as possible, and the force for their occupation should be separate from the field force, which should be ever ready to move at the shortest notice.

The line of communication should be secured by proper forts, amply provisioned at all times.

The railway should be advanced to Kandahar as rapidly as possible; if properly protected, in a new line of country, where negligences are sure to be punished, it will do more to promote the peace and prosperity of the country than any other measure, provided that the military occupation of the country be efficiently carried out. The completion of the railway will allow of the reserve of the British force being placed wherever it will be most healthy and easily fed, but it must ever be remembered that Kandahar will be a frontier post, which must be maintained in sufficient strength.

The government of the country should be adapted to the spirit and habits of the people, and should be conducted as much as possible by the employment of native Afghans, who will soon identify themselves with the Government, if it is made to their interest to do so.

The cumbrous regulations of India, with their indispensable tribe of foreign agents, should be excluded.

If the annexation is carried out on wise and liberal principles, the district of Kandahar will become prosperous and valuable. The inherent vitality of the trade between India and Central Asia has enabled it to struggle on in spite of the perils and exactions to which it has been subject. A safe road to Kandahar will give it a clear start, and instead of purchasing Russian articles at Peshawur, we shall deliver British manufactures to Central Asia.

(Signed) NAPIER OF MAGDALA.

Gibraltar, 12th October 1880.

No. 16.

MEMORANDUM ON THE RETENTION OF KANDAHAR.

Bearing in mind the tenure upon which we hold possession of India, I would for military reasons deplore our permanent retention of Kandahar. Many of those who now urge us to keep possession of that place know little of the difficulties we had to face in 1857. Having served through the Indian Mutiny, I remember them well, and looking back at them now, it is difficult to understand how others who had the same experience can wish to add to the responsibilities which then nearly crushed us. What should we have done in 1857, 1858, and 1859 if we had had a garrison at Kandahar? So hard were we then pressed that even a clear-headed governor like the late Lord Lawrence was only prevented from falling back behind the Indus by the persuasion of his military advisers. To occupy a point so far removed beyond our frontier would be a serious financial burden even in times of profound peace, and in time of any great trial its possession would indeed be a white elephant, capable of ruining our Indian Empire by the cost which the necessity of supporting it would entail upon us. In my humble opinion, the question of the retention of Kandahar is not a military one, for I can see no possible strategical advantage in its present occupation. Its retention will certainly cripple our military resources, and it would seriously hamper our strategical operations in the event of any great internal disturbance in India. My opinions on this point are somewhat influenced by the conviction that if we determine to keep a garrison at Kandahar the annexation of the surrounding district, and of the country between it and our frontier would sooner or later be forced upon us, and I feel that any such extension would be an increasing source of weakness to us.

Our recent operations in Afghanistan have taught us the true value of the Afghan military power. We can now afford to smile at the superstitious horror with which we have hitherto contemplated all idea of military operations in that country, a horror which has come down to us from the disasters of 1840. We have now learnt to appreciate the Afghan troops at their proper value, and to realise the fact that any well appointed column of our troops, if ably commanded, can march from one end of the land to the other. The English people have begun to see that our military disasters in 1840, as indeed all the disasters that have ever befallen us, are the result of the incompetence of the commanders employed. There is no Afghan army that could prevent an English division from marching from Quetta to Kandahar whenever it might become advisable to do so. If, therefore, we can at all times occupy Kandahar when we wish, why go there until the necessity for doing so has arisen?

The previous occupation of that place would do little to facilitate our march there with the large force we should be obliged to send through the Bolan in the event of difficulties with Russia, whilst it would, I conceive, have the effect of embittering Afghan sentiment against us, and by doing so would increase our difficulties when the time does come for us to measure swords with our great northern rival in those regions.

According to my reading of the military problem involved in this question, we secure no military advantage by the retention of Kandahar, whilst we incur considerable military risks by remaining there.

The objections to its retention on financial grounds are so evident that I shall not attempt to dwell upon them.

Whenever the Russians march upon Herat we must certainly occupy Kandahar, unless we intend to give up India or to allow it to be taken from us, but the longer we can postpone that occupation the better we shall be able to incur the vast expenditure it will necessarily entail upon us. As we can always get there with the greatest ease, I would deprecate in the strongest terms our going there until the necessity for doing so actually arises, and I am therefore of opinion that the sooner the troops now there can be withdrawn from it with safety and honour the better it will be for the true interests of our Indian Empire.

G. J. WOLSELEY,
Lieutenant-General.

November 20, 1880.

No. 17.

(No. 13 of 1881.)

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's
Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Fort William, January 26, 1881.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of a Minute by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India, dated 25th November 1880, on the subject of the retention of Kandahar.

We have, &c.

(Signed)

RIPON.

F. P. HAINES.

W. STOKES.

A. R. THOMPSON.

JAMES GIBBS.

D. M. STEWART.

E. BARING.

Enclosure in No. 16.

MINUTE by His Excellency the COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF IN INDIA on the Retention of
Kandahar, dated Umbala, 25th November 1880.

1. The retention of Kandahar is in my opinion necessary on political, military, and commercial grounds.

2. If we retire from it we shall indeed have lost all hold whatever of Afghanistan, and forfeited every shadow of influence over that country which our victories have conferred upon us. We have one after another abandoned every point which had been advanced as a reason for going to war with Afghanistan. The first and perhaps the most important of these was the right to send a British Envoy to Kabul, and to maintain him there with a small escort. Our Envoy went, and he, together with his escort, was massacred a year ago.

3. We have now evacuated Kabul and the whole line of country back to Lundi Kotal, making way for a new Amir; but we explicitly avow a determination to maintain no British officer at his court, and only a native official when it may be quite convenient to the Amir to receive him. Even when that time may come, can we trust implicitly to the reports he may render? Are our previous experiences of native agents at Kabul satisfactory? I imagine not entirely so.

4. This want of supervision leaves the Amir free to exercise such Russian sympathies as he may retain, or failing these leaves him exposed to all the well known wiles and activity of Russian intrigue and diplomacy. Of all this we shall know nothing, or at all events no more than the Amir may choose to let us know.

5. In our early discussions regarding the evacuation of Kabul, it was always assumed that the retention of Kandahar would enable us better to dispense with the services of a British Envoy at Kabul; and up to the time when the withdrawal from Kabul was agreed to, there was no such dissent from this proposition as in any way alarmed me as to the future of Kandahar; but the moment the withdrawal from Kabul became an accomplished fact, there arose a tendency to isolate the Kandahar question, and to declare that the one did not in any way depend upon the other.

6. Our late colleague Sir Edwin Johnson explicitly avowed on all occasions that such assent as he gave to the policy of withdrawal was based on the condition of retaining Kandahar.

7. I have throughout viewed with regret the abandonment of our position at Kabul, and have merely accepted circumstances as day by day we, by our own acts, made the place untenable, by the reduction of our stores, of our ammunition, and lastly, by our arrangements with Abdul Rahman.

8. But when the inevitable came, there still remained to us Kandahar as something of a make-weight against the abandonment of Kabul and the loss of our political influence over Kunar and the Momunds. It was and is an assertion of our might, a manifestation of our power and determination to retain a strong influence over the destinies of Afghanistan and over its foreign policy.

9. In the course of the discussion on the draft Despatch to the Secretary of State, regarding the abandonment of the Khyber and Kuram lines, I first became alarmed for the fate of Kandahar; for the putting aside of all mention of it as bearing on these matters seemed to indicate that these measures were in the minds of many but a prelude to the abandonment of Kandahar. I trust that in this I may be mistaken, and that my honourable colleagues may be found willing to admit the vast importance of this possession, not only to India but to the British nation. I am bound to say that his Excellency the Viceroy has always declared that he held himself free from any sort of compromise regarding Kandahar, when he advocated the policy we have pursued regarding the Kuram and Khyber lines.

10. Whether the holding of Kandahar will enable us to tap Kabul more effectually for political information, than can be done from Peshawur, may be open to doubt; but I think that by good political arrangements it may be made to serve this purpose. At Kandahar we must be brought into contact with members of the ruling family and Sirdars of influence, who would be ready to assist us in this for a consideration. At Peshawur we meet the mercantile rather than the governing classes.

11. I think it will be found that Kandahar has ever been a province which has been easily governed and administered, furnishing revenue for imperial purposes at Kabul and Herat, over and above the expenditure necessary for its own purposes. If this has been the case under Afghan rule, how much more may it be expected to prove so under our more enlightened sway.

12. Our occupation of Kandahar must be of a much more costly kind than that which was necessary under the Amirs, and the revenue which probably does not exceed 23 lakhs of rupees at present, would fall far short of our expenditure; but I have no doubt that under the influence of our rule trade would so increase, and agriculture so prosper, as to largely augment the public revenue under both these heads.

13. The garrison we are bound to maintain at Kandahar must for some years be out of all proportion to the revenue, but this garrison will supply us with all the force which may be necessary for the collection of that revenue. I have reason to believe that there is no part of Asia which can be so easily and so cheaply governed as the province of Kandahar.

14. The existing system of government is purely patriarchal; the area of land under cultivation in every village is perfectly defined and the Government dues perfectly well known. The police, revenue, and judicial work is done by the village maliks, elders, and kazis; no complicated and expensive system of administration is at all necessary. All that is required is a strong, personal, central government, ready to enforce its decrees and to punish offenders with a strong hand. The stronger this class of government may be, and the more the strength of the individual selected to administer it may be known and acknowledged, the better the Afghan will understand and the better he will like it. There are two things for which the country is not fit—first, our regulations, secondly, legislation. Hold it free from these for the next 20 years, and the material prosperity of the country will advance, and its population become as noted for obedience under our rule as that of the Punjab. All the elements of prosperity are to be found in the Kandahar districts, and with a strong, just system of government, such as that we are bound to introduce, and with a cheap fiscal system, such as that we find ready to our hand, there is no reason why (apart from political vicissitudes and external influences,) the country should not eventually pay for the maintenance of the force necessary for its retention.

15. Kandahar is for every purpose a strategic position of first-class importance. The movements of Sir Donald Stewart and of Sir Frederick Roberts to and from Kabul via Ghazni, show how easily the route can be traversed, and how completely Ghazni and Kabul are commanded from it. But whilst we recognise this, we must also admit that these movements prove that Kandahar itself is liable to sudden attack from Kabul, and that the temporary success of Sirdar Muhammad Ayub Khan's recent expedition proves it to be easily assailable from Herat.

16. I cannot pretend to believe that the ruler of Kabul, be he who he may, even our own nominee, will calmly and for ever accept the partition of the country which involves the alienation of Kandahar from Kabul. There are many circumstances which might induce Abdul Rahman to seek to disturb this settlement of affairs. Russia intervening, the price she would be prepared to pay Abdul Rahman for his active support and assistance would be the restoration of Kandahar. Kandahar will always be the objective of the Sher Ali faction under Ayub Khan, or whoever may hold

supreme power in Herat. Complications under these heads are bound to arise, and all those who advocate the retention of Kandahar, as I do, must acknowledge and be prepared to face them. This is the richest province of Afghanistan. It is therefore an object well worthy of a struggle to possess on the part of the rulers of Kabul and Herat; but it being necessary for us in a political and in a military sense, its comparative wealth may well be acknowledged as an additional reason for our retention of it. We are therefore bound to hold Kandahar in strength, not merely to garrison it, as was the case up to a very recent period. I have already submitted a proposal* for the force I consider absolutely necessary to this end; and in addition to the troops a large depôt should be formed there, well supplied with stores and all sorts of munitions of war, calculated for the supply of a considerably larger force than that now allotted to it; for it is impossible not to foresee the probability of a concentration of troops on this spot, either for aggressive or for defensive purposes. We should so fortify, and so supply Kandahar as to make it a strong place d'armes, affording us a base for possible offensive movements against Herat, or a certain barrier against any power that can assail us from Central Asia.

17. The value of Kandahar cannot be fully understood until we come to consider the significance of its possession by us, in connexion with the advance of Russia in Central Asia. Kandahar is an important strategic point on the line by which alone a serious attack on India can be delivered by Russia. It is the only line by which an organised Russian army could reach Kabul. It is also the direct route to India. The true base for this movement is the Caucasus and the Caspian. This is clearly indicated by the movements now taking place along the slopes of the Kopet Dagh towards Merv or Herat, as the case may be. I suppose no one will for one moment believe that the ostensible object of Skobelev's expedition, viz., the punishment of the Akhal Tekes, is the true one; the true intent of this expedition is scarcely veiled, and this is the securing of a base from which to attack India. Merv has some significance in this sense, but it is secondary to Herat; and I have no doubt that Herat is the real object of the expedition. Askabat is often mentioned in Russian papers as a place of great significance, notably in some which came before the Government of India in 1876. It was then named as a point to be reached by one of their expeditions, partly military, partly scientific. At this point it would be easy to change the direction of an army from Merv to Herat. The distance of Askabat from Herat is much the same as from Herat to Kandahar. The importance of this point on the Russian line of advance can hardly be overrated. In the face of General Skobelev's movements along the skirt of the Kopet Dagh, it is incumbent on us to retain Kandahar. This indeed appears to me to be an obligatory point, so long as Russia shows the slightest indication of advancing eastward from the Caspian. The object of this expedition, organized in great force, with great care, entrusted to a specially able commander, and supported by the construction of telegraphs and railroads, is not an aimless one. We may rest assured that Merv and Herat are the only points worthy of the attention of Russia on that line. Askabat leads either to the one or the other with equal facility. As to her asseverations regarding these districts, we have a clear measure of the value to be attached to them, by contrasting with her words, her acts in the matter of Khiva.

18. It maybe worthy of note that Russia is now far stronger in the Turkoman provinces than she was in 1878, when she was able to threaten the line of the Oxus by the assembly of three separate columns, the main and central one at Djam, the left on the Alai towards Kashmir, and the right column on Charjui, a valuable support to a movement on Merv or Herat from the Caspian. If, as we are informed, Russia stands relieved of her difficulty with China, she will be able to divert to the Oxus much of the extra strength gathered for the purpose of dealing with that country, in the province of Ili and on the Amur. Russia is pressing forward the construction of a railway which undoubtedly will become the Caspian-Askabat-Herat line, whilst we hesitate about the continuance of the Sukkur-Sibi and Kandahar line.

19. I believe that fertile as many of the valleys of the Kandahar province are, cultivation is capable of great extension. It is a wool producing country, abounding in fruit and grain of all sorts. The vine flourishes, so does the mulberry; it might become a great silk-producing country likewise.

20. Let us not be frightened into the abandonment of Kandahar or induced to occupy it weakly on account of the difficulties of supply which have momentarily beset us. I can easily imagine this being made a handle of to bring about either end. This is not the normal state of things, but one that has been brought about by purely adventitious circumstances. There have been two seasons of drought, and consequently of short produce; but short produce for these two years could not have affected the question so

* See papers appended.

seriously, had not Ayub's advent brought with it a host to eat up supplies, and at the same time so disturbed the tribes in the rear as to have rendered the movement of supplies from the base extremely difficult. This was aggravated by the arrival of Sir F. Roberts' army with its attendant followers and transport animals, all causing an immense consumption of grain and forage. The resources of the country are abundantly sufficient, under normal circumstances, for the supply of any force we may desire to maintain, or which we may have occasion to send there hereafter. I believe that the productive powers of the soil of the district of Kandahar have been greatly undervalued by many who have had personal opportunities of seeing the land. It is not every observer who observes correctly, but it is a fact that whilst some will say that the limit of productive cultivation has been reached, and that all else is barren, there are those who declare that there are large tracts of country possessing a rich brown loam soil, an eighth of which is habitually cultivated, one fourth being brought under cultivation in favourable years, but the whole of which is cultivable being well within reach of irrigation from the Argandab. Even the hills, which from a distance appear to be so rocky, are declared to have a fair proportion of this rich brown loam distributed over them. We know how fertile the orchards in the immediate neighbourhood of the villages are, and how valuable are their products. Why should we imagine that this fruitfulness is confined to these very limited spaces? Before we give up Kandahar on account of its limited production of supplies, let us have the country agriculturally examined by some expert in soils, one who knows how to recognise the indications of fertility as yet latent and undeveloped.

21. In connexion with this question of supply, the resources on the line of communication should be considered. With reference to Pishin, where I propose to station the first reserve for Kandahar, Sir Robert Sandeman writes:—

“Now it is undoubtedly true, that owing to the extraordinary drought of the last two years, grass in large quantities could not be obtained from local sources, but it is equally true that the armies under Generals Stewart, Biddulph, and Phayre were at first entirely supplied with forage obtained in Pishin and Quetta. Few people can be aware of the very heavy demands for food supplies for man and beast this country has had to meet since the outbreak of the Afghan war, and it was not until we had explored the Lora, Kowas, Arambi, and other valleys that we properly appreciated the fertility of Pishin. To the traveller marching through the Bolan Pass, and along the direct caravan route to Gulistan, the country may appear barren and unproductive; but had your correspondent travelled off from Gulistan towards the Lora River, he would have found the intermediate plain green with cultivation, and that the wheat crops in Pishin contrasted favourably with those growing in the most favoured parts of India.”

He goes on to speak of the broad and fertile plains of Sibi and Kuch Gundawa, as being rapidly brought under cultivation under the influence of our protecting power; and of the Marri hills as a great grazing country, whence a considerable cattle trade with Sind and the Punjab has already been developed. This does not look as if we should be precluded from keeping troops in Pishin on account of its barrenness, or being obliged thereby either to increase the whole force in Kandahar itself, or to draw the support back upon Sind. Indeed, were it otherwise, I do not see how the advocates of the Kojuck Amram, as the line of frontier for the future, could in any way justify their scheme, for the country they propose to occupy could not support the troops necessary to that object.

22. I have no trade statistics which would enable me to put forward an estimate of the value of the trade which now passes between India and Kandahar; but the wool produced in Zamindawar and between the Helmand and Herat, is well known in the wool marts of England under the name of “Kandahari.” This is a trade capable of vast extension, for hitherto it has been carried on in the face of every conceivable difficulty, the outcome of an unsettled and extortionate Government, of tribal exactions and most defective transport. We may imagine how trade would improve under a settled Government firmly established at Kandahar, and a railway connecting that place with Karachi, and the Indian railway system. Then as regards British exports, Manchester goods could be delivered at Kandahar at the rate at which similar goods are now laid down at Lahore. By this route, too, a valuable outlet for Indian teas could be established. This, I take it, means the absolute control of the trade with northern and eastern Persia, and of that with Central Asia. Commercially, Kandahar, the natural emporium of this trade, appears to be necessary to us.

23. Kandahar like India itself is ours by right of conquest. It matters little to us whether the inhabitants desire our presence or not. If it is desirable that we should keep it from a political, a military, and a commercial point of view, there in the interests of the nation we are bound to remain. We cannot recede without our motives being

misunderstood ; not only in Kandahar and in Afghanistan generally would this be the case, but in India itself. No Asiatics can be conciliated by concessions, for these are looked upon as signs of weakness, whether it be weakness of will or of military power. Putting aside, therefore, all pretence of acting for the benefit of the people or for the aggrandisement of any native potentate, I would frankly annex the province of Kandahar, and that promptly, as a matter vitally affecting our own interests. The province, I contemplate, would embrace Kelat-i-Ghilzai, the line of the Helmand, and back to Shorawak and Pishin ; Zamindawar and Bukwa, up to the Kashrud, being declared independent of Herat and kept strongly under our influence.

(Signed) F. P. HAINES.

PAPERS referring to the Proposal mentioned in paragraph 16 of the foregoing Minute, being Extract from the Proceedings of the Government of India in the Military Department, October 20, 1880.

Afghanistan.

MEMORANDUM from Captain T. DEANE, Officiating Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, No. 8,611-K., dated 7th October 1880, Kabul—Special.

Forwards, for information, a copy of the following letter addressed by Colonel Allen Johnson, Secretary to the Government of India, to the Quartermaster-General in India, No. 8,610-K., dated 7th instant :—

“ I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your Letter No. 7,839,* dated the 20th September 1880, submitting, for the consideration of the Government of India, certain proposals for the garrison to be retained at Kandahar and along the lines of communications.

“ 2. These proposals involve the retention at Kandahar of a large proportion of European infantry, and will permit of a force consisting of a cavalry brigade and two infantry brigades, with a full proportion of artillery, taking the field, leaving at the same time a strong garrison at Kandahar.

“ 3. It is proposed also that a brigade of Bengal troops should be kept in reserve in Pishin for a forward movement, should such be necessary, or for operations in the vicinity of the railway line.

“ 4. The lines of communication to be held as they were previous to the withdrawal of the troops.

“ 5. The tabular statement forwarded with your letter under reply shows the force his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief recommends should remain at Kandahar, and the troops which are to return.

“ 6. It is observed that his Excellency strongly recommends that a British cavalry regiment should form portion of the Kandahar force ; that the 15th Hussars should return at once for embarkation for England, the 13th Hussars being sent up to relieve the 9th Lancers, and the 10th Hussars being railed from Mian Mir to Lucknow after the Durbar camp is broken up.

“ 7. In your letter marginally quoted (replied to by Military Department, No. 8,548-K. of the 4th October 1880), his Excellency modifies the arrangements recommended, to the extent of the Bengal cavalry regiment and the Bengal infantry regiments, which were recently sent up, being sent on to Kandahar to relieve a similar number of Bombay regiments, the reserve brigade by this change being composed of Bombay troops.

“ 8. In reply, I am to state for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that the Government of India having duly considered the Commander-in-Chief's proposals, consider that although the force proposed for Southern Afghanistan is a very large one, and contains an unusual proportion of British to Native troops, in deference to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief's strongly expressed opinion that the force named is absolutely necessary for the safe occupation of Southern Afghanistan, the Governor-General in Council sanctions the whole of the proposals in the correspondence referred to.

“ 9. I am, however, to express the hope of the Governor-General in Council, that as the tribes settle down along the lines of communication, and as the railway line is opened out, Sir Frederick Haines will find it possible to reduce the very large force at Kandahar, as well as that in support in Pishin.”

* This letter is not on record in the India Office.

GARRISON at KANDAHAR and on LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS.

Posts.	British Cavalry.	British Infantry.	Horse Artillery.	Field Artillery.	Mountain.		Garrison.	Sappers.	Native Cavalry.	Native Infantry.	
					Europeans.	Natives.					
Kandahar Garrison - -	1	4	1	2	1	—	1	1	2 regts. 1 troop	6 regts. 2 cos.	
On communication Mundi Hissar	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Total - -	1	4	1	2	1	—	1	1	2 regts.	6 regts.	
On communications :											
Abdul Rahman - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1 troop	2 cos.	
Melkarez - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	"	"	
Dubrai - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	"	"	
Gatai - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	"	"	
Total - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2 sq.	1 regt.	
Chaman - -	—	—	—	—	—	$\frac{1}{3}$	—	—	1 troop	4 cos.	Hd.-qrs.
South Kojak Post - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	det.	2 cos.	
Killa Abdoola - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1 troop	"	
Total - -	—	—	—	—	—	$\frac{1}{3}$	—	—	1 sq.	1 regt.	
Kushdil-Khan-ka-killa - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1 sq.	2 cos.	
Gulistan Karez - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1 troop	1 coy.	
Segi - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	det. 12	$\frac{1}{3}$ "	
Dina Karez - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	"	"	
Meturzai - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	"	"	
Kassim Killa - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	"	
Gurkai - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	$\frac{2}{3}$ "	
Kuch - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	$\frac{1}{2}$ troop	3 cos.	Hd.-qrs.
Total - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3 $\frac{1}{2}$ troops	1 regt.	
North Chappar - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	—	2 cos.	
Dargi - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	"	
Shor - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	det. 12	
Sharigh - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1 troop	2 cos.	Hd.-qrs.
Nassak - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	det. 16	det. 12	
Harnai - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	$\frac{1}{2}$ troop	2 cos.	
Total - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	1 $\frac{1}{2}$ troop	1 regt.	
Thal - -	—	—	—	—	—	$\frac{1}{3}$	—	—	$\frac{1}{2}$ regt.	5 cos.	Hd.-qrs.
Kuriak - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	det.	"	
Sinnerai - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	"	2 "	
Spin Kuch - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	"	"	
Spin Tangi - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1 coy.	
Total - -	—	—	—	—	—	$\frac{1}{3}$	—	—	$\frac{1}{2}$ regt.	1 regt.	
Sangan - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	$\frac{1}{2}$ troop	2 cos.	
Dullojal - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	"	"	
Zindigi-ab - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1 coy.	
Kuchali - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	"	
Gunda - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	$\frac{2}{3}$ coy.	
Khelati Killa - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	"	
Thuli - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1 troop	1 coy.	
Nari mouth - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	det.	$\frac{1}{3}$ "	
Sibi - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	4 troops	3 cos.	
Total - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1 regt.	1 regt.	
Quetta and Bolan - -	—	—	—	—	—	$\frac{1}{3}$	1	—	2 sq.	2 regts.	
GRAND TOTAL - -	1	4	1	2	1	1	2	4	6 regts.	14 regts.	

Garrison at Kandahar on Lines of Communications—*continued.*

Posts.	British Cavalry.	British Infantry.	Horse Artillery.	Field Artillery.	Mountain.		Garrison.	Sappers.	Native Cavalry.	Native Infantry.	
					Europeans.	Natives.					
Brought forward - -	1	4	1	2	1	1	2	4	6	14	
Moveable column, Pishin (Bengal Native Troops) - -	—	1	—	1	1	—	—	—	1	2	
Total required - -	1	5	1	3	2	1	2	4	7	16	
Kabul-Kandahar Force - -	1	3	—	—	2	1	—	—	3	9	
Bombay troops (including 1st Madras Cavalry) - -	—	5	2	4	1	1 $\frac{1}{3}$	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	4	6	16	
Bengal troops sent up - -	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	3	
Total - -	2	9	2	4	3	2 $\frac{1}{3}$	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	4	11	28	
Deduct required - -	1	5	1	3	2	1	2	4	7	16	
Troops to return - -	1	4	1	1	1	1 $\frac{1}{3}$	1*	—	4	12	

NOTE.—Troops to return :—

15th Hussars - -	England.	15th Native Infantry.	9th Lancers on relief by 13th Hussars.
66th Foot - -	England.	23rd Pioneers.	8th Bengal Cavalry on relief by 7th Bengal Cavalry.
2-60th Rifles - -	England.	24th Native Infantry.	
72nd Highlanders -	Lucknow.	25th Native Infantry.	
92nd Highlanders -	England.	2nd Goorkhas.	
E-B Royal Horse Artillery - -	Bombay Presidency.	4th Goorkhas.	
C-2nd Royal Artillery	Bombay Presidency.	5th Goorkhas.	
11-9th Royal Artillery	Jutogh.	2nd Sikhs.	
*5-11th Royal Artillery	Mhow.	3rd Sikhs.	
($\frac{1}{2}$ 15-9th to move up) to	Quetta.	17th Native Infantry.	
3rd Bengal Cavalry.		2 Bombay regiments.	
3rd Punjab Cavalry.		3rd Hyderabad Cavalry.	
		Central India Horse.	

RESOLUTION.—To be communicated to the departments concerned.

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For Her Majesty's Stationery Office.

FURTHER PAPERS

RELATING TO THE

OCCUPATION OF KANDAHAR.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.



L O N D O N :

PRINTED BY GEORGE EDWARD EYRE AND WILLIAM SPOTTISWOODE,
PRINTERS TO THE QUEEN'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY.
FOR HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE.

1881.

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No. 1.

(No. 49.)

TO HIS EXCELLENCY THE MOST HONOURABLE THE GOVERNOR GENERAL OF
INDIA IN COUNCIL.

India Office, London,
3rd December 1880.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Para. 1. In my secret Despatch, No. 23 of the 21st May, relative to affairs in Afghanistan, I divided the questions then requiring decision into three categories. I expressed, in the first place, the strong desire of Her Majesty's Government for the withdrawal of the British forces from Northern Afghanistan, subject only to such delay as might be necessary to avoid serious risk to the health of the troops on their march through the passes, and as might enable an attempt to be made to reconstitute the Government of Kabul under a Native ruler. I then stated that Her Majesty's Government viewed with dislike the occupation of Kandahar, in support of a Native ruler placed there for the purpose of securing the disintegration of Afghanistan; but that they admitted the possible necessity of adhering to this arrangement in consequence of pledges which had been given to the Wali Shere Ali Khan. Lastly, I intimated the desire of Her Majesty's Government that your Excellency in Council should consider the question of the retention of the positions acquired under the Treaty of Gundamak, mainly from the military point of view, leaving it open to you to recommend their retention should they be thought valuable, but also free to relinquish them if that course should appear desirable, without any reference to the consideration that their abandonment would be a departure from the policy of the Treaty of Gundamak.

2. The intentions of Her Majesty's Government in regard to the first point have been completely and satisfactorily accomplished. I have expressed in separate despatches their approval of the measures taken for the withdrawal of the army from Kabul, of the recognition of Abdul Rahman Khan as Amir of Kabul, and of the language which has been held to him on the subject of his future relations to the British Government and to foreign powers.

3. In my Despatch, No. 45, dated the 11th November, I have stated fully the policy of Her Majesty's Government in regard to Kandahar. While leaving to the Government of India discretion as to the time and manner of withdrawing from that province, and as to the arrangements for its future administration preliminary to withdrawal, Her Majesty's Government hope that it may be found unnecessary to prolong the occupation of it by British forces beyond the winter.

4. As to the retention of those positions beyond the old frontier which were acquired under the Treaty of Gundamak, your Excellency in Council has decided, with the full approval of Her Majesty's Government, on the withdrawal of British troops from the Khyber Pass and the Kurram Valley. But no official information of the views of the Government of India as to Pishin and Sibi has yet been received, and, until the question of the retention of Kandahar had been determined, a full expression of those views could scarcely be expected. As, however, further delay in the consideration of this subject may be inconvenient, especially in reference to the question of further expenditure on the extension or completion of the railway, I think it desirable to furnish you with some indication of the opinions of Her Majesty's Government on the subject.

5. All the arguments for and against the retention of Kandahar seem to apply with somewhat less force to the occupation of Pishin. It does not appear that such a measure would give the Indian Government commanding influence in Afghanistan, or a strategic position of importance in view of a possible invasion by some formidable power, or that it would result in the development of a great and civilizing trade—advantages which some anticipate would accrue from the annexation or occupation of Kandahar. On the other hand, its retention, even as an assigned district as provided by the Treaty of Gundamak, would be a virtual annexation of territory. Its possession would keep the Government of India involved in the complications of Afghan politics, and be a constant temptation and pretext for interference in the domestic affairs of Afghanistan, though

the inducement and the necessity might be somewhat less than it would be if Kandahar were annexed to the Indian empire.

6. To hold Pishin would require a force which, though not so strong as that which would be requisite at Kandahar, would still be considerable; and the consequence would be a prolongation of the military and financial difficulties which are inseparable from the employment of British and Native troops beyond the frontier. From the information at present in the hands of Her Majesty's Government, it appears that the district of Pishin is less productive than had been supposed, and that the climate is unhealthy. If this be so, there would be much difficulty in supplying a force of the strength necessary to secure the objects of occupation, while the strain upon the efficiency of the army would be constant.

7. On the whole, Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that the case is not one in which a compromise between two conflicting lines of policy is desirable or possible. Her Majesty's Government have deliberately adopted the view that the true defence of India consists, not in the acquisition of strategic positions at a greater or less distance from the frontier, nor in a competition with any other Power for influence in Central Asia, but in the good government of India, the development of her resources, and the perfecting of the military organisation and efficiency of her army. It is desirable that this should be known and understood, and Her Majesty's Government deprecate in the strongest manner the continuance of any part of an alternative policy which is not distinctly justified on its own merits, or of which the only recommendation consists in its forming a part of a larger scheme, the more essential points in which have been rejected by Her Majesty's present advisers.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HARTINGTON.

No. 2.

No. 21 of 1881.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, HER MAJESTY'S
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA.

Fort William,

MY LORD MARQUIS,

February 2, 1881.

WE have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your Lordship's despatches, dated 11th November* and 3rd December† 1880, respectively relating to affairs in Afghanistan.

2. The former despatch contains an exposition of the considerations which should guide the Government of India in the policy to be adopted in Southern and Western Afghanistan, and communicates the wishes and instructions of Her Majesty's Government regarding the military positions now occupied by British troops beyond the Afghan frontier. It is noticed with regret that the immediate withdrawal of our forces from Kandahar has not hitherto been found possible; and Her Majesty's Government desire that we should keep steadily in view the paramount importance of effecting such withdrawal on the earliest suitable occasion. They recognize, moreover, the desirability of assisting, if this be found possible within a limited time, the establishment of some settled Government at Kandahar. In the despatch of December 3rd, your Lordship recapitulates briefly the instructions already issued upon the questions requiring decision in connexion with our position in Afghanistan, particularly with regard to the withdrawal of British troops from Kandahar. Her Majesty's Government, while leaving to the Government of India discretion as to the time and manner of withdrawal, and as to the arrangements for the future administration of the province, express their hope that it may be unnecessary to prolong the occupation of Kandahar beyond the winter. This despatch conveys to us further a very distinct and direct intimation of your Lordship's opinion that the retention of Pishin would be contrary to the policy deliberately adopted by Her Majesty's Government.

3. Upon a full consideration of these instructions we have decided that, since the importance of withdrawing from Kandahar on the earliest suitable occasion is paramount, the movement of our forces must necessarily be so timed as to enable the greater part of them to reach stations in India before the extreme heats set in. Our choice of time

is thus very closely limited; and this limitation must inevitably affect and govern the conditions of any plans we may be able to entertain for the future administration of Kandahar after our forces shall have left it. With regard to this latter question we have already reported to your Lordship the preliminary steps that have been taken for communicating with the Amir Abdul Rahman, and we propose to address your Lordship again on this subject in a separate letter. In the meantime we have the honour to report that preliminary instructions for the withdrawal of our troops from South Afghanistan have been sent to the military authorities, with the request that proposals for carrying out the necessary operations may be submitted without delay.

4. The concluding paragraph of your Lordship's despatch of December 3rd intimates clearly that Her Majesty's Government have decided to withdraw altogether from Pishin. In respect, however, to the time and manner of relinquishing that district, we desire to state our views clearly to your Lordship.

5. It is to be recollected that the Pishin district has already been for two years under the political authority of British officers, who have collected the revenue, established a police, and availed themselves in various ways of the resources of the country, and the good-will and services of the principal residents. Since the beginning of 1879 our dealings with the settled population of the Pishin valley have been upon the understanding that the territory had been assigned for an indefinite period to the British Government. Our position, military as well as political, in Pishin, differs from that which we hold in and around Kandahar sufficiently to require that the measures for withdrawing from the Pishin district should be separately considered and carried out. In Kandahar, and beyond the Kojuk range generally, our endeavours to arrange for some government which may assume authority after our military occupation shall have terminated, are necessarily limited by and subordinated to the military and political exigencies inseparable from the primary condition of early evacuation. In Pishin these exigencies are by no means so imperative; while on the other hand, we have incurred liabilities toward the population of this particular district. If any period of confusion intervenes before a regular government establishes itself at Kandahar, the knowledge that Pishin has been left unprotected and masterless, and that as soon as our retiring troops have crossed the valley there is nothing more to fear from the British garrison at Quetta, may very possibly invite plundering incursions from various quarters.

6. In this situation and prospect of affairs, we are of opinion that the instructions of Her Majesty's Government may be interpreted as leaving to the Government of India considerable discretion in arranging the time and manner of the final relinquishment of Pishin. We propose to instruct our political officers that the assignment will be given up, that this must be frankly explained to the people, and that all their arrangements must be determined toward that end; but that the dissolution of our connexion with the district should be managed, as a political measure, with circumspection and with regard to the future interests of the classes concerned. We do not anticipate that this policy will entail upon us any material degree of additional expenditure, or risk of complications with Afghanistan. It may be necessary to maintain, for some short period after the evacuation of Kandahar shall have terminated, a detachment at some place in Pishin, within support from Quetta, for the assertion of so much political authority as may be required for gradually completing our arrangements. But the former Afghan governors did not keep regular military stations in the valley, so that there will be no need or pretext for the Afghans attempting immediately to place garrisons there; nor is it likely that any ruler in South Afghanistan, whatever might be his attitude towards us, will commit the imprudence of crossing the Kojuk range to interfere with our provisional dispositions for the peace of this outlying district, so long as the object and intentions of the British Government are clearly explained and understood.

7. The Minutes which are being recorded on the subject-matter of this despatch by some of our honourable colleagues, will be forwarded by a subsequent mail.

We have, &c.

(Signed)

RIPON.

F. P. HAINES.

W. STOKES.

A. R. THOMPSON.

JAMES GIBBS.

D. M. STEWART.

E. BARING.

No. 3.

No. 40 of 1881.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA,
FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary
of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Fort William, the 28th February 1881.

IN continuation of our Despatch,* dated the 21st February 1881, we have the
honour to forward the remaining Minutes† of our honour-
able colleagues.

* No. 35.

† By Mr. Rivers Thompson, C.S.I.

By Major E. Baring, C.S.I.

We have, &c.
(Signed) RIPON.
" F. P. HAINES.
" W. STOKES.
" RIVERS THOMPSON.
" JAMES GIBBS.
" D. M. STEWART.
" E. BARING.

Enclosure 1 in No. 3.

MINUTE by the HON. RIVERS THOMPSON, C.S.I.

HER Majesty's Government, acting on their own responsibility, and "influenced mainly by considerations of a broad political character," have ordered the withdrawal of the British forces from Kandahar on the earliest suitable occasion. In the despatch which contains these orders, it is indicated, as the wish of Her Majesty's Government, that if it be found possible within a limited time to establish some settled form of government in the place, it should be our endeavour to secure it; but whatever settlement may be arrived at, we are to make it clearly understood that the future ruler of the country will be left entirely to his own resources, and that it is not our intention to interfere in the affairs of Afghanistan in a manner which would involve the employment of British troops beyond our frontier. These orders apply not only to Kandahar, but extend under very distinct and definite terms to the final relinquishment of Pishin, "the retention of which would be contrary to the policy deliberately adopted." Briefly it may be said that a united Afghanistan under a ruler friendly to ourselves is the object which Her Majesty's Government wish to secure—an object which, thus broadly stated, every one probably in England or India would desire to promote—though from the precipitate action which Her Majesty's Government have taken in the matter, and the peremptory manner in which, without waiting for the advice of those responsible for the government of India, this decision has been promulgated, there is too great reason to fear results of a very different character.

It has been affirmed that there can be no compromise between the two lines of action which contemplate, on the one side, the complete abandonment of Kandahar with our return to our original borders; and on the other, the annexation of Kandahar to British territory. The instructions of Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India definitely and irrevocably adopt the first of these alternatives; and though in words Her Majesty's Government leave with confidence to His Excellency the Viceroy in Council the responsibility of fixing the date of the recall of our troops from Kandahar, the very plain and strong terms in which the orders are conveyed, and the evident desire that no time should be lost in giving effect to this intention, scarcely leave to the Government of India the smallest discretion in the matter. The problem is easy enough if we accept the responsibility of quitting Kandahar on a fixed date, regardless of its fate and of the consequences to the people, many of whom were our faithful adherents during the late

war; but the problem is a very difficult one, if we are to attempt to reconcile the urgent orders for an early evacuation with any endeavour to see the establishment of some form of government upon our withdrawal. I deprecate therefore the peremptory character of the despatch which forces our action in a matter which necessarily demanded very delicate handling; and I regret the premature publicity which, by exciting the ambition of every aspirant to the vacancy will, upon our unconditional retreat, inevitably lead to civil war and confusion in every part of the country which we surrender.

As an argument for our withdrawal from Kandahar has been based upon our previous policy in connection with that place, I would revert briefly to the circumstances under which the administration of Kandahar was intended to be vested in Sher Ali Khan, with the open support of British troops. It is well known that this arrangement formed no part of our plans when the first campaign was concluded and the Treaty of Gandamak was made. Indeed, with the return of Yakub Khan to Kabul, and the appointment of a British Resident at that capital, the maintenance of any control or supervision in the direction of Kandahar was as unnecessary as it would have been impolitic. It was unnecessary because seven-eighths of the population in Kandahar being Durani, the rooted dislike of Kabul domination was in itself a safeguard against formidable intrigues in opposition to ourselves in Kandahar: and the acquiescence of the Kandaharis in our temporary occupation, with the commercial prosperity which our occupation had brought, had shown to us the strong improbability of any active hostility against us in that quarter. It is obvious, however, that when upon the events which followed the massacre of September 1878, Yakub Khan abdicated, and Abdul Rahman succeeded to the vacant throne at Kabul, without obligations of any kind of allegiance towards us, we had to look elsewhere for those material guarantees for peace and order which, from our past experiences of Afghan misconduct, were essential to our own security in India. The arrangement adopted in these circumstances was that of a native administration for the separated province of Kandahar under our own direct supervision. It was a system of administration which had been under long discussion by Lord Lytton's Government, and was accepted, I believe, very much in the desire to avoid the necessity of annexation, while obtaining for ourselves as complete a security as possible against foreign intervention in Afghan politics. On this understanding we recognized and admitted Abdul Rahman to the throne of Kabul: and on this understanding we abandoned the right to maintain at Kabul a European Residency. It may be allowed that the failure of the Wali's administration at Kandahar was conspicuous even before the military disaster of Maiwand; but it became obvious to most people who gave a thought to the subject that if, or when, the arrangement of a nominal native ruler at Kandahar under the protection of British bayonets broke down, it must lead either to the annexation of the Kandahar territory by the Government of India, or to its restoration under a consolidated rule to the Amir at Kabul. I always entertained the opinion that the latter might have been quite a possible alternative; and that time, if it had been allowed to us, might have worked out this solution. Evidently, however, two conditions were essential to its accomplishment: first, that Abdul Rahman should succeed in establishing himself in Kabul, and should prove himself a reasonable and friendly neighbour to the British Government; and, secondly, that Russia should show by her acts and not by her words merely, a permanent and honourable adherence to her voluntary promises to abstain from all interference with Afghanistan. On these terms we might have seen our way some day to an eventual cession of Kandahar to Abdul Rahman or to his successor. But it is not unreasonable to assert that such a hope is against all the facts of the position as they now appear. Abdul Rahman is in no sense master of the situation in his new kingdom; and we are yet in uncertainty as to whether even the offer of Kandahar is one which he is prepared to accept without such extensive guarantees from us as would be gravely embarrassing; while the condition, as it applies to the acts and intentions and promises of Russia, seems, in the face of recent events, putting aside the whole history of her relations with Central Asia, to be absolutely illusory. I regret, therefore, the precipitancy of Her Majesty's Government, because even if our negotiations with Abdul Rahman succeed, they expose us, in the attitude of Russia and with Abdul Rahman's undisguised leanings towards that power, to a very perilous future; and if, as is almost certain, Abdul Rahman after accepting Kandahar from us is unable to hold it, the whole of Afghanistan will become the scene of prolonged hostilities, with the result (very discreditable to ourselves) of Ayub Khan's acquisition not only of Kandahar but of Kabul. On either alternative I venture to say the interference of the British power would be imperative in its own interests, and we should have

to regain, at the sacrifice of another costly war, all those advantages of our present position which we are now proposing unconditionally to relinquish.

If I speak of British interests in India and the security of its north-west frontier against foreign aggression, I shall be understood as meaning that the importance attaching to these objects is the measure of our belief in the good faith of Russia. I share the opinion of most of those who consider the question from an Indian standpoint, that the dangers and risks which menace us from the progress of this power eastwards are real and positive dangers, which cannot be set aside by mere calculations of still long intervening distances. Even if all the past could be ignored of the steady advance of Russia to the banks of the Oxus, where its power is paramount at this day, and if we could remain satisfied in the security of a barrier such as the range of the Hindu Kush affords—delusive and dangerous as such a confidence would manifestly be—there are many other circumstances, which our recent operations in Afghanistan have clearly brought out, which justify us in taking precautions in our own behalf. Look at the origin of this last war. Whatever may have been the cause which induced Sher Ali to seek a Russian alliance in preference to our own (I attribute it myself entirely to the so-called policy of “masterly inactivity,” which alienated Sher Ali by its persistent disregard of reasonable claims and reasonable fears), I venture to repeat what I have before asserted, that no Government, whether in England or India, could have hesitated for a moment to repel the action which the Amir of Afghanistan adopted in September 1878, when, against warning, expostulations, and earnest endeavours on our part to maintain peace and amity, he wilfully chose to cast in his lot with a power which we are obliged to recognize as a rival quite as much as a neighbour. The policy of Russia in Central Asia, and especially as it approaches Afghanistan, must always be an object of the keenest anxiety to any one responsible for the safety and good government of India; and when we found that Sher Ali had been led on by intrigues and promises to reject our advances with ill-disguised hostility, at the very time that an embassy from Russia was welcomed, “*not only without hindrance but with much ceremony,” and with open demonstrations of salutes and illuminations at Kabul, we had no option but to resent by force the open attempt of Russia to establish her influence in Afghanistan. The fact that this mission started from Tashkend at the end of May 1878, that it took nearly four months in its deliberate progress without the slightest intimation to the Government of India, shows not only the secrecy with which the whole business was organized, but the facility with which such operations could be repeated. There can be no shadow of doubt that, if we had not interfered actively, the permanent establishment of that influence would have been attained; and if we might entertain the hope that the lessons of the war which followed will not be soon forgotten in Afghanistan, we can scarcely expect that the success of her schemes, in embroiling us in the Afghan difficulties of the last two years, will prevent Russia, whenever the occasion suits her, from renewing her intrigues with a power which, as far as we are concerned, we propose now to leave in a position of complete isolation. The contention that the results of our recent military operations in Afghanistan, involving the loss to Sher Ali of his kingdom, the exclusion of his son and heir from the throne, and the sufferings of the people from the war, will operate to diminish the chances of any Afghan prince ever again entertaining insidious proposals from Russia, seems to me opposed to all our past experience of the Afghan people. The miseries of the war will soon be forgotten. Indeed, if reliance can be placed upon statements often made to our officers during the war, the flood of money poured into the country during our military occupation of Kabul was held by many to be more than a compensation for the troubles which the war brought upon them. And as for the rest, while we know now better than we ever did before that Afghanistan as a State can never stand by itself, but must lean upon some external support; if it is not to India she can look, she will as certainly as before turn her looks to Russia. The probabilities of such a dependence will be assuredly confirmed if Abdul Rahman is, in the eventualities of the future, to emerge with our aid as the ruler of a united Afghanistan. Already we are not without indications of the kind of pressure he is intending to put upon us in his need of support of men and material; and further he has never disguised from us, even from the earliest days of his negotiations, the debt he owes to Russian hospitality during his exile of twelve years, and the obligation by which he is bound to recognise those services.

There is another consideration which seems to me to deserve prominent attention in connection with the proposal for an immediate withdrawal from Kandahar. It is one to

* The quotation is from a Russian official despatch.

which I have little excuse for referring, because, as a strictly military question, it has already been the subject of discussion by the highest military authorities, many of whom could bring to bear upon it a practical knowledge of the place, the people, and the surrounding country. If we may not rely upon the now well known opinion of Lord Napier of Magdala regarding the necessity of holding Kandahar, "because he is an officer who during recent years has had no connection with the political or military affairs of India," we may at least have the advantage of the professional opinion of nearly all the military advisers of the Government of India, as pronouncing warmly in favor of Kandahar as a strategic position of great importance; and not only so, but we also have the fact that everyone whose opinion has been taken only consented to the abandonment of the Khyber and Kuram routes on the express understanding that Kandahar was to be retained. This discovery of the importance of Kandahar is one which comes upon us in India with something like a surprise; for hitherto, not without reason, from the activity manifested by Russia on the line of the Oxus, the thoughts of our statesmen and military experts have been directed mainly to the progress of Russia beyond the Hindu Kush with Kabul as its objective. Our recent experiences in Southern Afghanistan as to the advantages of Kandahar as a military position, its capability of easy communication with our base at Kurrachee, its accessibility from Herat, always contested and denied till Ayub Khan's march and defeat of our troops at Maiwand showed the futility of the objections—and more than all the advance of Russia from the Caspian eastwards and her latest achievements, in the cause of civilization and commerce, against the Turkomans—must indicate to all unprejudiced minds the certainty that it is by this direct route from Herat to India that Russia aims in the conflict with us, which she at least knows to be inevitable. We have heard of them within the last few days at Geok Tepe, at Askabat, on the Tajend—places which a glance at even the largest maps will show to mean the practical occupation of all that part of the country of which Merv is the centre. No one, I suppose, will contest the fact that Merv is now as much at the mercy of Russia as any other Central Asia, dependency which she dominates, or that the seizure by her of Herat is a question only of time and convenience. Now, on our part, it may be allowed that we have been effusive in our indignation, as far as words are concerned, at the open violation of Russia's promises on the subject, and have very precisely intimated to Amirs of Kabul on more than one occasion that Russia's interference with Afghan affairs will not be tolerated; but our action when the emergency has arisen has always belied our language, and we remain idle spectators of the determined extension which Russia is, step by step, making of her dominion towards Herat. I discredit altogether, because it has failed us in the past, the assurance which is given to us on such occasions that when the real crisis comes England will deal with Russia in the matter as a European question. As we too well know to our cost from the past, it will be just as simple and easy for England to acquiesce a few years hence in the occupation of Herat as it is for England now to accept the practical occupation by Russia of the Merv territory. Then, as now, Indian opinion will be subordinated to party politics at home. Then, as now, the excuses in favour of Russian ambition will be equally ready and be equally deserving of respectful consideration. India, as before, will be left to indifference, amid the wrangles of political parties, as to the side which was the first to give cause of offence to Russia; and this is the more to be dreaded because we know as a fact that the movements of Russia are not regulated by promises, but by the exigencies of her policy; and that that policy is dictated more by the irresponsible ambition of Central Asian officers than by the authority which makes the vows and protestations at St. Petersburg.

The only argument which for a moment seems to me tenable, to justify the precipitate orders which Her Majesty's Government have issued, is that which is based on the expenditure involved in the retention of Kandahar. It is estimated to amount to 2,000,000*l.* annually, and though the details of the estimate are not before us, we have reason to suppose that the large expenditure thus indicated is calculated on the exaggerated alarms of the few partizans in favour of our retirement. Assuming, as we may rightly do, that India will have to bear an increased expenditure (whatever it may be) for the security of our frontiers and the safety of our Indian Empire, the question is simply whether it is worth our while to spend this money as an insurance against risks of very serious magnitude. I concur with the many who think that the outlay is necessary in our interests, because the withdrawal from an advantageous position which our arms have gained, and which as a military position we can easily fortify, will inevitably involve

complications and difficulties which the retention of Kandahar would avert; and because any retreat now to our original limits, with the policy which it proclaims of absolute non-interference, will in the end entail a much heavier expenditure than the measures advocated in the cause primarily of our self-preservation. Besides we have often before, with every addition of territory that has been forced upon us in India, heard these financial forebodings of failure; though fortunately they have never been realised. I think it will be found, looking back to the acquisition of Sind and of the Punjab after the wars on the Sutlej, that similar alarms of its uselessness and costliness found public expression; and when Lord Dalhousie annexed Lower Burmah in 1850, there were not wanting signs of disapproval that we were adding to the burdens and risks of our empire by extending it beyond the proper limits of British India. In the first case there were the stock arguments which now prevail of sterile sands and barren deserts, of a fierce people with strong warlike instincts with whom no truce could ever be made. And we find it after 30 years the most peaceful and loyal of our Indian provinces, supplying the best material for our military services, and with a revenue which compensates for all the risks incurred. While in Burmah, the most prosperous and promising of our Indian dependencies, the solution of the problem has been all the more remarkable from the fact of the more rapid development of successful administration. It would be foolish to ignore, from a financial point of view, the difficulties which an extension of territory beyond the Indus may involve; but that neither the financial nor the administrative difficulties are insurmountable has in a manner been proved already by the success achieved in a part of this very country in the assigned districts of Sibi, and by the prospects held out up to this time of the profitable occupation of Pishin. If any doubts are entertained upon this

' Not yet
received.

point I would refer to recent memoranda* upon the subject by Sir R. Sandeman, the Agent to the Governor-General in Biluchistan, which show conclusively the fatuity of proposals which, in violation of the obligations which we have publicly and officially assumed, would abandon to anarchy and confusion the peace and prosperity now established throughout the whole tract of country under our control.

But perhaps the most grievous and humiliating part of the orders in this connection is that which affects not only the stoppage of the railway works now under construction by the Nari Gorge, but the dismantling of the rails and the destruction of the earthworks already completed to a considerable distance towards Quetta. We certainly are not acting here exactly without precedent, for we can all remember the case in which the Chinese Government recently having got possession of a railway proceeded at once to demolish it and to break up its rolling stock. There is, however, this difference between the two cases, and it scarcely tells in our favour. The Chinese Government had never seen a railway before, and may have had just that kind of excuse for its folly which ignorance and superstition would excite. We on our side cannot plead such excuses, and least of all in places where we come in contact with barbarism. This wilful and deliberate surrender of advantages, gained after a vast expenditure of time and thought and money, and which would subserve peaceful administration much more than they would supply the military requirements of our position at Quetta, may be intelligible, by a stretch of imagination, to some people who fancy that there is a high moral motive concealed in our proceedings; but, as far as they affect India, they are absolutely beyond the comprehension of any native in the country.

In conclusion, I wish to say that I believe it to be an entire misconception to suppose that a large majority in either Kandahar or Pishin would not now accept the continuance of the British occupation of those provinces. I am certain at least that a few months of native government, be it under Abdul Rahman, Ayub Khan, or any other chief, would vastly increase the number "of the already powerful party who prefer British rule to any other." I am supported in this opinion by a very remarkable paper* by Colonel St. John upon the subject; and admittedly there is no one who can speak with the authority and personal experience with which he can speak upon the position of affairs at Kandahar.

Not yet
received.

* No 71, dated 5th February 1881.

The 24th February 1881.

(Signed) RIVERS THOMPSON.

Enclosure 2. in No. 3.

MINUTE by the Hon. E. BARING.

1. After the very full discussions which have taken place during the last two or three years, it is unnecessary that I should give my reasons for considering that the determination of Her Majesty's Government to evacuate the whole of Afghanistan is eminently wise and statesmanlike. I will only say that, ever since I have given any attention to Indian affairs, I have been an advocate of the frontier policy adopted by Lord Canning, Lord Lawrence, Lord Mayo, and Lord Northbrook,* that I consider a political error of the first magnitude was made in departing from that policy, and that I welcome a return to it. I should have been content to add nothing to what has been already stated by others of far greater ability and authority than myself,† had it not been that, as the Member of the Governor General's Council primarily responsible for the conduct of the finances of India, I am desirous that the very important financial aspects of this question should receive due consideration.

2. I am of opinion that, in addition to the general political reasons which may be given in favour of evacuating Afghanistan, it may be shown that it would be highly inadvisable to subject the finances of India to the strain which would be involved upon them by continued occupation.

3. It is, I believe, held by competent military authority that it would require about 6,000 British and 15,000 native troops to garrison Kandahar and to maintain the line of communications. The extra cost consequent on the service of these troops out of India is estimated at 1,000,000%. [100 lakhs of rupees] a year. This estimate, however, makes no allowance for the expenditure on barracks, fortified posts, &c., which would necessarily be very high. It is based, moreover, on the assumption that the troops would belong to the ordinary establishments of India, and includes only extra charges beyond those which would be incurred were the troops serving in India. If, as is more than probable, the force in India had to be increased, the ordinary pay, rations, and other charges of as many corps and batteries as were added, would of course form part of the extra cost consequent on occupation. I cannot doubt that the cost of occupying Kandahar would eventually prove to be considerably in excess of 1,000,000%. a year.

4. The cost of occupying Pishin would no doubt be less, but I cannot help thinking that it would still be very heavy. I observe that my honourable colleague, Sir Donald Stewart, who speaks on this subject with the weight of unquestionable authority, says that—

“The retention of our authority over Pishin does not necessarily involve the grave disadvantages and heavy charges contemplated in the Secretary of State's Despatch of the 3rd of December last, No. 49. Those who know the district best believe that it could be held at very insignificant cost by a detachment from the Quetta garrison.”

Sir R. Sandeman says that “it could be ordinarily held by less than a single regiment.” On the other hand, the Indian Army Commission (Report, p. 26), proceeding on the

* That policy was well stated by Lord Lawrence in a Despatch, dated January 4th, 1869, in the following terms:—“We foresee no limits to the expenditure which such a move (*i.e.*, a permanent advance of the frontier) might require, and we protest against the necessity of having to impose additional taxation on the people of India, who are unwilling, as it is, to bear such pressure for measures which they can both understand and appreciate. And we think that the objects which we have at heart, in common with all interested in India, may be attained by an attitude of readiness and firmness on our frontier, and by giving all our care and expending all our resources for the attainment of practical and sound ends over which we can exercise an effective and immediate control.

“Should a foreign power, such as Russia, ever seriously think of invading India from without, or, what is more probable, of stirring up the elements of disaffection or anarchy within it, our true policy, our strongest security, would then, we conceive, be found to lie in previous abstinence from entanglements at either Kabul, Kandahar, or any similar outpost, in full reliance on a compact, highly equipped, and disciplined army stationed within our own territories or on our own border, in the contentment, if not in the attachment, of the masses, in the sense of security of title and possession with which our whole policy is gradually imbuing the minds of the principal chiefs and the native aristocracy, in the construction of material works within British India, which enhance the comfort of the people, while they add to our political and military strength, in husbanding our finances, and consolidating and multiplying our resources, in quiet preparation for all contingencies, which no Indian statesman should disregard, and in a trust in the rectitude and honesty of our intentions, coupled with the avoidance of all sources of complaint which either invite foreign aggression or stir up restless spirits to domestic revolt.”

† Notably by the Duke of Argyll in *The Eastern Question*, vol. II., pages 215 to 455. So far as I am aware, no adequate attempt has as yet been made to answer the arguments contained in this volume.

assumption that Kandahar would be given up, allotted a very considerable force* to Pishin and the posts between it and Dadur, and it is within my personal knowledge that Sir Henry Norman, who also speaks with high authority on this subject, considered that the force proposed by the Commission erred on the side of inadequacy. After the experience we have gained in Afghan affairs, I think it not unreasonable to incline to the pessimist, rather than to the optimist, view of possible expenditure.

5. I will endeavour to state very briefly my reasons for thinking that the finances of India are not in a sufficiently prosperous condition to justify the Government in imposing upon them the additional charges to which I have alluded above.

6. The first essential condition of sound finance exists in India. The revenue exceeds the ordinary expenditure. In the year 1879-80, for which the accounts are now complete, there was a deficit of only 1,183,000*l.* after

	£	£
EXPENDITURE—		
Ordinary -	63,543,000	
War -	6,125,000	
		69,668,000
REVENUE -	-	68,485,000
DEFICIT -	-	1,183,000

treating as ordinary expenditure a sum of 6,125,000*l.* on account of the war. The expenditure on productive public works is now limited to 2½ millions a year. Although I would very gladly see private enterprise substituted for State agency in the construction of many of those works, I am amongst those who consider that the capital outlay by Government

on works which are strictly productive may properly be excluded from the account of ordinary expenditure.

7. The actual financial condition of India is therefore prosperous. I am glad of an opportunity of expressing this opinion, because the recent failure in the war estimates has naturally tended to induce a belief that the present financial condition of India affords ground for serious alarm. This is not the case. We need be under no serious anxiety in respect to our current finances. The difficulties with which we have to deal, considerable though they be, are different from those which obtained at the time when Mr. Wilson came to India in 1860. India is not in a state of chronic deficit. She can not only pay her way, but provide a large surplus of receipts over expenditure. More than this, the different branches of revenue show a fair degree of elasticity. Thus, if we compare the net receipts of 1869-70 with those of 1879-80, we find that the land revenue has increased from 20,812,000*l.* to 22,199,000*l.* Excise has increased from 1,991,000*l.* to 2,697,000*l.* Customs, which in 1869-70 yielded 2,168,000*l.* yielded in 1879-80, in spite of considerable reductions of duty in the interim, a sum of 2,022,000*l.* The salt revenue has risen from 5,462,000*l.* to 6,867,000*l.* Stamps and registration have increased from 2,281,000*l.* to 3,149,000*l.*

On July 1st, 1880, a return was presented to Parliament showing the net charge on the revenues of India for interest on debt, interest, and other charges for guaranteed companies, and working expenses and maintenance of State railways and irrigation works, classed as Productive Public Works from 1868-1869 to 1880-81 (Budget Estimate). This return shows a reduction in 12 years of 3,558,000*l.* in the net charge on the revenues of India, which is accounted for by an improvement in the net result of the guaranteed and State railways and other productive works of 4,041,000*l.* (including 703,000*l.* from land revenue due to irrigation works), while the net charge for interest on debt has increased by 483,000*l.*

8. Are we therefore justified in saying that the condition of Indian finance is thoroughly prosperous? I think not. However encouraging may be the aspect of the present, the possibilities of the future are at all events sufficiently grave to render severe thrift and economy a paramount necessity.

9. I cannot think that the financial condition of that country is free from anxiety whose main source of revenue is derived from payments in silver, either fixed in perpetuity or only capable of increase at long intervals, whilst at the same time it owes a large sum annually in gold. The home charges have of late years been gradually increasing. In 1881-82 they will amount to no less than 18 millions sterling. This charge is abnormally high, and moreover includes many remittances which are merely in the nature of banking transactions; but when all reasonable deductions have been made,

* 1 Field Battery, Royal Artillery.
2½ Mountain Batteries, Royal Artillery.
1 Garrison Battery, Royal Artillery.
1½ Regiments Native Cavalry.
2 Companies Sappers and Miners.
1 Regiment British Infantry.
4 Regiments Native Infantry.